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Abstract 
 
 
 
Irregular, clandestine or so-called “illegal” migration by land and sea is rarely 
out of the political and media agenda in Europe despite its statistically limited 
significance. Taking this mismatch as its starting point, this thesis explores the 
industry that has emerged around clandestine migration in recent years – the 
transnational policing networks, aid organisations and media outlets that all make 
the “illegal immigrant” their target, beneficiary and source. It focuses on the 
migration circuit between West Africa and Spain, where a joint European 
response to irregular flows was first tried and tested under the umbrella of the 
border agency Frontex. It is also here that success in “fighting illegal migration” 
has been most readily announced following the brief, spectacular migration 
“crises” in Spain’s North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 and in 
the Canary Islands in 2006.  
 The thesis explores ethnographically how clandestine migration has been 
constituted as a field of intervention and knowledge-gathering since this time. In 
this field, it is argued, the roles of policing, caring for and informing on migrants 
intermingle while producing shared models, materialities and classifications that 
impinge upon the travellers labelled “illegal”. Drawing on the dynamic 
nominalism of Ian Hacking, the actor-network theory of Bruno Latour and a 
growing body of critical migration and border studies, the thesis explores the 
interfaces where specific modalities of migrant illegality are produced. The 
exploration of these interfaces – in deportation, surveillance, patrolling, rescues, 
reception and activism – relies on an extended field site, with research carried 
out in Senegal, Mali, Morocco, southern Spain and European policing 
headquarters. Throughout, the thesis highlights not just the workings of the 
migration industry but this industry’s excesses and absurdities, which make the 
business of bordering Europe a fraught and contradictory enterprise.  
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Introduction 
 
The illegality industry at Europe’s African frontier 
 
 
MELILLA, NORTH AFRICA. 6 OCTOBER 2005. It was after darkness had fallen that the 
migrants came running towards the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Hundreds of 
road-weary Africans descended from their Moroccan forest encampments, threw 
makeshift ladders onto the border fences circling the territories and scrambled to climb 
across. Silhouetted figures crowded in between the tall fences, cameras capturing their 
blurry movements between reams of barbed wire. Spanish border guards and soldiers 
rushed to the scene. Journalists called it el asalto masivo, the massive assault: newscasts 
and front pages showed the black migrants, many “violent” and “desperate”, advancing 
swiftly and silently. Then Moroccan or Spanish security forces – it was never clear who 
was responsible – fired into the crowds. At least 14 people died.1 The ramshackle migrant 
encampments outside the enclaves were razed and burned by Moroccan soldiers; their 
inhabitants were rounded up, detained and put on buses bound for the faraway Sahara. 
Many were never heard from again. Then controls tightened, the border was cleaned up, 
the media moved on. But soon a new front would open up in Europe’s “fight” against 
clandestine migration: the sea route to the distant, improbable destination of the Spanish 
Canary Islands. 
 
LOS CRISTIANOS, TENERIFE, SPAIN. 13 SEPTEMBER 2009. The holiday high season 
draws to a close on the southernmost fringes of Europe. At the sun-drenched seaside 
promenade, next to the pizza parlours and tax-free shops, beckons a vast, blue Atlantic: 
European Union flags and rent-a-parasols flutter in the breeze. A Fred Olsen shuttle 
ferry rests at the shore in between trips to other resorts in the Canary Islands 
archipelago. But wait – another boat, a wretched little fishing boat, is wedging its way 
into the port. The holidaying Britons, Germans and Swedes stop in their tracks. For the 
vessel, hand-painted and wooden, comes escorted by patrol boats and groans under the 
weight of almost 80 people: all dishevelled, all poor, all black. The unseaworthy rafts 
with their unlikely human cargo, beamed across the world’s media, had since the summer 
                                                 
1
 This officially acknowledged death tally does not include those who later perished in the desert. 
An investigation into the deaths has repeatedly been called for without luck (Migreurop 2006) 
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of 2006 suddenly and spectacularly connected an insular tourist paradise with West 
Africa, more than 1,000 km away across the rough Atlantic.
2
  
 
This thesis is about the tragic spectacle of clandestine migration into Europe and, 
in particular, about the “fight” against it on the Spanish front since the debacles at 
the fences in 2005 and in the Canaries the following year. These are but two 
events in a growing tally of tragedies at the gates to the West. Gruesome tales 
abound of migrant deaths at the southern frontiers of Europe, at the US-Mexico 
border and along Australia’s Pacific shores. The scenes of this story are familiar: 
“illegal immigrants” crammed into unseaworthy boats, squeezed into rusty trucks 
trundling across the Sahara, walking through the distant deserts of Arizona or 
clinging onto Mexican cargo trains. Thousands have perished on these gruelling 
treks, but the misery does not end there. The media, populist politicians and 
zealous bureaucrats have seized upon the “illegal immigrant” as a bogeyman, a 
perennial outsider who in waves and floods invades western countries. In their 
accounts, an abject global figure is emerging: alternately an object of deep 
fascination and utter indifference, of horror and pity, he stalks the borders of the 
rich world, sowing panic, wrecking election campaigns and generating headlines 
as he goes.     
Much has been written about this “threat” lurking at Europe’s borders: 
news reports, documentaries, policy papers, academic tracts and funding reports 
in which the clandestine migrant is followed, scrutinised, probed. This thesis takes 
a different approach. It casts an eye on the observers and investigates the 
workings of what I will call the “illegality industry” in the emerging Euro-African 
borderlands. It moves across the value chain in the production of migrant 
illegality – that is, to the domains were such migrants are conjured, observed, 
represented, controlled and ultimately rendered profitable: from the control rooms 
of Europe’s new border regime to the shelters where humanitarians care for 
migrants under the watchful eye of the state and the patrols scouring African 
terrains for a sighting of their elusive prey. 
This cannot be done, however, without taking into consideration this 
industry’s “products” – the clandestine migrants themselves, who increasingly 
                                                 
2
 This vignette is loosely based on news reports of a 2009 boat arrival. See 
http://tinyurl.com/nutzsv and http://tinyurl.com/kqpmyy  
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find themselves marooned in the no-man’s-lands emerging between Europe and 
Africa. Running the gauntlet of border controls that now stretch across deserts and 
high seas, North African cities and dusty Sahelian dumps, these travellers are 
subject to what the director of a Spanish migrant reception centre called a 
Darwinian selection. It is a selection of the most brutal kind, in which shrivelled 
bodies disappear in Saharan dunes and bloated corpses float ashore at the Strait of 
Gibraltar. Thousands have died while attempting the crossing. Luckier travellers 
get stuck in newly cosmopolitan border towns and fringe neighbourhoods of 
Tangier and Oujda, Tripoli and Tamanrasset. Others get deported, time and again. 
Whether they succeed or fall short of their goals, these transnational travellers 
increasingly end up collaborating in their own making as “illegal immigrants” on 
the infernal production line of the illegality industry.
3
   
My thesis is an ethnography of this production line as it operates along the 
western edge of Europe’s external border: between West Africa, the Maghreb and 
Spain. In these emerging borderlands, the thesis will show, the production of 
migrant illegality is a highly conflictive and contested process. Each chapter 
explores an interface where the illegality industry rubs against its targets, 
highlighting the excesses, contradictions and absurdities that define Europe’s 
response to clandestine migration. We will meet a bereaved Senegalese mother 
with her lucrative anti-migration association (chapter one); a Spanish Comandante 
running a state-of-the-art border operation while fantasising about complete 
border surveillance (chapter two); the Senegalese subcontractors who reluctantly 
do Europe’s dirty borderwork in exchange for cash, junkets and gifts of night-
vision goggles (chapter three); the Spanish gatekeepers who drag migrants aboard 
their patrol boats in the full glare of the world’s media while ambivalently 
showing off the high-tech fences of Ceuta and Melilla (chapter four); “Mamá”, a 
reception camp worker caring for her captive “sons” (chapter five) who are treated 
as mere numbers by the police (chapter six); and activists descending on the Sahel 
for a show of solidarity with migrant victims and a fruitless search for Europe’s 
borders (chapter seven). Among these characters circulate shadowy presences – 
journalists and jailers, smugglers and spooks, defence industry contractors and 
                                                 
3
 One list of documented fatalities due to “Fortress Europe” counts 16,000 deaths between 1993 
and 2012: http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf  
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policymakers – as well as the anthropologist, himself part of the industry that has 
grown up around the “illegal immigrant”.  
 
 
 
Before proceeding, a brief note on terminology is in order. The term “illegal 
immigrant” (or “illegal migrant”, the latter used below when the traveller has not 
yet entered European space) takes quote marks in this introduction but not in the 
chapters, where it will be used as a folk category of social differentiation. I use it 
with some trepidation, however. The term is pejorative, stigmatising and even 
incorrect, implying as it does that such migrants are criminals while they have 
only committed an administrative infraction. Moreover, it masks the complexities 
of legal and documentary status pertaining to entry, residence and employment in 
which migrants are caught (Düvell 2008).
4
 Many of the travellers we will meet in 
the chapters exemplify this complexity – some have crossed fences and seas into 
Spain only to register with local authorities once inside the country, or have been 
rounded up in expulsion raids in Morocco despite carrying bona-fide asylum 
application documents.  
Aware of the ethical and analytical problems with the term “illegal 
migration”, analysts, activists and even media-savvy border guards instead talk of 
irregular, unauthorised or undocumented migration. However, as de Genova 
(2002) has pointed out, such terms suffer from a similar state-centrism. For our 
purposes, too, they lose the emic connotations and implications of “illegal 
migration”. Willen (2007a:11), among others, gives a robust defence of the 
ethnographic use of illegality because of “the cross-contextual applicability of the 
term, its substantial material consequences, and its impact on migrants’ own 
experiences of everyday life”. This is a line followed in my thesis. However, I 
will intersperse “illegal” with another key term in the French-speaking African 
environs of my project – “clandestine”. The French (im)migration clandestine or 
the noun clandestin carry the negative connotations of the English illegal 
(im)migration and illegal (im)migrants, and will be translated as such throughout 
my thesis. Meanwhile, the less negative burden of the English “clandestine 
                                                 
4
 Irregular migration has however recently been criminalised in Italy and the US state of Arizona 
as well as in North Africa, most notoriously in the Moroccan law 02/03 (compare chapter 3) 
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migration” (and its Spanish equivalent) makes the term analytically useful in, first, 
helping to distinguish migration via land and sea from visa overstays and other 
more common means of entering irregularity. Second, clandestinity, more clearly 
than irregularity or illegality, could be described as a mode of being-in-the-world 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002). It is, in other words, more than just a discursive and legal 
inscription defined through a state-imposed negation. The clandestine migrant 
hides from police, evades border checks and disguises his legal otherness through 
recourse to false documentation, ad hoc dress codes and furtive modes of 
behaviour (Coutin 2005). Since “clandestine migration” implies such an 
embodied perspective – in short, a positivity implicating not just the state but also 
the person being labelled – I will use this term when not quoting informants.5 
The use of “he” above is no coincidence, even as it points to a lacuna in 
my ethnographic data: the absence of female migrants, for which I have few 
excuses to offer other than their relatively small (albeit growing) presence on the 
clandestine circuit and the problem of access. By using “he”, however, I wish to 
highlight how the “illegal immigrant” is a profoundly gendered figure in the 
imaginaries of border guards, aid workers and journalists. Much like a mirror 
image of the feminised “refugee” delineated by Malkki (1995), the clandestine 
migrant is male, but he is a specific type of male invoking a peculiar constellation 
of attributes. He is anonymous and out of place, homeless and bereft of clear 
national belonging; he alternates between untrustworthiness and innocence, the 
roles of villain and victim; and he is increasingly racialised in Spain and beyond, 
feeding into revived fantasies of Africa as the West’s other, a hopeless continent 
beset by poverty and war, disease and disaster (Comaroff 2007). My thesis will 
focus on the emergence of these contradictory traits in the borderlands, inquiring 
into how the illegality industry reduces and flattens its “product” by funnelling a 
wide array of personal stories and cultures into the one generic mould of migrant 
illegality. 
This mould is itself a recent historical and political creation. The next 
section will give a brief overview of the continuities and ruptures between 
clandestine migration and larger mobility patterns in West Africa and Europe, as 
                                                 
5
 This analytical usage differs from e.g. Düvell (2008), as well as from the technical usage of the 
border agency Frontex 
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well as of the theoretical angles taken on such patterns by social scientists since 
colonial times. 
 
Illegality in context 
 
Myths abound in media-fuelled imaginings of clandestine migration, and the 
biggest of these is what de Haas (2007) calls a “myth of invasion” of desperate 
Africans massing at Europe’s southern borders. Amid the wild official estimates 
and the absence of firm statistics (Kraler and Reichel 2011), it has long been clear 
to migration scholars that clandestine movement towards Europe via land and sea 
is small relative to other means of irregular entry and residence. Spain’s latest 
census of immigrants, published in 2007, shows that less than one per cent of 
those entering Spain since 1990 have done so by means of irregular boat 
migration (Reher et al 2008:63). Instead the majority of Europe’s irregular 
migrants are visa overstayers – something even recognised by Frontex, the young 
EU border agency of which more will be said in subsequent chapters.
6
 In the West 
African case, moreover, regional mobility still predominates over intercontinental 
migration, with so-called “transit states” in North Africa increasingly constituting 
important destinations in their own right (de Haas 2007; van Moppes and Spaan 
2006). The political impact of the “boat people” approaching Europe’s southern 
borders, in short, greatly surpasses their actual numbers.  
Not only are the actual numbers minuscule. Look back only a few decades, 
and the “illegal immigrant” vanishes from view altogether. In West Africa, 
migrant illegality is but a recent phenomenon superimposed upon older and larger 
patterns – including circular migration within West Africa, ancient trade routes 
across the Sahara and transnational circuits borne of the colonial encounter. 
Illegality, however, threatens these older patterns. It twists aid priorities, inhibits 
licit movements and sours regional relations – all the while drawing upon colonial 
                                                 
6
 One Frontex (2011:32) report pointedly compares detected boat arrivals with the number of 
unauthorised overstayers of Swedish student visas, which at 12,000 in 2010 are “roughly 
comparable to the 14,258 detections of illegal sea border-crossing” in that year. The latter figure 
increased sharply to 71,171 in 2011 (Frontex 2012:14) but still remains small in comparison with 
overall immigration into EU states, which Eurostat puts at about three million a year (with third-
country residents making up just over half of this in 2009). See http://tinyurl.com/ccocwja  
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history and stirring memories from the darkest chapter in West Africa’s past, the 
slave trade ferreting human chattel across the Sahara and the Atlantic.  
 
West African mobility: from exode to ‘exodus’ 
 
The roots of migratory movements between West Africa and Europe can be traced 
back to the changes wrought by the colonial order. Britain and France, largely 
dividing the region between them, re-routed movements of people through head 
taxes, access to education and forced recruitment (Wallerstein 1965). As a result, 
willing and unwilling workers streamed into coastal cities and cash-crop regions. 
Along with the cocoa and coffee plantations of the Gold Coast and Côte d’Ivoire, 
Senegambia’s farms proved a magnet for migrant labour, and so-called navetanes 
were recruited from the inland Sahel in a seasonal pattern of exode that has 
continued to this day (Findley and Sow 1998). These changes reinforced an older 
pattern – West Africa as perhaps the most mobile part of the world’s most mobile 
continent (Bakewell and de Haas 2007). In this context, it makes more sense to 
speak of human mobility or simply “movement” rather than migration, which 
carries problematic “sedentarist” assumptions about permanent change of 
residence while privileging the crossing of administrative boundaries (van Dijk et 
al 2001).  
The freedom to move was never evenly distributed, however. The tension 
in European colonial projects between the differentiation and incorporation of the 
colonised Other, identified by Cooper (2005:4), was expressed in varying degrees 
of access to social and geographical mobility. Mobility had to be earned. While 
France needed educated local representatives and soldiers for its wars (the 
tiralleurs sénégalais), it also had to exclude, contain and corral its colonial 
subjects lest they seek material and political equality. In Senegal – the bridgehead 
for France’s colonial expansion and the country in which this thesis begins and 
ends – the differentiation between citizens and subjects, between western-
educated évolués and backward paysans, was particularly stark; it was also here 
that this French-imposed dichotomy was most strongly contested by workers in 
the immediate postwar period (ibid:208). These processes – the simultaneous 
differentiation and incorporation of colonised peoples, the hierarchised access to 
social and physical mobility, and the escalating claims of the colonised – have 
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clear echoes in the workings of the illegality industry fifty years after 
independence, as will be seen below.  
Regional migration triggered ambivalent reactions among European 
officials (Rain 1999). Movement into towns, plantations and mines unlocked 
prosperity for the colonisers, yet migrants were also potential troublemakers 
supposedly bent on escaping their “tribal cages” (Cooper 2002). While this 
colonial-era unease was picked up in the 1960s by western development agencies 
and independent West African states seeking to close their newly demarcated 
borders (Rain 1999), booming European economies urgently needed manpower. 
Migrants streamed into the old metropoles, among them large contingents of 
Senegalese heading for France. Here, in embryonic form, appeared the social 
forms straddling nation-states that in a later generation of scholarship came to be 
labelled “transnational” (Glick Schiller et al 1995). Such a “double engagement” 
(Grillo and Mazzucato 2008) with Africa and Europe was exemplified by the 
Soninké of the Senegal river valley, who maintained parallel ties with their 
villages and communal Paris foyers in identity-forging projects of international 
migration (Timera 1996).  
Then, with the 1970s oil crisis, Europe’s imports of labour migration came 
to a sudden, brutal end. Stringent entry requirements interrupted family and labour 
networks, leading to new strategies of mobility – and a first, tentative emergence 
of migrant illegality as a major theme in Europe as well as in North America.  
 While Nevins (2002) has explored the “rise of the illegal alien” in the US 
since this time, Düvell (2008:480) traces the same shift in Europe. From a few 
scattered mentions since the 1930s, he writes, “clandestine migration” emerged in 
both discourse and practice from the 1980s in a feedback loop between state 
enforcement and migrants’ mobility strategies that will become a familiar pattern 
throughout this thesis:  
 
Only when states issued legislation that declared unwanted immigration illegal and 
made it punishable and introduced technologies (photographs, passports, visas), 
administrations (immigration authorities) and enforcement procedures (deportation), 
did migration finally become clandestine.  
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The oil crisis did not just close off migratory channels to Europe, but also brought 
hardship for West African nations in the form of soaring debt followed by 
structural adjustment programmes. In Senegal, Buggenhagen (2011) finds that 
neoliberal economic policies – including the devaluation of the regional franc 
CFA currency, still controlled by Paris, in the 1990s – deepened economic strife. 
Yet as James (2012:21) notes, the presumably global force of neoliberalism has 
rather different consequences in different settings. In Senegal as elsewhere in 
West Africa, the new economic climate brought to the fore pre-existing notions of 
“making do” (se débrouiller in French, góor-góorlu in Wolof7) and a new push 
for international mobility, regardless of how constrained the “exit option” (Herbst 
1990) was now becoming. The result was that two-thirds of households in the 
Senegalese capital had by 2004 at least one member living abroad (Melly 
2010:43). Access to foreign lands became, like in other postcolonial contexts, a 
source of increased economic polarisation, with Europe rendered as a mythical 
repository of wealth and transformative power (Gardner 1995:95).  
 As European migration policies kept changing, so did West African 
mobility strategies – eventually leading to the appearance of the “boat migrants” 
with which this thesis is concerned. While Soninké men have had to substitute 
masculine youth culture for their migratory rite of passage (Jónsson 2008), 
Senegalese networks of Mourid Muslim traders have thrived by extending their 
reach to “new” migration countries in southern Europe and further afield (Carter 
1997). Other West and Central African groups, such as the transnational 
Congolese traders studied by MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000), skirt 
licit and illicit realms in their bizness while drawing upon a range of instrumental 
relations. Such groups have in different ways adapted flexibly to a new, harsher 
climate of international migration in a dynamic process with deep historical links.  
 
Dakar-Madrid: Spain between emigration and immigration 
 
It is at this historical juncture – when postcolonial migration patterns seized up 
and neoliberal policies were rolled out – that West African mobilities intersected 
with the southern European experience, including that of Spain. Belatedly 
                                                 
7
 The verb góor-góorlu (literally, doing one’s best) is based on the word for “man” (góor), 
highlighting the gendered nature of struggling along. See Hann (forthcoming) for a discussion 
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catching up with the rest of Europe after the end of the Franco era, Spain only 
went through its “uneasy transition” (Cornelius 2004) from labour exporter to 
labour importer in the 1980s. In preparation for EU entry in 1986, the Spanish 
government introduced the country’s first Aliens Law, which involved stringent 
controls modelled upon those of its northern neighbours (Ferrer Gallardo 2011). 
This top-down Europeanisation also entailed the fortification of Spain’s southern 
frontiers. It is no coincidence, as several authors note, that the first reported 
arrivals of pateras or small migrant boats around the Strait of Gibraltar occurred 
in 1991, the year when Spain joined the Schengen agreement for free movement 
within the EU and introduced visa requirements for Moroccans (Ferrer Gallardo 
2008:136; Belguendouz 2007).   
As such clandestine entries from the North African Maghreb multiplied in 
the 1990s, Brussels and northern European states put pressure on Madrid to step 
up enforcement (Cornelius 2004). In response, migrant routes were displaced to 
Morocco’s Mediterranean and Atlantic shores, and smuggling operations grew in 
sophistication. The origin of the clandestine crossers was also changing, with new 
groups gradually joining the pioneering Moroccan and Algerian harragas or 
“burners of borders”. Although sub-Saharan migrants had increased in numbers 
since the early 1990s, most had entered Europe through authorised means, as in 
the case of the Mourid traders. Then, in what de Haas (2007) calls the 
“watershed” year of 2000, large numbers of West African migrants started joining 
their Maghrebi counterparts on sea crossings to Spain and Italy.  
Their rather sudden appearance again related to important changes to 
regional migration dynamics. In the late 1990s Côte d’Ivoire, still a large labour 
importer, was mired in conflict underpinned by strong nativist sentiments, making 
life there increasingly difficult for migrant workers. Then, in 2000, violent anti-
immigrant riots racked Libya, which had become a magnet for West Africans 
since Qadaffi started implementing his pan-African policy in the 1990s (ibid). 
Spain’s economy, meanwhile, was in the midst of a boom. These factors all 
contributed to the connection of West African, trans-Saharan and Euro-
Mediterranean migration circuits – leading to the emergence of a hybrid migration 
system covering patches of the Sahel, the Maghreb and southern Europe (Collyer 
2007). 
 One key character on this new circuit was the aventurier, as French-
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speaking West Africans embarking on the overland journey towards Europe call 
themselves. Bredeloup (2008) traces the ancestry of this figure from its initial 
appearance on air routes to Paris in the 1970s. Among its precedents are the 
Sahelian youth, immortalised by Jean Rouch, on a quest to become streetwise 
“jaguars” in colonial-era Gold Coast8; the Congolese fashionistas of the Sape 
movement, some of whom later morphed into the traders encountered by 
MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000); and urban gangs in Côte d’Ivoire and 
the Congos, benguistes and bilistes, embracing the West (Beng in Ivoirian slang) 
and its symbols. These groups shared ideals of masculine bravery, urban street 
savvy and outward-oriented individualism, which the adventure crystallised in 
what Bredeloup calls singularisation, or a quest for individual emancipation, 
however dependent upon family funds. In making the task of fending for oneself 
(la debrouillardise) a virtue, Bredeloup suggests, the adventurer role reflects the 
era of economic freefall and quick-buck opportunities in which it arose – a world 
where ancient and not-so-ancient journeys of personal discovery and prowess 
have recombined with the neoliberal mores and closed borders of a new era. On a 
larger level, the adventure brings into stark relief the contradictory nature of 
migration and its transformative potential, noted by Gardner (1995) – not only is 
it an explicit process of transformation and emancipation ambivalently related 
with the world back “home”, but control over this transformation gradually 
transfers from adventurers to the illegality industry on the journey through the 
borderlands, as will be seen in this thesis. 
 The arrival of black Africans in rickety rafts along Spanish coasts became a 
media spectacle quite unlike that of their North African counterparts of a few 
years earlier. While adventurers, who usually take years to complete their 
stepwise overland journeys, see their treks as uphill “climbs”, European 
authorities by contrast conceptualise them as downhill flows, waves and 
avalanches. The suitably forceful response to the African “exodus” soon followed. 
Spain and the EU enlisted North African countries in repatriations and controls, 
introduced advanced border technology and stepped up patrolling – pushing 
migrants onto longer and more dangerous routes, including the Canary Islands 
path (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Migrants initially set off for this Spanish 
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 Jean Rouch, Jaguar, 1967 
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archipelago from the coast of Western Sahara, then from Mauritania, Senegal and 
even Guinea-Bissau as enforcement expanded southwards. By 2006, the Atlantic 
route was in full swing along a large tranche of the West African coastline.  
 Spain’s response to this newly opened route was swift, as will be seen in the 
coming chapters. Its first move was to insist it was merely the “gate to Europe” 
for these migrants – so pushing responsibility to European quarters. In a second 
move, Spain’s Socialist government reached out to West African countries and 
Morocco, which had been at loggerheads with its conservative predecessor. 
“Spain has for too long lived with its back against Africa,” the prime minister, 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, announced on a 2006 visit to Dakar.
9
 Now this 
historical neglect was swiftly turned into an advantage. Unencumbered by 
historical baggage in the region, Spain was able to sidestep the colonial legacy 
even while drawing upon its “politics of difference” (Cooper 2005) and forms of 
patronage. This uneasy replication of colonial patterns – and the claims-making 
and disbursement of privileges it entailed – will be a key topic of chapters two and 
three.  
By 2010, the time of most of the field research of this thesis, there was 
little news from the Spanish front in the “fight against illegal migration”: the 
denouement to the tragic spectacles of 2005 and 2006 was an apparent success 
story of empty detention centres, clear coasts, job done. Spain’s interior minister 
announced that 2010 had been the best year in a decade for migration control,
10
 
and the country’s “success” was being emulated and envied by its southern 
European neighbours. But what, except for the deepening economic crisis, was the 
reason behind this success, and how fragile was the ground on which it was built?  
 While these questions inform the thesis as a whole, two things need to be 
made clear from the outset. First, the “Spanish case” concerns the EU’s efforts to 
control migration writ large – and the contradictions bedevilling this larger effort. 
From 1999 onwards, Gabrielli (2011) notes, Spain went from being a passive 
recipient of EU dictates to playing an increasingly active and eventually leading 
role in the forging of a European migration response, as seen in summits from 
Seville in 2002 to Rabat in 2006 and beyond. In this two-way Europeanisation of 
                                                 
9
 See http://www.lavanguardia.com/waplv/51295195398.xml  
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 See http://videos.lainformacion.com/espana/rubalcaba-2010-ha-sido-el-mejor-ano-de-la-decada-
en-la-lucha-contra-la-inmigracion-ilegal_aDNrypzo9N1gLBx7a8OcG3/  
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migration policy (ibid), the Spanish conservative government’s securitarian push 
was continued from 2004 onwards by the Socialist PSOE with ever greater 
success, even as the new government embraced a discourse centred on 
humanitarianism, multi-culturalism and development assistance. This 
combination of steeliness and a soft touch made Spain a showcase for the EU’s 
so-called “global approach” to migration, launched after the 2005 tragedies at 
Ceuta and Melilla that were described in my opening vignette above. In this 
approach, contradictions are rife: it combines repression with rights talk, sutures 
development aid to policing agreements, and even creates contradictions among 
its varied methods. Such contradictions suffuse the EU border regime writ large. 
This is a regime, after all, whose dependence upon repressive policing awkwardly 
coexists with the political leadership of a Swedish liberal and card-carrying 
member of Amnesty International (Cecilia Malmström, the EU Commissioner for 
Home Affairs). It is a regime in which development money is used to “fight 
migration”, ignoring any ethical quandaries as well as evidence that points to 
increased migration as countries “develop”.11 And it is a regime that has wilfully 
fomented the pressure at the EU’s land and sea borders by policy – most 
importantly through carrier sanctions and other “externalisation” measures in non-
European countries as well as through the Dublin II regulation of 2003, which 
requires asylum cases to be processed by the first EU member state the claimant 
enters. A ground-level perspective on such contradictions in the EU migration 
regime is at the heart of this thesis. 
Second, the “success” on the Spanish front is both partial and imperfect. 
The relative decline on the westernmost routes into Europe masked the 
proliferation of entries elsewhere – first at the Greek-Turkish land border in 2010 
and then, with the 2011 Arab uprisings, via the older Libya-Italy route towards the 
island of Lampedusa.
12
 Irregular means of entering Europe by air from West 
Africa and elsewhere also continued apace, albeit at a greater cost to prospective 
migrants than the boat journey. Even along Spanish overland routes, tensions kept 
simmering underneath the supposedly closed border, as will be seen in the 
protests and conflicts of the coming chapters. Crucially, the border’s relative 
“closure” has depended upon political deals that might prove shortlived, not least 
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 This is known as the “migration hump” (Martin and Taylor 1996) 
12
 On this route, see e.g. Pastore et al (2006) 
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after the Socialists that negotiated these deals lost power to the conservative 
Partido Popular in 2011. While PP swiftly sought to differentiate itself from its 
predecessor by cutting healthcare for irregular migrants and insisting Spain should 
“stop being the paradise for illegal immigration”, it was also careful to maintain 
the international policing and “humanitarian” networks detailed in the coming 
chapters, much like PSOE had since 2004 built on PP’s efforts.13 Yet regardless of 
the changing political winds, the problem runs deeper. Much like in colonial 
times, when French dominance in Africa failed to embrace the rural hinterland 
(Cooper 2005:239), the European border regime cannot control the borderlands 
despite the dazzling surveillance machinery and innovative policing networks at 
its disposal. The state’s “monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement” 
(Torpey 2000) is not just a recent historical phenomenon – it is also a 
maddeningly ambitious undertaking that cannot but fail in its task of controlling 
thousands of kilometres of coastlines and terrestrial borders. 
 
The research frontier of clandestine migration 
 
As European officials discovered the clandestine circuit in the 2000s, so did 
academics. Irregular migration, Portes (1978:469) once observed, “is one of those 
issues in which the interests of scholars and of government agencies converge” – 
a situation that, de Genova (2002:421) asserts, is not much different a few decades 
on. Yet while irregular migration across the US-Mexico border has long been a 
vast field of inquiry, the Europe-Africa frontline was, until the Ceuta and Melilla 
tragedies, virtually unexplored. In the words of one Moroccan academic, irregular 
migration was an “empty field” on which migration researchers descended in the 
hope of quick data for articles, theses and reports. In Senegal, Italy and Spain, the 
pattern was repeated: here was a wide-open research frontier, an academic 
Klondike where any early studies were bound to attract disproportionate attention 
from funders, editors and research committees.  
The academic pioneers at this research frontier, much like the migrant 
adventurers they studied, rehearsed patterns going back to the colonial era. 
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Migration had in colonial times been framed as a “problem” to be solved by 
decision-makers and scholars alike. This was evident in concerns with 
“detribalisation” in the African migration literature (Richards 1939; Schapera 
1947) that were, in anthropology at least, eventually supplanted by the more 
complex conceptualisations of social change espoused by the “Manchester 
school” (Cohen 1969; Epstein 1958; Mitchell 1969). The almost ritual invocation 
of these rural-urban studies by generations of anthropologists contrasts with their 
scarcer impact on research. As Gardner and Osella (2004:xi) note, migration 
studies are still affected by a “northern bias” that privileges international over 
internal migration and western “destination” settings over so-called “sending” 
regions. The recent fascination with the clandestine migrant is but a poignant 
example of this larger pattern. 
The framing of clandestine migration as a problem ripe for piecemeal 
“solutions” was in part underpinned by funding from European research bodies 
and the patronage of supranational institutions such as the ever-present 
International Organization for Migration. As a result, many early studies of the 
clandestine circuit were short, sketchy affairs lacking ethnographic grounding, 
historical depth or critical distance. Beneath this onward rush of policy-relevant 
research, however, flowed a quieter current of in-depth studies. Anthropology 
arrived late at this research frontier, much as it had arrived late to the topic of 
migration writ large (Brettell 2003), and the best ethnographically informed 
studies have instead largely come from its sister disciplines of sociology, political 
science and geography. These studies, mostly in French, have variously focused 
on migrants’ living strategies and networks en route (Escoffier 2006; Pian 2009); 
explored the humanitarian consequences of clandestine migration (Albahari 2006; 
Carling 2007a and 2007b); analysed it through regional and historicised accounts 
of movements across the Sahara (Brachet 2009; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; 
Collyer 2007); or studied the economic, cultural and gendered contexts that 
inform the decision to migrate (Bouilly 2008a and 2008b; Melly 2011).  
 Yet such pioneering research, for all its value, fed into a larger stream of 
concern with clandestine migration that this thesis fundamentally seeks to 
interrogate. Through the aggregate efforts of academics, policymakers, journalists, 
police and aid workers, the social category of “illegal immigrant” was taking on 
an increasingly definite and naturalised shape across Europe. The clandestins, 
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ilegales and boat people had, in a few short decades, become a major 
preoccupation of politicians, a source of funding and concern for border guards 
and aid workers, and a fount of stories and data for journalists and academics. 
Amid this overproduction of knowledge on a minuscule contemporary 
phenomenon, it could be asked why studying it can at all be justified any longer. 
The next section will try to answer this question by defining the research object 
not as the “illegal immigrant”, but as the industry in which he is produced. 
  
The illegality industry as research object 
 
Several writers have sounded a note of caution on the research topic of irregular 
migration. De Genova (2002) says that the act of constituting undocumented 
migrants and “the migrant experience” as objects of study is a form of epistemic 
violence, reducing a wide array of people to an ethnographic gaze beholden to a 
state-centric vision. A standard anthropological perspective “from below” is not 
enough: rather, we need studies from “above” and “within” that explore the legal 
and historical construction of illegality. Agier (2011:68) similarly argues, in the 
case of encamped refugees, that studying these qua refugees “would mean 
confusing the object of research with that of the intervener who creates this space 
and this category” while “leaving out of the field of vision the humanitarian 
government that establishes, defines, controls and fixes the spaces of life of the 
categories that it simultaneously recognises and creates”.  
Following these leads, my objective is to explore ethnographically how 
clandestine migration has been constituted as a field of intervention and 
knowledge-gathering over the past decades. In this field, careers are made, 
networks created, knowledge and imagery circulated, and money channelled in 
increasing amounts. Why this obsession with clandestine migration into Europe 
by sea and land? Where is this obsession produced, and what are its effects? Why 
and how has a range of sectors – aid and media organisations, academic and 
defence industries, African and European security forces – become implicated in 
assessing, quantifying and controlling irregular migratory flows in recent years? 
To answer these questions we need research on the configuration of the illegality 
industry, not just on the experiences of those moving within it. This thesis does 
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so, however, largely from an oblique angle where the migrants themselves often 
provide the analytical and narrative push. The aim is to bring into a single 
narrative and analytical frame the logics of the illegality industry’s three distinct 
yet intermeshed fields – policing and patrolling, caring and rescuing, and 
observing and knowing. These functions largely correspond to three key sectors 
treated in the thesis: the border guards, especially the Spanish Guardia Civil; the 
aid workers, in particular the Red Cross; and the media and academia.  
It creating this frame, there are of necessity several things that this study 
explicitly does not attempt. First of all, it is not an ethnographic study of the 
migratory adventure from the travellers’ perspective, and little space will be spent 
on explicating the complex cultural and social determinants informing the 
decision to migrate. Instead, the focus is on the system that makes these travellers 
observable, interventionable, controllable – and, as migrants themselves insist, 
profitable. However, in my research on this system, certain strong beneficiaries 
and co-producers of migrant illegality also end up on the ethnographic margins. 
First among these groups are European employers, whose structural need for 
cheap and unorganised labour is usually seen as the reason why clandestine 
migration flows are allowed to persist (Portes 1978). Next are the smuggling (and 
trafficking) networks. Widely labelled “mafias” by politicians, these are nowhere 
near as organised as such a term implies – yet their business, which grows 
alongside tougher controls, generates important revenues. So do the security and 
defence companies handling migrant detention and deportation or developing new 
solutions in the fight against migratory flows. While both smugglers and private 
businesses will be considered in the thesis, their presence is secondary to its main 
concerns. So, too, is the world of politics and policymaking. Amply studied 
elsewhere, the swiftly developing EU policy environment on migration will be 
touched upon only tangentially in the thesis.
14
 Here, Feldman’s (2012) valuable 
recent ethnography of Europe’s “migration apparatus” ought ideally to be read in 
tandem with this study. Focusing on indirect policy conversations across 
disjointed sites, Feldman explores the growth of a nebulous, transnational 
migration management apparatus (in Foucault’s sense of dispositif) that produces 
a profound indifference towards the migrant it targets. 
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These conscious omissions have allowed me to focus on the “frontline” 
rather than directly on Europe’s dispersed policymaking. On this frontline, the 
“illegal immigrant” is situated at the confluence of several vectors of attraction 
and attention. Put in a simplified manner, for the police, clandestine migrants are 
of concern as a source of risk; for the media, they represent newsworthiness and 
drama; for aid workers, they are of interest because of their assumed vulnerability; 
while their marginality renders them worthy of study in academia. From this 
frontline perspective, clandestine migrants appear not just as bureaucratic objects 
of indifference of the kind Feldman (ibid) describes, but also as a source of 
fascination and preoccupation out of all proportion to the numbers. This obsession 
with clandestine migration is forged in a feedback loop between the patrols and 
pictures of the frontline and the politics of European capitals, where clandestine 
migration is a vote-winner in the battle Feldman identifies as “right versus right”, 
or neo-nationalists against neoliberals. This spiral of obsession with illegality at 
the border is, in fact, essential to the migration policy machinery and its 
production of indifference, since it ensures the political, financial and media clout 
needed for the sector to flourish. 
 Feldman (ibid:188) distinguishes between the “enduring (but less tangible) 
rationales and processes generative of an apparatus” and the “tangible (but less 
enduring) objects and locations symptomatic of an apparatus”. While I agree with 
his call for an anthropology that does not limit itself to studying direct 
connections in discrete sites, I maintain that Europe’s evolving border regime is 
not just based on “intangible” processes but is constituted through social, 
communicative and financial networks reaching from distant border posts to 
policymakers’ offices while depending on the physicality of deserts and sea 
borders, the geography of offshore enclaves and isles, and precarious but 
indispensable supplies of infrastructure and manpower. Following Mosse’s 
(2004:13) questioning of the policy-practice nexus, I argue that the materialities, 
geographies and social configurations “on the ground” are not simply temporary 
manifestations of a predefined discursive system but rather function as key 
constitutive arenas. By moving away from the nebulous world of the policy 
apparatus and focusing on the interfaces where the border machinery rubs against 
specific places, people and structures – what Tsing (2005) terms “friction” – we 
can hopefully produce an ethnographic account that spans the overarching logics 
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of Europe’s response to clandestine migration and those crucial “grains of dust 
that jam the machinery” (Agier 2011:7).  
 It is to highlight the economic, material and productive aspects of 
controlling clandestine migration that I call the varied sectors working on 
clandestine migration an “illegality industry”. Some of these sectors are, literally, 
industries, such as the companies building surveillance systems, and make tidy 
profits out of migration controls. Yet while profiteering from migration is 
important – not least in migrants’ understandings of their condition, as will be 
seen in the coming chapters – “industry” used as an analytical metaphor also 
highlights other, deeper features of the structures developing around clandestine 
migration. In an industry, employees and machinery work in concert to 
manufacture and process products across dispersed sites (factories, offices, points 
of sale) that add value through a division of labour. The term illegality industry 
here highlights several interrelated features of Europe’s migration response not 
neatly captured by rival terms such as apparatus, machine or regime: it 
foregrounds interactions between humans, technology and the environment; it 
highlights how illegality is produced and forged in concrete, material encounters; 
and it allows for the consideration of a dispersed value chain encompassing a 
range of sectors.
15
 To analyse these aspects, I draw upon the actor-network theory 
of Bruno Latour and the dynamic nominalism of Ian Hacking, which will now be 
dealt with briefly in turn.  
 Actor-network theory provides this thesis with an implicit framework for 
grasping the emergence of a system of migration control through interactions 
between materialities, machines and people. It approaches human and nonhuman 
groups as “actants” that, in the process of overcoming resistances among them, 
generate apparently solid systems (Law 1992; Callon 1986) through what Latour 
(1993) labels the work of purification and translation. This frame allows us to 
move beyond two of the scientific tendencies Latour (ibid:67) warns against: 
“sociologisation” or studying people-among-themselves and “discursivisation” or 
the analytical privileging of language and signification.
16
 It also allows for 
shifting the focus away from the two poles of migration studies – the (political 
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science) perspective that privileges policy and the (ethnographic) insistence on a 
grounded “migrants’ perspective” – towards the material, virtual and social 
interfaces of the illegality industry. From this vantage point, the fences, patrol 
boats, radars, TV cameras and rescue equipment can be seen as “actants” in a 
network or “collective” made up of human and nonhuman links. The “illegal 
immigrants” here function as key connectors or “tokens” in the illegality industry; 
their circulation is the language and currency of the network.  
 While actor-network theory provides the scaffold for my principal topic, the 
emergence and consolidation of the illegality industry, my secondary theme – this 
system’s production of migrant illegality – needs further theoretical elaboration. 
The clandestine travellers are not passive objects in circulation, as the “token” 
perspective above seems to imply, but actively participate in their making as 
migrants. To explore these dynamics, I will draw upon Ian Hacking’s (1986) 
notion of “making up people”. In Hacking’s take on dynamic nominalism, 
scientific and policy categories such as that of “illegal immigrant” are not simply 
discursive constructs but help create “new ways to be a person”. Hacking’s point, 
succinctly put, is that “[w]ays of classifying human beings interact with the 
human beings who are classified” (1999:31). The “interactive classifications” of 
social science and public policy feed back into the lived experiences of people so 
classified (the “looping effect”) through what Hacking terms the “matrix” of the 
social and material setting (ibid:10). The matrix or network to be explored 
ethnographically in the coming chapters is what I label the illegality industry; the 
interactive classification is that of “illegal immigrant”.  
A note of caution is in order. While both Hacking and Latour go beyond 
“constructivist” perspectives, both largely concentrate on the creation of social 
categories through scientific “engines of discovery”. The making of “illegal 
immigrants”, however, depends on the more piecemeal endeavour of policing, 
assisting and observing such travellers in Europe’s extensive borderlands. This 
limits the degree of interaction between classification and people classified, and 
means that other theoretical frameworks are also needed to understand the 
production and productivity of migrant illegality. Most importantly, I will draw on 
Willen’s (2007a:10) “critical phenomenology of illegality” that investigates the 
“embodied, experiential consequences of being illegal”. The challenge is, as 
Robert Desjarlais has said, to link “the phenomenal and the political” (quoted in 
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ibid:12), something I will do by moving along different scales: from policy and 
journalistic discourses to the blips on screens in radar control rooms and a 
policeman’s firm grip around the shoulders of a rescued migrant.  
If actor-network theory and dynamic nominalism allow for a grasp of two 
key features of the illegality industry – the emergence of a system and the 
production of illegality – its third feature, the dispersed “value chain” or the 
distinct domains in which illegality is produced, processed, “packaged” and 
presented, involves further analytical and not least methodological considerations.  
 
The extended field site 
 
How ought one attempt to study a complex system stretching from Sahelian 
border posts to European control rooms without its being clearly and fully present 
in any of these places? While views on a nebulous transnational system are 
always partial, as Haraway (1988) reminds us, a standard anthropological single-
sited approach can add to the frustration in its privileging of the “local”. Aware of 
this challenge in studying processes associated with “globalisation”, 
anthropologists have come to embrace multi-sited research. In migration studies 
in particular, researchers have for many years heeded Marcus’s (1995) call to 
“follow the people”, especially along the US-Mexico border (Alvarez 1995; 
Kearney 1998; cf Rouse 2002). Multi-sited studies have transcended the 
anthropological focus on a single, locatable community, yet problems remain. 
What Glick Schiller and Wimmer (2003:598) term methodological nationalism – 
ignorance or naturalisation of the nation-state and the territorial limitation of 
objects of study – is subtly reproduced in the “community focus” of many multi-
sited studies. Added to this is the ethical problem identified by Wilding (2007): 
while the anthropologist flits between places, the “informants” remain anchored to 
specific places and identities. Hage (2005) adds further practical and 
epistemological problems. To him, multi-sited fieldwork implies futile (and 
exhausting) attempts at studying the relation between each instance of a 
transnational “community” and its corresponding “site”. In sum, multi-sited 
ethnography still seems tied to community and locality even in its promise of 
abandoning them. Or, as Hannerz (2003) notes, the anthropological ideal of 
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immersion and “being there” lives on in the multi-sited world of “being there… 
and there… and there!” We could ask, along with Latour (1993:116): “Is 
anthropology forever condemned to be reduced to territories, unable to follow 
networks?”  
One solution is to do away with anthropology’s reliance on locality 
altogether. This is the approach pursued by Feldman (2012:184), who argues for a 
“nonlocal ethnography” that goes beyond the traditional anthropological 
privileging of “evidence obtained through direct sensory contact”. In this, he 
draws upon the earlier efforts of Xiang Biao (2007), whose study of mobile Indian 
IT workers made a strong case for a focus on intangible social processes rather 
than cultural, linguistic and place-bound embeddedness. While it gains 
ethnographic reach, however, such nonlocal ethnography loses some of the “thick 
description” so cherished by anthropologists – something Xiang (ibid:117) 
himself acknowledges in highlighting the lack of a “flavour of the research sites 
and a sense of ‘being there’” in his excellent monograph. The anthropologist, 
instead of being-there or being there-and-there, is suddenly appearing everywhere 
yet nowhere. 
There is, I believe, another option: what I would like to call the “extended 
field site” in a nod to the extended case method and situational analysis of the 
Manchester school (van Velsen 1967; Burawoy 2000). Exemplified by 
Gluckman’s (2002) seminal work, this approach brought groups that previously 
had been considered as separate – tribesmen and colonisers – into an analytical 
conversation that reached well beyond the confines of the geographically bounded 
villages that it was anthropology’s lot to study. An extended field site approach 
takes this focus on agonistic social interfaces and repeats it across diverse locales. 
Instead of multiplying sites or sidestepping localities, this rather involves a 
transversal relation to locales in which “the field” is not conceptualised within 
narrow geographical boundaries. In this, it follows attempts to move away from 
anthropology’s “spatialisation of difference” in “bounded fields” towards a 
methodological focus on “shifting locations” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997) without 
approaching this as a multi-sited proliferation of field spaces or a nonlocal 
ethnography. In a similar fashion to Hage’s (2005) “neo-Kulan” approach of 
focusing on transnational relations rather than their local embeddedness, I treat 
my dispersed research settings as a single site. The extended field site, as “one 
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site, many locales”, allows for the tracking, tracing and mapping of my primary 
unit of analysis, the system of the transnational illegality industry and the 
modalities of migranthood it produces.  
 This approach also draws upon the interface analysis familiar from studies 
of development (Long 2001). Each chapter of this thesis explores one distinct 
social interface where specific modalities of migrant illegality are produced in an 
encounter between workers and their target population. These encounters replicate 
across border towns, enclaves and retention centres in a pattern involving the 
same or similar actors: the Guardia Civil, the Red Cross, NGO workers, 
outsourced African police, story-hunting journalists, researchers and, of course, 
migrants. In reaching across such repetitive encounters, the aim is neither to 
flatten the account of the illegality industry, nor to essentialise and 
compartmentalise distinct subject positions, as interface analysis is sometimes 
alleged to do (Rossi 2006). The purpose is rather to explore how each interface 
uneasily and imperfectly superimposes a new supra-geographical function on 
towns, roads and enclaves in the borderlands and to inquire into the production of 
new subject positions through the encounter.  
Tracing such productive encounters has largely meant doing fieldwork on 
the move, switching between sites of departure and deportation (Dakar and 
Bamako, the Senegal-Mauritania border), ports of entry and reception (the 
Canaries and Andalusian coasts), points of blockage en route (Ceuta and Melilla, 
Oujda and Tangier in Morocco) and command and control centres (Frontex in 
Warsaw, Guardia Civil Comandancias in Spain). The mobility of the researcher 
here remains as problematic as in the “multi-sited” case discussed by Wilding 
(2007) – yet this is itself part of my object of study. The paradox is that the border 
regime’s attempts to curb human movement have created vast amounts of 
corporeal, financial, object and informational mobility (Urry 2007). To sum up a 
recurring, albeit implicit, theme: the illegality industry’s workers increase what 
Kaufmann (cited in ibid:37) terms “motility”, or the individual potential for 
movement, at the expense of the travellers they target. In an ideological gesture, 
the industry masks the mobility it produces while leaving “illegal immigrants” 
stigmatised by theirs even as they increasingly find themselves immobile or 
moved by police on their journeys north. 
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My methodological approach also draws upon journalism. As Malkki 
(1997) has noted, anthropology has mainly been concerned with durable, 
culturally transmitted experiences to the detriment of the transitory, dramatic 
events commonly treated by journalists. Clandestine migration is defined by such 
events, created and mythologised by the media in collusion with politicians, 
police, humanitarians, smugglers and migrants – as exemplified by the 
introductory vignettes above. While a critique of this spectacularisation is key to 
my thesis, I do follow Malkki in using the investigative end of the journalistic 
spectrum to rethink the benefits of fieldwork on “unrepresentative”, dramatic and 
staged events. As an anthropologist, I enter an overcrowded research arena where 
fieldwork is indeed no longer “what it used to be” (Faubion and Marcus 2009) as I 
follow in the footsteps not only of the academic pioneers at the research frontier 
but also of NGO workers, government fact-finders, policemen and media 
professionals. In this crowded field, the investigative, intrepid reporters stand out. 
Some of these, such as Fabrizio Gatti (2007) and Ali Lmrabet, have followed 
migrants on their clandestine journeys; others, such as Naranjo (2006 and 2009) 
and Del Grande (2007 and 2010), have investigated boat tragedies through long-
term engagement with migrants and officials. These immersive, investigative 
approaches resemble and sometimes surpass what anthropologists can achieve. A 
critical engagement with such efforts has therefore been a key part of my 
methodological approach – involving, for instance, “journalistic” persistence in 
negotiating access and contacts, a focus on dramatic events, and attempts to 
“follow the money” in the industry. These methods have been complemented by 
more fully “anthropological” participative fieldwork, although my intention 
throughout has been to work in as interdisciplinary a manner as the border 
professionals themselves.    
 
Ethics and access 
 
Fieldwork on the illegality industry also involves ethical and practical quandaries. 
The risk remains of repeating precisely what I set out to criticise: the extraction of 
value, stories and time from captive and immobilised “informants”, and their 
essentialisation in the process. My approach, however problematic, has here been 
to see migrants as co-analysts of the system in which they find themselves 
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stranded. The LSE and ASA ethics guidelines have been adhered to in my 
research, and consent has of course been sought and given among all concerned 
groups, from reception camp authorities to border guards and migrants, with 
utmost care taken not to divulge any information between these groups.  
Access has been a major concern, as is to be expected in the secretive 
world of clandestine migration. Migrants resisted participation for reasons that 
will be amply clear in chapter one. Coplan (2001:83), encountering such 
resistance in another sensitive border setting, notes how social enquiry has 
“become a form of surveillance, the eye whose pitiless, secretive gaze the 
marginalised seek instinctively to avoid”. This “pitiless gaze” was, in my 
research, also at times avoided by the master gazers themselves – the border 
guards. The “state” regularly resists being studied, as Abrams (1988) noted long 
ago, and more so in the murky world of border controls. While Frontex and the 
Spanish Guardia Civil refused access to frontline officers, the latter force was 
however surprisingly welcoming in authorising a large number of visits that 
nonetheless took place under rather “controlled” conditions. My extended field 
site approach has allowed me to offset access limitations and potential conflicts of 
interest in one place with renewed access, thanks to “snowball sampling”, in 
another.  
More importantly, these problems of access and ethics are a key part of my 
study in their own right. While the academics remain on the sidelines in the 
following chapters, the “I” of the text allows for a certain scrutiny of the role of 
the researcher with its doubts, tensions and mixed allegiances. For the “I”, one 
might substitute mentally “the anthropologist”: one minor type of worker in the 
illegality industry.  
 
 
 
 
Thesis outline 
 
The thesis begins at journey’s end, among Senegalese youth who embarked for 
the Canaries during the boat migration boom only to be swiftly sent back home. 
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The resentment among the “repatriates” in Chapter one provides a window onto 
the inequities and bizarre workings of the illegality industry that rolled into Dakar 
in 2006. The repatriates’ fruitless hunt for attention from the rich visitors 
descending on their neighbourhoods provides a privileged, if oblique and partial, 
view on the logics informing Europe’s “fight against illegal migration”. In this 
industry, the chapter argues, the repatriates have been put to work as human 
deterrents, as a source of income for European and local organisations, and as a 
fount of journalistic and academic material. The repatriates’ lingering resentment 
throws light on how their experiences are being used in an economics of affliction 
encompassing Spanish police, European funders, aid organisations, academics and 
the media. In this absurd aid economy, repatriates come to collaborate – as self-
identified clandestins and repatriates – in their own making up as “illegal 
migrants”. 
 The perspective shifts radically in Chapter two, which moves away from 
the trickle-down economics of Dakar’s aid world and instead casts an eye on the 
big money in the illegality industry. Largely thanks to boat migration, a Euro-
African border is being constructed at the southern edge of the EU. This border is 
manifested in a set of virtual and social interfaces – control centres, sea patrols, 
radar systems and policing networks encompassing West African and European 
forces. This regime, the chapter argues, renders clandestine migration as a source 
of “risk” both to human life and the European external border. In manufacturing 
such a risk that can be managed, visualised and controlled, the border regime 
creates a depoliticised security threat from which it can then extract maximum 
symbolic and financial value. I label this process a double securitisation of 
migration. 
 Chapter three shifts the focus to the African policing partners’ crucial 
role in the “fight against illegal migration”. By following migrants and those who 
police them on the overland journey, the chapter explores adventurers’ gradual 
transformation en route. In the borderlands, it is argued, the “illegal migrant” is 
conjured in increasing degrees of otherness, in ways not neatly captured by 
Hacking’s dynamic nominalism. Instead the chapter draws upon a 
phenomenological approach to illegality that considers the somatisation of despair 
and “deportability” (de Genova 2002) among adventurers buffeted by border 
controls. In toggling between the gift economy instituted between Spain and 
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African forces and the detection strategies this economy enables, the chapter 
explores the disconcerting production of illegality in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali 
and Morocco: the migrant here alternately appears as a hunted prey and a 
ghostlike, prohibited presence.   
 Chapter four considers the final crossing into European space and the 
two-faced border spectacle unfolding there – humanitarian rescues at sea versus 
the hidden show of force at the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla. By focusing on 
the overlaps between these regimes and their differing degrees of visibility, the 
chapter draws out the gaps, contradictions and excesses that define the border 
encounter. It takes as its starting point Agamben’s (1998) much-cited notion of 
“bare life” to see how this life interacts with frontline workers in the crossing, in 
particular with Spain’s “guardian angels” and gatekeepers, the Guardia Civil. The 
realities of the border encounter, the chapter concludes, cannot easily be 
encapsulated in Agamben’s figure of homo sacer or in the spectacular imagery 
emanating from the border. 
 In Chapter five, set in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, the adventurers have 
finally entered Europe. Or so they think – in fact, they soon find themselves 
stranded indefinitely in this tiny territory hemmed in between the sea and the 
fence, transformed into an offshore processing zone similar to Australia’s “Pacific 
solution” of island detention. The chapter follows the stranded migrants as they 
launch a protest against their captivity in the summer of 2010. By challenging the 
spatial order of their confinement in a reception centre at the very edge of Ceuta, 
the protesters give a novel, distressing twist to the process of migrant racialisation 
they are already being subjected to. As their protest echoes down Ceuta’s 
shopping street, they swiftly go from being infantilised as negritos by locals to 
embodying the role of the negro already glimpsed at the fences and on the high 
seas: wild, dangerous and out of control.  
 Chapter six steps back from the melee and analyses the stranded 
migrants’ predicament in more detail. It shows how they are subject to a politics 
of time in Ceuta and Melilla, wherein their months or years stuck in limbo 
constitute, to the Spanish authorities, capital withheld from the presumed 
“mafias” – and, in the end, from the migrants themselves. The chapter considers 
the overlapping time-space regimes framing migrants’ enclave life, ranging from 
the brief, equivocal pauses in their speech to the schedules of the reception camps 
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and the abstract uses of withheld time and time for surveillance. Stuck in an 
arbitrary landscape of time, migrants have little choice but to reach for absurd or 
desperate solutions, as seen in Ceuta’s 2010 protest and the grace of God they 
keep invoking.  
 Chapter seven heads back south and into another confrontation sparked 
by the EU’s border regime. Transnational activists are increasingly converging on 
the Euro-African border, and the chapter follows one such group on a “caravan for 
the freedom of movement” from Bamako to Dakar in early 2011. The activists, 
like the protesters in Ceuta, soon face a problem: the absence of a clear target and 
a concrete border at which to protest. In the absence of this, they instead lean on 
the stranded adventures of Bamako, deportees sent back from Algeria via the 
desert, as a unifier for action. In asserting the existence of victims of the invisible 
and diffuse border regime, the activists – like the academics, NGOs and 
journalists encountered en route – play into a politics of trauma that renders some 
migrants as better victims than others. Their “borderwork” (Rumford 2008), it is 
argued, dovetails with that of the illegality industry despite the best of intentions. 
Everyone tries to conjure a perpetrator of the violence of the border, yet this 
perpetrator remains frustratingly absent. As a result, the strategies for dealing with 
this faceless threat become increasingly absurd among border guards, protesters, 
migrants and aid workers alike.  
 These interfaces reveal the work-in-progress of the illegality industry in all 
its contradictions. They show how migrant illegality is not a unitary, pre-given 
category (Garcés-Mascareñas 2010): only by considering its contradictory and 
often surreal manifestations can we arrive at a full and complex understanding of 
the production of “illegal immigrants” at the emerging Euro-African border. They 
also highlight how the business of bordering Europe is a fraught and, in the end, 
absurd enterprise. The industry, feeding on the illegality it is meant to control, 
only produces more and increasingly bizarre forms of it. From the world of 
precarious guest workers has emerged, over barely two decades, a confusing and 
distressing array of migratory phenomena – wooden fishing boats packed to the 
brim; migrants marooned on tiny islands; bodies clinging to barbed wire or 
sinking on their inflatable rafts. The conclusion will reflect further on this 
absurdity, and what can be learnt from it. 
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Finally, a brief note on the style and format of the thesis. Somewhat 
sidestepping the long debate emerging from anthropology’s crisis of 
representation (Clifford and Marcus 1986), I have followed a “public” or 
“popularised” anthropological approach (Borofsky 2011; MacClancy and 
McDonaugh 1996) for the sake of potential wider readability. This has meant 
foregrounding the narratives arising from the ethnographic material rather than the 
theoretical debates informing this material, with frequent quotations and, 
occasionally, rather stylised representations of key characters in the chapters. The 
names of these characters, referred to by first name or nickname, are all 
anonymised. While quotes are usually verbatim, they are sometimes based on 
fieldnotes written as soon as possible after an encounter. This applies to many 
discussions with migrants, as well as to quotes from Ceuta’s migrant reception 
camp. Regarding referencing, the online links in footnotes have not been given a 
“last accessed” date since this would clutter up the text: they were all last accessed 
in October 2012. 
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1 
 
 
Mohammadou and the 
migrant-eaters 
 
 
 
Mother Mercy arrived one hour late. Her car stopped on the sandy Senegalese 
backstreet right outside the doorway, she stepped out of the passenger seat and 
strode into the bare, ramshackle locales of her collective for women who had lost 
their sons to boat migration. A crisp black dress laced with silvery strands flowed 
round her as she sashayed past, talking loudly into her mobile; on her wrist 
glittered a large watch. “Ah, excusez-moi,” she said, switching from Wolof on the 
phone to French, momentarily addressing me as I waited behind a wooden table in 
the corner. “The traffic jams…” She sat down and snapped her fingers to 
command the attention of her assistant, a rotund woman behind a rickety counter 
at the back of the room. The assistant promptly brought her calendar, whose pages 
already spoke of visits to France, Italy and Spain: Mother Mercy was a busy, busy 
woman. She flipped through the pages with one hand as she clutched her mobile 
with the other, giving orders and managing appointments in an executive stream 
of Wolof and French while jotting down the details of another trip abroad.  
 
It was at this point that I realised something strange was happening in the world of 
clandestine migration. 
 
Middle-aged women in flowing reds, greens and yellows trickled into the office, 
went up to the counter and gave 525 franc CFA ($1) to the assistant, daily debt 
payments in the micro-credit scheme Mother Mercy had set up for the members of 
her Dakar-based collective. Many of them had, like her, lost a son to the waves. A 
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poster on the wall next to the counter trumpeted Non aux pirogues de la mort! 
“Say no to the boats of death.” 
Eventually Mother Mercy hung up and slid a brochure across the table. 
“Our collective started its work with our sons losing their lives.” She had 
switched to a soft, maternal voice that sounded as though it had been through 
hundreds of rehearsals. As it turned out, this was indeed the case. Her outfit had 
been fêted by journalists and politicians from London to Las Palmas since the 
fateful days of 2006, when fishing boats packed with migrants had departed from 
Senegal for the faraway Canary Islands. “Mother Mercy”, as the media soon 
insisted on calling her because of her brave “battle against migration”, had graced 
the screens and pages of the BBC and France2, Glamour and Elle magazines, the 
Washington Post, France’s Libération and Le Monde, Spain’s El País… the list 
was endless.
1
 She flicked through the brochure detailing the collective’s good 
works, temporarily ignoring the incessant ring of her mobile. “Our campaigns 
have put a stop to illegal migration,” she said, despite the “meagre means” at their 
disposal. “We have to work hard to fixer les jeunes (keep the youth in place).”   
 The media and politicians had praised her efforts to “keep the youth in 
place” through so-called sensibilisation (sensitisation), awareness-raising 
campaigns about the “risks of illegal migration”. Her work was “more effective 
than all the warships and planes sent to the Atlantic Ocean by the European 
Union”, the BBC had said in 2006. If so, Mother Mercy was a victim of her own 
success. By 2010, the boats had stopped departing and funding was slowly 
leeching away. “We have to continue our work,” she said. “If we do sensitisation 
here, people just depart from elsewhere,” which meant they had to spread the 
message across the whole country, even over the whole region! “La 
sensibilisation n’a pas de deadline,” she said distractedly while typing a number 
into her mobile, then calling. My brief audience was over. 
  I went outside and called Mohammadou. “Tell him you got the number 
from me,” Mother Mercy had said, scribbling it on a piece of paper. Soon enough 
Mohammadou came ambling towards the office. He was the president of the local 
association of young repatriates from Spain, but cut a poor figure for such a lofty 
                                                 
1
 Other scholars have written about Mother Mercy’s association and its media impact, but I am 
leaving out these specific academic references in the online version of the thesis to safeguard 
anonymity; her moniker has been modified for the same reason. 
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title in his loose jeans, plastic sandals and old jacket, a smudgy cap resting on his 
head. He said a brief, unsmiling hello and then led me into the sand-swept lanes of 
his neighbourhood. Yongor, as I will call it, was a fishing village swallowed by 
the urban sprawl of Dakar that had been particularly hard hit by boat migration. It 
was from here that Mohammadou and his friends had once set off and it was here 
that they now lingered, jobless and immobile, nursing the wound of their one-time 
deportation.
2
 
“What can you offer us?” Mohammadou blurted out as we walked towards 
the beach, the stale air carrying smells of putrid fish and gasoline. “And what do 
you want?” The order of his questions seemed topsy-turvy, but it was so for a 
reason: he had seen too many visitors already. On a corner, two women in bright 
robes squatted next to a cart piled high with mangoes, children scuttling round 
them in the pale, hot sand. Walking past, I tried to think of suitable replies, but 
had none to offer him.  
 At the family home of Ali, a brawny repatriate in his twenties, the crash of 
the waves whispered through narrow lanes whose walls were scrawled with the 
phone numbers of neighbours’ relatives in Spain and France. Ali wedged a 
wooden bench into the sand and Mohammadou sat down and got his notebook 
out. He flicked through page after page of names, numbers and emails of all those 
who had come to see his repatriates’ association. The contact details of journalists, 
researchers, students, NGO workers, even an EU delegate adorned the pages. He 
had never heard back from any of them. “A lot of people have passed by here… 
But every time they go back to Europe, there’s nothing.” Ali nodded and shared 
out his only cigarette, Mohammadou drawing the last bit of smoke out of its dying 
embers. “Ils mangent sur nous,” Mohammadou said, his mouth twisting into what 
would soon become a familiar frown. “They eat from us.” Even the aid 
organisations ate their money, while the repatriates got nothing. “I am the 
president and I have to ask him for a cigarette, do you think this is normal?” 
Mohammadou said angrily, nodding towards his friend.  
The repatriates had had enough. They did not want to speak to researchers 
or reporters any longer. They felt embittered and angry with the fact-finders and 
                                                 
2
 I will use “repatriation” rather than the legally speaking more correct “deportation” or “removal” 
here, following former migrants’ usage and the generic term (repatriación) applied to their return 
(devolución) under Spain’s Aliens Law (BoE 2009; EMN 2010) 
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delegations – not to mention with the interlocutor of these toubabs or white 
people in Yongor, Mother Mercy. “Why did she send you to us?” Mohammadou 
asked with a twisted smile. It was a rhetorical question that was to become a 
standing joke during the coming year. “Because you don’t bring any money. If 
you had come in a four-wheel drive, she would have invited you to her house.” 
 
The birth of a tragedy 
 
The wave of clandestine migration hit the shores of Senegal and the front pages of 
European newspapers in the summer of 2006. The sudden sight of brashly painted 
wooden boats groaning under the weight of dishevelled Africans had come as a 
shock and surprise to the news-reading public and Spanish police alike, but the 
signs and premonitions had been there. The previous year, sub-Saharan migrants 
stuck in Morocco had launched the infamous mass attempt to climb the fences 
surrounding Ceuta and Melilla. The ensuing Moroccan crackdown pushed 
clandestine routes southwards: first to the Western Sahara, then to the desert state 
Mauritania along the Atlantic coast, and finally southwards to Senegal and 
beyond. A direct route had suddenly opened up from West Africa to Europe, and 
youth from Senegal and further afield saw their chance to hitch a ride. In 2006 
almost 32,000 people landed in the Canary Islands, 1,500 km of rough Atlantic to 
the northwest of Dakar (MIR 2011).  
 “This is the big chance, we mustn’t lose it,” young men reasoned in 
Senegal’s seaside fishing hamlets, according to Ousmane, a theatre producer and 
community leader. “It was generalised madness.” Women scrambled their savings 
together to finance the trip; young men bartered their family belongings. The 
captains of the boats became sudden heroes, and women sang their praise. 
Everyone wanted to leave on mbëkë mi, the Wolof term for the journey that 
literally means “hitting your head”. “At that time, everyone talked of the 
forecast,” Ousmane recalled: people checked obsessively for the best weather 
conditions in which to depart. Rumours were spreading. Spain wanted more 
migrants to come and work! The expressway to Europe was open! Fishermen-
turned-smugglers loaded their large wooden canoes with cans of petrol, bottles of 
water and supplies of dry food. They consulted the marabouts (Muslim religious 
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leaders), collected the money for the “tickets” and set their GPS for Tenerife, and 
off they went, boatload after boatload of willing workers. Barça walla barzakh 
was their motto: “Barcelona or the afterlife”. Men who hesitated to join in the 
boat craze were ridiculed as effeminate and weak of will.
3
 People said jéleen gaal 
yi, jigeen yi jél avion yi, Ousmane reminisced. “Take the boat, [only] women take 
the plane!”    
 After the mania came the fall. Police detained and imprisoned those who 
had been forced to return while the death count added up at high sea. Relatives’ 
phone calls were left unanswered. Boats disappeared with their human cargo, 
never to be heard of again. Thousands died in the waves; no one knows exactly 
how many.  
 Mohammadou’s fishing village was a pioneering terrain for mbëkë mi, and 
its youth suffered worse knocks than those of other coastal communities. While 
some local convoyeurs (smugglers) and marabouts had made good money out of 
the boat craze, losses were adding up across the neighbourhood. Wives, children 
and parents were left bereaved, and often bereft of income. Walking along the 
lanes of Yongor, Mohammadou invoked the dead at every turn. “Do you see her?” 
he said as we passed a woman in her thirties carrying a bucketful of goods on her 
head. “She lost her husband, she lost five family members, that’s why she has to 
work now.” He nodded towards friends, saying “he was in my boat” or “in his 
house three people died”. He had tried counting the dead, but his mother had told 
him to stop when he reached 475 – the effort was ripping open barely healed 
wounds. “Everyone has lost someone here.”4  
If the boat arrivals in the Canaries had triggered the first media frenzy, the 
tragedy back in Senegal now set off another. The media descended on the 
country’s seaside communities in search for stories on the dead, the missing and 
the deported – and Yongor was at the centre of their attentions. A 2006 visit to the 
neighbourhood by French presidential hopeful Ségolène Royal spurred the 
journalists on and put Mother Mercy and her association in the spotlight. Yongor 
went “from dire anonymity to world fame”, as one news report put it: it was 
                                                 
3
 See Melly (2011) and Nyamnjoh (2010:2) on the trope of heroic masculinity in boat migration 
4
 No exact figures on deaths and disappearances exist. Mohammadou estimated 1,500 youth had 
died (Yongor’s total population is around 40,000), though official estimates are lower  
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becoming a privileged stage for what the Spanish media and politicians liked to 
call the drama of immigration.  
 By 2010, the wave of clandestine migration had receded. But in its wake a 
confrontation had spread across Yongor and beyond, pitting mothers against sons 
and former migrants against each other. I had come there looking for stories about 
the fraught sea journeys and the brief, extraordinary arrival of Senegalese fishing 
boats at the heart of western leisure migration, the playas of Tenerife and Gran 
Canaria. So had hundreds of other researchers and journalists. The repatriates’ 
tragedies had been told and retold to countless visitors, but their resentment about 
this retelling opened a new line of inquiry. As I left Ali and Mohammadou on 
their bench, I was already intrigued by their simple, recurrent question: who 
benefits from illegal migration, and how?  
 Mohammadou and his repatriated friends would in the coming year help 
me analyse who the winners and losers were in the illegality industry at Europe’s 
southern frontier. This industry, built around the fight against illegal migration 
and drawing in the media, civil society, politicians, academics and police, has – 
among other achievements – put the unemployed repatriates to work. The 
repatriates deter any “potential candidates for illegal migration” from even trying 
the journey; they bring in money for local associations, NGOs and politicians; and 
they provide compelling stories for journalists and academics alike.  
 But it is not enough to consider how, in Mohammadou’s words, everyone 
“ate” from migration. His question about illicit gains led to other, deeper 
quandaries. Why this fascination with the unfortunate travellers of the high seas? 
And why, despite this fascination among aid workers, hacks and politicians, were 
they sidestepped as the illegality industry rolled into Dakar and other West 
African departure points from 2006? Beyond its much-vaunted “success” in 
fighting migration, what social realities did this industry leave behind in Senegal’s 
seaside neighbourhoods? During my visits to Yongor in 2010 and 2011 that 
structure this chapter, I would try to find answers to these questions. 
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Migrants as human deterrents 
 
Mohammadou often picked me up at the highway roaring out of Dakar as I came 
back after my fieldwork excursions along migrant routes through Morocco, Mali 
and Spain. A Ford billboard towered over the fume-choked junction; “drive one” 
it exhorted, next to a picture of a slick four-wheel drive. If such a car ever slogged 
up the sand-whipped lanes of Yongor it was bound to belong to either a local 
dignitary, an expatriate in Dakar’s booming aid industry, or a modou-modou, the 
Wolof term for rags-to-riches emigrants who in recent decades have come to 
embody success in Senegal (Melly 2011; Riccio 2005). On our walks of Yongor, 
we sometimes met modou-modou back on visits from Europe, big-boned and 
well-fed men sporting new jeans and confident smiles. Their houses, built with 
remittances from Spain, Italy or France, reminded the repatriates of their failed 
journeys at every turn.
5
  
 If the modou-modou advertised the benefits of departure, the repatriates 
were their abject inverse: walking billboards testifying to the futility of boat 
migration. Failure was broadcasted by their sullen faces, their empty pockets, their 
shattered dreams. They had used up their savings to pay up to 500,000 CFA 
($1,000) for a journey in a packed boat. Their friends had died in the rough seas. 
Some had turned back; others, like Mohammadou, had been diverted to Western 
Sahara, where internment and expulsion to the Mauritanian border awaited. 
Mohammadou told me how he had spent days walking back and forth in the 
desert no-man’s-land between Moroccan and Mauritanian border posts, soldiers 
forcing the migrants to retreat at gunpoint, until Senegal’s president intervened. 
Eventually Mohammadou made it back home, penniless. The migrants’ dreams 
had swiftly turned into the stuff of nightmares. 
 The shame of return was shattering. Sometimes tricked onto their 
deportation flights by police who told them they were being sent to mainland 
Spain, sometimes promised a money envelope that ended up containing as little as 
10,000 CFA, the repatriates eventually made it home. Some slept on beaches or 
hid with acquaintances, too ashamed to face their families. Their shame was not 
                                                 
5
 The modou-modou image of success is not clear-cut, however, as testified by their often barely 
half-built houses: see Buggenhagen (2001:376)  
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just a family disaster, however. It was also a dissuasive weapon, as I would learn 
in the Spanish embassy, a world away from Yongor and its miseries.  
  
 
 
The embassy, a whitewashed edifice in central Dakar’s Plateau district, was an 
operation in constant expansion. As the migrant boats kept coming in 2005 and 
2006, Spain suddenly “discovered” sub-Saharan Africa (Gabrielli 2008:1). The 
country’s Socialist government embarked on a political offensive in West Africa 
and opened new embassies across the region. Under its first Africa Plan, launched 
amid the growing boat crisis in the Canaries, Madrid also doubled overseas 
development aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 2006 and 2010.
6
 The Dakar 
expansion was part of this. In the years following the visits of ministers and the 
Spanish premier in 2006, a new consulate had been built, an export promotion 
office had opened and Interior and Labour Ministry attachés had set up shop. 
  Raúl was one of these attachés, a friendly police officer with years of 
experience in migration controls in Senegal who had lived through the heady 
times of 2006. “The waiter in the café where I go for breakfast told me one 
morning, ‘tomorrow I’m leaving, I’m heading to Spain!’” Raúl laughed. The 
media fed the phenomenon, he said, spreading rumours from the Canaries where 
those who had arrived “told of how you call the police as you arrive to the coast, 
then the police take you to a room where you get food three times a day, you can 
even repeat, and after some time they bring you to Spain”. Then the repatriations 
began, tentatively in early summer and with full force a few months later. “Now 
you knew that you might be selected for repatriation, so will you risk losing your 
job here only to be sent back?”  
The migration patrols launched in 2006 had of course contributed to the 
fall in arrivals, Raúl said, but the repatriations were even more important. 
According to him, these were “the principal weapon of dissuasion” in the fight 
against illegal migration. “It’s tough but it’s the best option.” The repatriate “is 
worth much more than whatever publicity campaign you can think of doing”, he 
                                                 
6
 See Gabrielli (2011) and http://seekdevelopment.org/seek_donor_profile_spain_feb_2012.pdf  
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said. Repatriation is “very difficult, very painful, very tough”, but it “transmits the 
idea that you shouldn’t leave”.  
His colleagues hammered home the same message. Raúl’s fellow attaché, 
the head of the Guardia Civil’s patrolling operations in Senegal, called 
repatriation an “efecto llamada al revés” (reverse “pull” effect). The Spanish 
ambassador likewise saw it as the principal form of dissuasion. “There are 
villages that have received people back who have risked their lives, who have 
risked their money, and who have failed.” Now, thanks in parts to the repatriates, 
he made clear, people thought twice about even trying.  
 The Canaries repatriations were but one instance of the rise of what 
migration scholars have called a global deportation regime (de Genova and Peutz 
2010). In a pattern repeated across the rich world, states increasingly defend and 
enact their sovereignty against those who violate the boundaries of the nation – 
poor migrants and refugees whose subjection to discrimination, abuse and 
disciplinary power is being catalogued from Israel to El Salvador.
7
 The intentional 
use of mass repatriation as “weapon of dissuasion” in the Canaries gives a 
performative angle to this biopolitics of sovereignty. Rather than simply being 
disciplined, the Senegalese repatriates were put to work as human deterrents 
within the illegality industry.  
 To implement repatriation-as-deterrence, Spain had entered into a grand 
bargain with Senegal. In exchange for joint patrols and repatriations, Spain 
promised money and favours. This created a virtuous circle for officialdom. 
Development cooperation smoothed the way for police initiatives while 
humanising the cold, dissuasive logic of repatriation. Spain’s “new generation” of 
migration accords signed across the West African region from 2006 followed the 
EU’s so-called  “global approach” to migration – a three-pronged strategy 
encompassing migration controls in sending countries, the promotion of legal 
migration and development assistance. These agreements, which soon became a 
model for Europe’s “externalisation” of controls (Gabrielli 2011), padded the 
steeliness of policing and deportation with financial rewards and warm diplomatic 
words. And it soon seemed to be working perfectly. Between 2006 and 2010, 
arrivals in the Canaries dropped from 32,000 to 200 a year (MIR 2011).  
                                                 
7
 See de Genova and Peutz (2010:6) and studies such as those of Coutin (2007); de Genova 
(2002); Fekete (2005); Bloch and Schuster (2005); Willen (2007a and 2007b)  
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 The path to cooperation had not been smooth, however. The Senegalese 
president, Abdoulaye Wade, was faced with a conundrum in the summer of 2006. 
Elections were approaching, and the opposition was ready to exploit the 
humiliation of repatriations. As more Senegalese migrants were sent back from 
the Canaries, the anger boiled over among them. “We called on all of the youth, 
everyone came out,” recalled Moctar, the president of the national association of 
repatriates. “We decided to make some noise… we will burn the country!” Riots 
raged on the roads of Dakar, and repatriates fought with police. They were finally 
summoned to see the president, who had briefly wavered on allowing 
repatriations but was now swiftly forging a coherent response to the crisis. To 
placate the repatriates, he had an offer: Spanish-sponsored development projects 
and work visas would come their way. More importantly, these deals would also 
help calm the opposition. 
First out in this softer part of the Spanish-Senegalese migration strategy 
was Plan REVA (Retour vers l’Agriculture or “back to agriculture”). This plan, a 
brainchild of Wade’s, was meant to integrate returned migrants into a modernised 
farming sector (Pian 2010). In September 2006, Senegal’s interior minister 
announced a firm Spanish offer of €20m of development aid – initially broached 
at the time of the first repatriations in June – in part destined for this plan 
(Gabrielli 2011:362). REVA would be beset by accusations of squandered money, 
government nepotism and propaganda (Ba and Ndiaye 2008; Rivero and Martínez 
2008). The repatriates, briefly wooed by the president, also refused to endorse it. 
They were fishermen, not farmers, and dreamt of real jobs, not tilling the soil. The 
Spanish money, it was widely rumoured, had instead of helping the youth funded 
Wade’s re-election campaign in 2007.8 
Another aspect of the strategy was the handing out of “visas”. Spain had 
launched a recruitment programme (contratación en origen) “in order to prevent 
what was happening, people going to Spain by boat illegally”, as Félix, the 
Spanish Labour Ministry attaché, bluntly put it. But the repatriates were again 
sidelined, despite initial promises; they had an entry ban on Europe, and Madrid 
had no wish to encourage more departures by rewarding those sent back. Instead, 
the visa scheme became a high-stakes political game. While some relatives of 
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repatriates were quietly offered places on the flights to Spain, visas were also 
bartered and sold by repatriate “leaders” or offered to members of Wade’s party 
(Pian 2010). Soon accusations flew in all directions. 
A few visas reached Yongor, where Mohammadou would play a part in 
selecting recipients. Sitting in his one-room home next to the beach, his little 
children coming and going as we spoke, he recalled the visa debacle in 2007. 
“One day they called me,” he said. “They told me, ‘you have won a visa, so you 
should come here tomorrow at 8 o’clock’.” He went to the national youth 
employment agency, in charge of visa allocations, the following morning. “I did 
the paperwork, I did everything!” Still, no news came. The next month they called 
him again, saying he should wait for another round of contracts, this time for 
fishermen. Again, he said, “I did my paperwork with the Spaniards. After that, 
I’ve seen nothing.” As the repatriates were sidestepped for visas, they became 
ever more resentful at their exclusion from which Mohammadou still smarted, 
four years later. 
The battle over visas sometimes took bizarre turns, as in the 2008 round of 
contratación of more than 700 women to go and work the strawberry fields of 
Andalusia. The tricky bit was to “break with the cultural schema of Senegal”, 
Félix explained. The Senegalese had insisted that half ought to be male, but “we 
explained that a certain gentleness is needed in the harvesting of this product”. 
The real reason, of course, was different. The women had to have “family charges 
in Senegal” so that they would be sure to return, the attaché explained, as had also 
been the case in similar programmes between Morocco and Spain. The result was 
a bevy of well-connected women, all “high heels and make-up” as one Spanish 
NGO worker recalled, descending on the rough terrains of Andalusia. The 
strategy had backfired as some women even stayed on. Félix blamed the 
“disaster” of the Senegalese administration, whose pre-selection of candidates had 
been jumbled. But as could have been expected, the rich and well-connected had 
won out in the scramble for visas.
9
 Then the crisis hit the Spanish economy, and 
no more contracts were being offered. The contracts were “an emergency 
system”, Félix said, but “the fact that there are no contracts now doesn’t mean that 
we have abandoned Senegal”. 
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A third aspect of the strategy was the awareness-raising campaigns, 
promoted by overseas development agencies and the International Organization 
for Migration. Based in the expatriate haven of Mamelles along Dakar’s shoreline, 
this intergovernmental body – often erroneously thought of as a UN agency –
received financing for “migration management” projects aimed at halting irregular 
migration, including a €1m injection of EU cash in 2007. Its campaigns applied 
the sensibilisation format common across French-speaking West Africa on 
anything from desertification campaigns to disease prevention (Rossi 2006). In 
public meetings, wise words from “community leaders” were mixed with 
testimony from former migrants, who sometimes were referred to as having been 
“vaccinated” against the wish to depart. “Sensitisation shouldn’t be only about the 
risks, not only ‘you might die on the way’,” said one European IOM officer. “It 
should also be about the fact that you might not get a job in Spain, you might not 
have a nice life there.” This positive spin on the campaigns betrayed a common 
unease among expatriate workers at the anti-migration effort. In previous years 
gruesome images of bloated bodies and sunken boats had appeared on Senegalese 
television in an effort by the Spanish government to stem the flow. While the 
IOM had run similar television campaigns across the region, it also followed a 
softer strategy incorporating cartoons, theatre and speech-making competitions. It 
had first conducted campaigns in fishing hamlets before branching out to sending 
zones inland, where people still did not know much about the risks, according to 
the officer. “There’s never enough sensitisation,” she concluded, echoing Mother 
Mercy’s words.  
Amid the proliferation of local actors in the deterrence game, Mother 
Mercy’s grassroots appeal made her stand out from the competition. After the 
death of her only son on his journey towards the Canaries, she had decided to 
convert her previous local development association into a women’s collective 
fighting illegal migration. Besides formal sensibilisation, the association’s women 
also kept an eye on Yongor’s youth in case they tried a clandestine journey. The 
association’s work was “very difficult”, Mother Mercy stated on her website, 
“because in fishing communities the woman does not have responsibility and 
should not take initiatives”. But she had strong backers. Her forceful anti-
departure narrative attracted the funders – and the police. “The mothers have 
helped quite a lot,” quipped the Guardia Civil chief. As one academic put it 
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[reference removed], “the mothers can resort to two potentially lucrative and 
incompatible survival strategies: to live off the money transfers of an emigrant 
son or to live off the funds granted on the basis of an anti-migration discourse by 
backers from the global North.” By converting her association into a vehicle for 
anti-departure rhetoric, Mother Mercy had chosen the latter strategy, but her 
reasons for doing so were complex and sometimes at odds with those of her 
backers. Her collective was created “because we have lost so many youth”, she 
later told me, in between criticism of how Europe was closing its doors while 
spending all its migration money on Frontex instead of on job-generating projects. 
“My son left with 80 friends and they all disappeared at sea, that’s what pushed 
me as a woman to call on my sisters who had suffered the same [fate] to organize 
a structure to fight this scourge.” For a time, the priorities of bereaved Senegalese 
mothers and European police coincided – yet it was a fragile alliance that 
tragically divided families, genders and generations who in fact held a shared 
concern with the injustices behind the fatal departures. 
 The repatriates, seeing the rapid and unequal spread of benefits from 
clandestine migration, had been deported, deceived and made destitute. Now the 
work contracts and aid money bypassed them. The Senegalese president “has 
promised a lot of things that we haven’t seen”, Moctar said. “They have done 
nothing, nothing at all, absolutely nothing.” But the initial anger had dissipated 
amid the undignified scramble for visas and funds. Soon he lure of the illegality 
industry would prove irresistible. Mohammadou and his repatriated colleagues 
wanted a share of the spoils. They wanted someone to listen. Above all, they 
wanted funding partners from Europe, and they knew that to find any they had to 
obey the rules of the deterrence game. As a result, they started fashioning 
themselves in the very guise preferred by western donors and politicians: as real 
clandestins working to deter “potential candidates for illegal migration”.  
On the corrugated iron door to the office of Mohammadou’s association, a 
shack doubling up as mobile phone repair shop on the main road leading into 
Yongor, their motto had been printed atop a painting of a wooden boat: halte à 
l’émigration clandestine (halt illegal emigration), an increasingly present and 
pernicious slogan in the Dakar aid world.
10
 “It’s thanks to us that no one is 
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leaving anymore,” Mohammadou kept repeating, as did Mother Mercy. Yet her 
offices, some 100 metres away from the repatriates’ shack, were a constant 
reminder of who the European donors believed: the logos of Spanish development 
agencies crowned her portico, and four-wheel-drives and taxis kept pulling up at 
her porch.  
 Mohammadou’s association had no funding partners, and so their projects 
– on equipping Yongor’s ailing fishing fleet, on creating chicken coops, on 
professional training for would-be or one-time clandestins – failed to take off. But 
in asserting their role in fighting “illegal emigration”, the repatriates signalled an 
awareness of their crucial role as human deterrents.  
The beach, down Yongor’s maze of lanes, was strewn with litter and 
crammed like a car park with wooden fishing boats. It was bigger versions of such 
boats – known as gaal gi in Wolof, pirogues in French and cayucos in Spanish – 
that had once taken Mohammadou and his friends to the Canary Islands. The 
boats were long and slender, painted in brash beautiful colours: red against 
yellow, deep green and black. The names of Senegalese wrestlers and marabouts 
had been written on the hulls. Occasional German or Spanish flags hung limply in 
the windless air. Industrial fishing boats rested on the horizon. Children scuttled 
past, deftly skirting fish bones, nets and household debris.  
 
 
“Look at the boat out there!” Mohammadou suddenly exclaimed. “It’s the garde 
espagnole.” The Guardia Civil’s patrolling vessel came every day, he said. It was 
Figures 1 and 1. Pirogues on Dakar’s beaches 
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just sitting there, observing, like a well-trained beast ready to pounce on any 
trespassers. “It can’t stop us,” he said. “If no money comes soon from Europe we 
will set off again… This time we’ll be 100,000, or thousands of 12-year-olds.” It 
sounded like a warning from someone aware of both the depiction of migrants as 
a threatening force and the legal constraints in deporting children.
11
 The 
repatriates’ effort to convince impatient youth to bide their time was the reason no 
one was leaving, Mohammadou made clear. This unpaid work of putting a brake 
on the runaway tales of the boat craze era
12
 was done silently, away from the 
spotlight. “We are waiting now for any development projects to come through 
from Europe,” insisted Mohammadou. Their patience would not last forever. 
 Mohammadou and his friends were recoiling from the passivity of their 
repatriation. They placed deterrence in their actions and speech, not just their 
bodies. It was a message that kept falling on deaf ears, however. Despite the 
European largesse, no partners appeared. Instead, their attempts to share in the 
spoils of the illegality industry had led to their being co-opted into Europe’s 
human deterrence programme.  
 
Migrants as money-spinners 
 
It was late spring 2010, and Mohammadou and I sought refuge from the heat 
blowing in from the Sahelian plains in a mud-floor courtyard shaded by a guerté 
toubab tree. His friends leant against a wall, fishing nets spread out at their feet 
that they mended with deft movements, threading cord through the frayed edges. 
Fishing had long been the main métier of Yongor’s Lebou inhabitants who, 
scattered in seaside hamlets across Dakar’s Cap Vert peninsula, were the 
Senegalese capital’s original population. Now a fishing crisis racked their 
neighbourhoods. Mohammadou had once worked as a mareyeur, selling fish and 
seafood, but no longer. Stocks had depleted in part because of an explosion in 
small-scale fishing, caused by Senegal’s worsening economy and the motorisation 
of pirogues (Nyamnjoh 2010). The biggest culprit in the emptying of the seas, 
however, was the sale of fishing rights to other states, not least Spain. The foreign 
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trawlers resting on Yongor’s horizon swallowed tonnes of fish destined for 
European and Asian markets. This, Mother Mercy and Mohammadou agreed, was 
why so many had tried to leave in 2006, embarking in the very boats they had 
previously used for fishing: here there were no jobs to be had. 
 Mohammadou leant back, sipped some bittersweet attaya, and repeated 
what was soon to become a familiar sum of money. “Do you know how much 
Wade and his government have earned from illegal migration?” he asked. 
“Thirteen billion CFA! And what has he done for us? Nothing.” The amount – 
referring to the €20m in Spanish aid offered at the time of the 2006 deportations – 
was lambasted not just by Mohammadou but by repatriates up and down 
Senegal’s coastline. Word circulated on how much money Wade had received per 
repatriate. “La migration clandestine a beaucoup d’argent,” Mohammadou 
insisted: there is lots of money in illegal migration.  
In Kayar, a fishing hamlet and tourist magnet north of Dakar, repatriates 
told the same bitter story. “Lots of NGOs came here after 2006,” said the 
president of Kayar’s repatriate association, “but we didn’t realise at the time that 
they were just trying to fill their own bellies.” We were careful to meet with his 
fellow repatriates in a large room, with everyone present so that there would be no 
suspicions of anyone receiving money for talking. “You have to say in your book 
that all those who have passed by here have done nothing for us!” one of them 
insisted. NGOs, journalists, researchers had all come. “What have we got out of 
it?” they asked, voices rising. “It’s been four years of talking!”  
 An acute awareness of what they saw as the great gains from illegality 
pervaded the repatriates’ migration experience. Mohammadou and his friends 
sensed that moneymakers trailed them on their journey, during repatriation and at 
home – “swindlers” and “liars” ready to make a killing from boat migration. They 
saw it in sea rescues and patrols, where boats were diverted from Spanish waters 
to Morocco since the latter would then “earn money from the European Union”. 
They saw it in the visits of EU delegates who come, “promise us things” and 
leave. They saw it in the scrum of journalists and researchers who “take our 
stories”. And they saw it in the western NGOs who “come here with their four-
wheel-drives” only to speed off once they have received funding for their spurious 
migration projects.  
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 I was no different to all those others, the more than 1,000 people 
Mohammadou said had visited their association since 2006. What could I offer? 
Money? Partners? Contacts? 
 All I offered was to set up a website. Nothing as slick and stylish as that of 
Mother Mercy’s collective, however. Not even a real website, mind, but a blog. 
The association’s IT expert typed their posts onto his laptop in his bedroom after 
Mohammadou’s attempts at hitting the right keys had failed. One of their first and 
only posts, in French, read like this: 
 
SUBJECT: LETTER ASKING FOR ASSISTANCE 
 
First of all, please accept our warmest greetings. We would like to let you know that 
our association was created between 2006 and 2007 in order to try to fix the youth to 
stay in the country because after our repatriation we have seen that a big number of 
youth had died at sea, after some time of waiting we have started to do sensitisation 
in the surrounding localities … but during this time we have received nothing from 
these promises even the European Union came to visit us last year with promises but 
none of that has been done. There are even people who talk about immigration 
without having experienced this scourge others content themselves with travelling to 
Europe by means of the repatriates and masquerade as people who come to find 
funding for the youth, while this is not the case because the money they bring in, 
they fill their bags with it. Even the projects and the visas that the Europeans gave to 
the repatriates have not even arrived to those concerned … This is why we turn to 
you so that at least we will have training centres to educate the youth, schools for the 
children of those who disappeared and funding to find some kind of work … We 
count on your understanding while waiting for assistance. 
 
THANK YOU   
 
No replies were forthcoming. With each attempt, and each visiting toubab, 
responsibility weighed heavier on Mohammadou’s shoulders. He was the 
president; he should bring partners. “Ana liggéey bi?” members of the association 
asked, stopping to chat with him on the streets. “Where is the work?” Lacking a 
good response, Mohammadou grew increasingly bitter and angry: for, unlike 
some repatriate “leaders”, he was sincere in seeking projects for the hundreds of 
repatriates in Yongor and their families, not just quick cash for himself. 
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 Meanwhile Mother Mercy was raking in the money, as the repatriates saw 
it. They had initially trusted her, seeing her as the benevolent “mother of the 
migrants”. Some even took loans she had negotiated, with sour after-effects for 
both parties. As the repatriates were sidelined, acrimony grew. By 2010 the split 
was deep and definite. Before the boat crisis she had lived in a single room, the 
repatriates said; now she had a big, big house. She was driven around by a 
chauffeur and flew off to conferences in Europe, but she could not go down to the 
seafront because she would be hounded away. She was a liar. “All that she says is 
false,” the repatriates kept repeating, like a record stuck in the same groove. She 
went and met funding agencies in Europe, then took the money but shared 
nothing. “100,000 CFA bills, 150,000 CFA bills, she takes them out as if they 
were cigarettes,” Mohammadou said with his trademark frown.  
 The repatriates’ anger towards Mother Mercy was, of course, not the 
whole story. It was rather a symptom of the double trauma visited upon Yongor’s 
inhabitants: first the deaths at sea, then the injustice of deportation and the 
unequal gains that followed. Mother Mercy was herself aware of the accusations. 
“People here think that when you are with a white person, he brings money,” she 
told me later, echoing the concerns of Mohammadou with his moneyless trail of 
researchers and reporters. “This creates problems and tensions in the community. 
[People say], I collect money here, I collect money there, but this is not the case!” 
Unlike Mohammadou’s association, however, she maintained “vertical and 
horizontal relations” with Spanish organisations, who had contributed substantial 
funds to her collective. The biggest funder was Aecid, the official Spanish 
development agency, which channelled money through Spanish NGOs. Their 
funding priorities, as I would soon see, held further clues to the role of the 
repatriates in Dakar’s illegality industry. 
 
 
 
In the Aecid offices in central Dakar, Rocío leafed through her files, looking for 
budget expenditure on migration-related projects that I had asked her about, with 
little luck. She was a Spanish development worker in her forties, brimming with 
enthusiasm for development. Projects were carried over from year to year, she 
explained; it was hard to get precise figures. I asked her why the repatriates got 
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nothing. She shrugged. “We’re a development agency,” she said. The funds “were 
for families who had lost someone, not for repatriates”. Indeed, their projects were 
presented as being about female empowerment, or for the “mother victims of the 
cayucos”. Brochures filled up with pictures of smiling African women sewing, 
dancing, shovelling and preparing fish, in what seemed a perfect example of the 
co-optation of once-radical development ideas by a larger state agenda (Gardner 
and Lewis 1996:126). Rocío was keen to stress the gulf separating development 
aid and migration controls, however. “We don’t want to know anything about that 
since it’s not our field,” she said and waved her hands as if pushing the patrols to 
one side. “That’s all with the Interior Ministry.”  
Such purification of development aid was a major clean-up operation. 
Development assistance was independent from clandestine migration, the Spanish 
ambassador insisted, and rather depended on the Africa Plan’s aim of fostering 
better relations with sub-Saharan nations.
13
 Leaving aside the fact that migration 
was already a fundamental part of this plan, the ambassador’s view also 
contrasted with recent findings on Spanish aid to Africa. One comprehensive, 
Aecid-funded study found that the country’s NGOs had expanded strongly in sub-
Saharan countries since 2006 thanks to exponentially growing official aid; that 
more than half of these NGOs had tenuous previous connection to the continent; 
and that the official funds directed especially at Senegal, Mali and Mauritania 
were closely related to irregular migration concerns.
14
 Another study focusing on 
these three countries similarly affirmed the “subordination of official development 
aid to Spain’s migration policy” there while stating that Spanish funds might even 
have hampered the stated policies of this aid – poverty reduction, human rights 
and democratic governance (Serón et al 2011:71).  
In the uneasy mixing of policing and poverty reduction, Spain’s West 
African experiment was but an extreme case of the perils of “co-development”. 
This approach, initiated in France, has meant seeing migrants as a factor in 
developing their home countries while contradictorily incorporating attempts to 
constrict such development-inducing migration flows (Audran 2008). “Co-
development,” Rocío quipped, “is meant to prevent… or, well…” She tried again. 
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It “could contribute to…” She stumbled. “It may or may not halt the departures.” 
Migration concerns entered Aecid’s remit under “vulnerable groups such as 
minors”, she explained, “who could later become fodder for illegal migration” 
(carne de migración clandestina). Maybe, she suggested, the repatriates could try 
to attract funding by presenting themselves as being vulnerable? 
 Before I left, Rocío looked over her shoulder towards the corridor, making 
sure no one was listening. “I say this since no one is here,” she began, lowering 
her voice, “but obviously, what are the links between Spain and Senegal? There 
are none. Links usually come through a shared language, a shared history, but 
with Senegal and Mali there is none of that.” She continued in a conspiratorial 
whisper: “It’s clear there’s a relation between [fighting] illegal migration and 
[funding] development here for Spain… though this topic is taboo.”  
  As in other international aid encounters, Spain’s migration-backed 
development push seemed like a case of “the emperors’ new clothes” (Bending 
and Rosendo 2006:226). Everyone started speaking the language of fighting 
illegal migration, perpetuating the illusion that the emperor was fully clothed. The 
irony was that Spanish and EU politicians, in seeking to depoliticise their anti-
migration operations through recourse to the language of drama on television and 
development on the ground, created a politicised development interface drawing 
in brokers, entrepreneurs and swindlers (Lewis and Mosse 2006). They were no 
longer in full control. 
 Through a trickle-down of development aid, local associations willing to 
take part in the fight would be co-opted and contained. This was part of a pattern 
of clientelism and “everyday corruption” in Senegal (Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan 2001), to be sure, but the illegality industry extended beyond this nexus to 
encompass European security, media and policy sectors as well. It also depended 
on a signifier amenable to infinite manipulation: the “fodder for illegal migration” 
invoked by Rocío. It was through this figure, in its IOM-promoted incarnation as 
“potential candidate for illegal migration”, that the business of migration had 
filtered down to the Senegalese “grassroots”.   
International agencies, the Senegalese state, western NGOs and local 
associations were all at it. On the top of the food chain were the “expatriates” 
parachuted in from other diplomatic or IOM missions. Tasked with tempering the 
illicit movements of their Senegalese hosts, they mixed in Dakar’s swish seaside 
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restaurants and mingled on the city’s expat party scene, where Guardia Civil 
officers on their three-month patrolling stints also made occasional appearances.  
One step down the food chain followed a range of Senegalese ministries 
that staked a claim in migration. While they in theory converged around the 
government’s official line, honed over the summer of 2006, of “protecting” 
Senegalese citizens from the risks of the boat journey (Gabrielli 2011), economic 
and political incentives made them pull in different directions. Chaos, as 
European aid workers complained, was the predictable result. Next came the 
European NGOs that had followed the money scattered by western governments 
in the pirogues’ wake. At the grassroots, again, the strategy was replicated. In a 
poor neighbourhood outside Dakar, a local development association had scribbled 
migration clandestine onto the end of its typed-up list of projects. A Senegalese 
human rights NGO, once of a radical bent, did sensibilisation with the IOM in 
Dakar and remote Tambacounda; it had produced T-shirts saying “There is 
another choice” on the front and “NO to illegal migration” on the back, and its 
office was plastered with stickers sporting the same message. Theatre troupes 
across Senegal did sensibilisation with cookie-cutter characters explaining the 
dangers of boat migration. In a Dakar fishing village, a branch of Mother Mercy’s 
collective invoked, in a letter asking for funds to build an ice factory, “our 
unfailing fight to make the youth of Senegal in general, and of [our 
neighbourhood] in particular, say no to illegal migration”. No matter that out of its 
local 500 members, only 20 at most had done mbëkë mi. Most of these, after all, 
fitted the IOM’s suitably loose profile of a potential candidate: young, male, and 
unemployed.  
 No partners came looking for Mohammadou and his friends. While aid 
workers such as Rocío insisted – correctly – that former migrants were not 
necessarily worse off than other youth struggling along in Dakar’s poor 
neighbourhoods, the repatriates’ sense of entitlement and frustration grew along 
with the parade of donors, brokers and visitors. However, their ire was mainly 
directed at Mother Mercy and other competitors, not at the funding agencies and 
European politicians. A quiet battle was raging among local associations about 
who was really fighting clandestine migration. Everyone bickered with everyone, 
not just in Yongor but across Senegal’s seaside communities. Moctar, the head of 
the presumably national association of repatriates, was working only for himself 
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rather than for a broader cause, local youth and repatriates said. In Kayar, one 
angry repatriate leader caught up with me in the back streets of the fish market. A 
rival association had received €6,500, “and they ate it all”, he said while pointing 
at scrawled funding figures in his notebook. “Some people benefit from this 
money in the name of the illegal migrants,” he said, waving a bunch of papers 
belonging to his association’s members. The papers – presumably certificates 
from Spain’s migrant detention centres – proved they were bona-fide clandestins, 
he insisted. He later turned out never to have made the boat journey.  
 Transcending this bickering was Mother Mercy, who played the funding 
game to perfection. Her success, as one academic noted [reference removed], was 
down to the combination of western concerns that her collective represented: 
women’s empowerment, development and illegal migration. But she was no 
victim of European priorities. She had entered a virtuous circle in which media 
exposure, political clout and more funding fed into each other. The women’s 
soap-making and handicraft projects found favour with donors, combining as they 
did a “back to the soil” strategy against migration and female empowerment. 
“Sometimes misfortune is good, we had never dared to speak out in our 
communities before,” she told me. “It’s thanks to migration, to the disappearance 
of our children, that we have integrated ourselves into male society.”  
 We should perhaps ask, along with Mosse (2004:8), not whether aid projects 
such as the Spanish migration-and-development drive succeed but how success is 
produced – and, we could add along with Ferguson (1990), what the side-effects 
of such success might be. The sensitisation drive, the mothers with their soap bars 
and the high-heeled farmhands put success in Senegalese quarters, while diverting 
activist and “grassroots” attention away from the controversial European patrols 
and repatriations that Wade’s government had approved. The illegality industry 
also created a role for former and potential migrants, but not as actors, brokers or 
beneficiaries. Instead, the repatriates oiled the cogs of the anti-migration 
machinery with their tragic experiences at sea. To them befell the thankless task 
of repeating their stories to the visitors-without-funds descending on Yongor – the 
researchers, fact-finders and journalists. 
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Migrants as content providers 
 
We were sitting in the “office”, people eating the peanut stew mafe from a shared 
platter, when a mobile phone rang. The association’s treasurer stopped fiddling 
with old Nokia SIM cards and took the phone, talking in French, and then handed 
the phone to Mohammadou, who went outside to continue the conversation. It 
was a journalist, he explained afterwards. Her reporting team would come on 
Sunday to discuss a documentary they wanted to film in Yongor.  
 I left the office with Mohammadou and Ali, walking along the rubbish-
strewn railtracks that spliced Yongor in half. Mohammadou was thoughtful, 
silent. Then he said: “I will ask her, what will we get from participating? All the 
time, people come here to speak to us about migration, always migration…” Ali 
nodded. “It’s tiring… we need compensation, or to talk of something else.” To 
him, “the most important thing is what happened after our migration.” The debt to 
relatives for the journey, the loss of jobs and savings and the fruitless funding 
battles – not to mention the day-to-day struggles for “migrant” and non-migrant 
alike in Senegal’s rattled economy – were not foremost in journalists’ minds, as 
Ali and Mohammadou were well aware. 
 A few hundred metres along the tracks lay the office of Yongor’s mayor. 
He had lost a brother and a cousin to mbëkë mi after paying for their fatal journey, 
and was sympathetic to the repatriates’ struggles. “Tell the journalists the truth,” 
he advised Mohammadou as we sat in plush sofas in his reception room. 
Mohammadou listened and nodded, saying little more. As we walked back, 
Mohammadou mulled his tactics. “We will say we haven’t seen any help from 
Europe, but without mentioning Mother Mercy,” he said. “It’s better that way.”  
 The repatriates had already met hundreds of journalists, but little had come 
of all this attention except broken promises. “In 2007, journalists came here 
almost every day,” said one member of the association. “They come and do their 
reports, all the time they come, then they just leave and we never hear from them 
again.” Mohammadou used to wonder where his photo had ended up, in how 
many news reports. “If I go to England and I see my photo on a poster, I ask 
myself why.”  
 62 
The poster image for boat migration was, however, not Mohammadou or 
his fellow repatriates; it was Mother Mercy, whose qualities made for perfect 
feature stories. She was the strong and steadfast mother and also the bereaved, 
impoverished victim. Such media portrayals, as one academic notes in an analysis 
of news coverage of the collective, pandered to western stereotypes of the African 
woman. Here the Mother Mercy moniker made perfect sense for western 
audiences as a “consensual figure arousing the compassion of everyone” in 
“fusing the charisma of the victim and the activist” [reference removed]. And the 
women played along, singing and showing pictures of their dead sons and 
husbands during journalists’ visits. Some entrepreneurial young repatriates had 
also found a source of income in chasing contacts for the journalists, offering up 
smugglers and marabouts, bereaved relatives and jobless fishermen, according to 
the needs of the story. Mohammadou and his friends had played this game too, 
but they were tired. Unlike Mother Mercy, they saw little outcome of the visits. 
 After the media stampede came the more slow-footed researchers. Many 
were preparing their postgraduate theses; some worked for NGOs; others might 
have been undercover police. “I’ll be completely honest,” a UN official in Dakar 
told me, relishing his moment. “Around 60 researchers have come here in the past 
few years to study irregular migration. You’d better think of another topic.” 
The repatriates had belatedly learnt that the clandestine migrant was a 
valuable piece of merchandise, and now wanted their slice of the business. 
Moctar, the repatriate president, said they had decided not to speak about their 
experiences unless they got something out of it. “For a small sum, I’ll give you 
three or four guys,” he told me. “Maybe 10,000 CFA is enough since you are a 
research student.” This was a discount, he made clear – self-appointed middlemen 
had been given 100,000 CFA or more by journalists keen on stories. While 
researchers such as myself often refused, the journalists kept giving, sometimes in 
the form of a gift to Mother Mercy’s collective, other times as a backhand fee to 
the fixers.  
Except for these one-off payments, the repatriates were unable to monetise 
their media presence. Their stereotype within the illegality industry was not that 
of Africans needing empowerment; it was that of wild youth in need of 
domestication. The only thing they could sell was their story at sea, which made 
for a perfect piece of journalism – a package of suffering and high drama that 
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worked both as hard news and feature fodder. And this story, as other researchers 
such as Nyamnjoh (2010:21) also attest, became shrouded in ambivalences and 
resistance in its telling and retelling.  
 One day I went with Mohammadou to see Momar, one of the association’s 
spokesmen. He was a dreadlocked member of Baye Fall, the Muslim Mourid 
devotees famed throughout Senegal for their colourful ragged clothes and itinerant 
begging on behalf of their marabout. We sat down on a foam mattress in Momar’s 
bare room as he emptied a “gunpowder” tea bag into a metal pot and put it on the 
coals. I asked if he wanted to speak about his journey. Momar was a kind man 
who found it hard to say no. “I do it for Mohammadou,” he said eventually. “We 
have a policy not to speak to anyone.” Mohammadou reiterated the figure of 
1,000 journalists and researchers visiting them since their return. Still, they kept 
yielding to demands for stories.  
 “It’s harder now than before leaving,” said Momar, who was a self-
employed plumber. “In 2006, I could find clients but after I left my clients found 
other workers. I had to start from scratch again.” This lack of funds, the 
repatriates often said, was another reason no one contemplated departing 
anymore: in 2006 at least they had some funds to draw upon for the trip.  
Then Momar talked of his journey. “Only the brave ones (nit ñu am jóm) 
left,” he said. His pirogue departed on 28 July 2006 – everyone remembers the 
date they set off – and he summed up his ordeal in a few words: “I went on mbëkë 
mi, I lost all my money, I lost many friends, I returned with nothing, nothing, 
nothing.”  
On the seventh day water and food ran out, Momar explained as we sipped 
our tea. The passengers, desperate, started drinking seawater. Then the fuel tanks 
dried up, so they cut down the tarp covering the pirogue to make an improvised 
sail. They ripped chunks of wood off the boat’s sides to make a mast and oars and 
spent hours rowing, 20 men on each side. There were 92 on board, lost on the 
high seas. Eleven people died. Several among them passed away on Momar’s lap.  
“The fourteenth day they started dying,” added Mohammadou, who had 
begun filling in Momar on the details. Soon they were bouncing elements of the 
story off each other, talking of how Momar’s pirogue – or was it 
Mohammadou’s? – had been intercepted. It was the Moroccans, not the 
Spaniards, who finally “came to the coasts of the Canary Islands to take us away”. 
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The more they talked, the blurrier the story became. It was a standardised account 
of their misery, I started to realise, a tale they had repeated so many times they 
knew it by heart, their individual tragedies melting into each other for the benefit 
of the visiting interviewers. Whose story was I hearing, and how many had heard 
it before me?  
They had stopped speaking to visitors, Momar said, since so many had 
come, and because the journalists asked “if you are normal or crazy”, questioning 
their sanity. What most shocked the journalists, Mohammadou said, was the 
descent from solidarity into chaos on the boat: how “yesterday we ate together, 
today we throw you into the water. But if you don’t, everyone will die on board.” 
Yet despite their complaints, the repatriates kept talking to the journalists and 
researchers. Their stories were, after all, the only product they could offer the 
illegality industry.  
 
 
 
The French film team arrived in Yongor in early April. I caught up with 
Mohammadou and his friends at the shore, where they sat atop a beached pirogue, 
blankly watching the cameraman home in on a woman doing the laundry. “She 
lost her husband in mbëkë mi,” Mohammadou said in his usual dry voice. Down at 
the beachfront, a pirogue was being prepared for a film trip at sea. The journalists 
had paid for the petrol, Mohammadou said. They had also paid for a meal of 
cebujën (rice and fish, Senegal’s national dish) for everyone, and had promised 
“something more” too. It was not clear what this was. Money? Contacts? 
Mohammadou said nothing more. 
 The conversation drifted onto the topic of funding partners. “You should 
help us find partners now that you’re a member of the association,” said Omar, 
their fast-talking, self-proclaimed spokesman who had suddenly shown up. The 
French documentary-maker, hearing the exchange, came out from under a shaded 
canopy and joined us on the boat, notepad in hand. “Could you help us find 
contacts?” they asked her eagerly. “You should prepare a dossier with your 
projects,” she suggested, looking sceptical. “We have done it already!” they 
insisted. Omar said an EU delegation had been there; the delegates had promised 
things but nothing came of it. He picked up his mobile and called the EU offices 
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in Dakar, but the delegate was away. Conversation died away and the repatriates 
sauntered down to the shoreline while the reporter lingered. “Why are they not 
leaving any more?” she asked me, looking out over the waters, past the pirogues 
towards Gorée island and the cargo ships. “Do people really know about the 
economic crisis in Europe?”  
 Besides their fascination with the tragedies on board, visitors struggled to 
comprehend migrants’ decision to depart. While academics analysed the journey 
as a form of collective risk-taking and an identity-forging experience (Hernández 
Carretero 2008; Melly 2011), their journalistic colleagues usually resorted to a 
quicker, neater explanation: a mix of desperation and ignorance, with Europe 
pictured as a shimmering El Dorado on the horizon. This vision, shared by 
politicians and donors, justified the need for sensibilisation on both the risks of 
the journey and the perils of life in Europe. By contrast, the migrants’ motto of 
Barça walla barzakh certainly conjured up an El Dorado, yet like the term mbëkë 
mi it also rendered the journey as an expected headache. Rather than being 
ignorant of the risks, migrants embraced it in a quest to affirm their masculine 
prowess, as Melly (ibid) notes. In mbëkë mi, Lebou fishermen out of work had 
suddenly found themselves as the protagonists in a national drama – the heroic 
seeking of European shores in defiance of the Senegalese and Spanish 
governments.  
Now, in the aftermath of their equally spectacular failure, ambivalence 
suffused the repatriates’ relationship with the foreign visitors. They often evaded 
the questions thrown at them and at times came up with fake answers, but they 
still replied. Maybe this time, someone would listen. Maybe for once, the hacks 
could put them in touch with a partner. Mohammadou kept finding excuses for 
talking. “This is the last time,” he said, or he got a business card out to show me 
that the reporter was, for once, worth the effort: “he is from France 3!” They 
always hoped, against experience, that this time would be different. With the 
French television team, they would yet again be sorely disappointed. 
 
 
 
Autumn had come. I was back in Dakar and Mohammadou met me as usual at the 
highway. On the corner someone had lined up stereos and radios, stacked a plastic 
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plate with detergent bottles and heaped old shoes onto a blanket. “It’s the modou-
modou who have brought it here,” Mohammadou said as we made our way into 
the neighbourhood. It was the time of tabaski, the Muslim festival Eid al-Adha 
when many migrants came back to visit their families.   
 Outside the women’s collective a shack had been erected, its top adorned 
with the now-familiar logos of Aecid and Spanish NGOs. Inside sat a bored-
looking woman in a blue dress, the shelves around her stacked with handmade 
soap, African dolls and assorted souvenirs. “They do that every year,” explained 
Mohammadou, “to sell to the visitors. But this year, no one is coming.” The 
largesse was moving elsewhere. 
 Mohammadou nevertheless had some good news to share. The association 
had joined in the preparations for the World Social Forum, the large annual 
gathering of activists, NGOs and politicians for an alternative globalisation.
15
 The 
turn had now come to West Africa to host this international event, and Dakar had 
been chosen as the venue. Mohammadou’s association would, in part thanks to 
my contact with the FSM, take part. “We had no idea there was a forum 
happening in Dakar,” he told visitors later on. “A social forum here in Senegal 
without the immigrants, it’s nothing at all.”  
Retreating from our usual shaded courtyard to watch a Chelsea football 
game, Mohammadou revealed he had recently hosted another team of reporters, 
who had come via the Forum. “Next time I don’t want to do it,” he said, “I’ll tell 
the Forum that.” The association and elders from Yongor had been invited to the 
pre-launch of the Forum, travelling there in buses and taxis as a real delegation. 
“We won’t ask for money at the Forum, we’ll go there to find contacts,” 
Mohammadou said. “It’s like with you, do you remember the day I came looking 
for you at Mother Mercy’s place? And see, now you bring cigarettes!” The 
delivery was deadpan as usual, but there was a new humour and bounce in his 
voice. Maybe things were soon to change. 
 As we walked back to the main road across the railtracks, Mohammadou 
said they had still not heard back from the French reporters. One of his friends 
chipped in, saying his sister had seen them on TV in Tunisia. “If we don’t see a 
result everyone will think that we have got something out of it!” another repatriate 
                                                 
15
 See http://fsm2011.org/en/wsf-2011    
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added. We said goodbye at the main road, where trucks roared out of Dakar and 
Senegal’s police went past on their nightly anti-migration patrols. 
As anthropologists such as Veena Das (1995) have noted, the telling of 
traumatic stories is often marred by silences and resistances. Survivors of conflict 
and disaster reel as visitors gain “fame from writing, filming or reporting about 
us” (Drakulic 2012). Unlike in the aftermath of war, however, the boat tragedy did 
not even raise the hope of bringing a perpetrator to account. There was no one to 
blame but the Atlantic waves, the “unscrupulous smugglers” and the repatriates 
themselves. With no result to show for their labours – not even a copy of the 
images, books or films extracted from their accounts – the repatriates’ retellings 
of their tragedies only mired them further in illegality, fuelling resentment and 
distrust at those who ate from migration. 
 
Repatriation and the economics of affliction 
 
In February 2011 the Forum descended on Dakar. The venue, Université Cheikh 
Anta Diop, had been invaded by cosmopolitan altermondialistes, Native 
American delegations, Moroccan nationalists, curious Dakarois students and an 
ever-growing crowd of vendors flogging straw hats, beads and postcards along the 
leafy roads of the campus. Amid the trinket stands and the swelling crowds, a 
theatre piece was taking place. A quick glance at the props spread out on the 
pavement – a fishing net, planks depicting a boat – gave it away as sensibilisation 
on illegal migration; so did the wail of the female protagonist. As her sobs 
subsided, her male co-protagonist spoke, arguing forcefully against departure: to 
leave for Europe “without mastering the language, without profession” did not 
make sense, he admonished his audience. The play was done in French instead of 
Wolof for the benefit of the foreign visitors, explained an Italian worker from the 
NGO funding the show. The actors already had multi-lingual experience: besides 
performing for candidates for illegal migration, they also did sensitisation shows 
for tourists whose solidarity trips financed the campaigns. “That way, the tourists 
know where their money’s going.” 
Elsewhere on campus, the venerable Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire 
was to host the migration and diaspora section of the weeklong gathering. But 
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nothing was going to plan. Wade’s government, suddenly unhappy with Forum 
radicalism, had deposed the university’s director, and the new one withdrew his 
support from the event. The halls of IFAN were closed, meetings got cancelled, 
chaos reigned on campus.  
Among the presenters was Yongor’s repatriate association. The repatriates 
had lost their hall in the chaos, and did not know where to go. I tagged along, as 
did two researcher colleagues. Eventually we found an empty lecture hall. There 
was no one in the gloomy science classroom, only Mohammadou, two of his 
fellow repatriates and us. A third, rival collective of “families affected by illegal 
migration” from Yongor had also made it there in the form of their spokesman, 
Alioune, and three women dressed in their finery. They had broken with Mother 
Mercy because of anger over funding and were still hoping against hope for news 
of their disappeared relatives. Like Mother Mercy, who we had spotted earlier 
mingling in the migration and diaspora grounds, they also hoped to find potential 
partners. 
 The room was oppressively hot in the late afternoon. We waited: maybe 
more people would arrive. Mohammadou wavered, not sure whether to go ahead. 
They had talked about this moment for months. Then a French woman in her 
fifties entered and sat down. Mohammadou decided to begin.  
 “I know very well that the people didn’t want to have a conference about 
illegal migration, because they know that if I speak, they will know the reality of 
illegal migration.” Mohammadou spoke in a deep voice that receded into a 
mumble, resting on a school bench at the top of the room, cap on head. “There are 
people who earn a lot of money from illegal migration, but since 2006, the young 
repatriates haven’t received anything from illegal migration.” He found the 
French woman’s eyes and held them as he told his story of 14 days at sea, 95 
people packed together. “There are mothers here who have lost their sons… while 
others say they have lost relatives, and go earn money in Europe.” He fixed his 
gaze on the woman as he talked in a calm, steady tone about the lost lives. The 
dirty fans did not whirr, dust stuck to the walls and sweat to our bodies. “Who is 
responsible, the European Union? Who?” Someone swallowed. Outside the closed 
door I heard the shuffle of feet, a reminder that soon this meeting would end and 
we could go back out to mingle among the careless students. “Here they have 
hidden everything, they have hidden everything, because people don’t want to 
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understand the reality.” Still Mohammadou held the French woman’s eyes. “They 
don’t give any resources for keeping the youth in place,” he said. I averted my 
gaze, instead scanning the walls where grimy posters hung depicting uranium 
chain reactions. “I’m not the association,” he continued, gesturing to his fellow 
repatriates. “The association needs assistance… You have to go speak in Spain, in 
Italy, because we don’t have the means to go there.” He mentioned the journalists 
who had come, the French reporter team from last spring, people calling him to 
say they had seen him on television, books he had helped Europeans write. “But 
the money from that, where do they put it?” Two of the mothers of Yongor were 
slouching over their desks, slipping into an afternoon stupor in the airless hall. 
“It’s finished, talking about illegal migration… you have to help the youth and the 
mothers.” A soft, short applause ensued, followed by a sad silence.  
Then Alioune and the mothers talked of their tragedy under the pale lights 
of the hall. “They are 86 families who really want to talk,” said Alioune, also 
addressing the French woman. As he handed out his business cards, she finally 
saw her chance and escaped from the room. 
 
 
 
Amid their fruitless hunt for partners, the repatriates had been put to work in three 
ways in the illegality industry: as human deterrents, as commodities to be bartered 
by NGOs and authorities, and as an alluring presence ripe for journalistic or 
academic portrayal. The illegality industry was not a smooth operation forged by 
policymakers and politicians in their European offices, however. Instead it 
mutated and grew increasingly absurd as Spanish (and Senegalese) needs for 
depoliticising controversial border operations co-opted development aid from 
above – a process that was, in turn, co-opted from below in manners akin to those 
described by Mosse (2004:239). While Mother Mercy was an expert at this 
snagging and snaring of the funders, the repatriates also tried their best. Here, the 
voyeurism inherent in clandestine migration – a veiled presence to be discovered 
by police, journalists or potential partners – spurred new and shifting modes of 
self-presentation. Sometimes repatriates decided to render themselves visible as 
illegal migrants, much like they would tear off their invisibility amulets or gris-
gris on the open sea once all hope was gone and they waited for a miraculous 
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rescue. They did so when calling upon the Senegalese state to do justice to the 
repatriates, when selling their story to journalists and researchers, or when 
presenting themselves as pacifiers of candidates for illegal migration to western 
funders. In the process, states, NGOs and repatriates all conspired in the “making 
up” of the illegal migrant (Hacking 1986). 
 What type of migrant was being made up? As Peutz and de Genova 
(2010:8) have said, the global deportation regime allocates individuals to their 
designated slots across the world, maintaining the fiction of place-bound, discrete 
belonging. It was such a territorial solution (Cornelisse 2010) that Spain had tried 
to achieve in Senegal. A brief crack had opened in the armour of the West, but by 
2010 order had been re-established. The gate to Europe had slammed shut. The 
wild men who once steered towards European shores were back where they 
belonged, immobilised and resentful in their homeland.  
Deportation had at first made the repatriates into tragic heroes. Melly 
(2011:363), commenting on tales of “missing men” during Senegal’s boat craze, 
says that “it was through repetition and reiteration of tales of failed migration 
attempts that men became spectacularly present as national adventurers, risk-
taking entrepreneurs, and devoted family men who were willing to sacrifice 
themselves for others”. Yet their return had entangled the repatriates in a battle 
over funds and dignity from which they emerged as diminished figures. As they 
were left to scramble for the spoils of the illegality industry, the imaginary of their 
one-time migrations mutated. No longer simply the stuff of heroic tales, mbëkë mi 
increasingly turned into a stigma. Illegal migration, prevented in sensitisation 
campaigns and paraded by repatriates’ morose and idle bodies, came to resemble 
less a sign of bravado and sacrifice than a disease-like affliction.  
This served the authorities well, but Mohammadou and his friends were 
nonetheless no pawns bartered between NGOs and “community leaders”, 
politicians and police, journalists and anthropologists. In their tragic attempts to 
reach the Canaries, they had thrown a line and hook across the waters to Europe. 
Their one-time journeys were an exercise in mutual interpellation (Althusser 
1971) that not only created relations between Spanish and African politicians, 
journalists and NGOs, but also entitled the migrants to ask the Europeans for 
funds, reparations and recognition. By 2010, most of Yongor’s former migrants 
were firmly ensconced at home, with little thought of leaving again because of the 
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patrols, the poverty and the tragedy they had faced. In their never-ending attempts 
to find partners, they nevertheless tried to convert their boat ordeal into political 
and economic capital. When this failed, only a wounded, resentful pride remained. 
 Down at the beach, looking out over the milky waters towards the Guardia 
Civil boat, Mohammadou fixed his eyes on me. “No one can stop us,” he said. 
“We are Africans.” To prove his point he unbuttoned his shirt to show a snake-
like leathery amulet wrapped round his stomach. The gris-gris would protect him 
if he were ever to leave again. It would make him invisible to the prying eyes of 
Senegalese police and the Spanish coast guards, the radars and the infrared 
cameras crisscrossing the wild waves all the way to the Canary Islands. There 
were new, stronger motors on the market, 60 horsepower Yamahas that would 
take them there even faster than in 2006. “We have no fear,” Mohammadou said. 
“We have no fear of the planes, we have no fear of the boats, we have no fear of 
the crisis.”  
Mohammadou and his fellow former migrants were not just dragged into 
the measly trickle-down world of Dakar’s aid industry. They would also become 
capital in a high-stakes game of bordering Europe, whose webs of control were 
every bit as invisible and magical as those of Mohammadou’s gris-gris. This 
border regime, and its extraction of the very “risk” once embraced by the 
repatriates, is the subject of the next chapter. 
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A game of risk 
 
 
 
Deep in the bowels of the Guardia Civil headquarters in Madrid, ten men sit 
around a small wooden table in an open-plan room. Uniformed marines, suited 
police and green-clad guardias clutch their phones or type awkwardly on identical 
laptops lined up round the table. A Baltic policeman dials head office and a stern-
looking officer speaks broken English down the line. The men are East European, 
Icelandic, Italian, Dutch and Spanish. Their table is the nerve centre of the 
European border agency Frontex’s migration control operations off Spain’s 
southern coasts.  
 Follow the wires and satellite networks as they spin away from this room 
and you will reach Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. There, at the back of the Military 
Palace, is the regional coordination centre for migration surveillance along the 
Atlantic seaboard. Inside, on an electronic map in a guardia-manned control 
room, patrol boats appear as blips in the waters between the Canaries and Africa. 
Next door sit Senegalese, Moroccan and Mauritanian officers who communicate 
with their African colleagues down the telephone cables and satellite links that 
reach, like the translucent strands of a great spider’s web, all the way to Dakar and 
the coast outside Mohammadou’s neighbourhood.  
 
A Euro-African border is under construction at the southern edge of Europe. 
Clandestine boat migration is a small phenomenon yet vast amounts of money 
have been spent on radars, satellites, advanced computer systems and patrols by 
sea, land and air to prevent migrants from leaving the African coastline in the first 
place. From state-of-the-art control rooms in Europe to rundown West African 
borderposts, from Atlantic coasts to the Mediterranean Sea, a new border regime 
is at work, aimed at tracking one principal target – the “illegal immigrant”.  
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Europe’s emerging border regime underlines the seismic shift that scholars 
have detected at contemporary frontiers (Parker et al 2009). Ballooning 
enforcement budgets, new technology and tougher migration laws are leading to a 
rebordering of rich states (Andreas and Biersteker 2003; Walters 2006) even as 
these borders are migrating away from their territorial boundaries (Guild 2008; 
Balibar 1998). Borders now exist in the ledgers of African police, in trucks 
scanned for migrant bodies, in surveillance software or remote visa controls. 
Amid such a proliferation, the borders of Europe appear less like those of a 
fortress and more like a fluid internet firewall (Walters 2006; Bigo 2005). Yet for 
all its recent “deterritorialised” dispersal, the border regime has a distinguished 
historical and geographical pedigree. It actively draws upon the Mediterranean 
and Atlantic waters with their ancient power to both divide and unite (Braudel 
1975) while mimicking the ancient Roman limes, the fortified imperial limit or 
buffer beyond which the barbarians awaited (Walters 2004). Limes is, in twenty-
first century Europe, the name of a border control programme; Greek and Roman 
gods lend their names to joint patrolling operations.  
The novelty of the Euro-African border, it will be argued, lies in a gradual 
process of abstraction of both the border itself and the clandestine traveller who 
approaches it. This process in turn hinges on the rendering of the migrant and his 
boat as a peculiar kind of risk. The language of risk, as Ulrich Beck (2009) notes, 
is spreading globally – it fuels financial market panics, terrorist fears and 
apocalyptic visions of climate change. While Beck’s early conception of risk has 
been widely criticised by anthropologists for being universalistic, reified and 
ignorant of power (see e.g. Caplan 2000:24-25; Vera-Sanso 2000:128), his more 
recent work sees risk as the anticipation of catastrophe (Beck 2009): it is 
manufactured, staged and acted upon, in the process becoming ever more real. 
The “game of risk” played out by Europe’s border agencies on high seas and in 
control rooms is such a staging, in which experts and security forces labour under 
the sign of looming catastrophe. In doing so, they remove the migrants and their 
rickety boats from the political field and treat them as something new, something 
abstract: a security threat approaching the external EU border. 
This process is known as “securitisation”, of which more will be said 
below. Securitisation has two distinct meanings in international relations and 
global finance but both, as will be seen in Frontex headquarters and Spanish 
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control rooms, try to disperse and reduce risk (Gledhill 2008). Yet risk cannot be 
contained by the border regime – and neither can the conflicts spawned by the 
ever-higher stakes in the business of bordering Europe.  
 
Joint Operation Hera: drawing the line 
 
Madrid, June 2010. Europe’s border regime remains largely unknown even to law 
enforcement officers, tucked away as it is into the far corners of distant cities and 
historic buildings. At the fortress-like Guardia Civil headquarters in Madrid, none 
of the guardias manning the gate knew about the International Coordination 
Centre (ICC) for migration controls. “Ah, is that Indalo?” one guardia asked, 
finally dialling the Comandante in charge. Indalo was one of two migration patrol 
operations along Spanish coasts, covering the Mediterranean coasts of Andalusia 
and Murcia. It took its name from an ancient good-luck charm from Spain’s 
southern Almería region, said to ward off evil: 
 
 
 
A guardia took me across the courtyard, up a flight of stairs and down a corridor 
from the ICC control room with its table of wired-up officers. Comandante 
Francisco sat behind his polished wooden desk, a large Spanish flag hanging in 
the corner. Francisco led the Guardia Civil on Indalo, and also oversaw the second 
Frontex joint operation in Spain: the patrolling of the Atlantic Ocean between 
West Africa and the Canary Islands.  
 The mass arrival of migrant boats in the Canaries had first taken Spain by 
surprise. “We weren’t geared up in the beginning,” Francisco said. “These were 
islands, an archipelago,” said a guardia colleague in Tenerife. “What problems 
could we have? There were just no serious problems in border control here.” But 
the Guardia Civil, responsible for patrolling land and sea borders in Spain, soon 
found their feet. By the time of the “boat crisis” in 2006, the building blocks of 
the new border regime were already being put in place. The Spanish government 
scrambled for EU support and signed secretive patrolling and readmissions 
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agreements with Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal.
1
 Soon it also had Frontex, 
Europe’s young border agency, on board. Francisco had left on a mission to the 
windblown port city of Nouadhibou in Mauritania, from where migrant boats had 
set off that summer, earning it the nickname la ville des clandestins (city of illegal 
migrants). His objective was the launch of unprecedented anti-migration patrols 
along African coasts. The Atlantic waters lapping against the Canary Islands 
would become the laboratory for a “migration management” model soon to be 
exported across Europe’s southern borders. 
Hera was the name given to the Frontex joint operation in the Atlantic. 
Erstwhile wife of Zeus, Hera is the Hellenic goddess of love and marriage, and 
she has achieved a perfect union between Spain, the EU and West African states. 
Hera I, launched in July 2006, brought experts to the Canaries to help identify the 
nationalities of detained migrants. Frontex later claimed “100 per cent success” in 
this operation. Hera II, launched a month later, brought Frontex-funded and 
Guardia Civil patrol vessels to African coasts. For the first time, European and 
West African states were patrolling the EU’s borders together.  
Hera has pride of place in the Frontex pantheon. In the Frontex booklet 
Beyond the Frontier, a sepia-tinted stocktaking five years on from the agency’s 
creation, Hera is described as “pivotal in achieving success. Before Operation 
Hera everything was theory. But after Hera the way forward was clear… [it was] 
the birth of sea operations” (Frontex 2010:37). Hera, Comandante Francisco said, 
was “the prototype that Frontex would like to export to the other joint operations”. 
They work “in the jurisdictional waters from where they are leaving, it’s the ideal 
operation”, he said. “You have to prevent them leaving, you can’t wait for them to 
arrive… That way you save many lives.” Early interception meant you saved 
money as well, he added: if migrants arrive “you give them food, you have to take 
care of them”. 
The numbers reveal why Hera was so popular. Arrivals in the Canaries fell 
from around 32,000 in 2006 to 2,200 in 2009. By 2010, the flow had virtually 
stopped. Moreover, none of the recent arrivals were sub-Saharan Africans, and 
none had departed from Mauritania and Senegal, instead using the shorter route 
                                                 
1
 Mauritania already had a 2003 readmissions agreement, which was reactivated in 2006 
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from Western Sahara to the eastern Canary Islands. The direct passage from West 
Africa to Europe had effectively been “closed”.  
Hera was a first, successful attempt at a Europeanised border regime, and 
“Frontex” soon became a shorthand for this attempt. One former guardia 
explained the process to me in a café with the use of two tapas plates: “First came 
the pateras,” he said, using the generic Spanish term for migrant boats, as he 
moved a plate across the table. “Then they put Frontex here.” Another plate on the 
table, blocking the route. Among border workers in the Canaries, the migration 
control centre created in Las Palmas was known as el Frontex. This agency, like a 
concrete obstacle, had through Hera halted the migrants boats. It had also – for the 
first time – drawn a clear borderline across the seas, separating Europe’s 
southernmost reaches from the African coasts.  
Yet the line, as soon as it was drawn, was already becoming diffuse; it was 
but the first step in the business of bordering Europe in the boats’ wake. 
 
Risk to life: rescues in the border zone 
 
Las Palmas, January 2010. Comandante Ignacio greeted me on the steps of el 
Frontex. The CCRC (Centro de Coordinación Regional de Canarias), as his 
domains were formally known, occupied the back offices of the Military Palace in 
central Las Palmas while waiting for new locales out of town. Inside, the corridors 
were adorned with pictures that would soon become a familiar sight in other 
Guardia Civil control centres – drowning Africans being pulled onto patrol boats, 
detained Moroccan migrants squatting next to a wall, patrol vessels racing 
through the waves. Upstairs, strung around a Canarian patio, lay offices for the 
chiefs of operations, intelligence gathering, international liaison officers and 
command and control. In the command and control centre, two young guardias 
manned the twin terminals. “Thanks to their work, no pateras arrive now,” said 
Ignacio with pride. A large electronic map projected on the wall showed the six 
Canary Islands and a scattering of Guardia Civil boats and vehicles on sea and 
land. Numbered sections of the seas indicated zones assigned to military planes 
monitoring the Atlantic under the Defence Ministry’s Operation Noble Sentry.2 
                                                 
2
 “Noble Centinela” ended in 2010 
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The control centre oversaw the whole operational zone, about 425,000 square 
kilometres of open sea between the Canaries, Cape Verde and Senegal (Arteaga 
2007:3).  
The Hera deployment had been impressive. By the summer of 2006, 
Guardia Civil vessels patrolled first the Mauritanian and then the Senegalese 
coasts in alliance with their African colleagues; Frontex-funded and Spanish 
military planes circled the open Atlantic; and the Spanish sea rescue service 
Salvamento Marítimo scoured the high seas in search for boat migrants. The 
proliferation of agencies involved in patrolling needed a coordination centre, and 
this took the form of the CCRC. This centre was to be run by the Guardia Civil, 
which as Spain’s military-status police force was an ideal choice according to one 
guardia: “The military won’t get upset and the civilians won’t get angry since the 
Guardia Civil has a civilian scope.” One security analyst called the CCRC “an 
experiment in security that is ahead of its time…  its mission represents a new 
generation of security: one that goes beyond what can be defined as purely 
internal or external, national or international, civilian or military” (ibid:6). The 
CCRC’s “multi-disciplinary” model, since exported and updated in the form of 
the ICC in Madrid, enabled an unprecedented visualisation and control of the 
southern maritime border.  
The CCRC’s very architecture highlighted how migration has in recent 
years emerged as what Didier Bigo (2001) calls a “global security problem” 
situated at the threshold of internal and external security. As states have shifted 
from “war fighting” to “crime fighting” at the borders, Andreas and Price (2001) 
assert, the roles of security forces have become increasingly mixed. In this new 
security landscape, Bigo (2001:121) stresses that, contrary to much popular and 
academic opinion, “migration control is not an answer to a security problem.” 
Instead, security agencies nervous about their future relevance “compete among 
themselves to have their objectives included in politicians’ platforms”. The CCRC 
stood not just as a monument to the winners in this battle on the Spanish front, the 
Guardia Civil. Rather, its placing at the back of the Military Palace, its new 
technology and multi-agency staff proved a catalyst in the shift towards a 
“militarisation of policing and domestication of soldiering” (Andreas and Price 
2001:31) around the figure of the illegal immigrant.  
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 
 
A worthy cause was needed to justify this militarised deployment. The solution 
was, as indicated by Comandante Francisco and confirmed by the pictures in the 
CCRC corridors, the crucial task of “saving lives”. The legal scholar Matteo 
Tondini has argued that Frontex maritime interceptions “may be in principle 
legally justified only if retained [as] rescue interventions” (2010:26) and this 
seems to be a lesson that high-ranking border guards have taken to heart. In the 
words of Giuseppe, an Italian coast guard and former project manager of Hera, 
“the priority is to save human lives, and this entails intercepting all the boats that 
try to arrive in Spain before they reach the coasts”. The basis for interceptions, 
Giuseppe confirmed, was “rescuing lives” based on SOLAS, the international 
convention for the safety of life at sea.  
 The bordering of southern Europe was aided by the fact that maritime 
borders are by their nature diffuse and governed by a patchwork of rules under 
international law.
3
 While humanitarianism provided a legal justification for 
interceptions on the open or “free” seas (Mare Liberum), it also lent a pre-emptive 
rationale to the controversial policing of African territorial waters, where Spanish 
memoranda of understanding signed with coastal states allowed the Europeans to 
patrol as long as local officers were formally in charge of the decision to 
intercept.
4
 “What matters is helping people,” said one guardia, “whether it’s at 
one [nautical] mile, or 15, or 30, or 200… when helping a boat there is no limit.”  
This humanitarian urge seems at odds with the boat tragedies in the 
Mediterranean, where at least 1,500 migrants died in 2011 alone (HRW 2012). 
Here loopholes in the international search and rescue regime (SAR) and SOLAS, 
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Aalberts (2010:17) assert, mean that European states can 
heave off responsibilities for rescuing migrant boats to their neighbours. The 
search-and-rescue laws, Human Rights Watch (2012) notes, are moreover unclear 
                                                 
3
 Under international law, national sovereignty extends for 12 nautical miles from the coasts; next 
follow a “contiguous zone” of limited sovereignty for another 12 miles, the “exclusive economic 
zone” of up to 200 miles and, finally, Mare Liberum 
4
 The agreements, which have not been made public, differ from country to country. Senegal 
allows non-Spanish Frontex boats and planes to patrol in the exclusive economic zone; Mauritania 
allows only the Guardia Civil to patrol, and only in the contiguous zone (Guardia Civil, personal 
communication) 
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on the concept of distress at sea, “allowing ships to ignore dangerously 
overcrowded and ill-equipped migrant boats”.  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to states such as Malta, however, Spanish patrols saw any migrant 
vessel as a virtual shipwreck (náufrago). In the words of one Spanish sea rescue 
chief, a cayuco was a “danger for navigation” by definition, akin to a coach racing 
down a highway “without brakes”. Such reasoning enabled early interventions 
across Spain’s vast SAR zone of more than 1,5m square kilometres, with the 
Canaries zone constituting two-thirds of this and reaching the African coastline. 
In the Mediterranean joint operation Indalo, too, the patrolling area followed the 
Spanish SAR zone rather than limiting itself to territorial waters. Yet Spanish 
boats also went beyond these limits, Guardia Civil chiefs conceded, and not only 
in West African coastal zones covered by the patrolling agreements. Around the 
Spanish enclave of Ceuta and in the Strait, guardias said they would enter 
Moroccan waters for a rescue when life was in danger – overriding the otherwise 
tense and militarised border.  
In short, humanitarianism enables what Guild (2008) terms a “migration of 
sovereignty” away from European shores by dissolving the patchwork of 
Figure 3.  Spain’s SAR zones (deep blue) 
Figure 4. Sea surveillance areas in Hera, 2009     Guardia Civil 
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maritime boundaries. Arteaga (2007:6) argues that “police units both intercept and 
rescue, which undermines their image as a dissuasive force”, but this very 
humanitarian-policing nexus is what legitimises and lends efficacy to migration 
control operations in African and international waters.  
The Euro-African border might have started life as a line, but the rescues 
and patrols soon subverted this linear logic. Sea and air operations diced up the 
open sea into surveillance areas dependent on the patchwork of SAR zones and 
the African patrolling agreements. Surveillance was not an exercise in “holding 
the line”, as the name of a border control operation in the US once had it, but in 
monitoring a grid (Feldman 2012:95). This monitoring exercise depended upon a 
framing of boat migration as dangerous by definition, a “risk to life” in the words 
of one Guardia Civil captain. Migrants had to be “prevented from leaving” for 
their own good. Yet migrants were not only rendered a risk to themselves on the 
open seas, but also to the integrity of the external EU border – and it fell upon 
Frontex, Europe’s elusive border agency, to conceptualise them as such a risk.  
 
Risk’s golden arrow: Frontex and the border business 
 
Warsaw, July 2011. Frontex headquarters are far from the African coastlines and 
deserts, far from the Mediterranean and Atlantic seas. Its home, the Rondo1 
skyscraper, is all sheer glass surfaces set in the corporate post-Communist 
landscape of the Polish capital, its façade sporting the logo of accountancy firm 
Ernst & Young. Libertas, Securitas, Justitia reads the Frontex motto on a limp 
flag at the entrance. 
Frontex is an elusive agency. Still little known among European publics, it 
is charged with managing “operational cooperation” at the EU’s external borders. 
Its main task is halting irregular migrant flows, and for this it has been provided 
with an exponentially growing budget, going from €19.1m in 2006, its first full 
year of operations, to €84.9m in 2012.5 Criticism has mounted over the legality of 
Frontex patrols and the pushback of asylum seekers (Migreurop 2010; Tondini 
2010), while activists have increasingly decried the agency’s “war” on migrants. 
                                                 
5
 Frontex (2010:10) and draft 2012 budget: 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Budget/Budget_2012
.pdf  
 81 
But Frontex, it soon became clear on my visits, is both more and less than this 
militaristic view would allow for. 
The glassed-in elevator rose swiftly and pinged open on the 11
th
 floor, 
where a Frontex doormat welcomed me onto a walkway leading to the agency’s 
swipecard-entry offices. On the wall behind reception was the Frontex logo, 
tastefully engraved in a wooden panel. A glass cabinet displayed Frontex T-shirts, 
Frontex torches and Frontex ties nicely folded in their boxes. THINGS NOT FOR 
SALE, said a notice. I sat down and browsed Polish policing magazines on the 
coffee table as a female staffer walked past, beeping her entrance card on a reader 
at the end of the room. A glass door slid open and let her into what looked like a 
decompression chamber. She looked towards the ceiling, where a camera read her 
face before the inner door let her through. This “mantrap”, as workers called it, 
plus the policing magazines and the NO SALE sign: these were the only indications 
this was not the headquarters of an accountancy or law firm, but the brains of 
Europe’s border regime, a “cop shop” in the words of one staffer.   
 Alessandra, the Frontex spokeswoman, met me in reception and led me to 
the offices of the deputy director. Spain had proposed Gerardo, a soft-spoken man 
with a background in the Spanish national police, as director when Frontex was in 
its infancy. A Finnish border guard, Ilkka Laitinen, secured the position but 
Gerardo’s being second in charge was still a coup for Madrid. Gerardo had a 
Spanish secretary, a strong Spanish accent and Spanish priorities, talking warmly 
of his country’s success in combating clandestine migration. As the interview 
unfolded I glanced at a poster of the sunny Pyrenees on his wall: its postcard 
rendering of Gerardo’s faraway home seemed an apt metaphor for the continued 
dominance of state loyalties in a supposedly Europeanised border regime.   
 The Spanish experience underpinned all subsequent Frontex operations. Its 
first mission was to Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, followed by Hera in 2006. While 
Gerardo called this operation the “benchmark” for all future joint operations, he 
immediately downplayed Frontex’s role in the success. “The joint operation might 
have helped,” he said, “but [this] was also the time when Spain was negotiating 
agreements” with African states. These deals for border surveillance, policing 
cooperation, repatriation and “arresting smugglers” had a drastic impact, he 
insisted. “We do not pretend to be the key players in this success.” Afterwards 
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Alessandra echoed Gerardo’s comments. “We have to be very careful when we 
talk about the reasons for the reduction,” she said. “We can’t take the glory.” 
 This was surely a communications strategy that aimed to strike a balance 
between visibility and invisibility – promoting Frontex just enough while letting it 
work in the shadows, leaving both glory and blame to the host state. But Frontex 
had indeed been a hanger-on, not a leader, in Hera. As one Frontex officer put it, 
the police officers who arrived to interview migrants “took it as vacations, going 
to the Canary Islands…. We had to guide them.” This was not just a temporary 
state of affairs. Giuseppe, the former Hera manager, recalled the 2010 deployment 
of an Icelandic patrol boat to Senegal. “They asked for a Frontex delegate to be 
with them [and show] how the operations are carried out. For them it’s a 
completely different reality, nothing in common with Iceland at all!”  
 Criticism of Frontex often single out the blurred limits to its 
responsibilities in sea operations, but this contrasted with the clear view given by 
Gerardo. “Once the operational phase is implemented,” he said, “the national 
authorities are the ones who have the command and control of the assets.”6 Future 
Frontex agreements with third countries might not even change this, Gerardo 
indicated. Governments were too reluctant to let go of control over their slice of 
Europe’s southern maritime border.  
 The borders, then, remain a largely bilateral business, as Frontex’s full 
name indicates: “European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union”. In the words of one commentator, “Frontex is still an agency that lacks 
independence, whose performance depends on the political agenda of states such 
as Spain, who in this way transfer their domestic interests to a European level” 
(Hernández i Sagrera 2008:4). Indeed, Spain leads Hera patrols on the basis of 
Spanish bilateral deals; the CCRC is not run by el Frontex but by the Guardia 
Civil from the back offices of a Spanish military palace. Frontex here seems 
reduced to being a funnel for European funds and a megaphone for member states. 
Yet this conclusion would miss Frontex’s main impact in rethinking the 
border. Its “thought-work”, as Heyman (1995) terms the routine bureaucratic 
production of thoughts on a target population, has helped redraw the patchwork of 
                                                 
6
 These comments resonate with the controversy surrounding Frontex operations at the Greek-
Turkish border. See HRW (2011)  
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borders in southern Europe within a larger narrative of the external border of the 
EU. Spain-Morocco, Italy-Libya, Greece-Turkey and, to a lesser extent, the 
eastern land borders: these are now frontlines in a common European endeavour, 
and Frontex provides the language to make sense of and operationalise this 
frontline in terms of migration. The agency’s thought-work, as will soon be seen, 
again frames migration as a risk – although no longer just to human life, but to the 
security of Europe’s external borders. 
 
 
 
For Frontex, the border means business. In the words of one commentator, 
“Frontex wears suit not uniform”.7 Its operations are organised along the lines of 
corporate ventures. “Project teams” handle joint operations (JOs), drawing in staff 
from most Frontex units: analysts from the Risk Analysis Unit (RAU), a support 
team from the admin division, maybe someone from “returns” (forced 
deportation) and staff from “ops” (operations) including the project manager. 
RAU’s tailored risk analyses (TRAs) on regions or topics of concern help define 
the area and focus of new operations. Next follow meetings with member states 
and the preparation of a TFA, or tactical focused assessment, identifying the 
“main themes and risks”. Member states decide whether to participate, and an 
operational plan is drafted on “who can provide what, when and where”, 
explained one risk analyst. The plan is circulated internally, “to legal, PR and so 
on”. The host state gets a say, and the end result is a final draft and a full 
operational plan. “After this the real hard work starts,” said the analyst. 
Operational area, timeframe, assets member states can contribute – patrol boats 
and planes, for example, or human assets – are set out. The JO is ready to go.  
 JO and RAU, TRA and TFA, assets and ops: Frontex lingo is as 
impenetrable as any business jargon. Its reports speak of “business fields” active 
in the (military-style) “operational theatre” of the external border. The 
“operational portfolio” includes delivery of “strategic and operational risk 
analysis products” to “customers”, also known as the border guards of member 
states (Frontex 2009a:16-17, 20 and 2009b). Despite Alessandra’s protestations 
                                                 
7
 See http://w2eu.net/frontex/frontex-in-the-mediterranean/  
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(“business implies a profit, right?”), Frontex’s business language with its splash of 
military metaphors points to the agency’s dual view of itself: as a purveyor of 
“solutions” and “best practice” on the one hand, and as a quick-footed emergency 
deployment force on the other. 
Frontex, as the fulcrum in the EU’s strategy of “integrated border 
management”, reconceptualises the border through a range of tasks: it trains 
border guards, creates arenas for officers to talk shop in joint operations and 
exports its jargon to member states for statistics collection. But it is risk analysis 
that is at the heart of Frontex’s thought-work, underpinning all operations. RAU 
collects intelligence via the Frontex Risk Analysis Network, whose nation-state 
contributors in turn gather data from immigration liaison officers stationed in 
“transit countries”.8 As the language of risk spreads across these networks and 
filters down to border patrols, Frontex reprioritises borderwork towards halting 
migration.
9
 Anything else – detecting oil spills, assisting boats in danger, 
intercepting drugs – is subordinated to that goal. As Alessandra put it: “[Joint 
Operation] Indalo [is] interesting in terms of... side products. Our mandate is 
border controls as such, controlling illegal migration,” but in Indalo they “seized 
four tonnes of hashish while they were at it”. Border controls as such mean 
irregular migration, first of all, and Frontex as an intelligence-driven agency has 
made it its task to define and understand this object through the concept of risk. 
Risk, to Frontex, is defined as “a function of threat, vulnerability and 
impact”:10  
 
[A] ‘threat’ is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is 
characterised  by both its magnitude and likelihood; ‘vulnerability’ is defined as the 
capacity of a system to mitigate the threat and ‘impact’ is determined as the 
potential consequences of the threat. 
 
Through this three-pronged risk concept, Frontex is providing one key piece in the 
“securitisation” of migration. In international relations, securitisation refers to 
taking an issue out of politics and framing it as a security threat, whether through 
                                                 
8
 Spain’s Frontex focal point is the national police’s Comisaría General de Extranjería y Fronteras 
9
 A secure web-based system, ICONet, is used for sharing such sensitive information 
10
 This definition is part of the updated Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) used 
by Frontex analysts (Frontex 2012:9) 
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enunciation or practice.
 11
 Migration has long been securitised, of course: first 
tentatively embraced by European policing networks in the late 1970s, it was 
made into a “justice and home affairs” concern in the EU’s 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty and has been subject to member states’ eagerness to police the borders ever 
since (Gabrielli 2011:170; Huysmans 2000). Frontex simply builds on this 
process, as Léonard (2011) notes in a recent assessment of the agency’s varied 
tasks of patrolling, training and intelligence-gathering. However, her study pays 
relatively little attention to the organising concept of risk. Risk bridges 
humanitarianism and crime-fighting, enunciation and practice, politics and 
patrols: it provides the language shorn of politics needed to make migrant boats an 
abstract threat to the external border. As will be seen, risk also allows for thinking 
of migration in terms of a second “securitisation” – in the banking sense of 
pooling and profiting from financial risk. 
Risk is made real through a world of arrows in which the migrant boats, 
still visible and tangible in sea patrols and rescues, reach a new level of 
abstraction. In a Frontex meeting room, one risk analyst spread printouts of a map 
for tracking clandestine migrant routes across the table. On the “i-Map”, 
developed by the migration think-tank ICMPD, arrows pointed across the deserts 
of Libya, Niger, Algeria and Mauritania before converging on migrant nodes such 
as Nouadhibou, Oujda and Agadez. In Frontex lingo, the routes are closed, 
displaced and reactivated, while “transfers” of “pockets” of migrants are talked 
about in the imported academic language of push and pull factors. Here migrant 
routes morph into sharp arrows – “forces or pressures”, as the Frontex risk 
definition puts it – threatening the EU’s “vulnerable” external borders. 
If migrants are rendered as risk, sub-Saharan migrants are riskier than 
others. Frontex and the i-Map delve into the trans-Saharan trails more than the air 
routes and shorter hops used by North Africans: 
 
[fig5 removed: i-Map screenshot of African routes, available at imap-
migration.org] 
 
                                                 
11
 The original “Copenhagen School” formulation of securitisation as a speech act (Buzan 1991) is 
complemented by Bigo’s (2001) focus, followed here, on securitisation through practice  
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The risk analyst traced her finger along the arrows, from Mauritania on the coast 
to the Algerian desert. “There was a displacement effect” in 2009 “from the 
Atlantic to the Western Mediterranean route”, she said. “Up to 2009, this was the 
most dangerous route migrants could take, the West Saharan route.” With 
increasing pressure on both the Atlantic and eastern fronts – the route from Niger 
to Libya and onwards to Italy – this was the only route left. “The only way was 
going up,” she said. The “pocket” had to be transferred; Spain’s Indalo area of 
operations was being reactivated.  
 Those who do the transferring and reactivation – the people smugglers – 
are known in Frontex parlance as facilitators. This covers anyone who has 
“intentionally assisted third-country nationals in the illegal entry to, or exit from, 
the territory across external borders”, ranging from taxi drivers on the Greek-
Macedonian frontier to organised trafficking rings.
12
 Through “debriefings” with 
migrants in detention, Frontex finds out about their routes and facilitators’ modus 
operandi, data that are later synthesised in risk assessments.  
 The gradual abstraction in risk analysis – evident both in the i-Map visuals 
and Frontex glossary – flattens the complex realities of the border. Is an Afghan 
refugee as much of a risk as a Senegalese boat migrant?
13
 Are Macedonian taxi 
drivers and Nigerian trafficking gangs equal threats? Frontex lingo, through its 
neutrality, facilitates the swift translation of border terminology. When smuggling 
networks professionalise in response to increased controls, this change is also 
masked by the i-Map arrows and the Frontex jargon of reactivation and 
facilitation. Frontex thought-work, through its very neutrality, furnishes a unitary 
vision of the border as the place where homogenous migrants and facilitators are 
fought back and apprehended. 
This unitary vision contrasts with the reality of boat migration, as the 
Spanish police know. The migrant networks of Senegal in 2006 and 2007 were 
spontaneous, according to Raúl, the Spanish police attaché in Dakar. “These were 
Senegalese fishermen who often wanted to migrate themselves. They had the 
boat, they had the motor, and clients offered themselves up.” In fishing 
neighbourhoods such as Yongor, a whole chain of workers was involved. The 
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 Definition provided by Frontex via e-mail 
13
 Frontex risk analyses talk of “risk countries” in contexts where such countries are likely to refer 
to senders of refugees. See e.g. Frontex (2011:50) 
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coxeur found clients on behalf of the convoyeur or borom gaal, the trip organiser 
and owner of the boat. Once all “tickets” were sold, the convoyeur contracted a 
capitaine or guide for the boat, who would handle the GPS on board, as well as 
several chaffeurs, who piloted the boat in exchange for free passage. To Frontex, 
the convoyeur, borom gaal, coxeur, capitaine and chaffeur are all facilitators that, 
in Spain, can be denounced in the media as “mafias” and sentenced as pasadores 
(smugglers).  
The framing of migrants and facilitators as sources of risk, then, 
“securitises the Other” (Martin 2004) through a process of visual and linguistic 
abstraction. But risk is not just the anticipation of danger, as Beck (2009:4) notes; 
it is also the source of potential profits and opportunities. To understand this 
flipside of risk, it is useful to think about the second, financial meaning of 
“securitisation” together with the term’s policing sense, along lines similar to 
those of Martin (2004) and Gledhill (2008). To bankers, securitisation refers to 
the bundling, slicing and trading of debt. In the financial derivatives at the heart of 
the 2008 credit crunch, risky subprime mortgages were packaged into a bundle, 
pushed into an off-balance-sheet vehicle and traded on global markets in 
“tranches” with different levels of exposure to risk (Tett 2009). The trick was an 
unprecedented dispersal of risk; yet this very dispersal proved the system’s 
undoing.  
Disconcertingly, the border regime seems to disperse and distribute risk in 
a similar fashion. It first securitises migratory flows as a threat through Frontex 
intelligence networks and tools such as the i-Map, whose golden arrows let 
experts envision new “solutions” in a graphic interface. Here risk is securitised in 
the second, financial sense – bundled into pockets, routes, flows and 
vulnerabilities and assigned to police forces and external investors. And this 
distribution, like that of financial securitisation, generates new risk and ever-
growing tensions among its “junior” and “senior” investors, as will soon be seen. 
Frontex, much like a fast-moving financier or the “facilitators” it targets, 
both shuns and embraces risks. To keep up to date with their routes it needs a 
lean, fast-moving and flexible operation. Five offices in a Warsaw skyscraper will 
do just fine for this purpose. Frontex has – for now, at least – no clumsy 
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infrastructure to handle.
14
 It is free to act along the whole EU border in quick, 
sharp interventions. Instead of the stiff and clumsy working arrangements of 
Europe’s old border guards, it provides a lean, flexible operation across the whole 
external border. “Frontex”, then, is not el Frontex – a control room in Las Palmas, 
a militarised border force. Like the blue Frontex armband its seconded officers 
wear in joint operations, it is flexible, moveable and removable. In this 
lightweight fashion, in the shadow of still-powerful states, it quietly goes about its 
business of bordering the continent.  
 
Seahorse: hardwiring the African frontier 
 
Las Palmas, April 2010. It was the time of the big yearly gathering. Suited police, 
marines in white uniforms and green-clad guardias congregated in the halls of 
Hotel Meliá in the Gran Canarian capital. The Euro-African policing conference 
on migration, attended by 89 security chiefs from 25 countries, was redolent with 
the power of the state: straight-backed men, flags on tables, glossy police posters 
galore. Behind the podium was a large banner of a sun setting at sea, a potent 
symbol of Europe’s external border; outside the big windows, sunbathers lounged 
on the city beach a few steps away.  
Presentation followed presentation. Comandante Francisco spoke 
excitedly of “the surveillance system of the future” through a complete integration 
of sea border controls and “compatibility between all systems”. The discussant, a 
tall Dutchman from Europol, exhorted African police in the hall to target human 
smugglers and “send us the information you have on these networks”. “There’s a 
model law on people smuggling for downloading on the UNODC [UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime] webpage,” he said, encouraging the Africans to promote it in 
their capitals. “As we’re building up so-called Fortress Europe, it’s getting harder 
to get to Europe… [so] you face the same problem with illegal migration and 
illegal stayers,” he said in a nod of sympathy to his North African colleagues.  
In the break, African marines mingled with guardias on the hotel terrace, 
sipping coffee and tea and digging into patisserie trays. I went about collecting 
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 In its revised 2011 mandate, Frontex was given powers to co-lead joint operations and the right 
to purchase or lease its own equipment (EU 2011). However, its deputy director indicated in 
interview that co-ownership of assets was the likeliest option because of budget constraints 
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business cards: the general director of the Malian Gendarmerie, the Senegalese 
Navy’s chief of operations, the Gambian immigration commissioner. They were 
all there, the top brass of Africa’s border forces. Two officers – North African and 
Greek – snapped pictures of each other as souvenirs. The real action was in 
backroom talk: Malians laughed hard with guardias in the halls, a Mauritanian 
gendarme took down phone numbers on his battered Nokia mobile.  
Journalists were let into the conference hall for the concluding session. 
They congregated at the back as the general director of the Spanish police and the 
Guardia Civil strode to the podium. He spoke fast and assuredly of “the excellent 
climate of confidence that has prevailed at the conference”. Illegal migration had 
gone down by 70 per cent, he said, and the fight against this “scourge” was 
proceeding apace thanks to “the collaboration between all the institutions 
represented here”. They need to “persecute this crime” of “commerce with other 
people”, he said, referencing the smuggling networks. It would be wrong to 
indulge in a “false sense of triumphalism”, he warned, but his speech was strident. 
The view from the top was bright and shiny, the battle was being won. But at 
what price? 
 
 
 
In the beginning, getting the Africans on board had been difficult. “Maybe they 
didn’t understand very well what we were trying to do,” said the Guardia Civil 
chief in Dakar in a rather diplomatic understatement. In the first years, “there 
would even be policemen or gendarmes who would send their children” if they 
knew a boat was leaving, he said. “They saw it as a bus trip.” Stories circulated 
about African officers absconding from policing conferences and migrant 
identification missions, never to be heard from again.  
 “All member states are aware that there’s no other way to fight migration 
than to cooperate with third countries,” insisted Comandante Francisco, and this 
was a lesson the Spaniards took to heart before anyone else. At the root of the 
migration agreements between West Africa and Spain discussed in the last chapter 
was policing cooperation. Enrique, a tough-talking Spanish policeman based in 
Morocco, had worked on pushing through these deals with state after state. “First 
there is always an accord between the foreign ministries on cooperation,” he said, 
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“something to cover things up” (para tapar). Next came the memoranda of 
understanding between interior ministries. “Let’s see,” he said, remembering the 
countries where he helped push these through: “Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, 
Morocco already had one, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, what 
else… oh yes, Niger. They are basically all the same, you cut and paste from one 
to the other.” Through these deals, a vast policing network was quickly being built 
up around Europe’s southern border.  
 Key to this network was the Seahorse project. Starting in 2005, it received 
more than €6m of funding as part of the EU’s €120m Aeneas programme to 
establish “an effective policy to prevent illegal migration” (MIR 2011). 15 
Seahorse, managed by the Guardia Civil, aimed to tie police forces into a tighter 
network through conferences, training and the increased deployment of liaison 
officers and joint patrols. The Seahorse secretariat had organised the Las Palmas 
conference for the fifth year running, in what was fast becoming a “tradition” 
according to the concluding remarks of the Spanish police chief. Spanish officers 
also trained African police on illegal migration in West African capitals and 
invited high-ranking officers to Spain for tours of control rooms and police 
academies. The conferences, courses and visits served not only “to see how other 
countries work on migration”, as the Spanish police attaché in Mali put it: they 
were also junkets for African officers that fomented a shared vision of the border 
while creating informal connections. In Las Palmas, cakes and coffee did as much 
to boost the border network as endless PowerPoint presentations. 
 But Seahorse was, above all, a high-tech venture. It would not only expand 
the transnational policing networks around the figure of the illegal immigrant; it 
would also hardwire these networks into a secure communications system via 
satellite. Technology triggered cooperation. The secure system, the Seahorse 
Network, had by 2010 pulled in Spain, Portugal, Mauritania, Cape Verde, 
Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Morocco (ibid). This is how the Guardia 
Civil depicted the arrangement, bolts of lightning shooting out from a satellite that 
spans the seas of Africa and Europe:  
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 Aeneas, which ran from 2004 to 2006, has been superseded by a “thematic programme” on 
migration and asylum  
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Hera built on this network, which spun out from the CCRC in Las Palmas in a 
widening web. Senegal, Frontex’s most eager collaborator, had created a national 
coordination centre in Dakar’s Navy base, where a joint chiefs of staff 
communicated with Las Palmas via a second control centre in the Senegalese 
Interior Ministry, as well as with the Spanish embassy attachés. The information 
did not stop in Las Palmas: by 2010, a steady stream of real-time information was 
funnelled from the CCRC, Dakar and elsewhere along the African coast into the 
control room in Madrid. Via daily briefings, flash reports and teleconferences, the 
ICC team there sent the information on to Warsaw, providing the Frontex 
Situation Centre with another piece in the full surveillance picture this control 
centre was building of Europe’s border operations.16 Through such day-to-day 
contact the communications network grew ever more intricate, its 
transnationalism increasingly taken for granted. 
 One thing stands out in this regime, and in the Seahorse sketch above: all 
information travels through Spain. No lines of communication unite Mauritania 
and Senegal, or Senegal and the Gambia. The information network was a one-way 
street. 
 The border theorist Ladis Kristof long ago drew a distinction between 
boundaries, which are “inner-oriented”, distinguishing insiders and outsiders, and 
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 The ICC is located in Madrid when both Indalo and Hera are active, otherwise in Las Palmas 
Figure 6. The Seahorse network   Guardia Civil presentation: imp-med.eu/En/image.php?id=125  
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frontiers, which are zones of contact and “the spearhead of light and knowledge 
expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown” (cited in Donnan and 
Wilson 1999:48). Ironically, to close off, Spain first had to reach out. It had to 
create a zone of contact – that is, a frontier. In doing so, the Spanish government 
had used copied-and-pasted memoranda of understanding to impressive effect. It 
had knocked on all the right doors in order to close its own. But Spain’s frontier-
making only got it that far: the smooth satellite channels generated friction. And 
these tensions, however slight and brief, sometimes broke into the open. 
 Before the Guardia Civil chief stepped onto the conference podium to 
declare that the battle against illegal migration was being won, before the 
journalists were let in to the hall, there had been a brief time for questions. One 
African officer spoke. “The police response is not the only approach to resolving 
the phenomenon of illegal migration,” he said. Another West African officer also 
raised his hand. He spoke softly in eloquent French that was promptly translated. 
“The exchange of information should be reciprocal,” he said, otherwise it was not 
“cooperation”. The Europol officer at the podium replied. He fully understood the 
frustrations about access to confidential information, he said, but there were strict 
rules for sharing. Maybe an open version could be made available, he thought out 
loud. Then he realised there was something the African officers could use. The 
previous year’s report from ICMPD was comprehensive, he said; what’s more, it 
was available to the public, “free and available to download” from their website. 
If they wanted, he offered, he could send his African colleagues a link.  
 
 
 
The Euro-African border was in Seahorse no longer – or not only – a line across 
the seas, a search-and-rescue area or a complex field of risk management. It was 
morphing into what Walters (2004:682) calls a “strategic node within a 
transnational network”, where Spain – unburdened by a colonial past in the region 
– was perfectly placed to create alliances with West African states around a 
shared concern with migratory risk. Yet instead of a smooth “risk community” 
across the maritime divide of the cosmopolitan kind envisioned by Beck 
(2009:188), here re-emerged the asymmetrical relation familiar from the days of 
Empire. Returning to the financial analogy, if the border regime apportioned risk, 
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the African partners in the fight against illegal migration were left with the most 
risky, “junior” tranches. In Beck’s (ibid:169) terms, risk was “exported” from rich 
to poor. This is what the Europol officer acknowledged with his sympathetic 
words on the side effects of Fortress Europe; it was also implicit in the questions 
voiced by the African delegates. The larger gains in securitising migration, 
meanwhile, went elsewhere – into Europe’s security industry with its 
technological “solutions” to the risk posed by clandestine migration.  
   
Surveillance: the men who stare at screens 
 
If risk analysis is the brains of Europe’s border regime, as Frontex (2010:62) 
would have it, the screens and surveillance machinery are its eyes. In the control 
rooms in Warsaw, Madrid and the Guardia Civil Comandancias dotting the 
Spanish coastline, the border is made visible, legible and operational. In this 
endeavour, Spain is again in the vanguard. Its “integrated system for external 
surveillance” or SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior) combines radar, 
hi-tech cameras and patrols in a powerful surveillance network that is credited 
with the sharp decline in migrant boat arrivals. SIVE has also boosted the fortunes 
of the developers, the companies Siemens, Amper and Indra. Indra, named after 
the Hindu god of war (who is, as it happens, cognate to Hera’s husband, Zeus), 
has exported SIVE to destinations as diverse as Romania, Latvia and Hong 
Kong.
17
 
 Walk into a SIVE control room and you will see rows of computer 
terminals manned by guardias staring at their monitors. Facing them are wall-
mounted screens that project a real-time electronic map and camera shots of the 
coastline and high seas. The operator monitors the SIVE map on his terminal, 
looking for signs of migrants approaching the coastline. Suddenly something 
might appear: a pixellated boat, with a vector attached indicating its speed and 
direction. The guardia brings the map up on the wall projection, takes a closer 
look. It could be nothing, the guardia knows. Maybe the radar has just detected 
the crest of a wave, a small fishing boat, or even a whale. The radars detect 
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 See http://www.indracompany.com/en/sectores/seguridad-y-defensa/proyectos/1876/sive-at-
romania’s-black-sea-border  
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objects up to 20 nautical miles from the Spanish coast: software helps filter out 
most large waves, but other indications of a patera are down to experience. What 
is the weather like? If the hard, easterly Levante wind blows across the 
Mediterranean, migrants rarely set out from Algeria and Morocco. How does the 
object move? A sinuous, zigzag path, represented by a trail of pixels, means it 
could be a patera. Is it moving fast? In the Canaries, where the large wooden 
cayucos groan under the weight of perhaps 100 passengers, a slow speed gives 
migrant vessels away. In the Strait, if the object is small and moves fast, it could 
be drug smugglers or migrants in a lightweight zodiac. With a right-click on the 
mouse, the guardia can “identify” the patera by assigning it a name. When it gets 
closer, he will do a follow-up. As the patera approaches the coast, the high-
definition cameras get to work, or the infrared ones if it is misty, rainy or dark. 
The guardia steers the camera with his joystick into line with the object, as in a 
computer game: he then brings the image up on the wall projections. If it is a 
“patera sighting” he activates the protocol and a Guardia Civil patrol boat shoots 
out, followed by a Salvamento Marítimo rescue ship. The patrol boat approaches 
the patera on screen and the guardia clicks on both to read off distance and 
direction: 287 degrees, 3.2 Nmi (nautical miles), 11min estimated to target. The 
four steps of an intervention are about to be completed: detection, identification, 
follow-up, and “interception or rescue”. Finally, a crosshair marks the spot of a 
patera interception.  
 The Euro-African border on the SIVE screens appears as a diffuse area of 
intervention, devoid of clear borderlines.
18
 What counts is the range of your radar, 
the specs of your cameras, the reach of your patrols – all represented visually on 
screen. In this borderless world, the “abnormal vessel behaviour” gives the patera 
away, seen in stops and starts or a zigzag, errant course.   
SIVE seems a roaring success: not only does it broadcast the border, 
promote Spanish technology and stop pateras in their tracks, it also renders 
migrant risk as an on-screen abnormality. But the SIVE screens blind visitors to 
how surveillance of the seas has changed the cat-and-mouse game (Donato et al 
2008) of the sea border. Most sub-Saharan migrants know that they might be 
spotted by the SIVE. Moreover, and unlike their Moroccan and Algerian 
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autopista del Estrecho, the passage designated for commercial vessels 
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counterparts who fear immediate deportation, they want this to happen. In the 
border game that ensues, everyone – facilitators, migrants, rescue services, 
guardias and police – have their assigned role. Migrants or their associates call 
for help before departure, sea rescue boats search for them, and once found bring 
them to port for a medical check followed by detention and the hope of eventual 
liberation. Other migrants, at much greater risk, try to skirt the radars and limit 
costs by using tiny, inflatable “toy” boats to traverse the deep, rapid waters of the 
Strait. They, too, are usually detected. Again, their detection is often down to a 
simpler solution than the expensive SIVE, since the Spanish authorities encourage 
the thousands of ships passing through the Strait each year to inform them of any 
patera sightings. The result of this combination of high and low technologies 
meant that, by 2010, most migrant vessels were intercepted. The impromptu 
arrivals among sunbathers on Spanish beaches were a memory of the past.  
Manning the SIVE could be stressful: the lives of dozens of travellers in a 
sinking boat depended on reading the on-screen signs correctly. During the mass 
arrivals of earlier years, reports surfaced of depression among guardias. As the 
arrivals dwindled, the main problem might instead be boredom: staring at screens, 
waiting for migrants to appear in their pixellated boats. The nationwide Guardia 
Civil workers’ association denounced the lack of SIVE staff and the working 
conditions in the control rooms, while aid workers whispered that the lack of 
manpower made the SIVE much less effective than it used to be.
19
 
 The solution to these limitations was, like Bigo (2005) has noted across 
Europe’s border regime, more technology. “We have to extend it much further,” 
said Comandante Francisco, outlining his vision of border surveillance in three 
layers. First, the SIVE and patrols covering the coasts. Second, planes, ocean-
going ships and satellites monitoring the high seas. And third, joint patrols 
scouring African territorial waters, as in Hera and to a lesser extent in Morocco.
20
  
 
[fig7 removed: the full surveillance vision of Euro-African borders]  
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This full surveillance vision is already becoming reality. The European Maritime 
Safety Agency is providing satellite coverage in the first Frontex multi-agency 
operation, Indalo. GMES, the European programme for Earth observation, has 
launched a collaboration with Frontex under its €15m G-MOSAIC programme for 
“situational awareness” of regional crises, its website showing footage of car 
tracks in the Algerian desert and colour-coded maps of “border permeability”.21 
GMES and other publicly funded initiatives have pulled in defence companies 
such as Indra that develop the technology at a healthy profit. And Frontex, 
through its research and development unit, is in the thick of it, coordinating 
research and linking up academia, EU authorities, security companies and border 
guards. Electro-optical sensors for sea, land and air surveillance, smaller sensors 
“for detecting humans and objects inside closed compartments”, advanced 
command and control systems (C4I) and vessel tracking tools are all on the cards 
in a fruitful back-and-forth between the security industry and Europe’s border 
regime (see Frontex 2010:55).
 22
 In the words of one commentator, migration 
control is “an opportunity for our industries to take advantage of an unbeatable 
laboratory to develop new research and development products” (Arteaga 2007:5-
6). The creativity the Euro-African frontier has unleashed seems endless. 
 This full surveillance vision is based upon two features: a dynamic 
visualisation of risk and a powerful rendering of the surveillance system itself as a 
generator of spatial order. In one virtual demo of a new border control system 
seeded by the EU’s generous FP-7 funding stream, an intruding clandestine 
traveller is spotted inside a circular sensor area, highlighted as a threat and 
targeted by an unmanned vehicle shooting out in a line of interception, much like 
the SIVE’s radars, cameras and boats follow the errant pateras.23 “Freeze!” the 
unmanned machine calls out; the traveller stops in his tracks, gripping his 
suitcase, until the border patrol arrives and the words “mission accomplished” 
light up on screen. 
 Satellite systems and aerial drones are at the pinnacle in this drive to 
visualise the border, attracting policing dreams and triggering activist ire. With 
“camera technology from the US or Israel”, Comandante Francisco mused, “we 
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could cover maybe 1,000 square kilometres with a small unmanned plane”. The 
vision, in his words, is a complete surveillance cover of the border region and 
beyond.  
 This will be achieved through a project known as Eurosur, or the 
“European external border surveillance system”. Pushed by the European 
Commission and member states such as Spain, Eurosur is moving ahead at 
breakneck speed, going from a 2008 roadmap to a draft regulation and “big pilot” 
in 2011 and planned operational roll-out by 2013. In support of Eurosur runs 
another project, Perseus, endowed with €44m in European funding. Taking its 
name from the heroic slayer of the snake-headed gorgon Medusa in Greek lore – 
or, more prosaically, from “Protecting EuRopean SEas and borders through the 
intelligent USe of surveillance” – Perseus will integrate national surveillance 
systems and enhance them with what its website calls “non-stop avant-garde 
technology”.24 The multinational Perseus consortium is led by familiar names: 
Spain’s Indra and the Guardia Civil. Thanks to Eurosur and Perseus, the policing 
dream and activist nightmare of an omnipresent surveillance system for Europe’s 
frontiers could soon become reality. But this all-seeing beast of the border, I was 
soon to find out, had an unlikely nemesis waiting for him in Frontex headquarters. 
 
Kill the cyclops: Eurosur and the informatised border 
 
Warsaw, July 2011. Back in the Rondo1 skyscraper, the elevator sped past the 
offices of Credit Suisse and Ernst & Young and stopped on the 22
nd
 floor. This 
was, finally, the beating heart of Europe’s border regime: the management and 
operational offices of Frontex across two conjoined floors. Glass walls rose high 
above the reception, revealing elevators on their race up and down the skyscraper. 
On a video screen, a Spanish guardia flung a water bottle towards a migrant boat. 
Internal stairs rose at the side of the flag-lined room, giving easy access between 
the managers on the 22
nd
 floor and “ops” on the 23rd while enclosing the heart of 
Frontex in a safe bubble. At the centre of it all was the Frontex Situation Centre, 
the all-seeing eyes of the border.  
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 98 
 The FSC was the latest generation of border control integration, a control-
room-of-control-rooms that monitored all operations off Greek, Italian and 
Spanish coasts. One of the screens showed a large map of operations around the 
Italian island of Lampedusa, listing deployments and delineating patrol areas; 
another screen covered Greek operations. “Once a week we update the maps,” 
said the commander in charge. No real-time information was displayed, though 
this was in the pipeline. A third screen was blacked out. “Is this for Spain?” I 
asked. “No, it’s just down,” the commander said with a chuckle. There was no 
real-time communication with Spain from the FSC. The terminals stood empty, 
his colleagues had gone for lunch. Work hours were eight to five Monday to 
Friday, with an officer on call the rest of the time. Europe’s virtual, all-seeing 
border still seemed a far cry. 
 And so it was likely to continue, at least according to Antonio, a bearded 
Spaniard with a Frontex badge round his neck and an endearingly brusque 
manner. As one of the principal architects of Eurosur, his excitement for the next 
generation of border controls was palpable, but his take on advanced technology 
was less than enthusiastic. 
 “Let me tell you an anecdote,” he said while sipping coffee in the breakout 
area, looking out over the rainswept expanse below. “I went to Spain, to the navy 
control centre in Cartagena, [and] they showed tracks of AIS [sea vessel tracking] 
on screen. ‘How nice!’ I said. ‘But what is the use of this?’ ‘Oh, we show it to the 
visitors,’ they said!” He shook his head. “Why should we be exchanging this 
[information]?”  
 Industry lobbying was to blame for this excess of technology, according to 
Antonio. “Satellites are useless,” he said, then told me of how GMES had recently 
sent around an email with satellite pictures of the Libya-Tunisia border. “But I’ve 
just seen this border on Al Jazeera, I’ve learnt they’ve been there for three days 
and don’t have water, that is a push!”25 And you know what they did? he asked 
with a laugh. They inserted “and” into their name, changing it to Global 
Monitoring for Environment and Security. “They need customers!” Unmanned 
flights were just as useless, Antonio continued, since they could not yet fly in 
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rendering of a desperate humanitarian situation as a so-called “push”  
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civilian zones because of safety regulations. The key to border monitoring, he 
said, was to “establish Frontex liaison officers and give them money to bribe 
[local] authorities to give them information”. Human intelligence provided 95 per 
cent of the results, Antonio said, while satellite might provide just 5 per cent – at a 
cost inverse to its proportion. “But the industries are happy and the Commission is 
happy because they are subsidising them.” He finished his coffee. “The Emperor 
is naked!” he exclaimed. 
Other officers similarly called for caution in the rush towards new 
technology. The FSC and similar systems are, like SIVE, resource-heavy and 
labour-intensive, while satellites still do not provide real-time information. “In 
Hera, maybe the information can be of some use if it gets to you within six-seven 
hours,” said Giuseppe, the Italian ICC manager, “but in Greece or Italy, the 
[migrant] boat can cross the sea in this time, it doesn’t have added value.”  
The “myth of mastering the frontiers”, according to Bigo (2005), is 
perpetuated in the hopeless striving for full electronic security. Yet this striving 
achieves something else too, as Antonio made clear. In the double securitisation 
of migration, Europe’s industrial giants can be seen as the largest investors, 
buying the most “senior” tranches carrying next to no risk. For them, the dream of 
a virtual border is creating a free-for-all where the risk represented by an errant 
migrant patera has become big business. Eurosur is at the pinnacle of this process, 
as a recent independent report notes. While criticising the “technocratic process” 
shorn of political control behind Eurosur, the report’s authors denounce the 
“blank cheque” given for its development, which could end up costing several 
times the conservative official estimate of €339m between 2011 and 2020 (Hayes 
and Vermeulen 2012:75). 
In this frontier economy, information means both power and money. The 
result, as with African states under Seahorse, is factionalism among competing 
border agencies and states. “Nobody wants to give up anything,” Antonio sighed. 
“If I give up the information,” the border agencies reasoned, “I will give up 
responsibility and my funding will be diminished.” In Spain, the divide between 
the surveillance community, centred on the Guardia Civil, and the intelligence 
community, mainly the Spanish police, was deep at times. “Often they don’t talk 
to each other,” he said. 
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 Border officers were aware of the skewed incentives and the constant 
threat of politicking. In fact, Eurosur was tailored to overcome these problems. Its 
first trick was to focus even more strongly on that one precious target at the 
border: the clandestine migrant. If the border was a field for information-sharing 
and information was an expensive commodity, it had to be shared in just the right 
doses. Eurosur did so by filtering out most information as noise. While it was in 
theory meant for any risk factor around the external borders, from environmental 
disasters to drug smuggling, in practice member states only agreed on sharing sea 
borders and boat migrants. Yet even this was proving tricky, Antonio noted. “It’s 
not a technical problem, it’s a political problem, a will problem,” he said. This is 
why he always emphasised to national security forces that Eurosur was a 
decentralised network. “There’s no central node,” he said, no trace of irony in his 
voice, “because they don’t want to have a Big Brother.”  
Rumours that “Frontex will see everything that is happening in the border” 
were crazy, according to Antonio. “That system will be… what do you call that 
monster with one eye here?” he said, touching his forehead. “A cyclops… we’ll 
be a hated cyclops!” Wanting to see everything was akin to the fate of a one-eyed 
monster who only saw what his single eye allowed him to see.
26
 “So let’s make it 
decentralised!” Antonio’s face lit up. “We will not exchange drugs”, he said, just 
“illegal immigration plus other common interest information” such as “a ship on 
fire”. The decentralised system, he exclaimed, “kills the cyclops!”  
 
 
 
To Antonio, if technology was part of the problem, it was also part of the solution. 
He took me to a small room where fans whirred frantically: in it stood three big 
cabinets with glass doors, reaching almost to the ceiling. Inside each was a stack 
of black computer consoles, red lights occasionally blinking. These were the 
“nodes”, the electronic hearts of Eurosur, allowing for the sharing of sensitive 
border information in a vast network eventually covering all European states. One 
of them, the “mother node”, was producing two copies of itself – one for Frontex, 
one for Poland. Next others would follow. If Hera had been the birth of sea 
                                                 
26
 Frontex was until the revisions of its mandate unable to process personal data, and is not 
allowed to send data to third countries 
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operations, it seemed we were witnessing yet another birth here: that of a fully 
integrated border surveillance system for Europe.  
 In Eurosur, each country will have one national coordination centre (NCC) 
for border surveillance, “a very difficult thing to achieve”. Antonio’s strategy was 
to confront them with a choice. “I ask them, so where do you want the Eurosur 
node? Then I force them to fight between them.” Technology, as with Seahorse, 
triggers compliance. In Spain, the new NCC will be located in the courtyard of 
Madrid’s Guardia Civil headquarters, surely to the chagrin of the national police, 
which will be invited to participate in it.  
Through a seamless link between NCCs and Frontex, complete 
surveillance of the Euro-African border is for the first time a possibility. Antonio 
sketched his version of the Eurosur border regime. The two upward-facing 
triangles represent member states with a shared border, the arrows are information 
flows, and the downward triangle is Frontex:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Information flows in Eurosur 
 
 
“Frontex doesn’t have a border but it has another requirement,” Antonio said 
while drawing the pyramid labelled CPIP, the “common pre-frontier intelligence 
picture”. The “pre-frontier”, in keeping with the technological obliteration of the 
borderline already seen on SIVE screens, refers to the areas lying beyond the 
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surveillance reach of the border regime – African territorial waters, trucks 
traversing deserts, smugglers running a safe house or ghetto.  
Look at the bottom arrows: they refer to maritime sensors, radars and other 
surveillance, Antonio explained, but they point outwards, towards African states. 
Sharing of information with African forces is already happening, of course. 
Spanish cameras spot a migrant boat setting off from Morocco, and notify the 
Moroccan Gendarmerie. Its surveillance systems locate a boat on open seas: the 
ICC calls the Algerians, who “rescue” the migrants if the boat is still close enough 
to their coasts. To Frontex, however, the pre-frontier is still anathema. Although 
the agency’s risk analysts gather data on migrant routes through Africa, its official 
mandate, staffers insist, ends at the external border. Eurosur will change this. 
Through its novel interfaces for information-sharing beyond the border – and a 
planned future integration with Seahorse
27
 – the pre-frontier will finally be made 
palatable. 
The border, in Antonio’s Eurosur vision, is a channel for the smooth 
exchange of information. It appears as something akin to a cell membrane, a 
selectively permeable surface that communicates with nearby cells sideways, 
downwards and upwards in a chain of signals. These signals are selective; there is 
symbolism aplenty in the software that sifts, filters and chooses before presenting 
its data in a graphic interface.  
In the room next door to the node factory sat six young computer 
programmers in front of their terminals. They worked for GMV, the Spanish 
company that had won the contract to set up the pilot version of Eurosur and its 
interface. This interface provides a new visual language that combines layers of 
risk analysis, operational information and irregular migration “events” on an 
electronic map, thus finally integrating the intelligence community’s notion of 
risk with sea surveillance in a forest of digitised symbols. Among the icons is the 
sign for “illegal entry”, used to indicate where a significant attempt at crossing the 
Euro-African border is taking place. Officers can add comments about the event 
in a chat box, as in Facebook or Messenger. It is a potent Keep Away sign, a 
modern equivalent of the ancient Spanish Indalo: 
 
                                                 
27
 A “Seahorse Mediterranean” system is also being planned, based on Spain’s Atlantic system 
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The interfaces and symbols – not least the illegal entry icon – hint at the magic of 
statecraft at work in Europe’s border regime. As if by a conjuring trick, a wooden 
boat on the high seas has become a source of risk sold on to African partners and 
industrial investors. This risk has been rendered on screen as golden arrows and 
zigzag lines interrupting the straight logics of border controls, before finally being 
abstracted into the amorphous, three-dimensional fields of information and risk 
flows of the Eurosur interface. Risk is here dispersed, but not obliterated. Beyond 
the neat interfaces, migrants face the opposite type of borders to those built in 
Eurosur: untamed frontiers, rough seas and scorching deserts, through which only 
the luckiest and toughest emerge unscathed. In their search for a virtual border, 
Europe’s border workers are creating a new, postmodern wilderness.  
 
Conclusion: the making of a Euro-African frontier 
 
Madrid, June 2012. Amid the deepening eurozone crisis, the Spanish capital 
seemed to have come to a standstill. The scaffolds, skips and caterpillars – such a 
frequent sight during Spain’s property-fuelled boom – had long since been 
removed from the city’s streets. But in one site, at least, the construction industry 
was defying the gloom. In the fortress-like headquarters of the Guardia Civil, 
cranes and excavators were at work digging up the vast courtyard to make space 
for the new NCC under Eurosur. A sparkling regional coordination centre had 
been inaugurated in the southern port of Algeciras, where Comandante Francisco 
had jetted off to receive the Spanish King. Algeria had signed a new cooperation 
agreement, and so had the Spanish Navy. Here was one sector that seemed to have 
escaped the age of austerity – the European security industry and its “fight against 
illegal migration”.  
In the control room next to the courtyard, Guardia Civil officers were 
already feeding live data on “illegal entries” into the recently installed Eurosur 
interface, to which more member states were now connecting by the month. Soon 
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even African states might be able to join, any political qualms brushed aside by 
the technical language of the Eurosur interface, in which migration “events” were 
created as the “property” of one state that could then be “ceded” to another. In the 
words of one officer, “you’d just have to create another user”. On the Eurosur 
monitor, illegal entry signs were scattered across the Mediterranean. “It’s a bit 
slow,” sighed the guardia at the terminal as her screen temporarily froze. Another 
brick in the wall by Pink Floyd rang out from her colleague’s computer: it was 
just another day in the business of bordering Europe. 
 
 
 
The emerging Euro-African border is an elusive creation of multiple logics. It is 
sharply drawn through the seas, but the closer you look the more it dissipates. It is 
fixed in place – in control rooms, patrol bases and surveillance systems – while 
constantly bleeding outwards. At times, the border appears as an Indalo or as the 
illegal crossing sign: here but no further. Other times, it appears in its guise of 
frontier, ever extendable and stretchable. It is everywhere and nowhere. In this 
way, “the borderwork of Frontex produces a border that is no longer at the 
border” (Vaughan-Williams 2008:77; Balibar 1998).  
As has been seen, this dispersal is accompanied by a distribution and 
management of migratory risk that breeds ever larger risks. “The hazardousness of 
risk analysis,” Beck (2009:14) cautions, “consists in the fact that imagining 
dangers that were previously unthinkable can inadvertently help to bring them 
about.” 
At first glance, Hera seems to disprove this conclusion. While the 
operation was devised as an emergency response it had, by 2010, become 
permanent. A “recovery of the territory by law enforcement agencies” had fast 
been achieved, in the words of a Senegalese border police chief. No one left along 
these routes. The border was, as his words indicated, partly militarised. Hera the 
divine match-maker had successfully tied the knot between police, military and 
industry in Africa and Europe.   
Hera might be the goddess of marriage in Greek lore, but her main traits 
are jealousy and vindictiveness. She had, as Frontex itself acknowledged, 
displaced routes into the even more dangerous Sahara desert, punishing migrants 
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for their transgression in crossing her seas. This way, Hera also brought trouble 
upon her fellow deities further east – Hermes, Nautilus and Poseidon, the Frontex 
operations in the eastern and central Mediterranean. Migration controls remain a 
zero-sum game, where the gains of one are the troubles of others. Mass arrivals hit 
the Greek land border with Turkey in 2010. In 2011, it was Italy’s turn to see an 
unprecedented influx of boat people following the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings. 
“Migration is something that will never stop,” said Comandante Francisco, 
echoing a sentiment often repeated by border officials. So why impose such a vast 
system to deal with the few brave men and women who try to arrive in Europe, 
cost what it may, by land and sea?  
 One reason was the pre-emptive task of “preventing people from leaving”. 
“We can’t leave the deployment we have in Mauritania and Senegal,” said 
Francisco. “If we leave, the avalanche will return in two days’ time.” Giuseppe 
agreed: “Both Spain and the African countries have said several times that it 
would be a big error to withdraw the deployment because this could give a signal 
to the candidates for migration to try to leave again from there to the Canaries.” 
Indeed, Hera operations in African waters were previously vaguely referred to as 
diversion and sometimes as interception: Frontex now labels them deterrence. 
Such deterrence is not the whole story, however. As this chapter has 
shown, the Euro-African border is generating its own momentum, its own sense 
of necessity. Frontiers have always attracted entrepreneurs: gold-diggers, bandits 
and self-appointed sheriffs on the hunt for the bounties of a recently discovered 
wilderness. The Euro-African frontier is no different. Along with the smugglers 
and swindlers, the passeurs and coxeurs, the security and defence industries have 
marched into the frontier, sensing a great business opportunity. The border has 
become a site for ever-growing investments, a place where frontiersmen can look 
for quick gains and where European leaders can project their fears and visions. 
The African security forces and the Guardia Civil do not want to let Hera and the 
CCRC go, say bemused policemen: too much money and influence is at stake, too 
many agencies have tapped into the treasures buried in the borderlands. 
 There are deeper reasons too. The nascent Euro-African border is the 
result of a symbolic and political urge to define the outer frontiers of the Union – 
and, for Spain, a chance to reaffirm its European identity through a combination 
of humanitarianism, technological mastery and political acumen. This double-
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edged Europeanisation of the borders was, of course, always a fraught enterprise, 
as shown in the summer of 2011 when the Schengen agreement was coming under 
unprecedented strain because of the migrant boats leaving Tunisia for Italy. In 
Warsaw, the Frontex deputy director did not want to be drawn on the 
consequences. “We are not an actor in this debate,” he sighed. The idea of the 
space of free movement was that it “gives the feeling that you are an EU citizen”, 
he added, pointing at his heart. But “as long as elections are approaching, 
everyone has to play this game”.  
It is a commonplace observation that a constitutive outside is needed to 
bind a polity, but the EU’s way of doing this is nevertheless a most peculiar 
enterprise. Its target is, as in the illegal entry sign, people on the move, and it has 
created a complex industry for the purpose. While states such as Spain provide the 
parts and build the machinery, Frontex edits the manuals, oversees the work, 
evaluates the results. Pushing the securitisation analogy, the agency works in 
some ways as the “special purpose vehicle” used in derivatives banking before the 
financial crisis – spreading risks off balance sheet, diffusing accountability away 
from sovereign states and their elected governments. In this double securitisation 
of migration, the junk risk is heaped onto the African borderlands. Here risk is 
reproduced and magnified, or as one European police attaché put it: “We’re in the 
eye of the cyclone now… When you bolt all doors, you’ll have a pressure 
cooker.” It is to this pressure cooker, and the fraught task of putting the lid on 
African mobility, that we will now turn. 
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Hunter and prey 
 
 
 
Europe’s high-tech border regime takes on a more profane guise on African soil. 
Walk into the Cité Police complex along the seafront corniche in the Senegalese 
capital and look out for a torn A4 printout taped to a door two floors up 
announcing the “Division for the fight against irregular migrations”. This is the 
home of Frontex’s local police partner in patrolling Senegal’s coastline. Inside the 
dark halls of the division, I knocked on a door with a broken handle indicating the 
offices of the research group on migrant smuggling networks. Jean-Pierre, the 
commissioner in charge of the division, opened and greeted me with a friendly 
handshake. His office was full of cartons packed with night-vision goggles and 
other border policing tools, gifts from the division’s Spanish partners. A large 
copy of the i-Map familiar from Frontex’s Warsaw offices lurked in a corner. 
Jean-Pierre started talking, unprompted, of the causes of clandestine migration. 
“The cause is poverty, the lack of work,” he said. But now all routes were closed. 
“The maritime route has been bolted up, the air route has become more and more 
difficult. What’s left? The land route, and this is more difficult too. They are 
closing over there as well, and there are lots of deaths.” Jean-Pierre, who was of 
foreign West African stock himself, sounded sympathetic to the migrants’ plight. 
“Everything’s harder,” he said. “Everything has changed now.”  
 It was largely thanks to officers such as Jean-Pierre that boat migration 
had ground to a halt, Spanish officials never tired of repeating. This was not only 
meant as praise but was also a simple statement of fact. The success in halting 
irregular migration did not reside in slick Frontex machinery but was rather to be 
found in the Sahel and the Sahara, where African forces had been subcontracted to 
carry out migration controls. And it was the Spanish government, rather than 
Frontex or Brussels, that took most of the credit for oiling the wheels of the 
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subcontracting machine. On a visit to Dakar in 2011, the Spanish state secretary 
of security waxed lyrical on policing cooperation on migration. “The policy 
promoted by Spain is a total, absolute and resounding success that everyone 
recognises, and especially so the European Union,” he said. “In 2006, I think we 
came here with an attitude that they were very thankful for,” agreed the Spanish 
ambassador. Spain’s attitude of “dialogue and cooperation” contrasted sharply 
with that of the old colonial power, France, which kept strong-arming its way into 
its former African dominions. While Senegalese and Malian officers sourly 
accepted the French presence, they talked warmly of their Spanish colleagues. 
Praise and dialogue was not enough to bring the Africans on board, however. The 
Spaniards rarely said as much, but key to the success of Frontex operations such 
as Hera was not just disbursing aid money but also providing incentives to local 
forces. Essentially, you had to outbid the smugglers. 
 As a result of such incentives, a hunt was on for the illegal migrant across 
the deserts, forests and towns stretching beyond the EU-Africa border. But this 
migrant is an elusive prey. Who is he? Where is he to be found? How can he be 
distinguished from his fellow-travellers – the labour migrants, merchants and 
sojourners who have moved around the region freely for decades? This chapter 
will seek to answer these questions by following the police “hunters” and their 
elusive clandestine prey on the journey north through the borderlands: first on the 
shores of Dakar in Senegal, next at the Mauritania-Senegal border, and finally in 
the transit sites and dumping grounds of the Sahara and Morocco. On this 
migration circuit, it will be argued, Europe’s subcontractors do not simply detect 
and prevent irregular border crossings – they also help bring their target, the 
illegal migrant, into being.  
In the borderlands, the making of illegal migrants is not simply about the 
assignation and appropriation of this social category à la Hacking (1986), as was 
seen among Dakar’s repatriates; it is also about travellers’ progressive embodying 
of it. A growing critical migration literature has started taking the phenomenology 
of migrant illegality seriously, focusing on such embodied experiences of border 
controls (Coutin 2005; de Genova 2002; de Genova and Peutz 2010; Khosravi 
2007 and 2010; Willen 2007a and 2007b). Building on these path-breaking 
studies, I will consider not just how migrant illegality is assigned but how it 
comes to be lived by migrants. “The border,” as Michel Agier (2011:50) says, is 
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now “everywhere that an undesirable is identified”, including the indeterminate 
zone in which the traveller’s body becomes the border, the site of enforcement 
(Khosravi 2007). Walking across stretches of desert, hiding in the undergrowth 
next to an abandoned beach, crawling into a truck meant for merchandise or 
staring at the moving sky in a vast wooden boat are all ways of travelling that 
render the journey a bodily minefield. Contorted postures, stomach aches, 
dehydration, shivering and sore feet become sensorial signposts indicating the 
gradual crossing of borders, and attempts to avoid these ailments start signalling 
illegality to police. In the back-and-forth between the bodily strategies of Africa’s 
wayward travellers and police patrols and detections, the illegal migrant is 
conjured in increasing degrees of otherness, stigmatised by his very bodily 
presence.  
 
Rucksacks and biscuits: clandestine-spotting in Dakar 
 
Night-time on Dakar’s shores. The headlights of the police van illuminate the 
lanes leading down to the beachfront. The patrol chief, dressed in a chequered 
shirt and relaxed trousers, steers the van with fast, careless movements that sends 
it jolting and bouncing to the rhythm of Arabic music streaming out of the 
speakers. “Only the night guards are out now!” the chief shouts, honking his way 
towards the beach. His is one of the patrol units dedicated to tracking down illegal 
migrants on Europe’s behalf. We step onto the abandoned beach, the officers 
leading me to a rocky section of the shore next to a French-owned hotel. “The 
illegal migrants were hiding here,” they say while pointing to the undergrowth, as 
if on an archaeological tour. The hotel owner used to inform on the migrants-to-
be, as did paid-off local informers. “In general, we take them before they depart,” 
says one of the officers. “All the clandestine passengers, regardless of their 
nationality, we bring them in.” In 2006 journalists published pictures of crammed 
Senegalese police cells with detainees almost piled atop each other. Migrants were 
detained for months to deter others from leaving; smugglers were sent to languish 
in jails.
1
 By 2010, the temps des clandestins, the “time of the illegal migrants”, 
                                                 
1
 The strategy later changed to one where migrants were seen as victims of smugglers, bringing the 
Senegalese approach into line with Spanish priorities 
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was over, as one of the officers put it, not without a note of regret. Only this 
memory of departures and detentions remained in Dakar: a hiding place amid 
rocks and shrubs on a darkened beach. The border police’s task had been 
accomplished. 
 The Direction de la Police de l’Air et des Frontières (DPAF), the 
Senegalese border police encompassing Jean-Pierre’s division for fighting 
irregular migration, was a European brainchild to begin with. It had been created 
in 2004 on the insistence of the French, “as if all this had been anticipated”, said 
one inspector in reference to the 2006 boat crisis and the Frontex response that 
ensued. Since then, Spain had taken over as DPAF’s main partner. Four 
Senegalese forces were involved in Frontex patrols in 2010: the Air Force, the 
Navy, the Gendarmerie and DPAF. While the Navy and Air Force monitored the 
seas and the Gendarmerie the coastlines, DPAF patrolled Dakar’s shores and 
Rosso and Oussouye near the Mauritanian and Guinea-Bissau border respectively. 
DPAF was, in a sense, the poor cousin of the Navy, the Guardia Civil’s main 
partner. Its officers were, crudely put, the spivs, sweepers and back-office staff in 
migration control – crucial to keep on board, but at one remove from the real 
action on high seas. 
At sea unfolded the glamorous side to Hera patrols – roaring planes and 
boats aided by the technological wizardry of radars, satellites and infrared 
cameras. Here was also the possibility of catching migrants in the act of setting 
out for Spain. The Guardia Civil or Frontex vessels would approach pirogues and 
look for signs of an imminent “illegal” trip, notwithstanding their being in 
Senegalese waters. Around 30 passengers was normal for a fishing trip or mare, in 
which Senegalese fishermen set out for days on end across open sea; lack of 
fishing gear in the hull raised suspicions, as did the presence of petrol canisters. 
The European border guards made a note of the captain and later checked the boat 
had returned to coast. All this was done under the “legal cover”, as one 
Comandante put it, of having a Senegalese officer on board. The appearance of 
sovereignty was still intact, national boundaries respected. “We help them to fight 
illegal migration,” said Comandante Francisco, no tongue in cheek. 
Such “help” would look distinctly unhelpful on land, leaving patrolling 
Senegalese policemen – if not their bosses – at one remove from the joys of 
collaboration. DPAF’s task was also more difficult than that of their seaborne 
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colleagues since it involved stopping migrants in their tracks, before they had 
even embarked towards Spain. The Guardia Civil chief in Dakar acknowledged 
this was a tough brief. “We can never demonstrate that 50 people in a bus are 
migrants,” he said. Instead any suspect travellers were referred to – like in 
Senegal’s sensitisation campaigns – as candidates for illegal migration. DPAF’s 
patrols had the crucial task of defining and conjuring migrants out of the broad 
group of candidates before they revealed themselves on the open seas; it was also 
here that the unequal gains from the illegality industry were most keenly felt.  
 
 
 
The Spanish-funded four-wheel-drive bounced along the road towards Hann-
Maristes. I had joined a daytime patrol, made up of four policemen crammed into 
the car and one officer riding a quad bike also donated by Spain for patrolling the 
beaches dotting Dakar’s Cap Vert peninsula. The officers were part of the coastal 
surveillance brigade, whose principal task was to patrol the beaches in three shifts 
round the clock in search for illegal migrants. “There’s no police or Gendarmerie 
brigade that’s more skilled than us on the theme of illegality [clandestinité],” said 
Abdoulaye, the gangly head of the unit, turning round to address me at the back as 
the car sped down a mud lane towards the beach. “We know everything that 
happens along the sea shore.” 
 On the beach, pirogues were pulled up in the white sands and locals 
occasionally sauntered by. No illegal migrant in sight. Alassane, a young officer 
with several years in the brigade, explained how to determine who was a migrant 
and who an innocent fisherman. “It’s very easy to catch an illegal migrant,” he 
said. “They don’t come one by one, they come 10 to 15 of them together, all with 
a backpack.” The backpack and the clustering were but two signs of migrant 
illegality on Dakar’s beaches. The clandestins, Alassane explained, also stocked 
up on biscuits to avoid excessive bowel movements during the crossing; they 
wore trainers or plastic sandals, good if the boat got wet; sometimes they dressed 
in several layers of clothing against the winds and kept elaborate gris-gris 
(charms) for protection or invisibility. They were also identified by their lack of 
movement. If a group descended on the beach and stayed there, waiting, Alassane 
knew they were migrants and would proceed to search them. Browsing through 
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their backpacks, he would find euros not franc CFA, and no mobile phones. All 
these signs were giveaways for police on the trail of today’s footloose travellers. 
 
[Fig9 removed: a Spanish-funded quad bike for patrolling clandestine migration] 
 
The brigades’ patrols were not concerned with the surveillance of abstract risk 
patterns familiar from the control rooms in Las Palmas, Madrid and Warsaw. 
Instead, their task – as Alassane made clear – was to read embryonic signs of 
potential threats on behalf of Spain and Frontex. For this subcontracting to 
succeed, Spain had developed an intricate gift economy. First, the Spaniards 
provided a generous “expenses” pay (per diem or indemnité) for working on 
illegal migration. They also lavished African forces with policing gear – the night-
vision goggles in Jean-Pierre’s corner, but also the brigade’s vehicles and 
computers. The third incentive was the trips discussed in the last chapter. To get 
the anti-mobility machine rolling, Europe had to invest in the mobility of the 
higher echelons of African forces, who flitted between policing conferences and 
study visits the better to police the cross-border movements of their countrymen.  
I will talk about these resources destined for African forces as gifts rather 
than as payments or even bribes in order to highlight how Spain’s personalised 
incentives created social bonds and an obligation to reciprocate. But such gifts 
also generated ever-increasing demands – as well as tensions over the question of 
who-gained-what in a pattern reminiscent of colonial-era disbursements of 
privileges (Cooper 2005).  
The Senegalese officers said Frontex paid for their resources, but Frontex 
denied any involvement. Any incentives, according to Giuseppe, the former Hera 
manager, were down to the “bilateral agreement between Spain and Senegal, 
Frontex has no knowledge” of it. He also sounded a note of caution. “When we’re 
with the Africans and you’re about to give them money, it’s not as easy as paying 
European police, you don’t know how it’s been spent,” he said, hinting that some 
of it inevitably “gets lost”. And the way money and resources trickled down, were 
unequally distributed and finally disappeared was a source of resentment for the 
officers in the illegal migration brigade. 
As I spoke to Alassane, his colleagues congregated around us. I asked 
them about the Spaniards. “We see them… the Spanish boat over there,” said one 
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of them, looking out over the grey still seas where the Guardia Civil patrolled, 
“but we have never met these people.” He continued: “There are identification 
missions in Spain, but police agents never go! We should!” Then Abdoulaye 
weighed in. “If there are benefits like that, it’s the office people who leave. But 
identification is the job of police agents!” The others all murmured in agreement.  
 Besides concerns about trips, the officers also demanded more resources. 
The brigade had received vehicles, including a speedboat, as well as gadgets that 
were more easily “retrieved into the private domain”, as one of the officers 
admitted with a smile: torches, an iPhone, two pairs of binoculars, mobile phone 
credit. But now funds were running dry. No more credit, no new gadgets. Vehicle 
upkeep stalled. The cars rusted or broke down after being exposed to sun and sand 
24 hours a day, according to the officers. “Each brigade should have its own 
vehicle,” said one of them. “They should give us the logistical means to be able to 
work at ease.”  
The biggest source of resentment, however, was pay. When the Spaniards 
and Frontex descended on Senegal in 2006, the per diem had been tantalising. The 
officers said they had initially received €40 per person per day – a fortune in 
Senegal. This only lasted for the first two months. “Afterwards everyone got 
implicated,” said Abdoulaye. All the police directorates wanted their share of the 
illegal migration spoils, and the brigade’s extra pay was slower and slower in 
coming. They had started receiving it once a week, then once a month, then once 
every 45 days or every two months. Money from “Frontex” reached agencies and 
police chiefs who had nothing to do with the fight against illegal migration, 
Abdoulaye said, while “the agents suffer a lot” on their long shifts. The others 
chimed in, complaining about the cost of eating out during their breaks, the 
mosquitoes on the beaches, the night-time patrols. The list of grievances seemed 
endless. “In illegal migration, it’s the police agents who do the bulk of the work 
but they haven’t gained anything at all,” said one officer, sounding strangely like 
Mohammadou and his repatriate friends a few kilometres down the road.  
For all my sympathies, I couldn’t help asking myself: what work? We 
stood around the beach chatting, watched upon by a few fishermen. By 2010 the 
brigade’s travails were no longer about spying for signs of illegal migrants, since 
no one left from these beaches any longer. The patrols were instead an exercise in 
what police chiefs called visibility – to show candidates and their families that the 
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police were ready to cut short any attempted boat journey. This was boring, to be 
sure, but not quite the ordeal the brigade made it out to be.  
The patrols were also about visibility in another sense. Much like the 
Guardia Civil’s patrol boat rarely failed to rumble past the European tourist 
haunts of Gorée island, the DPAF patrols were at least partly a show for the 
funders and the visiting researcher. Yongor’s repatriates said they never saw the 
DPAF patrols, despite police reassurances of their existence. Moreover, they 
insisted that “Frontex”, which to them meant a hapless bunch of bribe-taking 
Senegalese state agents, could not stop them from departing. “For me, Frontex is 
things people do to make money,” Mohammadou said with his trademark frown. 
“Because those people are not serious people, they are there but if you give them 
money they let you pass. That’s why, for me, Frontex doesn’t exist… Those 
people don’t do their work!” he exclaimed. Even though repatriates ironically 
denounced the Senegalese forces for “not doing their work”, by 2010 no would-be 
migrants were attempting to leave Dakar’s shores. Money instead circulated 
downwards, through payments to informers. A delicate financial balancing act 
was maintained between the European paymasters, African forces, local youth and 
potential “smugglers”, but how long it would last was another matter.  
Beyond the unequal gains, Frontex was a source of friction on other fronts 
too. Jean-Pierre voiced concerns about national sovereignty when discussing 
Frontex patrols. So did Moussa, one of the jet-setting chiefs the coastal brigade 
looked upon with envy. Moussa was nearing retirement, and his regular trips to 
the Las Palmas coordination centre, where I had first met him, were a boon at this 
stage in his career. The Senegalese forces involved in the Frontex mission rotated 
the liaison officer role between them, spreading the joy of a few months in the 
Gran Canarian capital equitably. To Moussa, it was “better for everyone” that boat 
migration had stopped because of the risks to life at sea, but he added a critical 
observation: frustrated youth stuck at home could spell trouble for those in power.  
Moussa had other concerns as well, however subtly voiced. “It’s very hard 
in Africa now,” he said. “People have studies, diplomas and so on, but afterwards 
there’s no work.” He was advising his sons, who studied in France, to stay put 
there. Life had become harder since the devaluation of the CFA franc in the 
1990s. “We’re not independent, the currency is still controlled by France,” he 
complained, mentioning the strong French military presence in the capital. “Dakar 
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is a strategic point, including for the Americans, the Arabs and so on… They 
come here, and afterwards they expand into the region. It’s the same thing with 
Frontex,” he concluded.  
 Moussa, Abdoulaye and Jean-Pierre all expressed unease at their 
predicament as subcontracted policemen working on Europe’s behalf in catching 
clandestins. This unease ranged from political ambivalence at the top to financial 
resentment further down the pay scale, and grew in inverse proportion to the 
dwindling gains in the illegality industry. When clandestins had been bountiful on 
Dakar’s beaches, officers had first been able to cash in by demanding bribes or 
even embarking their relatives for free. Since 2006, this had been supplanted by 
Spanish largesse. The Spaniards, aware of the need to incentivise, kept some 
funds flowing through the EU-sponsored West Sahel programme in 2012. But the 
absurdity at the heart of cooperation was hard to ignore. The Senegalese forces 
were now only chasing ghosts – potential clandestine migrants and smugglers 
who did not materialise. The basis of their business had vanished.  
Instead, this business had moved elsewhere. For if Europe’s border 
machinery has halted the migrant boats heading for the Canaries, it has not yet 
blocked the routes through the Sahara desert embarked upon by West Africa’s 
overland aventuriers (Bredeloup 2008). Along the desert routes, African forces 
face a harder task than on Dakar’s beaches – detecting furtive signs of an intention 
to migrate. In the process, they add a new piece to the illegal migrant under 
production. Already provided with a dress code, belongings and behaviour that 
mark him as illegal, the overland adventurer will in the border zone be endowed 
with something rather more ineffable: a mind of his own.  
 
Reading the illegal mind at the Rosso border 
 
The road winds, potholed and dusty, towards the border. The cramped car lurches 
over holes gouged out of the tarmac as we drive past bone-dry frontier outposts 
enveloped in a Saharan haze. Our destination is the town of Rosso, where the 
Senegal river marks the Mauritanian border.  
 Many adventurers have followed this route towards the distant Maghreb. 
Their long, stepwise journeys follow a different logic to those of the boat migrants 
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of 2006, many of whom simply sought a quick way to Europe. The adventurers 
have been called transit migrants, but they do not transit from A to B – instead 
their trips of uncertain end, often stretching over several years, trace intricate lines 
through the Sahel and Sahara.
2
  
As I dislodged myself from the sept-place taxi at Rosso’s flyblown bus 
station to the calls of hustlers (“Nouakchott? Nouakchott?”), a police officer I 
knew from a previous visit greeted me and immediately started talking about the 
“new system” for clandestine migration. Moroccan truckers bringing oranges and 
merchandise to Dakar allow adventurers to join them on the way up, for a fee. 
They get off before the Rosso jetty, cross the Senegal river alone and then rejoin 
the trucker in Mauritania. “It’s very difficult to control,” the officer exclaimed, 
“because it’s all in their head! What’s their final destination? You can’t stop them, 
you just can’t know. It’s just the idea,” he kept repeating.  
 While in Dakar, police categorised travellers into licit and illicit – above-
board and below-board in Coutin’s (2005) terms – on the basis of bodily and 
behavioural signs, in Rosso the elusive figure of the illegal migrant also acquired 
a peculiar mental make-up. It was the “idea in their head” that branded travellers 
as illegal at this border. The increasing essentialisation of the illegal migrant en 
route was not just discursive, however; rather, illegality imposed itself upon 
travellers, with real effects on their mental life. As travellers were detained on the 
basis of their supposed intentionality, they were sucked into a circular world of 
trips cut short, detentions and ignominies, deportations and empty pockets. 
Pushed “below-board”, they were entering the liminal state that Coutin has 
labelled “being en route” (ibid): present yet absent from the jurisdictions they 
traverse, at turns visible and invisible to the border forces that chase them.   
 
 
 
Rosso has everything you could wish for in a border town. Turbaned Moors sit 
back in shacks lining its potholed lanes, half-heartedly trying to flog Mauritanian 
ouguiyas for franc CFA or euros, while their nomad compatriots take camels 
across the river for grazing in an ancient arrangement that is nowadays dwarfed 
                                                 
2
 See Collyer (2007) and Düvell (2006) for a critique of the “transit migration” concept, widely 
used and promoted by especially the IOM 
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by the post-independence border economy. This economy is on display 
everywhere: vendors vie for space along the road leading up to the river jetty, 
selling cheap electric gadgets, packets of Argentinian gofio flour, Spanish 
quicklime and Mauritanian biscuits tasting of caked sand. And water, Mauritanian 
bottled water, drunk in one clean gulp to momentarily quench the thirst. Rosso is 
parched and hot: this is the border of the Sahara. The sun screams down through a 
haze of dust. Migrants stuck here complain of the heat, the dry air, the clouds of 
fine sand. You choke on flies and hide from the heat by drowsing on tattered 
mattresses and sipping a stronger green tea than that served further south in the 
Sahel. Cheikh, a tall man with sugar-rotted teeth, sat on one such mattress, 
pouring his potent brew of attaya as the pot hissed on the coal stove. Known by 
colleagues as Mr Migration, Cheikh was in charge of the Rosso Red Cross, whose 
Spanish-funded mission was to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants.  
Rosso has in the past years become a transit point – and dumping ground – 
for clandestine migrants. It is where “white” North Africa and “black” West 
Africa meet, and it is where Mauritanian gendarmes deport foreigners caught for 
supposedly trying to migrate illegally to the Canaries. Rosso is one link in the 
chain of subcontracted migration controls, in which local police forces and 
humanitarian organisations alternately detain, deport and care for migrants en 
route. As would soon be evident, however, it is a weak link, despite Europe’s best 
efforts. 
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After finishing his customary third glass of tea, Cheikh took me to the Red Cross 
“operational base”, the most visible sign of Rosso’s role on the clandestine circuit. 
A Spanish Foreign Ministry logo adorned this humble humanitarian space: a 
stretch of land adorned with a tent or two, with views of the border river through a 
frayed fence. “In 2006, we would have a hundred a day here, up to 600-700 a 
week, wounded and in all kinds of states,” Cheikh said. Next to us, a slight 
European woman squatted on the ground, smoking a hand-rolled cigarette. This 
was Belén, the representative for the Spanish Red Cross in Rosso. The role of the 
joint Spanish and Senegalese Red Cross mission was to care for exhausted 
deportees, who were given food and drink, a wash and a rest. Their main purpose, 
however, was to send migrants on to Dakar or their Senegalese home region. 
Since most deportees were not Senegalese, this simply meant removing them 
from the border zone – often against their will. Before this removal, there was also 
another crucial step: escorting deportees to the police post down the main road for 
formalities and an occasional scolding.  
The Red Cross and the border police were both subcontracted by Spain to 
perform different but complementary functions: treating migrants as victims in 
need of humanitarian assistance on the one hand, and processing them as 
lawbreakers on the other. This collaboration between police and aid workers did 
not strike Cheikh as unusual. In either case, the police had little interest in 
Figure 10. Views of Mauritania from the Red Cross base, Rosso-Senegal 
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detaining or harassing deportees – in their offices, the business of the border went 
on in its messy, languid way, and no money was anyhow available for locking 
people up.  
Overland travellers, Moors with weather-beaten faces and money-
changing hustlers converged around the police building down the main road. 
Inside, the deputy police chief, a gaunt man in his fifties, went up to a cabinet that 
perched precariously next to a pile of rubbish, browsed through it and found a 
folder labelled MIGRANTS CLANDESTINS. Data on new arrivals were 
collected in such folders and sent on to the border police in Dakar, he explained. 
That was all they could do here – “we interrogate them,” he said, “but we can’t 
detain them.” He insisted that Senegal “welcomed everyone”, unlike the 
Mauritanian security forces, with whom relations were strained. Next he handed 
me his CV. “You might find me some opportunities,” he said in a hopeful tone.  
The dearth of “opportunities” – jobs, money, promotions – again meant 
Spain had to provide incentives to keep their African colleagues on side. In Rosso, 
“Frontex” (meaning Spain) had provided a speedboat and petrol for land and river 
patrols, torches and night-vision binoculars, as well as the per diem payment. The 
task of questioning and processing deportees before the Red Cross sent them on 
was easy enough; the difficult task was finding any clandestine migrants before 
they entered Mauritania. All that travellers from Senegal, Mali and the Gambia 
needed to cross legally was vaccination papers and a devise or deposit of €50 
worth of Mauritanian ouguiyas. Other nationalities simply paid small bribes to the 
officers on the jetty in Rosso-Mauritania. “In Nouadhibou, that’s where they 
prepare the crossing and throw away all their documents,” Cheikh said. “They 
want to make the task harder for the police, they don’t want to give away their 
secret. There’s a serious problem of categorising them.”   
 This hidden-ness, the “secret” in their head that both Cheikh and the 
border police invoked, was in Rosso becoming a key constitutive ingredient of 
migrant illegality. This was, after all, what the French term clandestin connoted, 
as did the Mauritanian term for illegal migrants, siriyan, derived from the word 
for secret. Making the illegal migrant speak and reveal the inner workings of his 
mind was hard work. Moreover, he lied; he was untrustworthy as if by nature. As 
a French police attaché told me: “Le migrant, il est un grand menteur” – the 
migrant is a big liar. This sentiment, echoed by other workers in the illegality 
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industry, was not just a representation of a key imagined trait of illegal migrants, 
however. For travellers stuck in limbo, buffeted by Africa’s subcontractors and 
their hopeless dreams, the blurring of truths and lies was part of their everyday 
experience. It was also part of their toolkit as adventurers, as I would discover in 
Rosso.  
 
 
 
Cheikh had summoned three Liberians to talk to me in the bare Red Cross office 
across the road from the base. Edward was one of them, a well-dressed young 
man who sat waiting for me in the office’s only plastic chair. “It’s very difficult 
here with an English passport,” he sighed. By this he meant documents from an 
Anglophone West African country. Travelling the region had never been that easy 
for English-speaking nationals, with especially Nigerians subjected to high “fees” 
at borders despite the free circulation accords covering the West African 
ECOWAS region. These free circulation provisions were still honoured by 
Mauritania, from where Edward and his friends had just been deported, despite 
the country’s exit from the regional body (Serón et al 2011:51). In 2010, however, 
Mauritania had imposed entry restrictions for nationals of all English-speaking 
West African countries, forcing any prospective travellers to enter by air rather 
than overland. Anglophone travellers, increasingly seen as “illegal” by definition, 
were targeted in crackdowns accordingly. Edward and his friends had been 
expelled from Rosso-Mauritania across the river, he explained, and never made it 
further north. As we talked about this ordeal, his friends arrived. He introduced 
Alan as his brother, and Clara as a relative. Clara soon added a dissonant note to 
Edward’s story. They were detained and jailed in Nouakchott, she said, while 
trying to find work. Their purpose there was not all that clear – they alternately 
said they wanted to “see Mauritania” or try to go to Europe – and their prospects 
now were vaguer still. Why not take the Red Cross money and go to Dakar, I 
asked? “We don’t have anybody in Dakar,” said Alan. “It’s hard,” said Edward, “I 
don’t know where it’d be preferable for us.” Since the Red Cross could not help 
them, they needed to call a relative who could send them cash for going back 
home, or to settle in a place further south. Could I give them money for a calling 
card?  
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Afterwards I met Cheikh at the base, who shook his head at the Liberians’ 
story. They were “potential candidates” who just wanted to cross the border again, 
he said, adding that I did right in not giving them money. “They say they are 
brothers or that she is their sister,” he said, “but no one travels with their sister in 
that manner.” He did not believe any aspect of their story. Neither did I know 
what to believe. The Liberians were in a liminal zone where truth and falsehood 
had lost their definite edges, fraying with each passing day. They acknowledged 
that what they said had little value beyond the instrumental, laughing 
embarrassedly as they recalled telling the local imam they were Muslim so they 
could sleep for a night or two in the mosque. Everything they did was tinged with 
illegitimacy and suspicion. When I returned to Rosso a month later they had 
finally found a way to cross the river, one by one, back into Mauritania. 
The more adventurers such as the Liberians circulated in the system, the 
more money became available for the subcontractors, as Belén hinted over dinner 
in a plush hotel nearby. She looked frail and emaciated, constantly on edge, 
smoking cigarette after cigarette. She had no time for the politics of the Red Cross 
mission or for pondering the border patrols running in parallel to it – there were 
accounts to complete, constant requests from head office in Madrid, and the 
Senegalese didn’t lift a finger! Sometimes she got into a panic, she said, and 
simply froze with stress. The migration project had underspent because so few 
deportees had arrived lately, making for an accountancy headache and fresh 
pressure from her bosses. The Spanish Red Cross, contracted by Aecid, depended 
on their own subcontracting to – or “partnership” with – the Senegalese, and here 
there was ample scope for improvement. Belén felt she always had to chase, prod 
and remind her local colleagues to do something, while they kept asking her for 
things, “folders, papers, pens…” She saw them as little birds constantly opening 
their beaks and wanting to be fed. They were even using up the water in the tarp-
covered “bladder” in the base, which was specifically meant for migrants! Belén 
shook her head, exasperated. The migrant project would soon close for lack of 
arrivals and because of the end of the funding cycle; she looked relieved that she 
was about to get out.  
Cheikh and his volunteers saw little reason to prioritise the adventurers, 
who might have been through a bad spell but were still probably better off than 
the deprived residents of Rosso. This uneasy interface between western aid 
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workers and their local counterparts is of course far from new, as attested to by 
the work of Long (2001) and other development scholars. In Rosso, however – as 
elsewhere along migrant routes – the tense interactions absurdly depended upon 
the elusive presence of migrant illegality. Without it no interface could exist, no 
aid would be forthcoming and the industry would come to an end.  
In policing, by contrast, this elusiveness could help ensure a continuous 
cash flow, as I discovered while riding in a patrol car on a dirt road hugging the 
Senegal river. Here, like in Dakar, the police were chasing ghosts – but in 
conjuring a menace they would always have the ear of European funders. “Illegal 
migration has become our principal task,” said one of the four police officers as 
we rolled out of Rosso. None of them wore a uniform; the only indication this was 
a police patrol funded by Spain was a sticker saying POLICE taped to the car. 
Before, the smuggling of rice and sugar across the river was the main concern 
here, but Frontex had imposed new priorities. The patrol felt strangely like a safari 
– but the further we bumped and wobbled our way into border territory, sending 
up clouds of sand as we went, the more obvious it was that there were no illegal 
migrants in sight. We spotted cement smugglers pushing a boat into the water, a 
man with a suitcase, kids playing by the riverbed and lone, turban-wrapped 
figures. I snapped a picture of the team standing in an abandoned pirogue. “Now 
we are illegal migrants!” one of them quipped to laughter. The joke highlighted 
the absurd impossibility of the officers’ brief of tracking the intentionality of 
travellers along a much-traversed river, and their essentialisation of these 
travellers as a consequence. “It’s very difficult to detect the illegal migrant,” one 
of the officers sighed. “Just like that, he becomes a boatman, or else he appears as 
a simple traveller... they don’t exhibit their illegality in Senegal, it’s something 
that you can’t detect.” Not until Nouadhibou, he added. At that Mauritanian “gate 
to Europe”, police at last apprehend the travellers as what they really are – fully 
formed illegal migrants, ready to board their wooden boats and brave the wild sea. 
 
Nouadhibou: the numbers game 
 
At the sandswept fringes of the Mauritanian port city of Nouadhibou, some 500 
km from Rosso and 800 km from the Canary Islands, lay an abandoned school 
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compound known as Guantanamito. Spanish soldiers had converted the 
compound into a holding centre for boat migrants awaiting deportation in 2006, 
again using Aecid funds. Subject to critical reports by Amnesty International 
(2008) and the Spanish refugee assistance organisation CEAR (2008), 
Guantanamito housed migrants who had either been intercepted at sea and sent 
back to Mauritania under the readmission agreement signed with Spain, or 
increasingly apprehended in town and accused of trying to travel clandestinely to 
Europe (Migreurop/La Cimade 2010:18).  
 The centre was the product of an unusual set of circumstances. Mauritania 
had undergone a coup d’état in August 2005 that, while hardly the first in the 
country’s turbulent post-independence history, triggered widespread 
condemnation, including from the EU. It was a lucky coincidence that the surge in 
clandestine boat departures took place soon after the coup, since this forced the 
Europeans’ hands. They now had to negotiate with Mauritania, thus recognising 
the newly installed regime.
3
 As clandestine boat departures grew over the winter 
of 2005, so did the Spanish policing presence, leading to the official launch of 
Frontex operations the following summer. By then, journalists were also massing 
in Nouadhibou, armed with cameras and notepads and an insatiable thirst for the 
story of a migrant exodus. Academic observers criticised the sensationalism while 
pointing out that Nouadhibou had for years been a magnet for regional labour 
migration (Choplin and Lombard 2007). To no avail: hysteria around an African 
exodus was quickly worked up, and the police crackdown intensified as a result. 
 The Spaniards kept tight-lipped about their work in Mauritania – the 
American embassy in Nouakchott complained that getting information on Spain’s 
migration response was akin to pulling teeth, according to Wikileaks cables.
4
 
Perhaps this was because of the legal vacuum in which migration controls took 
place. As critical observers such as CEAR noted (2008), trying to migrate 
clandestinely to another country was not an infraction in Mauritanian law, which 
meant no sanction of detention or deportation could be applied to it. The moniker 
Guantanamito for the deportation centre was in this sense apt – as a space outside 
the law, though with the important caveat that migrants were only kept there 
temporarily (a few days in principle, often longer in practice) before being 
                                                 
3
 Spain was also aided in negotiations by the weak position of Mauritania’s post-coup government 
4
 See http://dazzlepod.com/cable/09NOUAKCHOTT379/   
 124 
bundled into a van destined towards the Senegalese border at Rosso or the Malian 
one at Gogui.
5
 Mauritania’s government had passed a law in 2010 on migrant 
smuggling and was in the process of passing another on migration that would give 
legal gloss to the response already under way. Its eagerness to collaborate was 
perhaps unsurprising, given that Mauritania’s new “migration strategy” was 
largely financed by the EU, as were the country’s recently constructed border 
posts, whose staff were trained by the IOM and the Guardia Civil and whose 
colleagues on the coast had received Spanish vessels and pay.
6
 
While the Mauritanian authorities were formally in charge of 
Guantanamito, assistance for detainees was handled by the Mauritanian Red 
Crescent, with support from the Spanish Red Cross. The centre was the brainchild 
of Enrique, the Spanish policeman who had negotiated bilateral migration accords 
with West African states. He still took pride in his role in creating it, despite the 
harsh critique and calls for its closure. The centre was “a green island in the 
middle of the desert”, he insisted, “like a hotel”. It was created for “humanitarian 
reasons” and was so well furnished that the Mauritanian gendarmes started 
stripping away its equipment for their own homes. By 2010, Enrique did not care 
to hear more about the current state of the centre: rundown and derelict, it was 
something he’d rather forget about. 
 “The fiasco of Guantanamito”, as one Spanish journalist put it, was 
complete.
7
 Stripped bare of supplies by soldiers and labelled a prison by human 
rights advocates, the centre was a perfect illustration of the absurdities of the 
Spanish-African gift economy. 
It also pointed to the increasing arbitrariness of policing clandestine 
migration on adventurers’ northward journey. As the Rosso border police had 
said, detecting illegal migrants was easier in Mauritania than on the border. 
Migrants revealed their illegality through the same signs as in Dakar when 
preparing for embarkation – travelling in groups and carrying small backpacks, 
biscuits and euros among their belongings. But the Mauritanians threw themselves 
into the task of detecting “illegals” with unusual frenzy. The key characteristic of 
the illegality industry in Mauritania was what activists have called the numbers 
                                                 
5
 With the migrant handovers money changed hands from Mauritanians to Malian officers, 
according to Migreurop/La Cimade (2010:32), though the exact arrangements are unclear  
6
 For more on EU/Spanish involvement, see Serón et al (2011:51-60) 
7
 See http://elpais.com/diario/2008/07/10/espana/1215640817_850215.html  
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game (politique du chiffre: Migreurop/La Cimade 2010:19). The Rosso police 
distinguished between raflés (“raided” foreigners) and clandestins deported from 
Mauritania. The former, they said, were simply foreign workers picked up to 
make up numbers, not migrants intent on migrating clandestinely to Europe. Sub-
Saharan Africans were detained in Nouadhibou for wearing two pairs of jeans, 
this “proving” they were on their way to Europe (Amnesty 2008). Once numbers 
of departing migrants dropped, not even this was needed as an indication of 
illegality: skin was enough. The Spanish Red Cross, which collected the only 
systematic data available on those detained, came to similar conclusions on the 
numbers game (Cruz Roja 2008). Guantanamito was first a “welcoming centre in 
citation marks”, said one Spanish Red Cross officer, before being “converted into 
a detention centre for anyone suspected of wanting to migrate”.  
Europe’s subcontracted migration controls here threatened to undermine 
not only diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries, but also the already 
fragile relations between Mauritania’s black (haratin) and white (bidan) 
communities by adding a tinge of illegality to the politics of skin colour. The 
legacy of slavery, as well as the forced expulsion to Senegal of black 
Mauritanians following a conflict between the countries in 1999, was never far 
from the surface. One civil society firebrand in Dakar saw a shift between 2008 
and 2010 towards the growing stigmatisation of strangers, with cases of even 
black Mauritanians being deported to the southern borders. “Now all black people 
are susceptible to being [seen as] illegal migrants,” she said.  
 
 
 
Jacques was one of the clandestine travellers detained and deported in the 
crackdowns. He waited for me at the Red Cross base in Rosso, dressed in a 
shabby sports jacket and stained jeans. It was hard to tell his age, but I guessed he 
was in his late thirties. A broad, expectant grin spread across his lips as we sat 
down on a bench next to the water bladder. He clutched a small, ragged backpack, 
that tell-tale sign of migrant illegality, in which all his belongings were gathered: 
a toothbrush, a grubby towel and little else except a blanket and a soap dish given 
to him by the Red Cross during detention in Nouadhibou. He only had a spare 
shirt besides the clothes he was wearing, which under the circumstances looked 
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relatively clean. “They stole my bag at the border between Guinea and Senegal,” 
he said. “I arrived in Senegal with nothing but a plastic bag in my hands.” Still 
smiling, he told me his story of growing up in Guinea; however, he said he hailed 
from Guadeloupe, the French overseas department in the Caribbean. He wished to 
enter Europe. In fact, he had a French friend who had promised to meet him in 
Morocco and help him sort out his papers. These he had lost somewhere en route 
– it was not quite clear where – and he had failed to get new ones when 
approaching the French embassy in Dakar. After this far-fetched attempt at getting 
travel documents, he had gone north. In Nouadhibou, Jacques had paid a driver 
for a clandestine trip to Tetuan, an unlikely destination in northern Morocco. 
Instead he was dropped 40 km away and told to walk towards the West Saharan 
border. There, border guards promptly packed him off to Nouadhibou for a 
beating and a night in the cells. He refused to eat because of a “bad stomach”. The 
next day he was sent on to Guantanamito. 
 Jacques smoked more and more, while he ate less and less. “I was so 
afraid,” Jacques said. “‘You have to eat!’ they told me. But I said, I can’t eat here, 
I can’t eat in jail because it smelt so badly there.” Guards accompanied him when 
he had to go to the toilet. A “Spanish lady” from the Red Cross was there, Jacques 
said, but did little to help. After a few days, the Mauritanian Red Crescent came to 
obtain information, asking how much he had paid for his clandestine journey, if 
he had a relative abroad… After a few days, the police sent Jacques and other 
deportees to Nouakchott, the capital. The policemen offered food but “I was a bit 
affected by all this anxiety, I couldn’t eat even a small piece of biscuit,” Jacques 
recalled. Finally he was sent on to Rosso-Mauritania, where he again refused 
food. Deported across the river at night, Jacques was turned back by Senegalese 
border police since he lacked a “piece of paper”, he said vaguely. By the time the 
Mauritanians sent him across a second time, the Senegalese police had left their 
shift, so Jacques went ashore and headed for the Red Cross. 
Jacques and many others were not registered in the Rosso police chief’s 
dusty ledgers of illegal migrants. They were invisible. This invisibility and 
indeterminacy, in which authority was exercised upon the migrant body 
randomly, suddenly and arbitrarily, took a big toll on the physical and mental 
health of deportees. Over a plate of mafe stew in the local fly-infested canteen – 
Jacques now ate big mouthfuls, slowly and methodically – the smile stayed on his 
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lips. “In Senegal, there’s freedom,” he said. “After you pass the border towards 
Dakar, there’s no place where they’ll hassle you.” But when someone dropped a 
plate behind him, he suddenly twitched with startled eyes. Tensions seemed to 
simmer underneath his taut smile and briefly burst forth in his twitchiness, queasy 
stomach and cigarette cravings.  
 To understand Jacques’ experience it is worth returning to Coutin, who 
sees migrants en route as experiencing an “erasure of presence” in which they 
undergo a “physical transformation” (2005:198): 
 
When they are clandestine, migrants embody both law and illegality. Absented from 
the jurisdictions that prohibit their presence, migrants disappear – whether by 
hiding, assuming false identities, or dying. By disappearing, migrants become both 
other (alien) and thinglike (capable of being transported)… Although they “cannot 
be”, migrants continue to occupy physical space. Their bodies become a sort of 
absent space or vacancy, surrounded by law. 
 
This vacancy was expressed in Jacques’ rootlessness and wandering (errance). 
Where would he go? Jacques had no clear answers, except saying that “I won’t go 
back… my objective is to reach Morocco, I’ll find a solution in order to 
continue.” But this was utterly unrealistic. Jacques was down to his last savings, 
500 CFA (70 cents) “plus my cigarettes”. “Once I get to Rabat, my friend can find 
me there,” he said, before mentioning that his friend’s email, the only contact 
detail he had, was stored on his mobile phone SIM card, which he had lost. 
Jacques was losing everything, including his wallet on the road to Nouadhibou, 
where he had ended up after a police officer took pity on him and helped him into 
a van departing Nouakchott. Even more so than with the Liberians, everything 
about Jacques was fleeting and unsure; everything he said blurred the lines 
between truth, lies and daydreaming. That night, he would sleep as he always did, 
atop his spare shirt, hoping no Senegalese gendarme would wake him up. Maybe 
the next day a boatman could punt him across the river for free.  
Back in Dakar two weeks later, I bumped into Jacques again; he had 
heeded my advice to catch the Red Cross van. In the ledgers of Caritas, the 
Catholic organisation providing the only rudimentary assistance for migrants in 
the capital, he now appeared as Ibrahim, not Jacques; his age was listed as 22, not 
verging on 40. I had tried to put in a good word for Jacques/Ibrahim, saying that 
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he had indeed tried to migrate to Europe, which meant he was entitled to 
assistance. This way, I was playing the same game as everyone else in the 
illegality industry – invoking a traveller’s intentionality as source of both 
suspicion and entitlement, labelling my friend an illegal migrant in the process. 
The last time I went looking for him, around the Laboratory for Research on 
Social Transformations, a university research outfit that proved a fitting place for 
him to seek shelter at night, he was nowhere to be found. Maybe he had gone 
back north for lack of options. But his aimless wandering was unlikely to lead him 
across the biggest hurdle awaiting West Africa’s adventurers – the Sahara. 
  
The dehumanisation machine: crossing Africa’s internal sea 
 
Heading north from Nouadhibou, the route abruptly stops. Here lies what 
migrants call Kandahar, a stretch of desert between Mauritania and Morocco-
occupied Western Sahara. It is a limbo in which deportees such as Mohammadou 
once got stuck, ping-ponged between the border posts and forced to retreat at 
gunpoint. To overland adventurers, the whole desert is, in a sense, such a limbo. 
In crossing it, adventurers go through their next stage in the transformation into 
full-fledged illegal migrants. They live off gari, a Nigerian staple of flour mixed 
with water. They learn the fleeting lingo of the border, a mix of English, French 
and local words that allows them to communicate across linguistic divides. They 
stash what little money they have away from the sight of border guards; in Niger 
and northern Mali, road checkpoints have become a source of easy income for 
state forces targeting the presumed illegal migrant. If lucky enough to pass the 
initiation rite that crossing the desert constitutes for them, their adventure – 
exhilarating, dreary and deadly in equal measure – will finally have been worth it. 
 Mali’s vast desert borders had before the country’s conflict in 2012 
become the latest frontier in the drive to control migration, thanks to stiffer 
controls along the shores of Senegal and Mauritania. The desert was anathema to 
Frontex since it was away from the external border of the EU, so Spain had to rely 
on other funding instruments here. On the basis of its 2007 migration accord with 
Mali, Madrid had increased official development aid, funded various programmes 
on “migration management” and (alongside the EU) equipped 17 border police 
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posts.
8
 The Malian border police, the Gendarmerie and the country’s official 
migration delegations had also received Spanish-funded computers, generators, 
fingerprint-reading equipment, cars and gadgets. As in Senegal and Mauritania, 
such personalised gifts made for good relations. The Spanish police attaché had 
taken the family name of one of his Malian colleagues in a sure sign of affection, 
while the Gendarmerie colonel in charge of migration tapped his laptop 
contentedly, saying “this came from Spain”. But as on the beaches of Dakar, 
while gifts created tenuous moral bonds they also created a mechanism for 
articulating ever-growing demands.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Take me to Europe!” exclaimed a Malian gendarme with a chuckle before 
showing me into the AC-blasted offices of his boss. The director-general of the 
Gendarmerie Nationale had gathered his top officials on migration for my visit, 
and all had a word or two to say on the need for more equipment vis-à-vis the 
border police. “Until now, the Gendarmerie Nationale has not been equipped,” 
said one of the colonels. “If our 35 [border units] are equipped, that will reinforce 
the control of migratory flows.” Other needs came in a thick stream: they needed 
computers for their border offices, and solar-powered electricity, and more 
vehicles, and petrol for these vehicles! All this would help cut migrant crossings 
                                                 
8
 See Serón et al (2011:74-75) for details on this cooperation 
Figure 11. Border police post, Senegal-Mali border 
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“upstream”. Above all, they insisted on creating development projects. The chief 
of the border police hammered home the same point. “Europe needs to help us 
with projects in villages, that way people can become sedentary,” he pleaded, 
complaining that EU money was only for fighting illegal migration. Then he 
proceeded to ask for funds on both fronts. “If you want to fight effectively against 
illegal migration in the north [of Mali], you have to create a system in the style of 
Frontex [à l’image de Frontex],” he said, invoking the Hera operations at sea. 
“But we too,” he exclaimed, “we have an internal sea, our sea is the Sahara!” The 
gifts generated ever more requests, articulated through the language of the Euro-
African border. 
 The adventurers adrift on the “internal sea” are not just subject to the 
aimless errance of migrants such as Jacques. In his “auto-ethnography” of 
clandestine crossings, Shahram Khosravi (2007) says such crossings challenge 
“the sacred feature of border rituals and symbols”. To him, migrants here play the 
role not of initiates but of “sacrificial creatures for the border ritual”. This 
involves their animalisation, evident in the terms used for clandestine migrants 
and their smugglers across the world (ibid; Coutin 2005) – in Morocco, sheep are 
at the mercy of wolves (Driessen 1998), in Mexico chicken are smuggled by 
polleros (chicken farmers) or coyotes (Kearney 1998). 
The adventurers’ making as illegal migrants is, again, not just discursive 
but played out on their bodies. Youssou, a Senegalese adventurer who had 
managed to cross the Sahara via Mali and Niger, recalled packing into a 
Landcruiser heading north into the desert, only to be forced to abandon it to shake 
off the police. As the migrants marched through the desert Tuareg bandits 
appeared, tipped off by the gathering’s guide. “They took our money, our clothes, 
our bags,” Youssou recalled. They tore all clothes off the migrants and made them 
lie naked in the sand. They ripped up soles, seams and gris-gris in search for 
hidden cash. They poured out the migrants’ water and scattered their last gari. 
They took away four women: one never came back. As soon as the bandits left, 
Youssou set out again. No time to lose in the desert. He came to a waterhole, 
shoved a few goats aside and drank. By then, Youssou had been reduced to a 
savage existence readily invoked by those who have survived. “We lived like 
animals” was a common remark among adventurers. One survivor recalled being 
deported from Algeria, imprisoned with murderers, forced to drink dirty water in 
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deportation camps, transported in cattle trucks across the desert that sent his body 
rocking from side to side with each bump in the road. “Am I really a goat? A 
cow?” he asked angrily. 
 As Coutin (2005) remarks, clandestine migrants are also rendered 
“thinglike” on the journey. Masquerading as cargo, they might manage to cross 
the desert. This is how Youssou finally left the Sahara behind. Smugglers told him 
to lie down under the tarpaulin of a truck, tucked in like merchandise in a convoy 
for contraband cigarettes. Arriving in this fashion in North Africa, adventurers 
such as Youssou have already gone through several stages in their making as 
illegal migrants. The clothes and accoutrements spotted on Dakar’s beaches, the 
migrant “mind” pondered in Rosso, the racialisation in Nouadhibou and the 
dehumanising experience of the desert add up to an ever more reified migrant 
illegality defined by the traveller’s “uniform”, his wildness, his deviousness, his 
blackness. It is to the refining of this crude illegality in North African policing 
that we will now turn: here, the definite touches are put to the making of illegal 
migrants in Europe’s borderlands. 
 
Oujda and the Strait: the politics of recognition 
 
Daouda and Modou had found the shortcut. I first met them in the market town of 
Fnideq on the Moroccan side of the Ceuta border, making their way between the 
café tables armed with skin creams they were trying to sell. They had used the 
new system mentioned by the Rosso border police, going by land from Senegal to 
Morocco. They had not even had to resort to cargo-like transport in fruit or 
cigarette trucks; as Senegalese nationals they could enter Mauritania and Morocco 
visa-free, as long as they paid a “fee” for the stamp after crossing Kandahar into 
Western Sahara. They were both in their early twenties, on their first trip abroad, 
and lit up as soon as I greeted them in Wolof. They both seemed at ease in 
Morocco, learning some Arabic and moving freely from their flatshare in Tangier 
to Fnideq’s weekly market despite their uncertain legal status as itinerant vendors.  
 I was surprised at this ease. Strong diplomatic bonds between Dakar and 
Rabat mean Senegalese benefit from preferential treatment in Morocco, but this 
only partly explained their relaxedness. Morocco was, as Agier (2011:31) says, 
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the first North African country in being “annexed to the security policies of 
European governments”. Seeing the country as a springboard to Europe for 
streams of illegal migrants from south of the Sahara, Spain and France in 
particular had long pushed for a strong policing response there. As relations 
between Rabat and Madrid thawed following the Socialist victory in Spain’s 2004 
elections, migration cooperation grew quickly, culminating in the tragic events of 
autumn 2005 outside Ceuta and Melilla. After the intense media scrutiny that 
followed, Rabat cleaned up its act. No more negative headlines, no wanton 
brutality. As a privileged partner under the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Morocco was keen to be seen as trustworthy and clean. At the same time, the 
country was increasingly a destination for business visits and students from fellow 
African states. As a result, Morocco had to walk a tightrope between clean 
controls, flexible entry rules and tough crackdowns. 
At the heart of this strategy was the Direction de la Migration et de la 
Surveillance des Frontières (DMSF), based in the town-within-a-town of cream-
coloured buildings and manicured lawns of the Moroccan Interior Ministry. 
Mehdi, the director of DMSF, navigated with expert ease between the politics of a 
new Moroccan era under King Mohammed VI and the mixed European calls for a 
business-like discourse on migration and a simultaneous tough policing response. 
In a sparkling conference room, he explained how Morocco’s thinking on 
migration had proceeded from a “global” to a “process-oriented” strategy. “We’ve 
seen an activity that is highly controlled by the mafias. We’ve seen lots of money 
involved, so it was very, very crucial to us to have a global strategy,” he said in 
American-accented English as his aide pushed a printout with statistics on 
dismantled smuggling networks across the table. Morocco had first followed what 
Mehdi called, somewhat puzzlingly, a “multi-aquarium strategy” that went 
beyond policing to encompass “sensitisation, communication, development, 
security, [and] legislative and institutional reforms”. Thanks to this strategy, he 
said, Morocco “had reached an incompressible level of ameliorations since we 
have narrowed by almost 90 per cent the arrivals of illegal migrants to Europe”. 
As the old strategy reached its “maturity level” in 2007, DMSF embarked on a 
new process-oriented approach where “everyone will work in the same 
aquarium”. Labelled PPP (“Prevention, Prosecution and Protection”), Morocco’s 
latest strategy covered both the country’s own clandestine migration flows – the 
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harragas or “burners of borders” that have crossed the Strait ever since Spain 
instituted visa requirements in 1991 – and the sub-Saharan adventurers whose 
journeys were to be “aborted upstream”.  
The key element in Mehdi’s discourse was what was left unstated: 
coercive border policing. He talked warmly about the Directorate’s work with 
Moroccan NGOs and about “confidence-building” in mixed patrols and high-level 
meetings with Spain. More than money, Morocco wanted recognition and 
participation as an equal. I asked Mehdi about EU funding for the Moroccan 
migration response, and his reply first startled me. “What funding?” he laughed.  
 
Well, there was a MEDA programme, about €67.5m, eh… 9  I’m talking about 
immigration, that’s a small envelope. But we are a responsible country, we are a 
responsible state, we are not using this card to get finance or… today we are 
combating networks that are active in this business because first we have to assume 
our regional responsibility, we have to protect our nationals, OK? We cannot accept 
that we become a transit country for migrants or drugs or for whatever, so we have 
to play our role.   
 
Mehdi was of course well aware that Morocco increased its political leverage 
greatly with Spain and the EU thanks to migration. It would be no surprise to him, 
either, that the EU was using the migration card in its development assistance 
strategy, with Morocco a huge beneficiary of such aid.
10
 Morocco, it is true, has 
long refused to sign an agreement with the EU on readmissions of foreigners 
having transited through its territory, and has consistently refused to accept back 
non-nationals under such an agreement signed with Spain in 1992. This has not 
stopped Rabat from using its imposed status of “transit state”, however, whether 
in pushing for rights for its own emigrant population, as a political pressure point 
in relation to occupied Western Sahara or in negotiations on agricultural produce 
and foreign fishing rights (Bensaad 2005; Gabrielli 2011). The pressure was, of 
course, two-way. The current EU-Morocco action plan, like its equivalents for 
other North African countries, includes clauses on “ensuring the effective 
                                                 
9
 This is a financial assistance programme for the EU’s southern neighbors: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterr
anean_partner_countries/r15006_en.htm 
10
 Aid figures also include €390m under a 2003 Spain-Morocco agreement: see 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67566/behzad-yaghmaian/out-of-africa 
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management of migration flows” and readmissions.11 In the migration-related aid 
stream, Morocco received €654m in funding under the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument over only three years (EMHRN 2010:61). While €40m 
of this assistance was earmarked for security (ibid), the aid money was generally 
clean, and so was the Moroccan strategy that Mehdi had delineated. But beyond 
its smooth surface lurked a rougher reality, tucked away in the backstreets and 
forests of northern Morocco.  
 Starting before the Ceuta and Melilla debacle but proceeding at a 
quickening pace in its aftermath, irregular migration was swiftly racialised in 
Morocco. Blackness became, as in Mauritania a few years later, a sign of 
illegality. In 2003 and 2004, taxi drivers in Tangier had started refusing black 
customers. The scruffy hostels in the city’s medina closed their doors to 
Morocco’s southern neighbours who had so far frequented them. Bona-fide 
refugees were increasingly rounded up, bundled into police vans and dumped in 
the no-man’s-land of the closed Algeria-Morocco border. As the crackdowns 
intensified, sub-Saharan travellers responded by developing intricate means of 
organisation and subterfuge. A constellation of safe houses sprung up across 
Moroccan (and other North African) cities. These ghettos, as migrants called 
them, were houses or flats en route, usually based around nationality or ethnicity, 
where migrants gained the right of entry through adherence to house rules and 
sometimes a small sum of money (Laacher 2007; Pian 2009).  
Conscious of how their bodies and behaviour betrayed them, migrants also 
developed techniques for “passing” as documented visitors rather than deportable 
clandestins. One expert on such subterfuge was Stephen, a Liberian asylum 
seeker. He dressed in crisp shirts and Adidas trainers, sometimes donning what 
English-speaking migrants called “schoolboy glasses”. As he walked through 
town, he pushed his weight onto the front of his feet, propelling him into a 
focused, fast gait. Stephen made sure to carry a bottle of mineral water in his 
hand, “like the tourists have”. He knew who the secret policemen were in Tangier 
– they all had the same leather jackets and sunglasses. More importantly, he knew 
that, once he spotted them, he should not turn but walk straight ahead with the air 
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 See http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/morocco_enp_ap_final_en.pdf  
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of a legitimate foreigner. In Zygmunt Bauman’s (1997) terms, he tried to enact the 
role of the “tourist”, not the unwanted “vagabond”. 
 Daouda and his friends did not yet have to resort to such authority-eluding 
performances. They laid out their skin creams on white sheets around Tangier’s 
Casabarata market while chatting with their Moroccan colleagues. Maybe they 
wanted to try going to Europe, Daouda said, but seemed in no rush. He was 
learning the ropes of being an itinerant vendor, living abroad for the first time in a 
basic flatshare with fellow Senegalese and Guineans. But soon enough, his time 
would come to taste migrant illegality.  
 While in Senegal and Mauritania, the illegal migrant was recognised 
through his “uniform” – backpacks, double pairs of trousers – in Morocco clothes 
and other “props” were used to pass as legal rather than to detect illegality. Here 
blackness was enough to raise suspicion: guilty until proven innocent. With this 
constant threat of apprehension, the clandestine “mind” conjured at the Rosso 
border was also congealing into a more definite shape. In Morocco, the illegal 
migrant was someone who had interiorised his own illicit status and its 
frightening corollary, what de Genova (2002) terms “deportability”. Moroccan 
forces had the power to block and move migrants while sowing fears for further 
interceptions. Nowhere was this circle of fear and forced mobility more evident 
than in Oujda on the Morocco-Algerian border. 
 
 
 
Oujda is a mythical place in the adventurers’ world. Some French-speaking 
migrants refer to deportation there as “going on pilgrimage”. This bustling 
university town is both the site of expulsion or reconduite à la frontière (return to 
the border), as Mehdi and his forces called it,
12
 and the key overland entry point to 
Morocco for adventurers. On its outskirts lies la fac (the faculty or “the school”), 
where migrants end up after expulsion to the no-man’s-land next to the Algerian 
border. Here, western journalists and researchers have congregated in recent years 
in their quest for a glimpse of the illegal migrants dwelling in shacks on a field 
shielded by crumbling university walls. Nigerian gangs hold sway around la fac, 
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 This term is used for similar purposes in France 
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and have even taken to confiscating visitors’ cameras until they pay up for the 
privilege of observing their world. This world is rough and raw, with adventurers 
hostage to the gangs and police, who can strike at any minute. Across the forest, 
adventurers out of luck bide their time hiding in tranquilos (“peaceful” places, in 
adventurers’ lingo). Veterans of the Moroccan migration circuits such as Stephen 
have already been deported to Oujda multiple times, some clocking up more than 
a dozen.  
As I arrived in Oujda in late summer 2010, such deportations were 
increasing. In recent years a drip-drip of deportations had replaced the previous 
mass expulsions, leading to less negative media coverage if not a sharp fall in 
numbers. In August this year, after a Morocco-Spanish standoff concerning the 
policing of the Melilla border, the Spanish interior minister had travelled to Rabat. 
Deepened migration cooperation was swiftly announced, followed by a renewed 
crackdown on black Africans across Morocco. And now it was the turn of 
Daouda, the skin-cream salesman, to experience the violence of expulsion.  
Daouda had been caught up in a raid (rafle), he told me as I finally got 
hold of him over the phone. His Moroccan entry stamp had run out in the 
preceding days. To renew it, he would have had to go back to his entry point at 
the Mauritanian border, but this was too far and expensive. After the Moroccan 
police stormed his flat, he and his friends were detained and “returned to the 
border” – only the wrong border: not the Mauritanian but the Algerian one. “The 
Algerians took all the money, tout tout tout,” is all he could tell me before 
hanging up. His friend Modou was out at the time of the raid, but had panicked 
and left immediately. I caught him on a bad line in Dakhla, halfway down to the 
Mauritanian border where a payment of €100 would give him a laissez-passer. He 
was heading home, the adventure over. 
I met Daouda a week later in Tangier, neatly dressed in what was probably 
loaned gear, for a meal near the port. He told me how the Moroccans had taken 
him to the no-man’s-land outside Oujda at night and indicated the direction for 
heading back to Morocco. “We didn’t know, we went there, but it was Algeria,” 
he said. Next, things got worse as for many before him. The “bandits” came:  
 
They were Algerian soldiers, and they stole everything, everything. They asked us, 
why have you entered here? They said we had to give them everything and if not 
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they would kill us. They took all the money – I had €700, my friend €500… They 
took our watches too, our mobiles, but they left the SIM card for us. They took our 
clothes. They left us in our underwear, and it was very cold. We walked barefoot 
until 8am, through the woods. Then we got to la fac, but we didn’t even sleep 
there… it’s not safe in Oujda, at any time the police may come, ask for papers and 
expel us again.  
 
Daouda and his friends finally made it to a village, where a friendly policeman 
paid for their bus trip to Tangier. Daouda was back, but something had changed. 
Unlike earlier, he was twitchy. His eyes kept darting towards the entrance of our 
restaurant. He talked freely but with an unusual alertness, constantly on guard. As 
he swallowed a piece of chicken, his eyes suddenly moved towards the entrance 
without his head moving at all. The effect was disturbing.  
 Thanks to the arbitrariness of policing, Daouda was falling into illegality 
at a dizzying rate. This dizziness was invoked by a more prosaic English term for 
Oujda expulsions than “going on pilgrimage”. “They [head]butt you,” Stephen 
called it. “It’s like internal bleeding,” his cousin chimed in, who had just been 
through deportation and was now afraid of the Nigerian gangs that had helped him 
back to Tangier. Stephen continued: “You feel confused inside, your head spins, 
you start thinking, why is this happening to me? I’m getting old and am doing 
nothing, have no future, why?” Stephen’s vocabulary and Daouda’s bodily 
reactions both pointed to the somatisation of migrants’ despair at an encroaching 
illegality, something I had already seen with Jacques in faraway Rosso. 
 I was entering the clandestine experience too, in a similarly paranoid way. 
In Oujda I walked with fast steps around la fac, trying – like Stephen, I later 
realised – to perform the role of tourist or student. I saw secret police everywhere, 
or potential informers. I had my reasons. In Tangier I had been filmed by a suited 
man in a café while interviewing an activist; at another time, a Cameroonian 
asylum seeker was stopped, searched and interrogated after talking to me. The 
border regime was producing mental and bodily effects in those it drew into its 
orbit, forcing the free lines of flight of the adventure into a tunnel of state-
controlled movements and surveillance. This battle of attrition against supposed 
clandestins sometimes ended – as it eventually did for Stephen – in “self-
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deportation” via the IOM’s euphemistically named “assisted voluntary return” 
programme.
13
 
 In Morocco, the petty gift economy of Spanish-Sahel relations had been 
wholly replaced by a politics of recognition, in which Rabat agreed to play its role 
as long as Spain and the EU deepened cooperation. Here, visits by European 
officials, the signing of new accords or simply the need for end-of-year statistics 
were enough to trigger fresh raids, detentions and forced displacements. As in 
Mauritania, if not enough migrants were found who fitted the “illegal” profile, the 
profile could simply be expanded along racial lines without much regard for the 
foreigners’ legal status. This meant migrants, whether on their way towards 
Europe or not, had to constantly recalibrate their own bodies to disprove their 
supposed illegality. It was a tawdry game, set on repeat. In 2012, an 
unprecedented wave of arrests of black Africans was unleashed in Mauritania, 
while similar round-ups picked up pace in Morocco. The adventurers, like 
currency, had to be kept in circulation for the illegality industry to keep rolling. 
 
Conclusion: illegality put to work 
 
The clandestine circuit between West Africa and Spain can crudely be seen as a 
simple exchange relationship, with presumed illegal migrants alternately 
functioning as human merchandise and cashpoint. With each financial exchange, 
however, new facets were added to the relations between African and European 
forces. The gift economy had created a social bond where before there was none; 
it had personalised Europe’s border regime; and it had bound recipient and giver 
into a tense mutual relationship of prestations and counter-prestations. Such gift 
relations, in turn, also added new facets to the constitution of migrant illegality in 
what, following Coutin (2005), could be seen as a process of gradual becoming en 
route. Spanish per diem payments to the Senegalese police procured an extension 
of migrant illegality, moving it away from actual infractions and towards bodily 
and behavioural signs. Gifts to the Mauritanians – ranging from patrol boats and 
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 On “self-deportation” in the US, see http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-self-
deportation-fantasy/2012/01/25/gIQAmDbWYQ_story.html. On the IOM’s returns programmes, 
see Hein de Haas: http://heindehaas.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/ioms-dubious-mission-in-
morocco.html  
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cash to political recognition – boosted the number of detainees while 
simultaneously adding an edge of racialisation to migration controls. 
Development aid and diplomatic favours compelled the Moroccans to apply well-
measured force to the increasingly fearful and furtive migrant body that, stripped 
of its rights and resources, could then be robbed at gunpoint by emboldened 
criminal gangs and Algerian soldiers.  
But the migrant can, through this growing vulnerability, also become a 
recipient of kindness from ordinary people, aid workers and police. In this 
gradual, complex manner, the illegal migrant emerges not just as a discursive but 
above all as an embodied figure while approaching the external EU border: he is 
alternately a hounded but pitied prey and a ghostlike, prohibited presence.  
 None of this means Europe has simply had its way with its southern 
neighbours, as the ambivalence and complaints of officers from Dakar to Rabat 
have shown. Nor does it mean the adventurer readily gives in to or 
unquestioningly appropriates the imposed category of migrant illegality. While 
this chapter has presented the becoming en route as linear, with illegal elements 
gradually added to the migrant “product”, the process is more intricate than this – 
and so are migrant adoptions of illegality. The migrant’s presence is here not 
simply under erasure, as Coutin (ibid) suggests: by adopting the role of the 
adventurer, the overland traveller also forges a distinct presence for himself 
through clandestine skills honed on the margins of the law. While some such 
adventurers somatise despair, others instead press ahead ever harder, taking pride 
in their predicament. While many adventurers self-consciously start adopting the 
terms illegal migrant and clandestin en route, others do not. Yet the main point 
remains: Europe’s streamlined strategy on irregular migration crumbles in the 
borderlands, where an absurd circle is created. The more gifts and favours for the 
outsourced African manhunt, the stronger the pressure to find fresh prey. Border 
controls perpetuate, thanks to their very success, the “problem” they are meant to 
combat. In the process they also produce a lived modality of migrant illegality, 
embodied in the figure of the clandestine traveller as he approaches the final 
hurdles on his way to Europe: the Mediterranean sea and the tall fences looming 
around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.  
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The crossing 
 
 
 
Amadou had spent many days lying in wait on the rocky slopes outside Ceuta.
1
 He was 
observing, his eyes scanning the fence like a camera. He would lie in hiding for two or 
three nights, watching the Guardia Civil officers on the other side, their routines, their 
comings and goings. All he had to eat were a few dry dates and a handful of sweets. In 
the end he learnt everything. He knew they went on patrol for five minutes to one side, 20 
to the other. He would have to time his attack just right.    
 Breaching the fence, this multimillion-euro armour, was a finely honed skill for 
Amadou. Every nerve in his body had to work in concert. No movement. No stray 
thoughts. Full, absolute concentration. No fear. If you are afraid, the Moroccan soldiers’ 
dogs will bark and attack. But fix your eyes sternly on the dog’s eyes, and it will stay 
calm. Amadou had learnt this the hard way, on one of his 10 attempts to climb the Ceuta 
and Melilla fences: a fellow adventurer took fright while they hid in the bushes and they 
were promptly detected, beaten and imprisoned. Amadou learnt with each attempt, each 
expulsion to Oujda, each endless walk back by foot to the fences. He was training himself. 
Sooner or later, his time would come.  
 
For the adventurers, Europe’s external border is a threshold between worlds. 
Behind them, the violence of the borderlands they have trudged through for 
months or years; ahead, a space of “human rights” and the promise of freedom. As 
they prepare for the final crossing, in silence or in hiding, they know that success 
depends upon their adventurer skills, their cool-headedness and the “grace of 
God”. This is their chance, the one moment their long adventures have been 
building towards. They must not miss it.  
 For the border guards, Europe’s external border is their workplace. Their 
patrol boats speed across vast stretches of sea; their sentinels look out across 
                                                 
1
 This story is based on one of the interviews undertaken during fieldwork in 2010 with migrants 
who had managed to cross into Ceuta 
 141 
fences for sightings of approaching intruders. As they scan the horizon, they know 
success depends upon reaching out to their colleagues across the border and to aid 
workers, journalists and politicians within. In these interactions, the border 
becomes a resource in which the avowed business is to make sure no one enters. 
They must not lose it. 
 Migrants and border workers are bound together in what has been called 
the border spectacle (de Genova 2012) or border game (Andreas 2000). To 
Andreas, border policing is an audience-directed “ritualistic performance” aimed 
at “recrafting the image of the border”, making it more solid and real. To de 
Genova (2012:492), building on Debord’s (2004) notion of the society of the 
spectacle, it is a show of enforcement in which migrant illegality is made 
spectacularly visible. Through the interplay between enforcement and an excess 
of discourses and images, he says, the border spectacle “yields up the thing-like 
fetish of migrant ‘illegality’ as a self-evident and sui generis ‘fact,’ generated by 
its own supposed act of violation”.  
The crossing offers a first glimpse for European audiences of the 
clandestine migrant who has until then remained hidden beyond the border. This 
is where illegality is transformed into something different, something bigger; what 
in Spanish media and politics has come to be known as the avalancha. The prey-
like migrants of the borderlands here gather into two distinct human “avalanches” 
– either a huddle aboard sinking boats or a frightening horde “assaulting” the 
fences of Ceuta and Melilla. This chapter is about this double transformation, and 
about the similarly two-faced spectacle within and without which it unfolds.  
The transformative power of international borders is not reserved for 
“illegal” travellers alone. As Donnan and Wilson (1999) note, people become part 
of a new system of value when they cross state borders. In Heyman’s (2004:324) 
terms, such crossings are sites where value “steps up or down” in the world 
system. Much as sweatshop shirts become fashion items and bags of cocaine turn 
into gold-like dust, migrants go through what Kearney calls “reclassification” 
(cited in Donnan and Wilson 1999:107) – a pun indicating how they are both 
labelled anew and potentially switch social class in the crossing. While the US-
Mexico border is the classic site for the study of such shifts, its emerging Euro-
African counterpart is perhaps the steepest value threshold in the world right now: 
a vast economic divide loaded with symbolic, legal and political potency for those 
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who cross it.  
This chapter will delve into these transformations and the scene on which 
they occur, but it does so by complementing the Marxian perspective on value 
underlying the perspectives just cited. Clandestine migration away from official 
crossing points does not neatly map onto the economic terrain, but rather follows 
its own surreal logics. While de Genova (2012) – and, in a similar sense, Andreas 
(2000) and Heyman (1995) – identify the obscene, “off-scene” reality behind the 
border spectacle as the continued need for illegalised labour in the West, this 
chapter will seek to locate another “off-scene” within and on the margins of the 
spectacle itself, in the realities that fall outside its visual order.  
In Spain, the border spectacle is fundamentally double-edged, in 
accordance with the peculiar geography of its southern frontier: the dispersed 
border at sea versus the sharply demarcated land border of Ceuta and Melilla. 
These borders, in turn, are endowed with distinct humanitarian and military 
logics. In enforcing this conceptual divide between land and sea, the Spanish state 
has since 2005 largely avoided the fate of Italy and Greece, where the “tough” and 
“humane” sides to the border spectacle, identified by Cuttitta (2011), are muddled 
and mixed. Yet this Spanish success is far from complete. The splitting of the 
border spectacle into two distinct acts veils the fact that both settings depend upon 
a similar militarisation and mixing of agencies in the border encounter. Moreover, 
the spectacle cannot detach itself from what falls outside its visual order – a 
visceral backstage world that sometimes escapes from the wings and intrudes into 
the theatre of operations.  
This chapter, then, is a spectacle in two acts: sea and land, rescues and 
repulsion, huddle and horde. It is about the masks donned in this encounter – not 
only by migrants, but by border workers as well. Amid these workers are the 
journalists, the Red Cross emergency teams, the sea rescue service Salvamento 
Marítimo and not least the security force charged with securing Spain’s land and 
sea borders: the once so fearsome Guardia Civil.  
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[removed fig12: An award-winning picture of a sea rescue in the Canaries] 
 
 
The spectacle, Act one: guardian angels of the high seas 
 
 
 
 
 
Federico García Lorca, Romance de la Guardia Civil Española 
 
 
Heavy is the gate to Europe, and hunched under the weight of history are the 
gatekeepers, the Guardia Civil. Spain’s military-status police force calls forth 
images from Spain’s darkest decades: the regime of Generalísimo Franco, the 
attempted coup in the fledgling days of Spain’s democracy and the persecution of 
gypsies and the poor invoked by Lorca at the time of the Spanish Republic. But 
something has happened in the past two decades. The Guardia Civil has fanned 
out across the world, its Comandantes and Coroneles talking warmly of 
humanitarian missions. And clandestine migration plays no small part in the 
security force’s revived fortunes. 
There were few better representatives of this brave new era for La 
Benemérita (the force’s nickname, the “noble” institution) than Comandante 
Francisco and his maritime surveillance colleagues. Francisco had even made a 
video, called The drama of immigration, that illustrated this transformation to 
visitors and fellow security professionals perfectly.  
Francisco pressed play, and familiar images flicked by on screen to West 
African guitar music. Wooden boats groaning under the weight of their human 
cargo. Black Africans scattered across the deck of a Spanish rescue vessel. 
Unmarked graves dug in Mauritania. Migrants suspended atop the water surface, 
balancing on the submerged remnants of their boat. Afrika-a-a-ah sings Senegal’s 
Ismael Lô on the soundtrack, in a bluesy voice. Nous sommes des enfants 
d’Afrique. Another packed boat in the crosshairs of a Guardia Civil camera, half 
the deck covered by a makeshift canopy. A patrol boat pulls up, edging closer 
Ai, city of gypsies! 
The Civil Guard saunters away 
through a tunnel of silence 
leaving you in flames. 
 
 
¡Oh ciudad de los gitanos! 
La Guardia Civil se aleja 
por un túnel de silencio 
mientras las llamas te cercan. 
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with each swell. The migrants squeeze against the side, reach for the hands of the 
guardias and are dragged aboard the patrol vessel, one by one. “The Guardia Civil 
has carried out a job that has often gone unnoticed,” says Francisco as his 
soundtrack segues to the New Age songs of Sheila Chandra, a melancholy voice 
atop an Indian drone. A uniformed guardia holds a listless African woman in his 
arms; another officer cradles a baby; a third carries a child on his back. Bloated 
corpses on Spanish beaches. A man on his knees in the Canarian sands, oblivious 
sunbathers blurred in the background. A corpse in silver wrapping. A drenched 
body, stiff with rigor mortis, pulled onto an inflatable raft. I ride the waves… of 
each deathly breath, sings Chandra. Then, in the night waves, the eyes and heads 
and arms of four drowning men grasping for the hands of their saviours. “We’ve 
saved lots of lives,” says Francisco, almost sounding defensive. “You have to 
avoid them putting themselves in danger.” The final text rolls, in Spanish, French 
and stuttering English: the Guardia Civil, together with its African colleagues, has 
since 2006 “rescued more than 20,000 people preventing them from putting in 
danger their lives embarking in small and dangerous canoas towards Europe”. La 
Benemérita’s emblem lingers afterwards: the crown of Spain, a sword and a 
fasces. Comandante Francisco pressed stop. 
 Since the time of the boat crisis in the Canaries, a flurry of images has 
brought the distress of clandestine migrants to a global audience. An exhausted 
African on his knees in the sand, motioning for something to drink; a white girl in 
a bikini, her hand on the shoulder of a male migrant tightly wrapped in a Red 
Cross blanket; a gaudily painted cayuco packed with people as it glides into port. 
The spectacle played out in these pictures provides a window onto the first act in 
the Spanish border spectacle: humanitarianism and its Guardia Civil protagonists.  
Many commentators have looked at Europe’s border regime through the 
rather distressing lens provided by Giorgio Agamben (1998). Clandestine 
migrants are, thanks to the externalisation of controls, subject to a state of 
exception in which the sovereign power to “let die” is exercised. Or so goes one 
line of argument (see e.g. Albahari 2006). But as was seen in chapter two, border 
controls are as much about the power to “let live”, the other side of Agamben’s 
notion of bare life – a vulnerable life that can be rescued in action, just as it can be 
killed by omission. And high-ranking Guardia Civil officers are consistently on-
message on the importance of saving lives. They are the “guardian angels of the 
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high seas”, in the words of a Socialist government delegate in the Canaries, whose 
recollection of the 2006 boat crisis was encapsulated in the picture of the 
drowning migrants towards the end of Francisco’s video, shot by the award-
winning Reuters photographer Juan Medina. In the photo, one of the migrants was 
being sucked into the night-time waves “with a face of fright, his eyes almost out 
of their sockets, clinging onto the hands [of his saviour],” the delegate recalled. 
“They drown, they are drowning, and you stretch out your hands to whoever you 
can.” 
 In rescues, the illegal migrant appears not as the abstract flow of risk of 
Frontex maps, nor as the hounded prey of the borderlands, nor as a naked life that 
can be killed but not sacrificed. On the high seas emerges, rather, a body in need, 
stiff with cold and fear, whose image can be captured, circulated, sold and shown. 
The images, much like their cognate pictures of African refugee flows depicting a 
“sea of humanity” without a past (Malkki 1996:377), fix the notion of the 
clandestine migrant as a helpless, nameless body, sinking into the dark waters. In 
rescuing this drowning body a virtuous circle is born, where the tasks of 
patrolling, caring for and informing on clandestine migration blur into each other.  
The production, distribution and appropriation of images – what I will call 
the visual economy of clandestine migration – mirrors and even facilitates this 
mixing of roles.
2
 The mixing was on display in Francisco’s video, in the rescue 
pictures adorning Guardia Civil corridors and in televised snippets of sea 
interceptions; on the walls of the Tenerife Comandancia, it was even spelled out 
in a framed Red Cross letter thanking the security force’s maritime service 
(SEMAR) for its “humanitarian assistance”. Through such mixing, the guardias, 
African forces, journalists and Salvamento and Red Cross workers forged what 
Calhoun (2008:85) calls an “emergency imaginary”. This imaginary, Calhoun 
says, is activated when officialdom “takes hold” of events such as refugee crises 
in such a way that these emerge as a “counterpoint to the idea of global order”. 
This is what happened in the crisis de los cayucos in the Canaries in 2006. 
 
Part I: symbiosis 
 
                                                 
2
 Like Poole (1997:8), I use this term to highlight the transnational social relations and channels of 
communication implicated in a particular organisation of the visual field 
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The full-blown emergency was preceded by a drip-feed of arrivals. In the late 
1990s, pioneering pateras had started reaching the easterly Canary island of 
Fuerteventura, where at night the locals “heard the screams of people as the 
pateras turned over”, recalled Emilio, a Red Cross worker. “The next morning 
bodies appeared on the shore… People wanted someone to do something.”  
 In 2003 the authorities asked the Red Cross for assistance, and soon 
Emilio’s emergency response team (ERIE) rushed to the beaches and ports to 
wrap migrants in blankets, give them first aid, a hot drink and a medical check-up. 
The rough terrains of Fuerteventura made Emilio’s work even more taxing. “We 
had to traverse a dirt track for eight kilometres, set up motors, field hospitals and 
everything else,” he said. “This was something that I thought of in terms of work 
in the field, as in the earthquake in Haiti.” Like in such a natural-disaster scenario, 
the Red Cross had to create an emergency protocol for intervention. “The field 
came to us,” Emilio said. But for a time, the outside world did not seem to bother.  
 Then Emilio had an idea: call the media. He started contacting journalists, 
without telling the authorities, each time a patera arrived. “We did everything we 
could so that this would be broadcast to the world,” he recalled. “No one knew 
what was happening there until we created a Red Cross-press symbiosis, though 
we kept it quiet…  the Guardia Civil asked, ‘but who the hell called the 
journalists?’ I said, ‘how would I know, maybe they tune in on the radio’.” Emilio 
recognised that his efforts only paid off in part, however. It was not until large 
cayucos started arriving on the bigger islands that a wider emergency imaginary 
was activated.  
Emilio recalled some roughness in relations with the Guardia Civil, with 
overworked guardias “screaming and pushing” the migrants. He took a forgiving 
view, however, and insisted that the guardias “had the same heart” as Red Cross 
workers, with many of them traumatised by what they had seen. “The Guardia 
Civil assisted a lot of immigrants in their quarters, they paid for sandwiches with 
their own money and their wives brought clothes for the immigrants.” 
On high sea, the situation was even more delicate. Utmost coordination 
and professionalism was needed to intercept and save dozens of migrants, stiff 
with hypothermia, from a sinking wooden boat at night amid raging waves. This 
was the drama played out in the photos circulated by guardias, the government 
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and the media: the performance – in both the sense of spectacle and of 
professional task – of the rescue.  
As Guardia Civil launches reached a patera, frayed nerves and hot tempers 
initially often led to disaster. Migrants stood up in fright or expectation of a 
rescue, making their boat overturn. Specialised Guardia Civil divers had to throw 
themselves into the cold waters or search for hands to grasp, hoping to drag 
drowning migrants aboard. It was such a capsized boat that Juan, the Reuters 
photographer, had shot in the waters off the Canaries. Soon staff were trained and 
risks minimised, heralding a first, strange sight of Europe for boat migrants: 
rescue workers bedecked in full protective gear who took them on board, isolated 
them as pathogens and safely steered them to port. As a young Senegalese boat 
migrant, Mamadou Dia (2011:52), recalled in a book about his 2006 ordeal in the 
Canaries: “The Salvamento Marítimo boat approached the patera and out came a 
man wearing a protective white dress, with gloves and a mask. The protections 
that man took towards us surprised me and made me worry about my future life in 
this country.”3 
 Before their arrival, someone always called the journalists. Contacts were 
close between aid workers, border guards and select reporters and, by 2010, the 
sight of arrivals had become routine on Spanish television. First, shots of a 
Salvamento boat gliding into port. Next, rescued migrants streamed off the deck 
under the watchful eye of the Guardia Civil to the snaps and flashes of 
photojournalists. Finally Red Cross volunteers wrapped migrants in blankets and 
lined them up for a medical check followed by transport to detention. The moral 
narrative of a professional, streamlined labour of rescue – the reassuring end to 
the emergency imaginary – was repeatedly broadcast and brought to its expected 
denouement, just as it had at the end of Comandante Francisco’s video. 
 
                                                 
3
 Workplace health regulations also included special insurance covering tropical illnesses for 
Salvamento staff and separate ventilation for rescued migrants on large Guardia Civil patrol boats  
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The port spectacle showed how the “symbiosis” invoked by Emilio did not just 
concern relations between aid workers and journalists. Along with the 
humanitarian protocol first developed on Fuerteventura and around the Strait 
came an increased mixing and blurring of roles between the different agencies 
working on migration. A few examples of this mixing should suffice. 
First, information-gathering. The Red Cross conducted short interviews 
with recent arrivals, and Salvamento Marítimo took pictures of cayucos during 
rescues. “Often we compared [data] with the Guardia Civil next day or at the end 
of the week,” Emilio said. “Data were contrasted and we interlaced and cross-
checked and this was sent to Madrid in order for there to be overlap.” This meant 
the Red Cross headquarters in Madrid – as well as the Interior Ministry. 
Salvamento provided the Guardia Civil and police with their footage so that these 
could ascertain the “captain” for detention, as well as the possible origin of the 
boat. In this way, the images attained value as evidence, temporarily exiting the 
larger media circuit of border imagery to which the agencies all contributed. 
 Second, the circulation of staff, know-how and resources. In their spare 
time, guardias on Fuerteventura volunteered in Red Cross emergency operations. 
Roles were more clear-cut on the bigger islands and along Spain’s mainland 
coasts, but there too staff switched agencies and roles. A former ERIE team leader 
on Gran Canaria was now a policeman; a long-time Red Cross worker in Tarifa 
became a Salvamento captain; a Red Cross spokesman became a renowned 
reporter on boat migration. Equipment circulated as well. The Red Cross did not 
Figure 13. A rescue in the Strait of Gibraltar, September 2012          Salvamento Marítimo 
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only take over old Yamaha motors from the cayucos, but also Salvamento and 
Guardia Civil launches in a sharing and recycling of resources that mirrored the 
circulation of border imagery. The Red Cross, Salvamento and sometimes the 
Guardia Civil also held joint exercises, contributing to what one Salvamento chief 
called a “feeling diferente” between the agencies working on migration.  
Third, translation and interrogation. A former Red Cross volunteer in the 
Canaries, Senegalese by origin, recalled rushing across the island in 2006, often 
attending to one boat arrival after another the same night. He translated for the 
Red Cross since “they came to me and spoke, they weren’t reticent”. He then 
found out where the migrants were from, or took an educated guess. Relations 
between the Red Cross and police were friendly thanks to an understanding 
commissioner, he said. “He gave me a job in the end, when you finish you go 
straight to the police and you have work, you collect data [do interviews] and the 
government pays, and they paid me very, very well.” Here the police could tap 
into the goodwill generated by an African Red Cross volunteer to retrieve 
information from boat migrants. Similar set-ups facilitated the sharing of tasks 
across agencies in other settings too. 
Fourth, migrants’ perceptions of these mixed roles. It was hard to develop 
trust with migrants, Emilio said; in the beginning they mistook Red Cross workers 
for police. Around the Strait, migrants often said they had been picked up by “the 
Red Cross”, which usually turned out to mean Salvamento Marítimo or, at times, 
even the Guardia Civil. In Nouadhibou, Spanish Red Cross efforts to disown 
“Guantanamito” clashed with the Mauritanian Red Crescent’s referring to it as 
“our centre” or the “welcoming centre”. Red Cross volunteers in Rosso-Senegal 
said that deportees often refused to go see them since they saw the organisation as 
part of the coercive state apparatus they had already encountered in Nouadhibou.  
 
 
 
Part II: transformation 
 
The Red Cross brand had been identified with Spain’s humanitarian regime – and 
had, as the Tenerife delegate insisted, received a huge boost to resources for this 
reason. In the Spanish migration response as a whole, the Red Cross had come to 
 150 
embody the concept of acogida, translated as welcoming, reception or sheltering. 
The Socialist government put acogida into practice through a reception and 
integration fund by which NGOs gave recent boat arrivals shelter, food and 
support for a short initial period. Several civil society groups turned down 
participation because of the fund’s short-termism “even though it would have 
sorted our accounts out quite well”, as one NGO worker put it. The Spanish Red 
Cross embraced it, however, alongside longer-term reception, assistance in port, 
and humanitarian aid in Rosso, Nouadhibou and select migrant reception and 
detention centres (CIEs, Centros de Internamiento de Extranjeros). Its large body 
of volunteers, its established role as auxiliary to the state and its institutional 
imperative of discretion were all factors that soon helped make the Red Cross 
indispensable. As its role grew, however, so did a muted critique. Some activists 
and policemen dismissed the Red Cross as only “putting on plasters”, while others 
highlighted the organisation’s role in legitimising controversial policing 
operations. The Red Cross was aware of these dilemmas, and was only present in 
a few CIEs for this reason. In such centres “roles can become confused”, said one 
officer in Madrid. “To work as the auxiliary to public powers has its pros and 
cons.” 
 One international Red Cross representative in West Africa was blunter. 
“The Red Cross has become the jailer,” he said, adding that national societies 
worked on “projects that are not always humanitarian… This is a problem within 
the movement.” His comments illustrated an unease that was usually expressed 
more diplomatically by his colleagues in the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the custodian of the Geneva conventions at the heart of the movement, 
about the role of national Red Cross societies in Europe’s migratory operations. A 
different concern was voiced by North African Red Crescent societies: like good 
auxiliaries to the state, they – unlike their European counterparts – saw no need to 
prioritise foreigners on their soil.  
While these clashes reflected long-standing differences, highlighted by 
Forsythe (2009:74), between a cosmopolitan ICRC and the “patriotic” national 
societies, they also highlighted a larger humanitarian dilemma. A grey zone has in 
recent decades emerged in war zones between combatants and aid workers – as 
seen, for example, in the military appropriation of the Red Cross emblem in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Pandolfi 2010:227). As a result humanitarianism finds itself, 
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according to anxious voices, at a crossroads. While some trumpet a golden era 
brought on by the multiplication of aid into billions of dollars and of agencies into 
the thousands, others see humanitarianism politicised, its universalism questioned 
and its workers ambushed (Barnett and Weiss 2008:3). According to Ticktin 
(2006:33), humanitarianism has been transformed into a form of politics – an 
ethical configuration and mode of governance whose efficiency draws upon its 
very apolitical guise. 
Humanitarianism has however, as many scholars note, always been 
political. Moreover, it has also been intimately linked to militarism ever since 
Henri Dunant founded the ICRC after witnessing the bloody aftermath of the 
battle of Solferino in 1859.
4
 The symbiosis between humanitarians and coast 
guards was thus not an anomaly; what was unusual was the degree to which 
humanitarianism transformed the militarised aspects of Spain’s sea operations, 
rather than the other way round. This was evident in comments by the Tenerife 
delegate in 2010 as he attacked the then conservative opposition’s calls for 
implicating the army in stopping the cayucos, before acknowledging that “it’s true 
that the Navy, collaborates, but in a humanitarian sense”. They were guardian 
angels watching out for huddled boat people, not soldiers pushing back an 
invasion.  
 Among the guardian angels, the Guardia Civil underwent the biggest 
transformation. In combining the ancient moral benefits of being la Benemérita 
with the pictures, videos and performances of sea rescues, the Guardia Civil, so 
laden with a heavy historical baggage, was reinventing itself within the 
framework of a state-sponsored emergency imaginary. Spain’s grizzled border 
guards of yore had morphed into humanitarians. This was the story on display in 
Comandante Francisco’s video, in the photos and plaques in the Comandancia 
corridors. It was a compelling narrative that would look suspect, however, without 
the accompanying bright orange colours of Salvamento’s rescue vessels and the 
Red Cross brand.  
Salvamento’s fortunes had also been transformed. “The Spanish sea rescue 
service is among the most highly valued in the world right now,” said the Tenerife 
                                                 
4
 The larger debates on the politicisation of humanitarianism will not be discussed here: see Fassin 
and Pandolfi (2010) and Weizman (2011) for two recent interventions, Nyers (2006) on refugees, 
and Collinson and Elhawary (2012) for a policy perspective 
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delegate, explaining this in reference to clandestine migration.
5
 The same could 
not be said for the Red Cross, however, since its role at the border was constantly 
under threat from the “humanitarian” conflicts within the movement, criticism 
from without and funding cuts from above. The organisation had certainly proved 
helpful in branding Spain’s migration operations but as its usefulness declined it 
could be cast off like migrants’ Red Cross-emblazoned blankets. 
 Not only were the agencies transformed in the border spectacle, but so was 
their target – the subsaharianos (sub-Saharan Africans) and magrebíes (North 
Africans) rescued at sea. This typology was based on the only easily observable 
fact from afar, workers insisted, yet these groups were also differentiated as kinds 
of migrants. The subsahariano was seen as orderly, rule-obeying, even docile; the 
magrebí, meanwhile, was a potential troublemaker. The subsahariano would sit 
down on the beach and wait for the rescue workers to arrive, while the Moroccans 
and Algerians disobeyed orders, self-harmed and tried to run away. While 
workers alternately grumbled and took a forgiving view about the North Africans’ 
behaviour, black migrants were often talked about with notes of respect and awe. 
“Sub-Saharans are super-strong in character,” said one Red Cross coordinator, 
talking about their lack of agitation despite the hardships on their journeys. “They 
don’t cave in the way we do.”  
These complex frontline categorisations were brought into sharper relief 
by the border imagery, where the subsaharianos not magrebíes were the chief 
humanitarian subjects. The pictures that acquired high iconic, symbolic and 
financial value in the visual economy were those of black migrants on rickety 
boats, hands outstretched towards their European saviours. The Red Cross 
blankets, clothes and kits provided the uniform of these new boat arrivals, the 
guise in which migrants were seen on television screens – huddled and wrapped 
up, sandals or clumsy plastic shoes on their feet, all alike, perfect images of the 
anonymous rescued migrant.  
In one journalist’s words, the potency of the images beamed out from the 
Canaries in 2006 lay in the surreal encounter of “Stone Age man” and 21st-
century bikini-clad girl on a tourist beach. Wild-eyed with salt-streaked hair, 
clothes wet and in tatters, speechless on his knees in the golden sands of Tenerife, 
                                                 
5
 Spain’s national sea rescue plan received €1bn for 2006-2009, six times its previous allocation. 
See http://www.salvamentomaritimo.es/sm/conocenos/plan-nacional-de-salvamento/?ids=1628  
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the boat migrant in these pictures briefly appeared as a primitive man rescued 
from the seemingly most irrational of journeys.  
 
Part III: the rescue image 
 
The extraction of such images from the complex realities of boat migration is at 
the heart of the spectacle of the border. As Robinson (2000) notes in other 
humanitarian settings, the “emergency” needs a visual and narrative frame. The 
images and headlines are, in a word, agentive not descriptive: where the media 
look, money and official attention follows. It was in the largest circuit of the 
visual economy – where rescue pictures circulated as news commodities – that the 
emergency imaginary found its frame; it was also here that the gaps and cracks in 
this frame were most clearly beginning to emerge. 
The media’s power to force political action on emergencies is often 
referred to as the “CNN effect”, and its existence is still widely debated (Forsythe 
2009). In the chaos of the Canaries in 2006, however, the process seemed inverted 
– politicians actively sought to create the emergency frame. For the Canarian and 
national opposition, the rescue imagery was an indictment of a floundering 
government; for the Socialists, it was a means to pressure the EU into action. The 
journalists came to play a role in these battles, at times as hapless extras, at times 
as active protagonists, alongside the other workers in the illegality industry.  
The “guardian angels” and journalist did not just share in the emergency 
imaginary; they also mixed and depended on each other to do their job. Journalists 
embedded themselves aboard patrol boats, were called by police contacts to quays 
and piers and mingled with aid workers on beaches, at times lending a helping 
hand. This mingling applied in particular to the journalists who tried to go beyond 
the “avalanche” story. The media fascination with boat migration has reached its 
apogee among this intrepid breed of journalists who have disguised themselves as 
clandestine migrants and embarked on journeys in trucks and boats, camera in 
hand. They have travelled to migrants’ home villages with news of deaths and 
tracked deportees to deserts and detention centres on African soil. Members of 
this intrepid reporters’ club seek not quick scoops but the recognition of their 
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peers, among whom the skill in chasing a story is what counts, much like the 
qualities admired among the migrant adventurers.
 6
   
For all the reporters’ efforts, the “emergency” kept framing their 
interventions. One British reporter sighed at the fact that migration only sold if it 
was “something about us being under siege”, exasperated at editors who changed 
his programme titles to invoke this fear. Others had their book titles tweaked, with 
“African” becoming “illegal” migration, or their investigative pieces on migrant 
abuse in the borderlands framed by scare stories on an impending invasion. 
Rafael, a Spanish correspondent in Morocco, took a pragmatic view after his 
many years of “doing migration” for a conservative daily, insisting he got the 
leeway he needed despite the paper’s official line. Others were not so 
understanding. These included Juan, the Madrid-based photographer whose iconic 
pictures from the Canaries had graced countless front pages, Francisco’s video 
and the Tenerife delegate’s recollections.  
Juan insisted he was an immigrant himself, hailing from Argentina; and 
like the immigrants he photographed, he also became a focus of the media’s 
attentions. A documentary for Al Jazeera, “photographing the exodus”, presented 
Juan as someone who “has taken the plight of these desperate souls to heart” not 
only in “photographing their misery” but also in keeping contact with them long 
afterwards. On screen, Juan and a guardia thumb his award-winning pictures from 
the capsized boat; next Juan travels to Mali and shows the pictures to the families 
of the survivors. The guardia and family members react in the same fashion: 
voices lowered, eyes softening. “This is utter desperation,” says the brother of one 
of Juan’s survivor friends, shaking his head. Another cries inconsolably.  
Juan’s work was a conscious critique of the “speechless” (Malkki 1996), 
one-dimensional depiction of boat migrants in the mainstream media. Yet his 
work also seemed to be the most striking manifestation of the role assigned to this 
migrant: a bare, naked, drowning life. Juan knew this. “The photographer is like a 
remote control,” he told one conference gathering: editors could make his images 
                                                 
6
 Much of this in-depth journalistic material is not available in English. Spanish books include 
Naranjo (2006 and 2009), Pardellas (2004) and Fibla and Castellano (2008). See Gatti (2007), 
Kenyon (2009) and Del Grande (2007 and 2010) on the Libya-to-Italy route  
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appear instantly on their homepages or newscasts at the press of a button, without 
context and without consideration of the photographer’s intentions.7  
His comments highlighted how the rescue image was alienated from its 
producer and “object” alike. This alienation of course applies to any commodity, 
as Marx long ago noted, yet strange things happened once the rescue image was 
put into circulation in the visual economy of clandestine migration. Juan’s image-
as-commodity mingled with imagery from mainstream broadcasters, humanitarian 
organisations and security forces, and was appropriated by these image-producers 
in turn. This way, the Tenerife delegate and Comandante Francisco could present 
the rescue image as evidence of humanitarianism, not of what Juan denounced as 
the “cruel and macabre obstacle course” created by the government and guardias’ 
very efforts. While their framing indicated that the government had taken control 
of the story of clandestine migration since 2006, the imagery escaped any easy 
encapsulation. As it circulated, it took on a range of complementary and at times 
competing values. It served as memento for traumatised Red Cross volunteers, 
guardias, survivors and their families; as iconic sign of humanitarianism in 
Guardia Civil corridors; as glue for a collegial experience among agencies; and as 
evidence in interchanges between Salvamento and police. At other times, the 
image took on qualities of self-perpetuation and agency, as predicted by Debord’s 
(2004) notion of the spectacle and by the Marxian theory of the fetishism of 
commodities that underpins it. One Guardia Civil captain had asserted this 
fetishistic potency in saying that one of the most iconic Canaries photos, of “the 
blonde girl embracing the black man… had a tremendous pull effect on would-be 
migrants in Africa”. To counter this potency, Spain had in turn broadcast images 
of death in Africa as deterrence.  
The rescue image, like a patera filling with water, struggled to contain all 
it was assigned to do; the visual order of the border spectacle was bursting at its 
limits.  
 
Part IV: the backroom of migration 
  
                                                 
7
 Conference appearance at Encuentro de Fotoperiodismo de Gijón, 2010 (website now defunct). 
For Al Jazeera documentary, see 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2007/04/200852519420852346.html  
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One hot summer afternoon I went to a Red Cross asamblea (local headquarters) to 
watch videos of rescues. “Ah, those were my times,” said a Salvamento captain 
who had joined his Red Cross colleagues to watch the footage: guardias aboard 
Salvamento launches, beached pateras, corpses pulled aboard rescue boats, plastic 
gloves inflated as balloons for migrant children. The captain knew everyone, 
trading anecdotes about Guardia Civil sergeants appearing in the videos. But as 
we saw a guardia carrying a child on his back, he snapped. “It’s not real!” he 
exclaimed. “That’s what I don’t like about all this.” What, I asked? The captain 
mentioned examples: guardias putting their three-cornered hats on children’s 
heads, or on adult migrants to protect them against the sun. He had videos of the 
“backroom of migration” (la trastienda de la migración), what happens after the 
journalists leave – shoving, shouting and violent beatings.  
The border spectacle, as Juan and other journalists were well aware, 
revealed but a small slice of the border encounter. It left out the “backroom” or 
backstage world of violence shielded from view by the state, as well as the trauma 
and drama at sea. It did not fulfil Debord’s (ibid:17) prediction for the society of 
the spectacle – that is, replacing the real world with “a selection of images which 
are projected above it, yet which at the same time succeed in making themselves 
regarded as the epitome of reality”. The harrowing truths of the border were 
instead relegated from the visual realm to the visceral backstage world of smells, 
touches and noises. And this world both reinforced and undermined the forms of 
“bare” migrant life seen in the border spectacle. 
Emilio, the Red Cross emergency chief, had desperately wanted the 
media’s attention, but was still not happy with the slick images churned out by the 
news organisations he had summoned. He took friends and family along to make 
them experience how different the realities of a boat arrival were to the “cold” 
representations on television. Waiting on the seafront to begin an intervention, he 
recalled, “people readied themselves, with the smell of the sea on the pier before 
they arrive, the sound that grew stronger because you could hear the patrol boat at 
a mile’s distance, you knew they were arriving…” Besides the noise, the 
adrenaline and the whiff of the sea, the strongest memory was the smell of the 
patera itself. Emilio talked of the “characteristic smell of the paint of the patera 
impregnated in their clothes”: 
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Many times we knew. We went somewhere and those smells might be there, on a beach, 
and there’s an abandoned patera there and we arrive, smell it and say, it smells of 
intervention. It was a special smell, everything smelled the same, of people in an enclosed 
space, it smelled the same, something like patchouli perhaps, something characteristic and 
people of black race have a characteristic smell, the interventions had their characteristic 
smell, it was the mix of the paint, the gasoline and well, the situation in which they arrived, 
they basically relieved themselves where they sat. 
 
The patera smell haunted Emilio’s memory and helped create a special space for 
interventions in his mind. It also marked out the characteristics of boat migrants 
as rescuable and racialised: the heady brew of salt water, gasoline, paintwork and 
strong bodily odours also recognised by Guardia Civil and Salvamento 
colleagues. It was a “concentrated human smell”, one guardia told a Spanish 
journalist, that reached them before they saw the boat: “it smells of misery” 
(Aldalur 2010:164). 
 Another aspect of rescues beyond the spectacle was the migrants’ gaze, 
their mirada. “They don’t say anything, but [the mirada] is super-expressive... it 
says ‘help me’,” one Red Cross volunteer said. To Emilio, the mirada “told you a 
lot, it told you that this person has just left their whole life behind, risking many 
things and losing so much, for nothing.”   
The mirada, the smells, the noises – these impressions could not be neatly 
encapsulated in the border spectacle, nor distributed within its visual economy. 
However, they were indispensable, contributing to the images’ aura. Juan recalled 
how he took the iconic picture of the drowning men. “I heard how the patera 
capsized, the memory I have is of the sound,” he told his conference audience. It 
was utterly dark, he staggered up a ladder on the patrol boat and snapped pictures 
with his flash on, without seeing anything. The most iconic picture of boat 
migration was, then, a glimpse of the unseen, of something beyond the journalistic 
and humanitarian gaze. In the Al Jazeera documentary, his guardia colleague 
recalled the shouts – of “resignation”, not desperation – from the pitch-black 
water. His memory of rescues was “how they grip on to you, how tightly they 
grab your hands and arms”. Touch, noise, smells – this was the harrowing 
backstage world, the very human side to the border encounter only hinted at by 
the humanitarian spectacle. 
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This darker side would however become central to the second act at the 
border. This is where the backstage world of violence had been relegated, and 
where the spectacle once began: the tall fences around Ceuta and Melilla and the 
tragic mass attempts to climb across them in the autumn of 2005.   
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The spectacle, Act two: keepers of the gate 
 
CEUTA, JULY 2010. It was a dazzling day, the light breeze pungent with the 
smell of wild herbs. The patrol car had swerved through the hills, leaving zone 
Bravo and entering Charlie. It stopped at the highest-lying sentry box, with 
breathtaking views in all directions. “Take pictures!” exhorted the Guardia Civil 
officer in charge of Ceuta’s border barrier. As I snapped away, Teniente Federico 
gazed across the twin fences dwarfing our car and slicing the North African 
hillside in two. To the left they undulated down into the valley, disappearing at 
the official Spanish-Moroccan border of Tarajal next to the sea. To the right, they 
snaked towards the fishing hamlet of Benzú, on the other side of the enclave, at a 
steep angle. Here as in Melilla, thermal cameras and sound and motion sensors 
tracked movement on Moroccan territory. Guardia Civil vehicles and officers 
patrolled the Spanish side; through the steel mesh, it was just about possible to 
make out the Moroccan soldiers and auxiliary forces, known by migrants as the 
“Alis”, ensconced in whitewashed, EU-funded sentry boxes. The valla or 
perímetro fronterizo, as the Guardia Civil interchangeably called the barrier, 
seemed unconquerable. 
Figure 14. Between Ceuta’s twin fences, July 2010 
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Before the humanitarian spectacle, the Euro-African border had first been 
a fence. Until the early 1990s only patches of tangled and weed-strewn coils of 
barbed wire had marked the international boundaries round Ceuta and Melilla, but 
as Spain joined Schengen they now became the EU’s only terrestrial borders in 
Africa. With the EU-Africa border arrived new, Europe-bound migrants, who 
were quite unlike the Moroccan labourers, Indian merchants and Andalusian 
workers who had entered the enclaves in an earlier era: bedraggled, poor, black, of 
uncertain origin or destination. As their numbers grew, so did the fences. First 
they were flimsy affairs, easily cut open or washed away by the rains. As more 
migrants arrived, the fences were slowly fortified with the help of EU money 
(Ferrer Gallardo 2008). Galvanised steel mesh eventually rose more than three 
metres above ground, undulating across Ceuta’s hills and Melilla’s plains. 
Sensors, cameras and bright spotlights were strung out around the perimeters. 
Migrants were pushed onto other routes, across the Strait and to the eastern 
Canaries, where Emilio and his Red Cross colleagues tended to them. Then came 
the 2005 asaltos with which this thesis began: hundreds of migrants “storming” 
towards the fences, leaving at least 14 dead in soldiers’ gunfire and many more 
expelled to the desert. Soon after, the barrier was strengthened yet again. The 
valla – triple fencing in Melilla, double in Ceuta – eventually towered six metres 
above ground, enclosing the enclaves in a perfect armoury. There is a before-and-
after 2005 in Ceuta and Melilla, with the fence as its memento, like a vast scar 
etched into the hills.  
Walls and fences increasingly circle nervous polities, attempting to guard 
against the “lawlessness lapping the edges of nation-states” (Brown 2010:83). The 
US-Mexico border is now sealed by physical barriers and “virtual” fencing that 
stretch from the Pacific Ocean to the mouth of the Rio Grande. The Israeli 
“security barrier” undulating through Palestinian olive groves seeks to keep 
terrorists out (Calis 2011), while its more recent counterpart between the Sinai 
and Negev deserts targets African refugees and migrants.
8
 On the Greek-Turkish 
land border, a similar anti-migration fence is being built. These fortifications are 
not meant to keep out the armies that traditionally threatened the polity, but 
                                                 
8
 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/mar/28/israel-border-fence-video  
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instead target transnational threats – including, most strikingly and prominently, 
the clandestine migrant (Andreas 2003).  
In Spain, the vallas are a key part of the border spectacle. To Andreas and 
Snyder (2000) the main purpose of such barriers lies in broadcasting deterrence at 
the border rather than in guarding against the dangers lurking outside them. 
Brown (2010) goes further, seeing them as monuments of folly to the waning 
sovereignty of nation-states and, with a Freudian twist, as a “psychic defence 
against systemic failures”. In unsuccessfully defending against the dangers that 
threaten to penetrate the nation, these barriers reinstate the sacred aspects of 
sovereignty in producing “an imago of the sovereign and his protective 
capacities” (ibid:131). Nation-state walls, Brown concludes, are “modern-day 
temples housing the ghost of political sovereignty” (ibid:133), conferring magical 
protection against incomprehensible powers. 
 The awe-inducing vallas seem, at first glance, to prove Brown right – as a 
show for anthropologists, EU delegates, the media and other select visitors they 
were unbeatable. Yet like at the sea border, their show was partial and incomplete. 
It was in fact what fell outside the spectacle that rendered the vallas so effective.  
Ceuta and Melilla’s history in walling out unwanted outsiders goes back to 
the times before the vallas. As garrison outposts and penal colonies (presidios) 
since before the Spanish colonial period in northern Morocco, the enclaves have 
as Driessen (1992) notes always been sites were central state ideology clashes 
with “frontier praxis”. From within Melilla’s medieval city walls, the Spaniards 
organised raids on Rifian Berbers who in turn raided and laid siege to the enclave. 
Despite these razzias, intense cross-frontier trade also developed between 
enclaves and hinterland (ibid:189-190). Since Morocco’s independence, tension 
and trade have likewise fluctuated, with one constant: Rabat’s non-recognition of 
Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves. This is the context in which the vallas 
incongruously emerged in the past two decades as a protection against the 
“transnational threats” delineated by Andreas (2003): unlike the old city walls and 
moats, they defended not against Moroccan tribesmen or soldiers, but against the 
sub-Saharan (and Asian) avalancha. 
For migrants, politicians and police alike, the valla was indeed a near-
sacred object of the kind invoked by Brown. For migrants, it was so in the most 
concrete sense: like the West Bank barrier studied by Calis (2011:155) or the old 
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Berlin wall, it was surrounded by lethal prohibitions. “It’s untouchable,” said 
Pepe, an NGO leader in Melilla and one of the foremost enemies of the border 
regime. If a migrant approached it, the Moroccan soldiers would shoot; if he 
managed to breach it, he would be informally returned to Morocco through doors 
in the fences. This was so because of the immense symbolic power of the vallas to 
Brussels and Madrid, Pepe said: “If we cannot safeguard 10 km of valla [Melilla’s 
approximate terrestrial perimeter], how will you be able to control all of the EU’s 
terrestrial borders?” There, “the only objective is that not a single one passes,” he 
said. “The statistics have to say zero entries when they send it up high”. 
As a result, the vallas were the dark side of the double act at the border. 
Here militarisation took on its violent guise, inflected by the enclaves’ martial 
past rather than by Red Cross humanitarianism. This militarisation of the border 
incorporated not just the Guardia Civil and Moroccan forces, but also the 
fearsome Spanish Legion and the Regulares del Rif, an indigenous force 
stemming from Spain’s colonial past in northern Morocco; in the 2005 crisis at 
the vallas, both these forces were mobilised to seal the border. 
 
Part I: mimesis 
 
MELILLA, OCTOBER 2010. “It was here that it happened.” Ramón had driven 
his Guardia Civil car to the edge of Melilla, where the enclave’s border fence 
suddenly forked in two and then ended abruptly at a sheer drop down to the waves 
and coastal road far below. This was “A0”, the final section of Melilla’s fence, 
more commonly known as hito 18 (boundary post 18) in reference to the official 
border radius traced by cannonballs fired in 1862 from central Melilla. Ramón 
was standing at the spot that Spain’s Socialist vice-president, María Teresa 
Fernández de la Vega, had visited five years earlier, on the eve of the 2005 
asaltos. She was escorted round the fence when the guardias suddenly sensed 
imminent danger. Migrants were waiting in the undergrowth brushing against the 
Moroccan side of the fence. “Because of the smell we knew that people were 
hiding there,” said Ramón. It could be “thousands of them”, they advised the vice-
president, who was promptly escorted off-site. After her dramatic experience at 
the border, the government had decided to make new fencing at an initial cost of 
€20m that would swiftly rise even higher (Ferrer Gallardo 2008:143).  
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As border controls and discourses have become militarised in Ceuta and 
Melilla (ibid:142), so has migrant praxis in a play of reflection and mimesis 
ricocheting from forest hideouts on the Morocco-Algerian border to the control 
rooms of Madrid and Rabat (cf Taussig 1993). Guardias noted how the early 
arrivals of the 1990s gradually lost their fear, their tactics changing along with 
those of border guards and the gradual growth of the fences. The adventurers 
created intricate communities in the hills outside the enclaves, with structures of 
chairmen or rotating leaders for each national community, UN-styled “blue 
helmets” to keep the peace, and democratic structures for decision-making 
(Laacher 2007). As Moroccan security forces stepped up harassment in 2005, the 
adventurers’ organisational prowess was diverted towards the border. Here the 
very materiality of the fences helped trigger the asalto masivo since a critical 
mass – a horde – was now needed to climb them. “The only way to enter is on a 
mass scale, if not they cannot climb the fences,” acknowledged one Guardia Civil 
Comandante. The word migrants, guardias and journalists used for these attempts 
was, incidentally, the same – “attack” or asalto.  
Pierre from Cameroon was one of the organisers of the grande attaque in 
2005 from the slopes of Mount Gurugú, the mythical hill outside Melilla. It was 
the Spaniards who rigged the trap, he said, retelling his story in Mali’s capital 
Bamako, where he and many other adventurers had ended up after the ensuing 
ordeal. The Alis came to speak to their chairmen in the hills, assuring them that 
the next morning the coast would be clear. They should know – they were in 
constant contact with the guardias. Migrants started preparing. “We gave the Alis 
some whisky and Nigerian women,” said Pierre, with no signs of remorse. It was 
the law of the jungle. Then they made their way downhill. First went the cibleurs 
(scouts, “targeters”) who recced the terrain, then came the men with the ladders, 
then the women. They went in stages, advanced a bit at a time. When they arrived 
close to the fence, helicopters were circling above. Someone had betrayed them 
that night. Someone, they never knew who, had called the guardia chief, selling 
the information for passage to Spain. Then the Moroccan forces pounced. The 
migrants fanned out, Pierre escaping into the underbrush and onwards to the 
border village of Farhana. He tried to hide inside a black refuse sack, but someone 
was already inside. It was an ancien soldat (old soldier), Pierre explained, the 
term for those who had tried to attack the valla several times without luck. He 
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chose another refuse sack, and next day the two decided to “attack the town”. The 
metaphor points to how far adventurers have militarised the simplest daily acts, 
such as crossing a residential area without being detected. They made it into the 
forest, though their safety would not last. The Moroccans were searching the 
bushes and border hamlets, eventually catching Pierre in a shop. Forced expulsion 
awaited in one of the big buses he had seen leaving the forest in the aftermath of 
the attaque. Activists and journalists trailed them, trying to record their forced 
removal. They were told to get off in the Sahara, and two pieces of cloth were laid 
on the ground. “Walk between them, straight ahead,” the soldiers said, “and you 
will get to Algeria.” The sands to the sides were mined. Pierre’s tragic adventure 
had just begun. It would continue through Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal 
and Mali, where he was still stranded five years on. 
 Pierre’s recollections, however partial, point to the shared militarism of 
the border language among security forces and migrants, as well as to their 
intricate social links. These were not the only groups acting in agonistic concert 
across the valla, however. The Red Cross attended to the wounded at the fences 
and in the enclaves’ reception centres. In 2005 activists and aid workers such as 
Pepe had entered the hills of Gurugú and Ben Younech outside Melilla and Ceuta 
with provisions, and soon news teams arrived as well. Demand was rocketing for 
images and stories such as the one Pierre had told me. As the attacks reached their 
denouement, seemingly tipped-off journalists were already mingling among the 
soldiers (Migreurop 2006:31). One Spanish journalist had come to Gurugú before 
the grande attaque and offered to pay migrants if they would go and attack the 
fence so that he could film it. “He went to speak to the Cameroonians, who do 
anything for money,” recalled one Melilla veteran in Bamako. The Cameroonian 
adventurers agreed, attacked and failed, their bruising filmed by the cameraman, 
like tragic reality show contestants.  
 As controls extended away from the vallas with greater efficacy after 
2005, other militarisation effects also appeared on migrant circuits. Sites of 
departure were called striking points; migrant ghettos became known as bunkers. 
“The adventure, it’s like going to war,” said one Melilla veteran, “and we’re like 
soldiers.” Militarisation also reached into the social circuits of the adventure. 
Nigerian smuggling rings – known as the “task force” or the Taliban, replete with 
fearsome “commandos” – had set up their own bunkers, including a “prison” in 
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Rabat where migrants were taken hostage until relatives paid up. The “mafias” 
that officials kept invoking were coming into existence thanks to the very controls 
supposed to fight them. The only routes that remained relatively free from 
organised smugglers, however, were precisely those were the government accused 
them of dumping migrants – the short sea route into the enclaves or across the 
Strait, and the fences of Ceuta and Melilla. Here a crossing attempt was mainly 
dependent upon the adventurer’s own wit, strength and cunning. 
The vallas, seemingly a sharp divide, had with the help of European money 
become a medium for increased cross-border cooperation. They acted as a catalyst 
in a militarised alignment of fence technology, Moroccan forces, guardias, 
journalists and migrants. Yet, unlike at sea, this mixing and hybridisation was 
hidden from view. Here the show was wholly the fence itself, its glistening and 
tall steel divide, its promise of absolute separation.  
While showing it off, guardias constantly had to shield its darker workings 
from view by escorting the audience off the scene, much like they had done with 
the Spanish vice-president before the 2005 “assaults”. Once the audience 
departed, a visceral reality replaced the visual splendour of the vallas. The smell 
of migrants, the touch of their hands on the cool steel mesh or the sound of their 
advance became incorporated into the very fabric of the fence; and so was the 
guardias’ ambivalence in their double role as guardian angels and gatekeepers of 
the external border. 
 
Part II: ambivalence 
 
What one guardia called a double standard (doble moral) suffused the show of 
force at the border. He did not elaborate on what he meant, but he hardly had to. 
Locals still reminisced about how, during the 2005 saltos (jumps) preceding the 
final autumn attacks, black men staggered into central Melilla with gaping 
wounds. In Ceuta, aid workers had seen migrants arrive with gashes that looked 
like “when you slice a chicken fillet”. Rafael, the Spanish correspondent, pegged 
his memories of 2005 on the deadly razor wire. “Some of them were just hanging 
there, looking like chorizos.”  
Melilla’s new valla was the star in the range of “advanced security 
solutions” offered by the Spanish company Proytecsa; it was, in the words of the 
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Socialist vice-president, not only “more efficient” but also less harmful and 
aggressive than the one it replaced.
9
 Planned for both enclaves, the “humane” 
fence was eventually only erected in Melilla, leaving Ceuta with its newly 
fortified but still “aggressive” razor wire. Thankfully, there the border was hidden 
from view in hilly terrain traced by the guardias’ closed perimeter road.   
 
[Fig12 removed: Spanish newspaper depiction of the Melilla fence] 
 
The “double standard” was built into the very fabric of the Melilla fence. As in 
Eurosur and the Spanish radar and satellite systems, technology was waved as a 
magic wand, promising migration controls shorn of violence and politics. The 
external fence was inclined outwards, making climbing it more difficult and 
limiting the need for razor wire, most of which had been removed in 2007 to 
media fanfare.
10
 Those who still managed to climb the outer fence faced a 
moveable upper panel that, once movement was detected, descended and trapped 
the climber underneath. If they made it into the middle section, they soon found 
themselves snared in an intricate mesh of metal cables known as the sirga 
tridimensional. The sirga tensed upon contact, immobilising the migrant like an 
insect in a spider’s web. If the intruder against all predictions got past this mesh, 
next was a lower middle fence; then, finally, the inner fence, again six metres 
high. “It’s sold as not being harmful,” said Ramón about the sirga, adding 
defensively that “those who would have to make sure it isn’t are the politicians or 
the company [Proytecsa]”. Sensors and cameras (104 in total) detected any 
movement along the fence. Peppered water would be sprayed upon the attackers 
at a time of a bigger asalto, accompanied by disorientating sharp flashes of light. 
“It has never had to be used, thank God,” said Ramón.   
Along sea routes, humanitarianism – on display in the rescue images – 
helped border guards overcome any qualms about having to play “the role of the 
baddie”. Enrique, the Spanish policeman stationed in Africa, recalled a row with a 
Red Cross worker. “I asked her, who has saved more lives, you or me? You give 
them blankets, something to eat and so on when they arrive in the Canary Islands, 
                                                 
9
 Citations taken from old Proytecsa website: compare http://www.proytecsa.net/valla-
tridimensional-fronteriza-proytecsa-proytec.html  
10
 See http://www.publico.es/espana/17862/retiradas-todas-las-cuchillas-de-la-valla-fronteriza-de-
melilla  
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but we are out there rescuing people.” The police work was “99 per cent 
humanitarian”, he said: “What I want to do is to save lives… I might have been 
the baddie but my conscience is clear.” The guardias along the fences, however, 
could not invoke such a humanitarian role. From the valla, no Comandante-edited 
video collages emerged trying to put the record straight.  
Attempts to gloss over the cracks between humanitarianism and violence, 
between the guardian angel and gatekeeper roles, took unexpected expression at 
times. Along the restricted road at hito 18, cut-off water bottles had been tied to 
the fencing. “It’s something they [guardias] put there for the birds to drink,” 
Ramón explained. The tenderness of the gesture contrasted brusquely with the 
three layers of fencing, the razor wire and soldier cubicles, and the grills blocking 
rivulets and streams flowing into the enclaves. In its privileging of wildlife over 
people it also recalled other attempts to humanise the walls around the West, 
whether in concerns over the free flow of animals across the US-Mexico barrier or 
over the threat that Australia’s refugee detention centre on the remote Christmas 
Island poses to the welfare of migrating crabs.
11
  
 The cables, wires, sensors and cameras – not to mention the bird’s water 
bottles – did not remove violence from border controls. “They market the valla as 
an obstacle,” said Pepe, in reference to Guardia Civil claims that the fence only 
gave them a few extra minutes. “But it’s not an obstacle, it’s a hunter’s trap.” 
Migrants had fallen onto the sirga and been ripped open; ambulances could not 
enter between the fences. Instead the new valla achieved something else. It 
grasped the intruder via the smallest bodily signs – footsteps, breath, odours, 
noises, hands on wire. Unlike at sea, these physical and visceral signs fell within 
not without the border regime. The migrant’s hand was not there to grasp, but set 
off an alarm in the control room; his smell signalled not misery but danger. The 
visceral and the visual here combined in a backroom show only meant for the 
guardias in the Ceuta and Melilla control rooms, who saw red lights illuminated 
on their digital maps once a furtive bodily sign activated the valla’s sensors.  
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 See http://www.wilderness.org.au/campaigns/marine-coastal/detain_ci  
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The valla was sensitive to the smallest poke or caress, like a skin tingling with 
nerve ends. Along Ceuta’s fence, a guardia watchman had opened the doors and 
let us into Morocco. Razor wire adorned the outer fence: coiled into concertinas of 
knife-sharp spikes, it staggered up for several metres. Teniente Federico pointed 
to the sensors snaking through the layers of steel mesh, cables and military-grade 
razor wire. They set off the alarm easily, he said, so they would use cameras or 
binoculars “to see whether it is an animal, a negro (black man) or a mokhazni 
(Ali)”. If the thermal cameras spotted an intruder at night, the Alis would be 
contacted to scour the bushes with patrol dogs. Sometimes they “pass right by 
without seeing them”, he said. But the guardias guided the Moroccan soldiers 
with their night vision: “you have them at your feet now, you’re almost stepping 
on them!”  
 The fence technology and its networked manpower – the “living system” 
of the valla, as Ramón called it – provided more than just the “magical” 
protection Brown (2010) invokes. It was effective, but only in a peculiar manner 
intimately related to the border spectacle. Above all, the vallas had steered the 
horde away from the land border, making it reappear instead as a huddle of 
rescuable migrants at sea. It had also reproduced the prey-like presence familiar 
Figures 15 and 16. The Ceuta fence: view towards Tarajal and from the Moroccan side 
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from the borderlands in the internal workings of the vallas, where the traces left 
by lone migrants were easily confused with those left by gusts of wind, wild 
animals or straying Moroccan soldiers. The vallas had moreover fomented a 
trickle of clandestine entries into the enclaves by sea and via the official border 
posts. However, images depicting such methods – heads sticking out of car seats, 
the migrants’ bodies replacing the upholstery; barely glimpsed body parts 
soldered into the underbelly of trucks; migrants on jet-skis or hydropedals in the 
Strait – were but part of the border workers’ curiosity cabinet. The spectacle was 
under control. 
This success came at a substantial cost. “The valla is almost a bottomless 
pit,” Teniente Federico said in Ceuta. No matter how much money was poured in, 
more was always needed for the constant upkeep – bringing big profits for 
security companies, as well as more staff and resources for the guardias, whose 
primary task in the enclaves was the “sealing” (impermeabilización) of the border.  
There were also social consequences. If the EU increasingly resembles a 
gated community, as van Houtum and Pijpers (2007:1) have asserted, Ceuta and 
Melilla are its most concrete manifestations. The gating of wealthy enclaves round 
the world is, as Low (2003) observes, a contradictory enterprise. Aimed at 
shutting dangers out, they help foment the very fears they guard against. Among 
these fears was not just an impending avalanche, but also growing tensions with 
the walled-out neighbours. In Melilla, Pepe explained with some relish, the 
boundary markers or hitos were now outside the fence. Because of Moroccan 
protestations on entering “their” territory to construct the valla – notwithstanding 
the no-man’s-land officially circling the enclaves – Spain had had to cede ground. 
This meant, Pepe said, that when a migrant ran towards the fence and started to 
climb it, the Alis would shoot or fight him back in what was, really, Spain.  
These problems added to the Guardia Civil officers’ ambivalence in 
showing off the vallas. While Federico had reeled off a list of official visits, he 
admitted he might not last long in Ceuta because of the claustrophobia produced 
by this very barrier. In Melilla, Ramón remarked that some people compared the 
valla with the Gaza-West Bank wall. “I don’t think so, there’s no other way to…” 
His sentence tailed off, unfinished. Heading away from the cliffside, he talked 
about the Melilla of his childhood, pointing to the pristine coves across the fence. 
“There I used to go swimming as a child,” he said, “we caught fish with our bare 
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hands.” He fell silent for a moment. “Migration has closed this city a lot, it has 
transformed it.” Relations with Morocco had worsened because of the valla, he 
acknowledged, even though the fence was only meant against the subsaharianos 
and asiáticos. Then Ramón switched gear, with a newfound certainty. “It seems 
we are always on the defensive,” he said. “But well, get rid of the fence then, let 
millions of people come!”  
Ramón had confirmed Pepe’s talk of the valla as the new “de facto 
border” without much elaboration as he drove along it. Up against the Melilla 
fence on the Moroccan side were the sentry boxes of the Alis. The Moroccans had 
advanced, snapping up the few metres of ceded territory. The same process was 
under way at the official Beni Enzar crossing, where the no-man’s-land had been 
gradually occupied. A Forces Auxiliaires sign even hung on the Spanish side of 
the dry Río de Oro, just outside the official entrance to Spain. And this is where 
the next instalment in the spectacle at the vallas would play out in the summer of 
2010.  
 
Part III: the spectacle hijacked 
 
As Ramón’s drove along the fence, the noise grew louder and louder. Suddenly 
we turned a corner and there it was, in all its glory: Barrio Chino, “Chinatown”, a 
zone of warehouses and hangars on the outskirts of Melilla. The whole zone 
heaved with adrenaline-fuelled waiting, walking, packing, shouting, queuing and 
scuffling. Walkways undulated along the fence, and along them old women 
staggered double-bent towards the gates with huge bundles on their backs and 
parcels roped to their bellies: coiled-up mattresses, bulks of toilet rolls, packets of 
underwear. A young man tried to squeeze past and a scuffle ensued; one guardia 
hit out with his baton indiscriminately. Further ahead, another guardia shouted at 
a restive congregation of men perching on top of their parcels. Once they got the 
go-ahead they would roll bundles of blankets or tires coiled into one another 
uphill, like huge dice. Ramón sighed. “Sin novedades en el Barrio Chino” (no 
news from Barrio Chino) is the best thing you can hear when returning to the 
Comandancia. 
 The porteadores (porters), like the day labourers streaming into the 
enclaves, were allowed to enter without a visa in what was an exception to 
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Schengen rules for residents of the neighbouring Moroccan provinces of Nador 
and Tetuan. They queued from early morning at special entrances in the fences 
and would then be sent through walkways to the shopping hangars on the Spanish 
side. The ensuing pandemonium was on display not just in Melilla’s Barrio Chino 
but in Ceuta as well. “Atypical commerce”, Ramón labelled it, using an official 
euphemism. “If they don’t do this, what would they live off?” Their illicit trade 
was also the lifeline of the enclaves, and of bribe-extracting Moroccan officers.
12
 
The value of the border trade only in Ceuta has been estimated at €1bn-€1.5bn a 
year, or up to 70 per cent of its economic activity (Ferrer Gallardo 2008:138).  
The arrangement by which goods moved out without Spanish controls 
while Morocco was meant to curb any illicit movement of people on their side 
was, to say the least, unbalanced. The valla tipped the scales further, yet not in the 
negative economic sense at times asserted for other fortified borders (Brown 
2010:95). By channelling the border trade, the valla had boosted business in 
making the step in the value chain even steeper, in Heyman’s (2004) terms. The 
point of tension rather concerned its effect on the workers, carriers and traders – 
in short, the humiliation of the valla.   
The valla was a tale of two animalised flows: domesticated herds at 
officially sanctioned crossings, feral hordes away from them. “Look!” exclaimed 
an NGO worker as she drove past the fenced-in walkways in Melilla. “We are not 
animals!” The ignominy of being forced through such corridors “like cattle” 
affected Moroccan nationals rather than Spaniards, and some of the latter 
defended the fences as a necessary evil. The aid worker’s “we”, however, referred 
to a cross-border identity underpinned by the enclaves’ official view of 
themselves as havens of convivencia (peaceful coexistence) between their 
Christian, Muslim, Jewish and Hindu communities. While this view had always 
contrasted with a reality of discrimination, as Driessen (1992) points out, things 
were hardly made better by the valla. The setting was ripe for protest. 
In July 2010 it came. Moroccan activists decried racist mistreatment of 
their countrymen at Melilla’s border post of Beni Enzar, and promptly launched 
demonstrations at the valla. Civil society organisations, which many observers 
suspected of being agents of the Moroccan secret police, blocked the entry of 
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cement, bricks and fresh produce. Activists plastered posters across the border 
area that mocked Spanish policewomen, who they accused of insulting its 
citizens.
13
 Spain’s conservative opposition leader and premier-to-be, Mariano 
Rajoy, visited Melilla, journalists thronging round him and hunting angry activists 
at the border. Meanwhile, in an unusual move, Morocco accused the Guardia 
Civil of abandoning sub-Saharan migrants in a raft outside Ceuta.
14
 Along with 
these tensions came an influx of clandestine migrants into Melilla at a rate not 
seen in years, prompting speculation in the Spanish Congress and media about 
Morocco letting them through, flung like projectiles into the enclave in their 
improbable, inflatable toy boats.  
If so, it was hard to know exactly what the Moroccans wanted. The status 
of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as of Western Sahara, remained open wounds in 
Spanish-Moroccan relations. Added to these concerns were rumours of 
outstanding EU aid, as well as royal whims. The Moroccan King, holidaying near 
Melilla, had been molested by the military helicopters roaring past towards the 
Spanish-occupied islands and outcrops scattered around the northern Moroccan 
coast. These tiny plazas de soberanía (“sovereign places”) had, like Ceuta and 
Melilla, been held by Spain for hundreds of years yet had long been claimed by 
Rabat. To these political issues were added the smaller ones at Melilla’s border, 
where alleged mistreatment was not the only problem. The valla imperilled the 
old order of small bribes and big gains, the lifeblood of the frontiersmen around 
Melilla. For the protesters, the Spanish policewomen were a convenient target in 
representing the Europeanisation of Melilla’s border; the sub-Saharan migrants, 
meanwhile, could serve as a weapon to enforce their aims. At the valla, uninvited 
actors were hijacking the border spectacle for their own purposes on behalf of a 
larger geopolitical order.  
By late August, the Spanish interior minister had visited Rabat and mutual 
“misunderstandings” had been corrected. Upon this followed the expulsions in 
which Daouda the skin-cream salesman was caught up in the previous chapter, as 
well as protests reverberating within the enclaves, as will be seen in the next.  
Despite the Spanish security forces’ insistence that relations with their 
Moroccan colleagues were excellent, they often repeated that “if migrants pass, 
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 See http://www.maroc.ma/PortailInst/Fr/evenements/D%C3%A9rives+racistes.htm  
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 See http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/DEPAFP20100806T175949Z/  
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it’s because they want them to pass”. Mehdi, the Moroccan director of border 
controls, diplomatically made clear the enclaves were pull factors [facteurs 
d’appel] for migrants. “They can put cameras, they can put whatever they want. 
But the truth that it’s not sufficient if you cannot stop these flows upstream… 
Once you have them in Melilla and Ceuta, that’s it, you get stuck with them, 
that’s it.”  
The valla did not detract from the enclaves’ attraction; instead, it raised 
the stakes. Like the gating round a community (Low 2003:131), it marked out 
Ceuta and Melilla as wealthy havens and potential sites of protest. As a spectacle 
in itself, it attracted not only migrants but also groups with varied grievances – 
including, besides the Moroccan nationalists, transnational activists protesting 
against the EU border in annual commemorations of the 2005 tragedies.  
In guarding against the migrant horde, the valla had created a new set of 
problems. Placard-wavers, marchers and merchants could now deploy the ancient 
technique of the siege at the fences (Pallister-Wilkins forthcoming; Brown 
2010:120). This did not deter the valla, however, which simply drew more groups 
into its embrace. The Alis’ sentry boxes snugly up against the fences, the 
journalists, activists and agitators congregating near it, the restive crowds at 
Barrio Chino or gathered along the border walkways all became participants in 
the network created by an ever more intricate anti-migration barricade. The 
insatiable valla kept growing; the spectacle unfolding in its shadow was 
increasingly no longer under the control of its presumed directors. 
 
 
Part IV: backstage entrance 
 
It was Amadou’s final attempt at the Ceuta fence. He had guided a group of four over the 
mountain passes at night. By now he knew everything. The weather had to be right. It 
should be raining or cold, since the soldiers were then less likely to be out; windy, so that 
the dogs do not smell you; and foggy, to reduce the guards’ visibility. They should climb 
one of the highest passes, where not even soldiers enter but where falling means death. 
They had to be utterly silent, Amadou admonished his companions. Look, the fence! It 
was so close. A noise escaped one of the nervous migrants, limiting their options and 
forcing them to attack even though the guardias were patrolling along the other side of 
the razor wire.  
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By now, Amadou had understood each component part, each sense, of the valla – 
sniffing guard dogs, the watchmen’s routines, the yielding razor wire, the sensors and 
poles and doors, the concertina and wire mesh. He was ready to take the valla system 
apart as a skilled car mechanic dismembers a vehicle.  
Amadou and his companions went one by one. To cross, you need to put on old 
clothes. New garments snag on the razor wire. You must wear cotton, not nylon. You have 
to use gloves push the concertina, then you put your foot on top of it, to avoid it catching 
your clothes. Blades may cut into your arms or legs, but you have to avoid getting caught 
in the stomach or crotch. On the top, the razor wire can entangle and kill you, but there’s 
a trick for getting through. Then you need to find a pole along the inside of the fence 
instead of getting nervous and jumping, breaking bones. It is a six-metre fall. Amadou 
slid down a pole. He looked around quickly. Where was the door? In the prison in 
Tetuan, the nearest Moroccan city, other adventurers had told him about the doors in the 
inner fence. Amadou had not been sure they existed until, on an earlier attempt, guardias 
had entered through a door and expelled him back to Morocco. Now he spotted such a 
door. The trick, he had been told, was to find a small opening in it, big enough for your 
head. If the head goes in, the body does too. Amadou crawled through. He had heard of a 
dog kennel, la perrera, where migrants used to hide from the guardias. In search of the 
kennel, he made his way into the hills, finally in Spain. He had crossed the most difficult 
of borders.  
 
Curtain call: beyond the spectacle 
 
This chapter has shown the spectacle of the crossing in its double act. In the first 
act, it is a rescue of the huddle sinking below the diffuse sea border. In the second 
act – in fact the primordial border act – the crossing is a violent repelling of the 
horde at the sharply drawn land border. Between the acts, chairs have been 
shuffled. Some actors have been relegated to the wings and others have entered 
for a heroic appearance. Yet the cast is nearly the same. What changes are the 
props, and the scenery, and the modalities of illegality that are produced in the 
encounter. 
 It is worth dwelling for a moment on the visual order of the spectacle, and 
on what it leaves out of the realities of the crossing – the central theme of this 
chapter. The spectacle can be split according to the spatial dichotomy of 
officialdom, and so can its intended audiences. On the sea border, the spectacle is 
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not only centred on the rescued migrant but also on the hybrid arrangements 
enabling his rescue: the overlap of Red Cross emblems, Guardia Civil launches 
and Salvamento boats spectacularly rendering up the life-saving state at its 
maritime limits for a domestic and international audience. On land, both the 
migrant and the mixing are off-scene, save for a Red Cross cameo or two. Here, 
instead, the spectacle is the border itself – the fence in all its awesomeness, not the 
intricate social network of the valla – and its foremost audience are the European 
paymasters. In Latour’s (1993) terms, at sea the work of translation and its hybrid 
creations is put on display, on land the work of purification, while the two are 
kept apart through yet another purification separating sea and land borders. At sea 
the border imagery circulates widely, on land its circuits are circumscribed and 
tabooed. At sea appears the rescuable huddle, on land the frightening horde.  
These categories are far from static and clear-cut, however. They change 
according to electoral cycles, media storylines and migrant routes, and in 
accordance with differing terrains and technologies. In Spain’s crisis-hit summer 
of 2012, rescue imagery had briefly been reduced to the simplest of messages – 
Red Cross volunteers wrapping migrants in blankets in an upbeat Coca Cola-
sponsored advertisement, encouraging TV audiences to get the country moving.
15
 
 Such rescue images render up the “fetish” of migrant illegality, in de 
Genova’s (2012) term, through two complementary transformations depending on 
the potency – itself fetish-like – of the image. The double act of the border 
spectacle here seems to create Agamben’s twin figures of homo sacer, the 
vulnerable huddle and the rights-less horde, those who can be saved and those left 
to die. Yet Agamben cannot get us far here. As Lemke (2005:8) notes in a 
critique, “Agamben is less interested in life than in its ‘bareness’”. This bareness 
says little about either the differentiations in migrant illegality at the border or its 
economic and spectacular uses explored in this chapter.  
The spectacle is further complicated by what remains outside the visual 
order – the illicit mixing, the smells and noises, and the fantasies and fears that 
cannot be fully captured on screen. These backstage features highlight how the 
spectacle is incomplete, conflictive and always in excess, as de Genova (2012) 
notes. No single story triumphs. Unwelcome actors – Moroccan nationalists, 
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transnational activists, critical aid workers – stand ready to jump onto the stage. 
Journalists, the tricksters of the illegality industry, always seek new angles to 
expose and complicate the official story – yet always risk being framed by that 
same story, or by a new version of it. The travellers and smugglers of the 
borderlands, trickster-like too, at times seek the border spotlight for a coup de 
théâtre, at other times a silent backstage entry like Amadou.  
Aid workers and border guards also struggle with what is left in and out of 
the spectacle, and their own roles in it. They recall the reek of an approaching 
patera, the haunting mirada, the screams and the outstretched hands of boat 
migrants. For the most fundamental mixing in the crossing is that which escapes 
both the spectacle and any bare formulations of life in its bareness: the brief 
encounter of the drowning or climbing or running man and the person in his path, 
who meet not as border guard and ilegal, humanitarian and huddling sub-Saharan, 
but as two people joined in the strangest of encounters beyond the full grasp of 
either.  
  
 
 
In the summer of 2012, something disconcerting was happening at the Melilla 
fence. Seven years after the “massive assault”, the migrants were back again. In 
the dead of night, Spanish media reported, up to 500 sub-Saharan migrants 
approached the fence en masse, only to be “repelled” at the last minute by 
Moroccan gendarmes. The Spanish government delegate thanked Morocco for its 
“magnificent collaboration” while warning that the mass entry attempts would 
continue. And they did: in early July, one Moroccan gendarme was reported as 
having died in altercations at the fences amid accusations by migrants of fatal, 
unreported violence against them.
 16
 In August and September, the mass attempts 
continued. The horde had returned, thrusting the vallas back in the spotlight.  
The attacks, as in 2005, had been preceded by months of raids and 
expulsions. Moroccan commentators had even accused sub-Saharan Africans in 
the country of being mercenaries, invoking the Libya uprising and tapping into the 
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militarised discourse of the border. In late September, Moroccan nationalists 
congregated at the Melilla fence; two weeks later, Spain’s now conservative prime 
minister was due in Rabat for a bilateral summit.
17
 The pattern from 2005 and 
2010 was being repeated. 
If the horde was back, so was the huddle. Yet it was no longer playing the 
role assigned to it in the border spectacle. 
In early September 2012, an absurd sight greeted beachgoers and 
journalists outside the Moroccan seaside town of Al Hoceima. On the tiny, 
Spanish-held Isla de Tierra, within swimming distance from the beach, 81 
subsaharianos loitered in the sweltering sun. Clustered around the Spanish flag 
crowning the island, they were thrown food and drink by Spanish soldiers, 
snapped by photographers and bartered by politicians, who for several days did 
not know what to do with them.
18
 If they were transferred elsewhere in Spain, 
more would come; if the government asserted that the migrants were not in 
Europe, this backed up Morocco’s claim to the “occupied” territories. Rabat had 
already protested at a Spanish plan to post Guardia Civil officers to its plazas de 
soberanía for migration control. The situation was delicate.  
Isla de Tierra, “island of land”, was an aptly named setting for a brief third 
act in the border spectacle. The migrants had sought out a border space combining 
the logics of sea and land, where the careful split of humanitarian and militarised 
borders no longer applied. The Spanish government denounced the “humanitarian 
blackmail” of the “mafias” it accused of having dumped the migrants there. 
Besides a hard conservative line on migration, this accusation also revealed a 
growing frustration at how the state’s co-optation of humanitarianism, so carefully 
constructed under the previous Socialist government, was itself being co-opted 
from below in a radical new fashion.  
Thanks to the Moroccan King’s intervention, a solution to the standoff 
was finally reached. Under cover of darkness, Guardia Civil officers hauled the 
migrants off Isla de Tierra and into Moroccan hands. The usual deportation route 
ensued, to Oujda with its waiting Spanish journalists. In the media’s blurry 
pictures from the darkened beach, however, the violent backstage workings of the 
border had finally been rendered visible, if only for a brief moment. 
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 Not only did activists and migrants upstage the double act of the border, 
but so did the authorities. Migrants kept filling the reception centres of Ceuta and 
Melilla – with many of them, in the case of Ceuta, having been diverted there 
after trying to reach the Spanish mainland across the Strait. Those so “rescued” 
soon found themselves incorporated into the enclaves’ new role on the migratory 
circuit: as offshore processing centres. Fences and walls, as Pelkmans (2012) 
observes in the case of the old Iron Curtain, might shut out the unwanted but can 
also serve to keep people in. This is what was happening in Ceuta and Melilla. 
The guardias manning Madrid’s control room had made note of a strange 
border crossing in 2011. In February that year, a Malian migrant in Ceuta had 
tried to climb the fence, bent on re-entering Morocco. The migrant, detained by 
the Guardia Civil, said he had spent four years in the enclave and just wanted to 
go home.
19
 It is to this entrapment within the valla, and the unbearable tension it 
created, that we will now turn.  
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5 
 
 
White mother, black sons 
 
 
 
The summer of 2010 had begun hotter than usual. The easterly Levante winds 
enveloped Ceuta in a humid haze for days, and the Rock receded from view 
across the Strait of Gibraltar. All people talked about was the muggy, relentless 
heat. The caballas (mackerels), as the enclave’s inhabitants are known, laid 
themselves out to sunbathe on the beaches facing the Mediterranean to the east or 
the windswept Atlantic towards the west. But up on the hill, far beyond the prime 
stretches of sand and the whitewashed town centre with its tapas bars and 
churches – as far as way as possible on Ceuta’s seven square miles of land – a 
different reality was unfolding. The eight prefabricated modules hastily erected 
back in 2000 to cater for a growing number of clandestine migrants kept the heat 
in and its residents out in daytime. And the temperature was inexorably rising. 
 The adventurers’ tragic mass “assaults” in autumn 2005 had not only 
reconfigured the policing of the fences, but had also sparked a new strategy for 
fighting illegal migration within the enclaves. Instead of sending migrants on to 
mainland Spain and setting them free with an expulsion order, as had been the 
norm during the economic boom, a politics of containment was born. The idea 
was to “avoid making Ceuta and Melilla a trampoline towards the [Iberian] 
peninsula”, according to one migration lawyer. “Migrants here are being used as 
an example so that those who wish to enter do not do so.” From having been 
springboards, Ceuta and Melilla became, in the words of police, activists and 
lawyers alike, ratoneras or trampas: traps.   
 Entrapment makes Ceuta a prime migration laboratory for the authorities, 
journalists, aid workers and researchers who converge there. Ceuta is a key site 
for regulating the irregular flows of people across the southern border of Spain, 
and thus into the EU. The brake put on migrants’ mobility here makes them 
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readily available for police raids, as well as for researchers and hacks on the hunt 
for stories, humanitarians seeking needy beneficiaries, and diplomatic missions 
enlisted to identify their citizens for deportation.  
 But in laboratories, experiments can go wrong.  
 The summer of 2010 was to be the moment when Ceuta’s clandestine 
migrants – almost all black Africans – invaded the city, bringing a loud protest to 
the heart of this European outpost. It was not to last long. But Ceuta’s brief 
summer of discontent reveals the contradictions in the EU’s migration policies: 
on humanitarianism versus control, on locking people up or setting them free, on 
hiding or parading society’s undesirables, on fear or pity towards Europe’s 
ultimate Other. This chapter is about the protest and its backstory of containment 
and despair among the immobilised migrants at Europe’s southern borders. It is 
also about the progressive racialisation and infantilisation of illegal immigrants, 
and the shades of black that defined their life in the enclave. 
 
The camp 
 
The road wound uphill, past rubbish-strewn slopes lined with flattened 
Landerbräu beer cans, chocolate drink bottles, fag ends and plastic bags. A long 
climb ensued, heavy steps in humid African heat, before reaching the hilltop 
gate. Flowerbeds and eucalyptus trees lined the perimeter fence. Next to the sun-
flecked entrance with its security booth, a big sign indicated who was in charge 
of the reception centre inside: the Spanish Labour and Immigration Ministry and 
the State Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration, with financial support from 
the EU. Three flags fluttered atop the fencing: blue-and-yellow for Europe, red-
and-yellow for Spain, black-and-white for Ceuta. Migrants walked up to the 
turnstiles, swiping cards and resting their fingers on a reader. This was their 
home, the home of the homeless, where clandestine migrants found themselves 
stranded on their long, fraught journeys toward the north. 
 Migrants called it the Camp. The CETI or Centro de Estancia Temporal 
de Inmigrantes – temporary reception centre for immigrants – was separated 
from the rest of Ceuta by acres of forested hills and a few miles of coastal road. 
Unlike in the foreigners’ detention centres of the Spanish peninsula, the CIEs, 
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the clandestine migrants and asylum seekers who lived here could come and go 
before the gates closed at night. They slept in eight prefab modules of eight 
rooms each, eight dorm beds to a room: 512 beds in all. In early summer 2010 
about 400 people were staying in the camp, many of them for two-three years or 
more. By the end of the season, fresh arrivals would push the number over 500 
and beyond capacity.  
 Almost all of the residents were black Africans who had arrived after 
arduous journeys by foot and truck through deserts, by dingy and makeshift rafts 
across the sea, using infinite cunning and determination. These adventurers had 
been through what the camp’s director called a “Darwinian selection” along the 
clandestine routes stretching deep into the Sahara. Only the strongest would 
arrive, or even survive. Many had died in the desert, found themselves stranded 
in Morocco’s ghettos and bunkers or been deported, penniless and paperless, to 
the dustbowl of northern Mali. The adventurers in Ceuta were thus an exclusive 
crowd. Having finally breached the EU frontier, they thought fortune was 
smiling at them – but Ceuta, they soon found out, would only flash a grim grin of 
irony. Here a new role was designated for them, a new modality of migranthood 
that stood in sharp contrast to both their earlier adventurer selves and their wild 
incarnation on the other side of the border. As prime objects of scrutiny, 
intervention and pity, they would become Europe’s most abject Other, fully 
formed “illegal immigrants”.  
 Michel Agier has discussed a “return of the camps” to the borders of 
Europe, as well as a worldwide “extension and greater sophistication of various 
forms of camps that make up a mechanism for keeping away undesirables and 
foreigners of all kinds – refugees, displaced, ‘rejected’” (2011:3-4). In these 
camps, care and control interact in intricate ways through what Agier labels 
humanitarian government. The CETI, which employs more than 80 people under 
a mixed-management system where the authorities leave much of the care work 
to aid organisations (particularly the Spanish Red Cross), is a “sorting centre” in 
Agier’s terms. Here migrants are screened, recorded and assigned identity 
categories in an elaborate process of “flow management” (ibid:47). The sorting 
centres serve as airlocks (Rodier and Blanchard 2003) or speed boxes 
(Papadopoulos 2011) that regulate the flow of people according to the fickle 
needs of the European labour market. But in Ceuta, the flow had by the summer 
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of 2010 been reduced to near-zero. Almost no one was sent on to “the 
peninsula”, as migrants and caballas referred to mainland Spain across the Strait.  
 In calling it “the camp”, the adventurers explicitly likened the CETI to 
the refugee camps of Africa. They had a point. As noted by Malkki (1995) and 
Turner (2010), refugee camps are usually characterised by their remoteness, their 
ambiguous status as transitory spaces, and the tight control over the movement of 
their residents, who are all presumed to be vulnerable. The same was true of the 
CETI. Malkki (1995) observes that refugees are people out of place, an 
aberration in the “national order of things”. Because of this “polluting” nature 
they are relegated to the margins, the threshold of their host society. And on this 
threshold, the camp resident comes to be constituted as a refugee, that peculiar 
contemporary “object of knowledge and control” in humanitarian government 
(ibid:52). The Ceuta camp, as will be seen in this chapter and the next, worked 
similarly upon its reluctant residents; only it was not producing the refugee role 
to which many adventurers aspired, but rather an even more aberrant figure in 
the national order of things – that of the illegal immigrant. 
 In the summer of 2010, adventurers stuck in Ceuta would challenge the 
logic of the camp, but in doing so they flipped the coin of their nascent 
migranthood, embodying and confirming fears and stereotypes of the Other 
lodged deep in what Trouillot (2003) has called the western “geography of 
imagination”. In Agier’s (2011:32) terms, they went from being tolerated and 
contained to being rejected and deportable. Rather than being seen as innocent 
victims in need of education and integration, they came to incarnate European 
fears of the not-so-noble savage already glimpsed on the high seas and at the 
enclaves’ fences: wild, dangerous and out of control. Clues to the sudden switch 
in their fortunes will be sought in the contradictory interplay of fear and charity, 
camp space and city space in Ceuta’s summer of discontent, in which journalists, 
police, camp workers and migrants were all to play a part.  
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Spaghetti and cigarettes  
 
3 JUL 2010 – EL FARO DE CEUTA – LATEST HEADLINE: “TWO IMMIGRANTS 
INTIMIDATE AND HURT CETI SECURITY GUARDS AFTER URUGUAY-GHANA 
MATCH”. NEXT DAY’S FRONT PAGE: “THE RINGLEADERS OF THE 
DISTURBANCE IN THE CETI WANTED TO STIR UP A REVOLT, ENCOURAGING 
OTHER MIGRANTS”1 
 
 
The trouble had started with a cigarette. It was the time of the 2010 World Cup 
and football fever was gripping migrants and caballas alike. Big plasma screens, 
affixed to the ceiling of the camp’s canteen, had been showing the Uruguay-
Ghana game. A spat erupted between a guard and a migrant who was smoking, 
and a brawl ensued. That, at least, was what migrants said. Ghana lost, tempers 
flared and security guards were attacked, was how the local media portrayed it. 
Security guards had been hurt and prosecutors were calling for stiff sentences 
against the supposed instigators. Meanwhile, a dozen or so failed Congolese 
asylum seekers had decided to camp outside the police jefatura (headquarters) in 
town, demanding transfer to the peninsula. The protesters curled up on cardboard 
spread across the pavement, in front of a row of suitcases covered by more 
cardboard to protect against the rains. “We would rather die than go back to the 
CETI,” said their protest signs. 
 Discontent was brewing but calm had been restored back at the camp. It 
was set out over two levels: upstairs lay the offices and down two flights of 
steps, with dazzling views across the Strait and the taunting sight of Gibraltar 
Rock, lay the living quarters and a sports pitch. The upstairs parking lot was as 
desolate and sun-drenched as a de Chirico painting, furnace-like, the sun 
pounding down through the wispy clouds onto the asphalt. Round it lay an office 
building labelled control, classrooms, a health centre, showers and the canteen 
with its metal wipe-down tables and plasma screens. Occasionally a migrant 
would saunter up to the phone booths outside the canteen, put a hard-earned euro 
coin into the slot, and speak for a minute to relatives at home or future 
destination, in Cameroon or Catalonia. Messages rang out on the speakers set up 
round the camp. Ding-ding-dong… attention s’il vous plaît in French or 
                                                 
1
 See http://elfarodigital.es/ceuta/sucesos/12134-dos-inmigrantes-acorralan-y-lesionan-a-
vigilantes-del-ceti-tras-el-uruguay-ghana.html and El Faro front page, 4/07/2010 
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“attention please” in English, followed by a list of migrants called to the office or 
to a class.  
 Mamá, as the residents called her with a fair amount of affection, sat at 
her desk in a bare office inside the control building, a map of Africa covering the 
wall behind. Her kind, tired eyes scanned documents on the desk: lists of the 
living modules below and the residents of each module scribbled into the 
appropriate slots. There were reports to send off, new arrivals to tick off, bajas 
(residents who had escaped to the peninsula) to cross out. She was one of three 
técnicos, as the female workers who did the rounds of the living modules were 
called. They were collectively known as the madres by camp colleagues and 
migrants, but none was more motherly than Mamá. Stern, smiling and stressed in 
equal measure, she navigated a steady stream of nationalities, defused rows, 
sorted out residents’ cleaning rotas and accommodated new arrivals. 
 Mamá heated her coffee in the microwave and went out to smoke a 
cigarette on the landing behind control, looking down across the fence encircling 
the camp, where a steep slope gave way to the road below. “So you are here to 
study migration?” she asked me. “They are an object worthy of study,” she said 
of the residents. She did not mean this in the sense of “guinea pigs”, but because 
of their experiences. “You could see everything here”: the best, the worst. She 
had a final puff on her cigarette, flung her small bag over her shoulder and took 
me downstairs. As a camp volunteer, I would get a rare view of that hotly sought 
object of study for journalists, researchers, police and NGOs alike – the recently 
arrived illegal immigrant. 
 Downstairs, Cameroonian makossa music streamed out of speakers 
resting on the windowsill of a men’s dorm, young men dancing to the beat in the 
doorway. Mamá went up and confronted one of them. She called him Comando 
or Guevara. He looked the part, all rebellious cool in black beret and shades, 
balancing a plastic glass with one hand as he swung the other in a lethargic dance 
move. Here he will be called el general, echoing the journalists’ epithet for him 
during Ceuta’s impending protests.2 “You are endangering the special curfews 
for the feria!” Mamá exclaimed. This was Ceuta’s party week of the year – a 
seven-day extravaganza of sevillanas-dancing, fino-swigging and funfair rides 
                                                 
2
 Journalists said this was the term by which the other strikers addressed him, but showed delight 
in using this military terminology themselves 
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down at the port. The director had extended the curfew – normally it was back at 
11pm, doors open at 7am – for the residents. El general did not care. His voice 
was a drawl, his breath smelled of alcohol. “I don’t want to go to Spain, I want to 
go to the United States,” he said in French. I translated. “Go wherever you want 
but in here you have to follow the rules,” Mamá said, pursing her lips. A friend 
intervened and pleaded: “We have been here a very long time,” he said, “without 
girls, without drinking… at least a little bit of music!” The party people more or 
less fit the profile of the average camp resident: a 26-year-old man, single, sub-
Saharan, asylum seeker, and a balsero (having arrived in Ceuta by dingy), with a 
stay of over one year. In 2005, the average stay had been three months. Now it 
was one and a half years.
3
 It was a long time, and was growing longer. 
 Mamá sniffed their drinks and inquired sternly if they had been drinking 
alcohol. No, they said. Her friendly face shrunk into a sour grimace. She had 
moved into their room, a damp eight-bed dorm with scribblings from previous 
residents on the bare walls: la vie est un combat, “Kurdistan”, “Love Jesus”. She 
confronted the circle of Cameroonians around her. They were lying! “Are you 
Christians?” she asked. “Why are you doing this?” She threatened them with 
sanctions and went off, but only after doing a few impromptu dance moves. Ah, 
maman! they exclaimed. “Tell her how much we like her,” quipped el general. A 
confrontation had been temporarily averted. 
 Mamá fought such small battles every day. Next to music, laundry was a 
major bugbear. Washing hung everywhere: on the railings next to the eight living 
modules and above the sports pitch, along the fences encircling the camp and 
draped over the wooden benches, tables and shrubberies scattered round the 
central courtyard. Mamá removed every piece of washing she found, day after 
day. She left towels in piles and waved bras in the air, and sometimes dropped 
trousers onto the sports pitch to teach residents the house rules once and for all. 
But next day the laundry was back. Its constant reappearance hinted at protest 
and at the residents’ wish to occupy the space of this anonymous camp, making it 
the most unlikely of homes. “It’s for the sun,” the camp’s female residents 
pleaded, but Mamá would have none of it. In Ceuta the state ran the show: 
migrants were no longer adventurers dependent on their own wit and cunning. 
                                                 
3
 Figures provided by the CETI director  
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Instead they were objects of state intervention in the uneasy mix of coercion and 
charity seen on Mamá’s daily rounds. 
 While applying sanctions, calling the guards and waving clothes about 
were coercive sides to the madres’ work, tobacco was in the camp a symbol of 
charity and a sign of freedom. On her tours of the living modules Mamá pulled 
out her silver cigarette case and roommates queued up, each waiting for his turn. 
“I’m not permitted to give them anything,” Mamá said. “No clothes, nothing. So 
at least I give them cigarettes, what else can I do?” Migrants soon learnt the 
game. “Cigarillo por favor, no trabajo, no dinero” (cigarette please, no work, no 
money), they said as Mamá meandered her way round the lower reaches of the 
camp. Sometimes she had to correct them, telling them that, next time, say 
“mamá, un cigarillo, por favor”. The young migrant would repeat with an 
unsure smile and pronunciation. “Mama cigari-lo por favor.”  
 Mamá finally made her way up after our round of the modules. “I’m 
dying for a cigarette,” she said. A final cigarette was getting soft in her hand. She 
never had the time to smoke it. 
 The work of the madres was hard and often thankless. Most caballas had 
little interest in the migrants’ plight. Unlike the Red Cross emergency teams 
along the coasts, NGOs labouring both outside and inside the gates had problems 
attracting volunteers. One worker said she had sometimes cried at night because 
of the impotence of seeing police deport residents they had worked with for 
months or years. Mamá and her colleagues, though, found the energy to 
continue. She had learnt much during her six years in the camp. “I have changed 
as a person, I am not the way I used to be,” she said. Then small things kept the 
mood up. In her office, she flicked through her grey steel cabinet, looking for 
letters from former residents. There it was. A handwritten letter from a migrant 
who was now in Madrid. In a sprawling hand, it thanked everyone working in the 
camp. Now he was writing a book about “sub-Saharan migration” and wanted 
replies from the camp workers on topics of interest: the idea that migrants take 
Spanish jobs, racism, and so on. Mamá treasured this handwritten letter. It was 
special. There was a second letter too, written on computer, that all workers had 
received a copy of. It was from an Indian migrant, who thanked everyone in 
perfect Spanish. The camp psychologist had helped him write it, Mamá 
explained. These were the only letters she could find. 
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 
 
The CETI, to Mamá and her colleagues, was not a camp. She saw it as an 
albergue, a hostel. Migrants were there so they did not have to sleep on the 
streets. Workers simply referred to them as residentes or usuarios, residents or 
users. New arrivals signed a paper saying they were in the CETI of their own 
free will because they were unable to provide for themselves. This legal 
mechanism meant the camp, as an open centre, was not covered by the same 
restrictions that applied to the CIEs in mainland Spain, where migrants could 
only be held for 60 days. The migrants received clothes upon arrival, free meals 
three times a day, clothes and a bed free of charge. Even language courses, 
workshops and sports were on the menu. “They have everything here,” quipped a 
guard. Camp workers said the residents “don’t know how bad things are in the 
peninsula”, where la crisis was ravaging Spain’s economy and social services.  
 As the CETI director put it, Spain gave a much better reception or 
acogida than its neighbours Italy and Malta. And only Spain, he said, carried out 
humanitarian rescue in the Strait. The CETI was a manifestation of the 
benevolent Spanish approach to migration honed in the Socialist years – 
humanitarianism not crackdowns, dialogue not dictates, integration instead of 
rejection. The implication was, simply put, that staying in the CETI was better 
than going hungry on the streets of Madrid, and both were preferable to being 
left to Berlusconi’s devices. 
 Many residents appreciated the effort. “They are trying,” they would 
concede. “The camp is not the problem,” said one, “the camp is taking care of us 
but not of all that we need”. Praise was showered on the new director, a former 
diplomat appointed after the demotion of his unpopular predecessor. Residents 
said he was an educated man. He wanted to help them. He took pregnant women 
to the hospital in his own car. He addressed migrants in French as vous, and just 
as politely in English. He inquired about their health, organised sports sessions 
and paella outings, allowed soft drinks into the compound and added some spice 
to the bland canteen food. But to the adventurers fresh off their boats, the 
goodwill was dwarfed by their misery. They had just made it to Europe, and 
expected the freedom to work, travel and send money home. None envisaged 
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idly living off handouts for years, or spending their time on sexual health 
courses, drawing workshops and clases de alfabetización (literacy classes), as the 
near-compulsory Spanish lessons were often called. At the camp, said one 
migrant, “you sleep, you eat, maybe you go to a Spanish class, you sleep a bit 
again…” It was not enough. “We are not newborns,” he said angrily. “We are 
men.”  
 The camp residents were in a bind: they were not permitted to work or 
move on, and so had no choice but to accept any handouts coming their way. 
They had become charitable objects in the eyes of the caballas, and any 
discontent was interpreted as ingratitude. In a clumsy stab at affection, they had 
become known in town as the negritos, a diminutive of negro that reflected their 
racialisation and growing infantilisation. This race talk accompanied the 
migrants’ transformation into passive welfare recipients. “We are paying big 
amounts of money to knock them to bits, little by little”, said Paula, a nun who 
was among the few critics of migration policy in Ceuta. “We are teaching them 
to become dependent on the Spanish benefits system.”  
 The adventurers navigated this terrain of pity, charity and rejection by 
accepting the cigarettes while complaining of the food. The food at the camp was 
bad, they said. The rice was hard or overcooked. The fries were stale. The fruit 
juice was artificial. There was no spice. Always spaghetti, spaghetti, spaghetti. 
The ignominy of accepting handouts was most evident in the daily ritual of lining 
up in the canteen, beeping the entrance card, and getting a fill of bland slop – as 
they saw it – while watched upon by matronly kitchen staff and baton-equipped 
security guards. As a result African women’s makeshift restaurants, offering 
tastier fare, were thriving in the hills outside the camp gates.  
 Food was state-sanctioned charity that, along with the bed and assistance 
offered up by the camp, was near-compulsory. Like the sacks of rice and cans of 
cooking oil handed out in African refugee camps, it reduced residents to passive, 
reluctant recipients (Turner 2010:68). But cigarettes were outside the state 
domain. Through tobacco and other little gifts, camp workers tried to personalise 
and counter the power relations inherent in humanitarian government. In this 
uphill task, family provided a useful organising metaphor to counteract the 
rhetoric of camp or prison. New arrivals were told to cooperate with the camp 
mothers. Cigarettes changed hands daily to friendly calls of maman, por favor. 
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Tensions were thus kept in check, but at a price: the camp was now reproducing 
the unequal power relations in an incipient infantilisation.  
 
Broken slippers 
 
14 AUG 2010 – EL FARO SPLASH: “UP TO 17 SUB-SAHARANS HAVE ARRIVED IN 
RUBBER DINGHIES IN LESS THAN 24 HOURS”. INSIDE THE PAPER: BIG PICTURES 
OF RED CROSS WORKERS AND MIGRANTS IN CEUTA’S PORT, TOPPED BY THE 
TEXT “FEAR OF PRESSURE FROM MOROCCO ON MIGRATION”4 
 
The long walk up the same rubbish-strewn road got hotter and more tiring as the 
summer wore on. Heading uphill, I often had company. There were women 
carrying crates of beer cans on their heads, disappearing up the forested slopes; 
Punjabi migrants who had been smuggled into Ceuta via the Sahara and were 
now hiding in the hills, fearful of deportation; and an Algerian migrant, tall and 
well-spoken and utterly out of place. He had been expelled from France to 
Algeria and was now trying to make it back to his family and home by land. 
Would he need to join the language classes, sports sessions and disease 
prevention workshops of the camp? We walked up the hillside and discussed 
ways of leaving clandestinely via the port. Why did he not arrange to see the 
camp lawyer? I suggested. He saw no point to it. “They just want us to sign their 
papers so they get paid,” he said. “Migrants are merchandise… If they let the 
migrants go, unemployment would spike in Ceuta,” he added. “It’s big business 
here.” He had a point. About 80 people were employed at the camp, not counting 
the plentiful private contractors. The high unemployment rates in both Ceuta and 
Melilla meant that the camps were seen as “something positive” among locals, in 
the words of a migrant lawyer. 
 There was a shortcut leading up to the cliffs and promontories above the 
road. A dreadlocked Liberian showed the way, jumping up the slope with deft 
movements, gripping branches as he went. It took 43 minutes to walk to the city 
centre, he had explained on the bus, where he had paid the driver with the 10-
cent coins he earned by begging and carrying shopping bags outside a 
supermarket. I followed him up the slope, slipping in my sandals. The path 
carved its way through the dry cracked mud towards a clearing. There, on plastic 
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 El Faro, 14/08/2010 
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chairs atop a mat of leaves, rusty tins and plastic bottles, sat three adventurers. 
One was eating spiced rice cooked and served up for a euro by one of the women 
of the camp. Others held beer cans. They all stared at the impromptu visitor. 
Here they were in charge. The tables were turned. It was a brief glimpse of a 
space more akin to the migrant ghettos or bunkers of Tangier, Rabat and the 
forests outside Ceuta and Melilla than to the regulated regime of the camp. Here 
no one would ask mamá for a cigarillo.  
 During the summer new migrants arrived at the camp in a steady trickle. 
Whether Morocco was sending them across, as Spanish news reports alleged, 
was hard to know. Whatever the reason, tension was building at the border and 
the camp was filling up. A small group of adventurers had been rescued on the 
Strait this August afternoon, and were now fresh out of the shower in their CETI-
provided jogging suits. “Addadis”, said the fake-brand label. One of the 
newcomers was Algerian, the others sub-Saharan or – as camp workers called 
them – morenos (dark-skinned). Normally applied to a sun-tanned Spaniard or a 
North African, the term moreno has started to be used across Spain to describe 
black Africans, especially in the context of migrant assistance. Through this 
term, camp workers tried to avoid the negative connotations associated with 
negros or blacks. Migrants soon caught on, and the French-speakers among them 
starting referring to themselves as moriños, surely inspired – football fans as they 
all were – by Mourinho, the Real Madrid coach.  
 The morenos clutched black refuse sacks stuffed with the damp clothes 
from the sea crossing they had just attempted. Their first steps on Spanish soil 
were eased by the smooth procedure for new arrivals, in which all participants 
played their roles in a professional relay race. First a police visit downhill, 
followed by entry to the camp and a shower. Then a health check. Next, 
registration – fingertips gently pressed down on a scanner, photo snapped. After 
this, a meeting with social, the state-employed social workers who explained the 
running of the camp, admonished migrants to follow Spanish classes and listen 
to what the mamans told them. Finally, out of a machine popped the green CETI 
entrance card that would be the new arrivals’ only form of identification in the 
enclave. Over the next week followed a series of meetings that residents were 
required to attend and tick off on slips of paper, known as the protocolo. This 
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way a dossier was built up for each arrival: step by step, the hitherto anonymous 
and unknown migrant became categorisable and interventionable. 
 Unlike the segregation by nationality so common in the administration of 
refugees, noted by Malkki (1995:137), in Ceuta the camp workers mixed 
nationalities in the dormitories to avoid creating “ghettos”. Whereas the ghetto in 
the adventurers’ world referred to safe houses based around nationality, in Spain 
it came to connote a negative communalism. Mixing people of all backgrounds 
and breaking up close-knit groups was a liberal gesture, but in its liberal 
individualism it also made people anonymous, substitutable. Incidentally, this 
was an important step in the crafting of the migrant illegality sought by 
journalists, researchers and politicians in Ceuta. The camp’s very spatiality, in 
splitting linguistic groups and assigning adventurers to non-negotiable slots and 
bunks, did the groundwork for a reconfiguring of the adventurer as a generic 
illegal immigrant. 
  If the “no ghetto” policy rendered residents both individual and 
replaceable, the next step – according to the logic of a sorting centre – was 
nevertheless to differentiate and classify. The four main migrant categories, a 
Red Cross worker explained, were Moroccan, Algerian, (South) Asian and sub-
Saharan. Moroccans fell outside the scope of the CETIs thanks to their 
government’s non-recognition of Ceuta and Melilla and thanks to the ease of 
repatriation. As a result, some Moroccans claimed to be Algerian. Among sub-
Saharans came a further division: Anglophone versus Francophone. Another 
categorisation followed the psychological (or intelligence) test: educated versus 
illiterate. Courses were organised along the intersecting vectors of colonial 
language and literacy levels. The typology also generated informal assessments. 
The anglófonos had been upset about the earlier camp brawl, workers said, 
because they were afraid of repatriation. “It’s harder here for the anglófonos than 
for the francófonos because of the language,” Mamá said. “They find Spanish 
difficult.”  
 The Francophone morenos came out of control and took their first steps 
in a process that would construct them as a new type of migrant, assembled from 
materials that defined their existence in Ceuta: CETI card, protocolo slip, 
cigarettes, blankets, slippers. Mamá took toilet rolls, bedsheets and shower cream 
out of a cupboard, and the migrants stuffed the items into a second black refuse 
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sack. Then, in a small troupe, they headed downstairs, a sack flung over each 
shoulder. 
 As the troupe made its way down the steps, the camp appeared in a new 
light alongside the big-eyed adventurers finally entering Europe: the unfamiliar 
familiarity of this tucked-away place, this strange raucous mix of African youth 
and music and laundry and barracks that came at us suddenly, hidden behind the 
somnolent parking lot and the empty canteen. The dream of a clean, modern 
West, evoked by the name “Hilton” that road-weary migrants had at one point 
given to the camp, was dissipating with each step. The migrants remained silent, 
fretful and amazed, clutching their sacks. “A lot of foreigners here,” observed 
Emmanuel, one of the youngsters from Cameroon, the home country of those in 
today’s troupe of black African arrivals, and of most of those waiting below. 
“It’s like a boarding school.” “People are nice here,” was all I replied with 
tenuous reassurance as we made our way downstairs, into the swirl of football 
and ping-pong players, African women doing their laundry, and screams and 
banter emanating from wide-open doors.  
 Emmanuel and his companions peeked inside a room. It was the standard 
layout: three bunks, eight beds in all. Metal cupboards with locks bought by 
migrants in Ceuta’s Chinese one-euro shops. A small table and a chair. Residents 
had found ingenious ways to establish privacy by tying sheets to the bunks’ 
poles, screening the beds from view. Bits of broomsticks served as support for 
the top-bunk sheets. This was prohibited, Mamá said, but she let it be. Posters 
and cut-outs were taped to the walls – scantily dressed western women and a 
random selection of news clippings. An African woman leant in through the 
small window, inspecting the beds. Emmanuel’s young face twitched. “Is this a 
room for women?” It was not, Mamá assured him; women had separate 
dormitories. She told a resident to remove the luggage piled onto the top bunk, 
and then inspected the foam mattress. It was dirty but it would serve for the time 
being. “When will everything start here?” Emmanuel asked, still hopeful. “Now 
it’s still like vacation.” He must have seen it as the strangest sort of boarding 
school, where they would be waiting for the director’s good word to be able to 
leave.  
 These hot days in August, it did not take long for new arrivals to figure 
out how things worked at the camp. Rumours spread from bunk to bunk, room to 
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room, community to community. People stayed here for three years, Emmanuel 
and his friends were told. It’s like Guantánamo, said another. It’s a prison. “Why 
do they keep us here?” asked some anciens, as French-speaking long-termers 
were known. There were two simple replies. La crisis – the economic crisis 
throttling Spain’s economy and squeezing any need for unskilled migrant 
workers – was said to be the reason they could not be sent on to Seville, Madrid 
or Barcelona. But many believed that something rather more sinister lay behind 
their predicament. The Algerian gentleman was not alone in seeing migrants as a 
lucrative business. “Human trading”, one migrant called it. They “consume” 
thanks to us, said another. Ils travaillent sur nous, said a third, echoing 
Mohammadou in faraway Dakar: they have work thanks to us.  
 This was the logic of the march on the city centre that would soon follow. 
Migrants called it a “strike” not a protest. This made sense since they saw 
themselves as working for the camp and the authorities, who in turn saw 
themselves as working for the migrants. The strike was to be a rare reckoning 
with the absurdity of the illegality industry and its abiding assumptions about its 
captive human material. According to the camp’s logic, residents’ undocumented 
status signalled a larger social, psychological and cultural “lack” that needed 
time and treatment; the residents were their product. To the strikers, however, the 
camp produced nothing except illicit profits thanks to their own unpaid labour of 
doing time. These antagonists, as will be seen, were both right and wrong: the 
camp and its residents did produce something, but not what the workers – or the 
strikers – wished.   
In short, the scope for misunderstanding between workers and residents 
was acute, and became more so as tempers flared in the summer heat and the 
rumour mill started processing the news from across the border.  
 For the time being, however, direct confrontation gave way to petty 
annoyances. Slippers broke. Sheets were not washed on time. T-shirts frayed. 
They had no money for calling home. The food was bland. More slippers broke. 
Every day, these slippers – residents would come and show Mamá, look, it 
snapped! Could I get a new pair? Mamá sighed. “We spend a fortune on slippers 
here. What do they do with them?” Often the residents would dutifully find some 
needle and thread, sowing the toe-strap back on so the slipper would last another 
few weeks. The 43-minute walk to the centre and the climb up the forested 
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shortcut were taking their toll. Even when going to the police commissariat for 
interviews the migrants had to walk for miles, carving the ignominy of camp life 
into their footwear. But by complaining about clothes and slippers, migrants had 
come to collude with the official view of them: as needy people who lived off 
charity. These were the negritos of the popular imagination, poor black people 
who did not have it easy, who always asked for help. Los pobres (poor things), 
workers, caballas and even police would say, shaking their heads in pity.   
 A few days later, Emmanuel cornered Mamá on her daily round of the 
modules. He had questions. Would he get some skin cream? He showed his 
compulsory TB injection, looking a bit inflamed. Suddenly he looked insecure, 
twitchy. “How long will we stay here?” That depended, said Mamá. Did it 
depend on good behaviour? Yes, Mamá confirmed, good behaviour was 
important. She added that they – it was not clear who “they” were – might also 
look for a particular profile instead of sending away the well-behaved ones. 
Politics, nationality, many things played a part. Emmanuel nodded. “But one day 
we will leave this place?” he asked. “We will not stay here forever?” “Yes, you 
will leave,” said Mamá, “but we don’t know when”. Emmanuel said he had 
heard of people staying here for three years. It could be one week, one month, 
two years, said Mamá. As we left, Emmanuel flung another question at me: “how 
does one do to live here?”  
 
The yellow card 
 
6 AUG 2010 – MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY’S LATEST COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE 
OCCUPIED CITIES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA: “MOROCCO VIGOROUSLY 
CONDEMNS THE ABANDONMENT OF EIGHT SUB-SAHARAN IMMIGRANTS BY 
THE SPANISH CIVIL GUARD ALONG ITS COASTLINE”5   
 
Rumours stirred in the camp. Moroccan newscasts that residents watched on the 
canteen screens, over their mobile internet-connected laptops or on television 
sets they had affixed to their bunk beds showed Spain abandoning black migrants 
in a raft outside Ceuta. The migrants had later been rescued and hospitalised and 
recounted their stories – true or fabricated – to Moroccan journalists. Someone 
                                                 
5
 See http://www.aufaitmaroc.com/actualites/maroc/2010/8/6/le-maroc-condamne-
vigoureusement-labandon-par-la-garde-civile-espagnole-de-huit-subsahariens-au-large-de-ses-
cotes  
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had also started talking about an EU delegation’s impending visit, and soon the 
camp swirled with questions. Would they come tomorrow? Would they listen to 
our problems? The camp was like a pressure cooker simmering with rumours and 
resentment.  
 Emmanuel’s face had changed. He looked surly, bitter, standing outside 
the canteen and looking out over the Strait. “Here we do nothing,” he said. 
“We’re adventurers, we’re used to struggling for our survival”. The camp was 
the opposite of the adventure, I suggested. Yes, Emmanuel said, “here it’s like 
staying with daddy and mummy”. He grimaced. “To me, the adventure is not yet 
over.”  
 A few residents had gathered on the benches behind a module, next to the 
sports pitch and the camp’s swings. El general was among them, decked out in 
his usual sunglasses and beret. My Algerian friend hovered in the background. 
One resident, a well-spoken Cameroonian I had previously met for discussions 
outside the camp gates, asked me: “If you come back after a year and I am still 
here, would you be happy?” “It’s a prison,” another chimed in. “We are treated 
like savages.” “It’s the slave trade all over again.” An older man spoke up. He 
was a veteran of the migrant circuit: he bared his thigh to show two big round 
scars from a bullet fired during the asalto in 2005. “Look above,” he said, 
pointing towards the horse-riding centre that had been constructed right above 
the camp and regularly sent clouds of dust down over the parking lot. “Here they 
keep some beasts next to others.” “Aucun blanc peut vivre ici” (no white person 
can live here), they said.  
 Mamá had arrived, and questions and accusations flew in her direction. 
Why, the gathering asked, if our tarjetas are valid in all of Spain, can we not 
travel to the peninsula?  
 The Spanish authorities gave the tarjetas amarillas, the yellow cards, to 
asylum seekers whose applications had been accepted for processing. In earlier 
times, the tarjeta had been a passport to the peninsula. Then, in late 2009, the 
situation changed. Spain’s new asylum law made it much easier to have one’s 
application considered, and the national police in Ceuta promptly decided not to 
accept the cards as identification at the port. As a consequence, the previously 
much-desired yellow cards came to threaten stagnation rather than promising 
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mobility. Asylum seekers felt cheated, and newcomers suddenly thought twice 
about even applying.  
 Mamá had disappeared upstairs but came back, waving a printout with 
information she had found online. Ceuta and Melilla were Schengen territory, 
she read out to the eager and ever-growing gathering amid the swings, but they 
had a special disposition to carry out passport controls at the port. I translated 
into French. Questions were fired rapidly at her. “Why can’t we leave?” Europe 
wanted to halt migration at its external borders, explained Mamá. So the camp 
was the responsibility of the EU? asked residents, confused. No, it was Madrid’s 
responsibility, said Mamá, “but Madrid depends on Brussels, and there they are 
afraid you will continue north and spread across Europe”. “Why can’t the 
Europeans speak directly to us?” asked the veteran of 2005. And why, “if the 
camp depends on the EU, do we need to learn Spanish here? Why not another 
language?” “Anyway, why have they taken us here? We did not ask Spain to 
rescue us at sea!” One resident after another chimed in, in a furious, unstoppable 
barrage of questions. 
 The biggest problem in the camp, residents said again and again, was the 
lack of information. While this will be looked at in detail in the next chapter, 
suffice to say here that this predicament seems endemic to sorting centres, as 
Agier (2011) notes. In Poland, a doctor in one such centre deplored “the 
detainees’ lack of information about their rights, and the fact that they do not 
understand why they are detained for so long” (ibid:49). In Ceuta, residents 
experienced a similar silence. Everyone even seemed confused about who was in 
charge. Some migrants had heard in Morocco that the Portuguese ran the camp, 
and would channel workers to Lisbon. Many knew that the EU gave Spain 
money for running the camp thanks to the flag at the gate. But who to call, who 
to plead to, who to criticise? No one could say. Even the camp workers seemed 
unsure. It was “Europe” that wanted to keep migrants here, not they or even 
Spain, they often said. Was it the Spanish government delegation in Ceuta that 
was in charge of assuring this, however? One worker had even insisted, 
erroneously, that the Interior rather than the Labour Ministry ran the camp. 
Confusion reigned.  
 El general finally spoke, and all listened to his whispery voice. He called 
for a big meeting at the camp, to air all concerns. The authorities shouldn’t worry 
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about money, he said. If they were permitted to leave they would go back to their 
homes clandestinely, with an inflatable zodiac. Mamá nodded, then warned them 
their stay would be para largo (for long). All listened attentively for the final 
word on their fate. Maybe one day the politics would change and they could go, 
Mamá added. No one could say when. The silence broke, and her explanations 
drowned in a tide of exclamations. “Racistes!” a young man screamed. The 
mood was changing. Mamá retreated, anthropologist and residents trailing her. 
One pointed at a little girl; “Why is she here?” “Well, her parents shouldn’t have 
entered without papers,” said Mamá. “Would you leave your son here?” they 
asked. “I send my son to places like this for 15 days, but paying,” retorted Mamá, 
referring to a campamento (holiday camp) rather than the campo for refugees 
that the residents saw themselves as inhabiting. But this was no time to debate 
the semantics of makeshift lodgings. “Leave!” someone screamed behind Mamá. 
He seemed unhinged, angry beyond measure. “We will close this place down!” 
Mamá went upstairs, lips pursed, fast steps. There would be no big meeting, that 
much was clear.  
 Upstairs new arrivals were waiting in the classroom building, sitting in 
sofas with the usual plastic sacks in front of them. Mamá opened a cupboard and 
handed out the kit, mechanically, in silence. Blanket, jogging suit, T-shirt, 
hygiene kit, slippers. On the way to the shower, an ancien sauntered up. “Ici 
c’est Guantánamo!” he screamed to the new arrivals. Outside the canteen, the 
residents had gathered, dozens of people sitting on windowsills, loitering in the 
doorway. It was mealtime but they were not eating. No more spaghetti. Instead 
they occupied the dining tables and watched a Barça game in silence, 
interspersed with commercials. It was the quintessential camp protest: occupying 
space and refusing food, the poisoned gift that was their due. Security guards 
hovered in the wings.  
 It was the night before the strike began.  
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A cardboard rebellion 
 
27 AUG 2010 – EL PUEBLO DE CEUTA – FRONT PAGE PICTURE: NAKED TORSOS, 
ANGRY MEN MARCHING. “FROM THE CETI TO THE CENTRE: SUB-SAHARAN 
IMMIGRANTS SHOW THEIR ANGER OVER A STAY OF SEVERAL YEARS IN 
CEUTA”. EL FARO: “ABOUT A HUNDRED SUB-SAHARANS, WELL 
COORDINATED, ORGANISE A DEMONSTRATION ASKING FOR FREEDOM”6 
 
It had started to the tune of whistles and slippers hitting the pavement as a stream 
of strikers came running up Ceuta’s sleepy shopping street. They gathered at 
Plaza de los Reyes, the seat of their target: the grey bulk of a building that 
housed the Spanish government delegation. The square was the leafy heart of 
Ceuta where the children of the local elite used to play under the watchful eyes 
of their nannies. Now riot police formed a neat line of helmets and shields 
against the waves of protesters clad in their “Addadis” jogging trousers and often 
little else, bare-chested or stripped to their underwear, their camp T-shirts torn 
and twisted into turbans or scribbled upon as makeshift placards. “CETI is a 
prison” read one. “CETI Guantanamo Libertad” said another.  
The final spark for the strike had come from the arrival, that very 
morning, of the much-awaited EU fact-finding delegation. Its intention was to 
question migrants on the topic of sexual violence endured en route, but as the 
delegates’ car pulled up at the camp the strikers were already massing at the gate. 
The delegates took fright and sped off downhill, trailed by a horde of screaming 
migrants, as the camp director later explained with an ill-suppressed chuckle at 
the bizarre imagery. The research site must have looked ideal: a camp where 
migrants were gathered, immobile and ready to interview. It was not to be. 
“They’ll never come back to Ceuta now,” the director said. 
 The protesters had gathered round the square’s central fountain, arms 
aloft or wrists crossed, as if shackled. Ooh-oh Afri-cah, oh-oh-Africa, oh-oh-
liberté, they sung in a melodious chorus, mixing in football chants and Shakira’s 
waka waka. The whine of whistles mixed with loud claps; a beat was coaxed out 
of plastic water bottles transformed into makeshift drums. The caballas and 
tourists stopped to look and listen, snapping pictures at a safe distance. Hacks 
with cameras and notepads milled with the crowd, trying to pry quotes off 
migrants but without much luck. They had their spokesmen and leaders. 
                                                 
6
 El Pueblo front page, 27/08/2010 
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 One of them, a bespectacled English-speaker, laid out the strikers’ case 
for the benefit of the TV cameras. “After two, three months we should be 
liberated,” he said, like in “all the other camps”, meaning the closed CIEs in the 
peninsula. Protesters gathered into a knot round him, screaming agitatedly, one 
of them waving a broken slipper in front of the camera. The speaker pushed it 
out of sight. Here the issue was freedom not handouts, he said. “Prison!” shouted 
someone next to him. “You as a journalist,” the speaker finally asked, “could you 
live here for 10 months with one set of clothes and one pair of sandals?” The life 
of the slippers, from camp gifts fresh out of the plastic packaging to grubby 
footware that snapped apart, had become a metonym for the degradation of the 
strikers’ hopes and their impoverished life after entering Ceuta.  
 El general led a chant at the fountain: Gouverneur! Gou-ver-neur! They 
wanted the Spanish government delegate, but he was away. His holidays had 
begun. Getting hold of someone responsible for their predicament would prove 
impossible. But except for the delegate, everyone was there. Representatives of 
all sectors in the burgeoning illegality industry had finally gathered: a mix of 
journalists, aid workers, police and the odd anthropologist congregating round 
the dishevelled migrants. On this square, the finishing touches were being put to 
the construction of Europe’s illegal Other. An NGO worker from the camp stood 
by, shaking her head. “In the end, it makes me sad,” she said. “What will they 
achieve?”  
 “You know they met yesterday in the hills,” said a journalist with one of 
the local papers who stood observing the throng of protesters from behind police 
lines. She had a scoop from last night’s forest get-together, where migrants had 
debated their options for action. “It’s normal, they have been here for three years, 
nothing more than eating and sleeping, eating and sleeping.” On the whole, news 
reports were sympathetic. The carnivalesque nature of the strike, the splashing of 
water and the football chanting mitigated the discomfort of naked torsos lined up 
against riot police and the piles of cardboard now cluttering the neatest, nicest 
square of the city. But the goodwill was not to last. 
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PRIMETIME NATIONAL TELEVISION: MIGRANTS WITH BANNERS IN CENTRAL 
CEUTA. THEY FIND THEMSELVES VIRTUALLY “IMPRISONED”, ACCORDING TO 
THE VOICEOVER. IN EL FARO, ANOTHER CORD IS STRUCK: “THESE, THE 
PAPERLESS, WITHOUT PLACE, WITHOUT NAME NOR SURNAME, EVEN 
WITHOUT CLOTHES, EXUDING AN AIR OF RESTLESSNESS AND 
UNTRUSTWORTHINESS, TO THE POINT WHERE THE PEOPLE SITTING IN THE 
CAFÉS GET UP AND REORGANISE THEIR CHAIRS, SCARED, UNSURE, 
SURPRISED, ASHAMED.”7  
 
On Monday morning, Ceuta woke to the sound of pistol-shots. Down the 
somnolent shopping street they came, a ragtag contingent of angry black men, to 
the loud clack-clack-clack of folded pieces of cardboard hitting the pavement, 
slapped down with force and anger. Caballas looked out of their windows; 
Moroccan daytrippers stopped and stared; housewives and flaneurs quickly 
gulped down their coffee.  
 The weekend had passed and something had changed. The police chief 
had come out to talk to the migrants on the square, but had given no ground. 
They would have to wait in Ceuta. Soon after, the fervour of the first days had 
been whipped into a frenzy. The cardboard that the protesters slept on and that 
had served as canvas for their scrawled messages had acquired a new function: 
that of a soundbox, or a weapon. The protesters were militarising, the media said, 
and their leader was el general. He did military salutes outside the national 
police jefatura and his soldiers responded, some face-painted, most still dressed 
in their CETI jogging suits. “Assis!” a helper screamed out, and all sat down. The 
German journalist capturing these scenes said it reminded her of images of 
Africa’s civil wars. Rebel armies run wild. The camera zoomed in on a red-eyed, 
bare-chested man, his face contorted into a grimace, banging away on a 
makeshift drum. 
 The militarisation of the protest was, of course, no accident. To the 
authorities and the media, it was a sign that the leaders of the strike were former 
guerrilla fighters or paramilitaries. What they failed to see was that the salutes 
and mannerisms above all pointed to the larger militarisation of clandestine 
migration circuits discussed in the previous chapter. The strikers only had to dip 
into the existing imagery and paint an image of themselves that suited their 
objectives. In the process they fuelled the latent militarised discourse in the 
                                                 
7
 El Faro front page, 27/08/2010 and http://www.elfarodigital.es/blogs/jorge-lopez/17535-entre-
pitos-y-flautas.html    
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press, which was swiftly switching from depicting migrants as victims to 
portraying them as a menace.
8
 
 
 
The change in coverage brought new, fruitful angles for the press. Police 
released files showing the “hard core” of strikers had in fact not been stuck in 
Ceuta for years. Their calls for transfer to a CIE and then even deportation were 
read as a devious tactic; they knew full well they would be released once on the 
mainland. News spread that they had roughed up fellow residents who did not 
want to participate and threatened “camp workers”, which turned out to mean the 
previous director. The German journalist had also been threatened. “Destroy her 
camera!” they had screamed, but she kept filming. She knew some of them well, 
but they had changed. I knew el general and the others too, their doubts and 
frustrations. Now I peered out of balconies and bars, hovered round the scene. I 
was not to be trusted, some of them said. “Why should we speak to you? You 
will leave, and you will earn money from your report, you earn money from us 
but you give nothing. What will you do with our story?” Of Emmanuel up at the 
camp, I would see little more. His sullen face would occasionally flash by before 
quickly disappearing out of sight, avoiding any small talk. 
                                                 
8
 CAC (2006), in an exhaustive study of the media treatment of the 2005 tragedies, detects an 
oscillation between depictions of migrants as helpless victims and dangerous aggressors   
Figure 17. Strikers in front of the government delegation in Ceuta  Cristina Vergara López 
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 The German journalist’s camera trailed a striker rushing towards a 
newspaper kiosk. He furiously hit the pavement, his cardboard fraying more with 
each sharp slap. “Guantánamo!” “Liberté!” his brothers-in-arms screamed. 
Another striker followed and soon, in a circle, they were beating the ground in 
unison. Locals looked on in anger. “¡Echadlos a todos!” an old woman shouted 
to the camera. Throw them all out. 
 But police stood by. The aggression was only against the asphalt, against 
the very soil of Ceuta. “If I knew what door to knock, I would knock it” one 
Cameroonian had said before the protests. There was no door to knock, no one 
who listened, nothing on which to vent this unbearable frustration. So they 
pounded this ground, as if to punish it. This is what they hated, this African soil, 
this fake Europe on display along the shopping street targeting Moroccan 
daytrippers and transiting tourists – Zara boutiques, electronics shops, Supersol 
supermarkets, Cortefiel clothes, outdoor terrazas and bars where tourists sipped 
cold beers. The protesters moved on down the road, their noise receding in the 
distance. 
 
 
 
The politicians woke up late to the severe sense of crisis sparked by the strike. 
“With cartonazos no one is going to the peninsula,” warned Spain’s government 
delegate, using the by now oft-heard term for cardboard-on-pavement.
9
 The 
media had turned on the strikers, and reserved a fair amount of vitriol for the 
politicians too. A veteran journalist bemoaned that “we find police who don’t 
even know what to do: they put on their helmets, they take them off, they take up 
their shields, they circle the square, they come and go”. Spain’s migration policy 
was going up in smoke, ended her piece, one of many scathing assessments.
10
 
 Yet the wavering between laxity and repression – and the latter finally 
came – was not a failure: it was a result of a policy straining under its own 
contradictions. Spain’s supposed soft touch – its propensity to engage in 
                                                 
9
 José Fernández Chacón cited in El Faro, 2/09/2010. See  
http://www.elfarodigital.es/ceuta/politica/18035-fernandez-chacon-a-los-inmigrantes-a-
cartonazos-nadie-se-va-a-la-peninsula.html 
10
 See http://www.elfarodigital.es/blogs/carmen-echarri/18553-con-la-resolucion-en-la-
mano.html  
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dialogue, to extol humanitarianism, to care for migrants – was paired to a rather 
steelier set of objectives coming from both Madrid and Brussels. Care and 
control both fuelled and fed off each other, much like they did on the high seas 
and in other instances of “humanitarian government” noted by Agier (ibid:144). 
As was usually the case on the clandestine circuit, the migrants were the first to 
grasp these contradictions. One latecomer to the strike, banished from the camp 
for violence against a guard, said that migrants in Ceuta were like a sacrifice 
giving “a good image for Spain in all of Europe.” A Cameroonian asylum seeker 
similarly put the finger where it hurt: “France seems nasty with migrants,” he 
said, “but they treat them well in the end. In Spain they seem nice with migrants 
but then they leave us like this!”  
 The mix of directives tied the hands of Ceuta’s decision-makers and 
stirred a growing frustration shared by journalists, camp workers, the public and 
the migrants. What could they do? The strikers could not be imprisoned, not all 
of them: what would be the point, how high the cost? They could not be sent on 
to the peninsula, or the wrong signal would be sent out to other migrants. They 
could not be fined, because they were penniless. One police chief couched the 
dilemma in the inclusive language so characteristic of the Socialist government’s 
migration response: “What they’re doing is perfectly legal, anyone has the right 
to demonstrate,” he had told me as strikers chanted at the plaza. “We have to 
tolerate it … [and] maintain the rule of law, the strict rule of law.” The further 
the strike went, the more this façade started cracking. Migrants and authorities 
were stuck in the same frustrating limbo, of which the protest was simply the 
culmination and catharsis. But in giving an absurd riposte to absurd policies on 
behalf of everyone, the strikers also risked fast becoming the fall guys of Ceuta’s 
summer of discontent. 
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On veut le responsable! 
 
“THE SUB-SAHARANS TURN DOWN THE DELEGATE, TEAR UP HIS RESOLUTION 
AND WILL PROTEST ‘UNTIL DEATH’.” EL FARO, 8 SEP 2010. PICTURE 
UNDERNEATH: A BLACK HAND HOLDS UP THE YELLOW CARD TO THE 
CAMERA, WITH THE INSCRIPTION “THIS DOCUMENT IS VALID ONLY IN SPAIN” 
VISIBLE, THE PHRASE ASYLUM SEEKERS INVOKED FOR THEIR RIGHT TO 
TRAVEL TO THE PENINSULA11 
 
The sub-Saharan crisis, as the media dubbed it, was increasing the temperature 
across Ceuta. The Spanish government delegate had finally penned a resolution 
banning the protests, invoking insecurity and danger for Ceuta’s inhabitants. The 
strikers first signed it, then threw it onto the tarmac, ripped it apart and streamed 
down the street to loud cheers and shouts. “Heated spirits, tribal chants and a lot 
of pressure” was how the media summed up the standoff. To some caballas, 
memories were stirred of violent conflicts between migrants and authorities 
before the camp existed. It was, as Ferrer Gallardo (2011:30) notes, a riot by 
African migrants in 1995 that had sparked the initial fortification of the border, 
while smaller protests in later years had hardened the resolve to maintain 
migrants on the geographical margins of the enclave. One local woman 
remembered being trailed by black men in town in the late 1990s. “It made me 
afraid, above all for my daughter, you know.” Similar sentiments were now 
resurfacing across the city. 
 Up at the lofty heights of the camp, tension was everywhere, eroding 
workers’ motivation like a toxin. They had tired under the weight of incessant 
demands. For those on the frontline, camp practicalities, residents’ wishes and 
fears, and the differing objectives of the Interior and Labour ministries had to be 
juggled every day. Mamá, an expert in such juggling, kept sending off her 
weekly reports, checking on modules and assisting new arrivals. After many 
years in the camp, a protest would not shake her resolve. She greeted the strikers 
when passing them in town, but snapped and confronted anyone accusing 
workers of racism. The strike did not lead her to question the camp’s mission nor 
the needs of its beneficiaries. She rather split the good from the bad – the 
instigators from the integrated. Other workers and the authorities did likewise, in 
an emerging categorisation that would soon have consequences for the strikers.    
                                                 
11
 El Faro front page, 8/09/2010  
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 One of the Spanish teachers, David, called for migrants to congregate in 
the big hall of the camp for an announcement. About 20 of them showed up, 
taking their place in the school benches. On the walls hung residents’ drawings 
from a disease prevention workshop: condom exhortations competed for space 
with a map plastered with AIDS ribbons. “They think all illnesses come from 
Africa, just look at the map,” said one of the men in the benches, twisting his 
face into a grimace. Another promptly went up to the map and moved a few 
ribbons from African to European countries. Now it was more equal, they said. 
“They make all types of tests on us when we arrive here,” they exclaimed. 
“AIDS, syphilis, tuberculosis… but when white people go to Africa, they are not 
even asked for vaccination papers!”  
 David entered and announced he would open the camp gym, one hour 
two times a week. He explained the rules and took questions, which came thick 
and fast. What did they need to bring? Their green CETI card and covered shoes, 
for safety. So would they get shoes, since they didn’t have any? No, David said, 
“well if you don’t have any it’s OK, just be careful.” But why did the football 
players get shoes, not those using the gym? David could not say, he was not 
responsible. People in the audience laughed, a flat bitter laugh. “On veut le 
responsable!” There was no one responsible, David said. He was opening the 
gym as a favour. For longer opening times or shoes or anything else they would 
need to speak to social, it was an interdepartmental thing, he could not do it. The 
meeting closed.  
 David lingered in the parking lot, smoking a cigarette and shaking his 
head. A resident came up, asking for one. “But it’s bad for your health,” said 
David. The resident insisted, got one, left. David sighed. Before it had been 
different: he took people to the cinema, to Ceuta’s aquatic park, on excursion. He 
organised a book fair right next to control! But now nothing interested them, he 
said. All they did was ask for things, all the time more things. Camp workers 
talked wistfully about how the new arrivals were somehow different from the 
gentler migrants of earlier times. The new ones would refuse slippers or food. 
Some flirted with the female staff. Others created trouble from the first day. Ya 
vienen aprendidos, said Mamá: they arrive having learnt the rules of the game in 
Morocco, where NGOs or “mafias” or fellow-travellers tell them all about Ceuta.     
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 I left the camp in David’s car, speeding past the steady streams of 
migrants making their way into town. David had had enough, and the protest was 
proving the final straw. “You know, they have always been the negritos del 
CETI,” he said. “Ay que pena (what a pity) people would say,” how good they 
are, these poor people. “But that is when they are ensconced in the CETI. Now as 
they have come to town, they have become negros,” he said. Where would this 
rancour, newly stirred in Ceuta’s inhabitants, lead?  
 
 
 
In town, the strikers seemed to be losing the battle. Their cardboard and whistles 
had been impounded. Still, camp residents kept coming: a rumour had spread 
that police identity checks on strikers would lead to people being ticked off and 
sent to the peninsula.  
 Shorn of whistles and carton, the strikers came singing in a tightly packed 
group down the shopping street teeming with caballas fresh from their holidays. 
They stopped in front of an ice-cream parlour and faced a growing police 
contingent, still singing. Later one striker told me they had tried to say sorry to 
the caballas. This the media ignored. The female journalist of the other day had 
lost sympathy for the strikers. The authorities would open public order cases 
against them, she said. “If you had seen the state in which they left the square…” 
 Two strikers silently held a white cloth banner towards the passers-by. It 
read, in rather good Spanish: 
 
We are like you, we are not evil nor wild animals, but a reflexive and conscious 
generation. We only claim our rights. We are tired of stay in prison, please 
government. FREEDOM – FREEDOM !!! 
 
Three young policemen in discreet vests and fashionable hair approached the 
strikers, motioning to them with black-gloved hands. They carried out an identity 
check, calling forward a handful of protesters at a time, eyeing their camp cards, 
patting them down and depositing them some 30 metres ahead. The singing had 
died off, and an expectant silence reigned. Onlookers were congregating – 
reporters, passers-by, Moroccan daytrippers, policemen. All watched the same 
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proceedings, in which the hidden phenomenon of clandestine migration was 
made visible. It was hard to tell who was a bystander, who a journalist, who an 
undercover police. Cameramen sat atop a statue and lingered on terraces above; 
photographers snapped pictures. Surveillance was everywhere. The strikers with 
the banner dutifully folded it, went up for the body search, and unfolded it again 
on the other side. Finally the police read out names from a list. A handful of 
strikers went up and were put into waiting police vans. The vehicles filled up and 
sped off, leaving the remaining strikers and police standing silently in front of 
each other for a wavering moment. Then, tentatively, the chanting picked up 
again in the remaining crowd – CETI no bueno, CETI no bueno. They moved 
forward slowly, squeezed into a tight procession behind their banner. Finally 
they turned the corner round the Plaza de la Constitución, waving their yellow 
cards in the air and leaving an indeterminate feeling of sadness and futility in 
their wake.  
 As the strikes started unwinding, Europe’s “deportation machine” (Fekete 
2005) was revving into gear. A police van took the detainees to the camp, where 
they sat for an hour in the heat waiting for their belongings to be picked up from 
their rooms. A worker peeked inside: they looked like wild animals, she said, 
tucked into that small hot space, starving, thirsty… They pleaded for food, and 
finally got a sandwich that they tore into like “wild dogs”. Fourteen detainees 
were sent on to the peninsula. The reason they took these 14 was because they 
did not have the asylum-seeker’s yellow card, which meant they could be 
transferred to detention in a CIE. From there, the next step was deportation.  
 The protest seemed to have failed, but maybe success or failure was not 
what mattered. The strike bore witness to the “climate of exceptionality” that, 
according to Agier (2011:52), reigns in the camps and their environs. “Protest 
has no proper place in these sites,” he says, “and itself takes exceptional and 
exacerbated forms, before being rapidly and violently repressed”. The repression 
came slowly in Ceuta, however, and in the meantime the strikers had managed to 
craft another form of migranthood out of the meagre resources at their disposal – 
the stuff of pitiable negritos and interventionable morenos. Their fake-brand 
“Addadis” clothes, a supreme sign of their neediness and anonymisation, made a 
perfect uniform for a ragtag army. The handout T-shirts morphed into bandanas 
and placards. And the cardboard, the free cheap cardboard they slept on as 
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dejected migrants out on the square became, temporarily, a weapon against the 
invisible enemy of EU migration policy. Their street performance distinguished 
them from the apolitical clandestins spotted in other camps across Europe who, 
according to Papadopoulos (2011), only want to travel on, invisible, 
imperceptible, unmolested. They were stepping into the realm of politics as 
subjects not objects. The strikers were interpellating the state rather than the 
other way round – a state that was not even their own – to see them, to detain 
them, to do anything.  
This situation recalls Butler’s (1995:24) corrective to Althusser’s (1971) 
theory of interpellation. To her, the subject is not only hailed by the state but is in 
“passionate pursuit of the reprimanding recognition by the state” in a process that 
she terms “subjectivation”. In their attempts at hailing the state, Ceuta’s strikers 
followed a similar logic to that of the sans-papiers on the streets of Paris or the 
Latinos with their million-strong marches across the US. McNevin (2007:671), 
commenting on the latter, sees irregular migrants as situated at the “frontiers of 
the political in the context of neoliberal globalisation”. Their political claims, she 
argues, “challenge those sovereign practices through which they are constructed 
as apolitical and illegitimate intruders”. This was true in Ceuta as well, yet the 
strike there took the challenge to the state one step further, or one step back. It 
was simply over the right to leave, and even the right to be deported. While the 
adventurers had already had to assume their own “deportability” (de Genova 
2002) in Morocco, here they sought to deploy it, calling the illegality industry’s 
bluff in the process. 
 The strikers’ appropriation of space spoke of a similar story. By rejecting 
their containment on the faraway hillside and marching on the pristine city 
centre, they challenged the spatial order by which illegal immigrants were 
rendered as separable, pitiable and researchable. But in doing so, the strikers had 
recreated the flipside of the helpless and innocent clandestine migrant, the 
negrito. They had become the wild and dangerous negro. To quote Fanon 
(1967:112, 129), one “galaxy of erosive stereotypes” had been substituted for 
another – “the Negro’s sui generis good nature” replaced by “Mama, see the 
Negro! I’m frightened!”  
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The cordon 
 
EL PUEBLO DE CEUTA – FRONT-PAGE PICTURE OF WORKERS IN PROTECTIVE 
GEAR AND FACE MASKS ON THE CENTRAL SQUARE, CAPTIONED “THE CITY 
CLEANS A SOURCE OF INFECTIONS GENERATED BY THE IMMIGRANTS WHO 
SLEEP IN THE PLAZA DE LOS REYES”12 
 
The road to the camp wound uphill, past the same old rubbish-strewn slopes. I 
walked it as so many times before, heavy steps set in humid African heat, until 
reaching the hilltop gate. Two riot police vans were parked in the shade. At the 
turnstile stood a young security guard with muscled, tattooed overarms. He was 
squeezing a hand exercise gadget, producing a squeaky repetitive noise. 
 Residents walked up to the turnstiles, swiping cards and resting their 
fingers on the reader. When they entered, the guard stopped squeaking, put their 
bags on a table inside the gates, and rummaged through them with black-gloved 
hands. Out came three black guys, one dressed in a beret and sunglasses. It was 
el general. He looked subdued. “The only thing left for us to do now is to swim,” 
he mumbled hoarsely.  
 The turnstile stopped one member of the party from getting through. The 
guard’s colleague in the booth opened the gates, and the friends headed downhill. 
“Fuck!” exclaimed the reception guard: that one’s card was disabled. “Curva 
(curve), do you copy?” The walkie-talkie crackled. “Look,” the guard told his 
colleagues manning the length of the fence, “El general is heading downhill with 
two morenos”. One had a deactivated card, he said: “send him back up”. The 
moreno with the blocked card came dutifully clambering back up the sun-
drenched hill.  
 After the protest, a cordon sanitaire had been set up around the camp, 
and another one was firmly in place in the centre. Ceuta’s spatial order was 
swiftly being re-established. Late at night uniformed police kept watch on a 
huddle of protesters who stood in a corner of the square, motionless. Their 
cardboard had been confiscated. Outside the police jefatura, a zigzag of riot 
fences had been put up, blocking the sleeping space of the Congolese. A police 
car sharked up behind them, the officer pointing at a small piece of cardboard 
that they dutifully deposited in the rubbish bins nearby. They slept straight on the 
                                                 
12
 El Pueblo front page, 5/09/2010  
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asphalt until Ceuta’s cleaning brigade descended in the early mornings in their 
unending task of polishing the town centre. “Here the moriños are treated 
differently!” exclaimed one of them, dirty and agitated from lack of sleep and 
excess adrenaline. “But our force is here, in our heads,” he said, pointing to his 
temples. They would not be defeated. 
  Next morning, the strikers were gone from the square. Space had been 
reclaimed for the Spanish kids, the elderly flaneurs and the Moroccan shoppers, 
and the stone benches where migrants had slept had been put in nice symmetrical 
order again. But the whiff of illegality would linger. Two impressions stayed, 
however unfairly. A group of posh schoolkids had gathered in town: one of them, 
a teenage boy, picked up a piece of cardboard from a skip and proceeded to slap 
it against the pavement to the laughter of his friends, slapping and slapping until 
it echoed in a faint reminder of the strikers’ cartonazos. An old couple was 
talking at one of Ceuta’s frequent military parades: “Let’s see if they do anything 
with the negros,” said the wife. “What they should do is circle them all in the 
square and bang-bang-bang,” replied the man.  
 Mamá sat in her office with a handwritten list on the table. It enumerated 
the strikers who had persisted despite the official resolution. “They have taken 
them all to the calabozo de Tarajal,” said Mamá, the prison next to the border. 
They were back on the threshold of thresholds, ironically enough, the limbo of 
the frontera they had desperately tried to escape. Their bedding and clothes had 
to be collected downstairs, Mamá said. She got out her typed-up list of rooms, 
scribbling notes on it in an ever-more complicated mesh of doodles. It was in a 
mess, she said. The migrants who just arrived this morning after a dramatic sea 
rescue still had to be added.  
 Nine of the 14 strikers previously taken away in vans and transferred to 
the peninsula – the “bad ones”, as the authorities saw it – were deported back to 
Cameroon thanks to an impromptu bilateral deal. The strikers who had remained 
in Ceuta were released and prosecuted, but the case failed in the courts. 
Meanwhile, a new strategy was unveiled at the camp. Migrants’ good behaviour 
was now going to be rewarded by their being sent to centros de acogida – 
reception centres run by NGOs – in mainland Spain. The sorting mechanism of 
the camp was being refined. Nationality took on a new importance, since most of 
the strikers had been Cameroonian. The good and bad elements were sifted. The 
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presumed ringleaders (cabecillas) were sorted under “bad”, and were scheduled 
for removal or simply left in place, more stuck than ever.  
 Despite this el general managed to escape, the local papers reported 
during the autumn. How he had done it no one knew; maybe he had stowed away 
in a lorry, as had many before him. Ceuta calmed down, and the camp launched 
new activities for residents: more workshops, on-the-job training in the camp, 
sports and cultural interchanges with caballas, and even a special course at the 
local university. The crisis had officially been wrapped up and resolved.  
 Barely a month after the strike, some of the deported Cameroonians had 
already made it back to Ceuta. As hardened adventurers, they fast-tracked 
through the borderlands, despite the fences and radars and subcontracted police 
blocking their path. Perhaps the returnees sought to follow el general’s example, 
but the threat of stagnation in “Guantánamo” still made their return seem surreal, 
inconceivable. Like with the strike, the logic of the return has to be sought in the 
battle over migrants’ time, the subject of the next chapter – their captive present, 
their past on the road and their imagined future. There was simply no going back 
for the adventurers of Ceuta. 
 
 
 
The strike and its aftermath had shown that the products of Europe’s illegality 
industry were not simply the rationally classified subjects of a sorting centre; 
they were also redolent of fears, myths and magic. Here it is worth returning to 
Malkki’s (1995) observations on refugee liminality, how camps can conjure new 
roles out of the old. Ceuta is nothing if not a liminal space, an “out-place” in 
Agier’s (2011) terms, artificially construed as the ultimate threshold of Europe – 
and the camp is a limbo-within-a-limbo. “It is in liminality that communitas 
emerges,” Victor Turner (1974:97-100) once said, referring to the sense of 
togetherness forged outside the structures, hierarchies and normative orders of 
society. Turner would, perhaps, have found that Ceuta’s migrants were in the 
liminal middle-stage of a rite of passage much like the kind Malkki (1995) 
describes for Burundians-turned-refugees. The “elders” of their host society kept 
them separate, as initiates often are: far away in their camp and on the threshold 
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of both Ceuta and Europe, suspended in time and place until their turn came to 
be incorporated into or rejected by Europe’s symbolic order. But the rite had 
broken down. Liminality had switched to stasis. And then, the strikers – as a 
group of initiates rebelling against the prevailing order, a “generation” in their 
own words – created their own rite and their own communitas by marching on 
the town centre. The result was a downgrading of the migrants’ status, not 
incorporation into Europe. The strike and its structural causes in containment, 
policy contradictions, media attention and policing prerogatives had turned 
needy subjects into savages. It had made negros of the negritos and morenos. 
Mamá’s stray children had finally abandoned the nest.   
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6 
 
 
Stranded in time 
 
 
 
Darkness falls over the shacks in Melilla. John takes another swig of his 
lukewarm whisky mixed with cheap energy drink and sways to the mix of Fela 
Kuti and hip hop streaming out of a speaker atop a rickety bench. “Fela was a 
prophet,” he says. “He stood up for Africa.” The whisky glass circulates among 
his Nigerian friends in our little circle, seated on ripped-out car seats and plastic 
petrol cans. Around us, women stir black metal pots, dragging children along 
with them wherever they go. These are the chabolas or shanties, as migrants call 
their makeshift dwellings, which they have furnished out of pallets and tarp. Like 
Ceuta’s hillside forests, the chabolas offer a brief reprieve from the observatory 
of the enclave – the turnstiles and camp cards, the patrols and surveillance 
cameras. Reprieve, but no escape. From here, Melilla unfolds as a world of 
multiple fences: the fence around the migrant camp downhill, the mesh shielding 
the golf course next door, the high-tech valla separating the EU from Morocco 
around a bend in the border road. “This place they call Europe, but I think it’s 
Africa,” says John, his hand fanning out over the dust-coated misery of the 
chabolas and the distant Mount Gurugú from where migrants once descended en 
masse towards the valla. The whisky glass is filled and shared out again. John’s 
friend, sporting fake Raybans and a neatly trimmed beard, raps along to the hip 
hop. “We are like convicts,” he sings. A captive colony: the chabola dwellers 
have been stuck in Melilla between one and three years, waiting for their chance 
to go to the Iberian peninsula.  
 Eventlessness defined migrant life in the enclaves. Ceuta’s strike in the 
summer of 2010 was an exception – the migrants in Ceuta and Melilla were 
above all sucked into an endless, dreary, patient process of waiting. The days 
ground on, each like the next. Yet the long wait endured by the “convicts” was 
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not simply an empty period of time, at least as far as the authorities were 
concerned. Migrants were, police said, blocked in the enclaves in order to 
strangle the finances of the “mafias” who brought them there. Marcelo, the chief 
of the police immigration bureau in Ceuta, illustrated this by positioning himself 
as a hypothetical trafficker. “If I pick up [capto] 100 women in Nigeria to bring 
them from there and put them in Madrid [for prostitution], I have an estimated 
cost of, I guess, €6,000 for each one” in smuggling them into Spain. The women 
pay €3,000 each up front and the rest once they arrive, €300,000 in total; this 
means the smuggler needs to invest the remaining €300,000. “If you withhold 50 
of them in Ceuta and you repatriate another 50, my business will be in ruins!” he 
exclaimed. “I’ve lost, because the poor woman who was heading there [to the 
peninsula] can’t pay. I’ve lost €150,000, and you’ve withheld the other women 
here for two years, that’s two years that I have immobilised capital, that’s 
another €150,000 lost.” The strategy, then, was to remove Ceuta and Melilla 
from the smuggling route by selectively retaining and deporting migrants. In this 
policing effort, the time migrants spent in the enclaves constituted capital 
withheld from the presumed smuggling rings. What Marcelo failed to mention, 
however, was that most sub-Saharan migrants had in 2010 arrived through their 
own efforts, rather than with the help of professional smugglers. For these 
adventurers as well as for their trafficked or smuggled counterparts, retention 
constituted collective punishment, reducing them to indefinite confinement in 
ways akin to the “island detention” practices in Australia and elsewhere along 
the fringes of the West.
1
 
As a result a silent battle was being waged in the enclaves over time 
withheld and stolen, emptied time, time bought and given, time retrieved for 
observation, scrutiny and care. Yet as theorists of temporality have long noted, 
time cannot be separated from space (Munn 1992; Massey 1994; Thrift and May 
2001). Migrants’ waste of time was predicated upon their spatial immobility. 
Ceuta and Melilla were gaps in the migration circuit, in which a regime of 
interlocking time-spaces, unevenly stretched over the enclaves’ tiny territories, 
seemed to regulate migrants as a population while disciplining them as bodies in 
the biopolitical fashion delineated by Foucault (2008). Their time-space of 
                                                 
1
 See Mountz (2011) on such detention practices elsewhere  
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confinement, ephemeral yet inescapable, soon became a burden weighing heavily 
on their shoulders.  
This time-space regime did not simply confine migrants in what activists 
called the “sweet prison” of the enclaves. 2  Like ship castaways, they rather 
seemed stranded in a topsy-turvy world with its own rules and routines, a world 
of mimicry and make-believe. In its strangeness, this world was not only 
reminiscent of the refugee camp existence invoked by migrants, but also of the 
“total institutions” of western social states. Like the mental asylums and prisons 
once studied by Goffman (1961), enclave confinement inserted the reluctant 
“inmates” into an institutional order with its own logics. Like in prisons and 
asylums, these inmates went through a process of “mortification” that sought to 
eradicate their previous adventurer selves: they were cleansed, checked for 
diseases and sparsely clothed and accommodated, their camp life documented in 
thickening files. And again like in these institutions, their recalcitrance was 
interpreted along moralistic lines suitable to the authorities’ objectives. They 
were, like John’s friend had hinted, captives in an offshore, self-contained world.  
The adventurers were not hapless victims of this contradictory world, 
however, but participated in its very creation. After all, Ceuta and Melilla were 
just the most extreme example of the imposed waiting that defined the migration 
circuit: waiting for contacts, for money transfers, for a clandestine crossing, for 
papers. If the migrant strike had hinted at a new impatience among the hardened 
adventurers of Ceuta, there were numerous other strategies – techniques of 
waiting – in the migratory repertoire. Some tried to render themselves invisible 
to avoid apprehension; others sought to accumulate “good time” and be rewarded 
with passage to the peninsula; yet others, such as John and his chabola friends, 
aimed to stretch their time in the enclaves while hoping for deliverance. This 
multifaceted battle over time in both Ceuta and Melilla, the subject of this 
chapter, reached from abstract time-as-capital through the camp’s day-to-day 
schedules all the way down to the briefest of time slots: the half-second pause in 
speech before migrants revealed their names and nationalities to strangers. 
 
                                                 
2
 This was the term used by Ceuta’s nuns. See Asociación Elin (2010)  
 216 
Buying time: pauses, lies and parking lots 
 
A THURSDAY IN AUGUST, 1.30pm. Ding-ding-ding-dong rang the 
microphone of the Ceuta camp as I called out for the five latest arrivals of an 
increasingly busy summer. They had already showered with an anti-parasite 
shampoo while one of the camp security guards kept watch, as was the routine, 
and had then been escorted to the camp clinic for a medical check-up and the 
mandatory TB test, indicated by inked squares on their upper arms. Eventually 
they came into the reception and sat down, waiting for a meeting with the social 
workers. Four of the migrants, whose natty dreads hinted at their rough living in 
the forest of Ben Younech outside Ceuta before departure, had come together in 
an inflatable boat. The fifth had set out alone, seeking to paddle across the Strait 
in a tiny raft before being spotted by a commercial ship and picked up by 
Salvamento Marítimo. He was called Patrick, a 29-year-old Cameroonian in 
shorts, slippers and a sun hat. “I don’t know why they sent me here, I was trying 
to go to Algeciras,” he said. His voice stayed calm, but he was visibly frustrated. 
He had good reason to be. This was his second time in Ceuta. He had first come 
eight years previously, in 2002. Deported back to Cameroon, he had set out again 
and been on the road ever since. “Now they conserve people longer here,” he 
remarked. Before, it had been a matter of weeks not years before people were 
sent on. Patrick was unique in having tried to paddle alone across the Strait, but 
in two other respects he was typical for the African migrants arriving in 2010 in 
Ceuta and Melilla: he had spent many years on the road and had not making use 
of the smuggling rings invoked by the police chief. As a bona-fide adventurer, he 
took pride in his skills in skirting borders without assistance; he also lacked 
funds for expensive smuggling trips. The time he was losing in Ceuta was his 
own.  
The microphone that had summoned Patrick was at the heart of camp life, 
its amplified ding-ding-ding and “attention please” lending an uneven daily 
rhythm and sense of purpose to the long, hot days of summer. Lurking in a 
corner of the reception, it was a source of banter and ambivalence, an instrument 
of camp authority occasionally subverted when migrants grabbed it and called 
out names to everyone’s laughter. Usually workers would reluctantly go up to the 
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mike, press the red button and call out names for workshops or meetings in basic 
French or English. Often no one would show up despite the repeated calls of 
names. “It’s because they haven’t memorised them yet,” said Mamá with 
characteristic frankness. The migrants were not used to hearing the names “they 
had been assigned” by the smugglers. “Many times you ask for their names and 
there’s a pause, then they look it up on their [camp] card.” 
Captivity yielded knowledge. The immobility of migrants in Ceuta and 
Melilla meant collecting data on them should be easy: names and nationalities, 
backgrounds and biometrics, routes and destinations. But the authorities faced a 
formidable adversary. The lies and pauses, the microphone and its unheeded 
calls, were symptoms of the war over time and knowledge that was silently 
waged between the Spanish state and the adventurers, with the camp workers as 
uneasy go-betweens.  
 
 
 
In daytime, migrants dispersed across Ceuta and Melilla. They loitered in 
parking lots in the merciless sun, occasionally waving to drivers who were trying 
to park. This work they called tira-tira (“pulling”). Besides waiting in shop 
doorways to beg and help customers with their bags – or, in Melilla, “doing 
limpiacoches” (washing cars) to remove the dust blowing in from Morocco – 
tira-tira was all they could do to make a few euros. I often sauntered up, asking 
questions. “What is your name? Where do you come from?” There was usually a 
pause before the reply, a wavering, a brief silence before a West African might 
utter Somalia as their country or Mohamed as their name. In this pause lay the 
silence of their predicament, their thoughts and doubts bundled into a half-
second. I soon learnt to stop asking about country or name, and to enquire 
instead about the measure of all things in the enclave: “How long have you been 
here?”  
 The pause, often accompanied by a brief quiver across the lips, hinted at 
the fear of not being believed, of being caught lying. And many migrants lied. 
How could they not? The goal was the peninsula, and the end justified the 
means. The twisting of truth arose out of their captive predicament but to 
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workers and locals it became, rather, a sign of their migranthood, just as it had 
for the police on the hunt for adventurers across deserts and seas. Everyone knew 
that migrants invented nationalities and names. They claimed physical symptoms 
and diseases according to what might take them to the peninsula, camp workers 
said. If there are no good dentists in Ceuta, everyone suddenly had a rotten tooth.  
To the migrants, Ceuta itself represented a pause, a holding of breath 
before their push across the final hurdle into Europe. This was so in a strictly 
official sense. Migrants were not permitted to join the municipal register (padrón 
municipal), which meant the time they spent here did not easily count towards 
the Spanish arraigo social (social embeddedness), whereby irregular migrants 
may apply for a residence permit if they can prove they have lived in the country 
for three years.
3
 The migrants were acutely aware of this, complaining of having 
to start from scratch if they ever made it to the peninsula. “You have to 
remember that one year is a long time for them,” said Luis, a ponytailed lawyer 
at the camp, whose office was bedecked with pictures of the West Bank wall and 
magazine cut-outs about the Senegalese “mother victims of the cayucos”. “These 
are their best years.”  
The pauses were ambiguous. On the one hand, migrants aimed to reduce 
them. They did tira-tira for this reason – to get away from their doubts and from 
“only thinking”, as one documentary on Ceuta’s migrants put it.4 If the pause 
swallowed your whole world, you would go crazy. “There are mad people up 
there,” migrants said of the camp: listless, absent, psychotic. They had 
succumbed to the pause, fallen into the crack that constituted their existence. On 
the other hand, the invocation of Somalia or Sudan was itself a way of extending 
the larger pause of Ceuta. In this effort, migrants’ make-believe nationalities 
interacted with the paperwork produced about them. Foremost among these 
documents was the yellow card that had been held aloft by Ceuta’s strikers. 
Asylum seekers filed their demands with the Immigration Office in the 
centre soon after arrival. The yellow card they then received was valid in all of 
Spain – so it said on the card – and inserted the paperless adventurers into a 
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 In 2011, the new conservative government swiftly moved to curtail this right. See 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/11/24/actualidad/1322125831_984714.html  
4
 “Only Thinking” by Gabriel Merrún: 
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/socialanthropology/visualanthropology/a
rchive/mafilms/2009/   
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documented order. But since police, following Spain’s new asylum law, no 
longer accepted the cards as documentation in port, the freedom of movement 
promised on the cards was phoney. In this sense, the cards were what Navaro-
Yashin (2007) has called “make-believe documents”, or a phantasmatic form of 
state-produced certification. While Navaro-Yashin’s case from northern Cyprus 
concerns documents not recognised beyond the (unrecognised) state producing 
them, in Ceuta the failure of recognition occurred between two authorities within 
the same state. To complicate matters further, the yellow cards were a fake-upon-
a-fake, based as they often were on invented nationalities. Ceuta’s asylum 
seekers remained, in the words of the police chief Marcelo, “completely 
undocumented”.  
If fake nationalities and asylum applications held little promise, they at 
least insured migrants against immediate deportation and kept the hope of a 
laissez-passer (safe conduct) to the peninsula alive. This was the strategy of the 
Nigerians, whose government had a readmissions agreement with Spain. Asylum 
seekers from other nationalities coveted what was known as the fuera (out); the 
word used by migrants in Ceuta to refer to the steps of their expulsion order 
following a refusal of asylum. After three fueras, migrants hoped for transfer to 
detention on the mainland, followed by deportation. Like Ceuta’s strikers, they 
sought rejection of their claims and transfer to the CIEs, since they knew 
deportation was unlikely to be carried out for lack of readmission agreements 
between their countries and Spain. However, even this was denied them: in 2010 
the fueras were painfully slow in coming. 
John, who had a family in the chabolas, had little reason to invent a 
nationality. Instead he hoped for papers, an impossibility in the crisis-racked 
Spain of 2010. Patrick, who went by several names, sought none of the above: he 
neither applied for asylum nor invented a nationality. Instead he was biding his 
time, waiting for the possibility of a clandestine passage to Europe. 
 
 
 
The mystery of migrants’ origins, journeys and stratagems was a source of banter 
and intrigue among camp workers, who used the extended pause of Ceuta to 
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guess and classify at leisure. How could they not? This was after all their task in 
a sorting centre, and like any professionals they wanted to understand their 
“users”, categorise them, and assist them accordingly – here with the added 
challenge of the truth being hidden. Yet in their search for truth they became, for 
migrants, complicit in the regime that kept them stranded and deportable. 
Mamá’s attempts to list the camp’s Muslim residents for special Ramadan 
mealtimes were hampered by suspicion; anxious residents inquired whether new 
faces in the camp, such as myself, were really undercover police.  
Theories and tricks for ascertaining nationalities were often aired during 
breakfast breaks in the coffee room. Some so-called “alleged nationalities” were 
easy to expose, said Luis. Nigerians might say they are from Sudan, then “you 
ask them about the capital, Darfur and janjaweed and they don’t know anything”. 
Mamá read nationalities off residents’ gait and bodies – the tall, long-limbed and 
lanky ones were Senegalese, the Cameroonians thick-boned and broad-faced, the 
Nigerians similar to the Cameroonians but louder, “very Anglophone”. Almost 
despite myself, I too had started taking a forensic approach to nationalities. Why 
did that Gambian speak French not English? Do Ivoirians have that type of tribal 
scar on their cheeks?  
Such guesswork was constant among camp workers, and involved 
defining not only physical but also temperamental traits. One day I entered the 
coffee room and there was the big, friendly head of social together with the 
former director, now relegated to an administrative role. A map of Somalia was 
spread across the table. “And the African stuff, have you learnt it yet?” the 
former director asked me, meaning whether I had started to recognise different 
nationalities by their traits. He gave me a crash course, contrasting the “docile” 
and easy-going migrants from Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal with the 
Nigerians and Cameroonians, who “create more trouble” (dan más guerra). The 
new director added a more analytical angle: the Congolese and Cameroonians 
were well-organised, the former outside and the latter inside the camp, while the 
Nigerians had lost dominance and instead engaged in shady “business”. 
 This game of guessing and classification could, once frustration was 
factored in, easily take on the more sinister air of intelligence-gathering. “They 
lie about everything,” said one camp psychologist. Migrants started “playing the 
victim” in one-to-one sessions, he said, inventing mental and physical ailments, 
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“but I start noticing incoherencies quickly”. Stories circulated of a resident who 
had taken to reading the newspaper upside down, and another who just stared 
listlessly in front of him. Eventually these migrants had been sent on to Red 
Cross reception centres on the mainland. “They are faking it, but you can’t have 
people like that in the CETI,” said one worker. Others were more sympathetic, 
even attributing migrants’ madness to their captivity. “I’ve seen people who are 
OK, normal, when they enter,” said one workshop leader. “Then they change 
completely, it’s like they are a different person.” Even the symptoms of the 
fakers could start to become real the longer their performance went on and the 
longer the pause of Ceuta was extended.  
The guessing game clashed with camp procedures, which depended on 
certainty in pinpointing migrant identities. And such pinpointing was central to 
camp life; how else could entry cards be produced, forms filled in, data collected, 
names called out? The result was an awkward splintering between the 
documented existence of residents and the hidden truth about them, a game of 
make-believe played out both inside and outside the camp. In the tira-tira world, 
the Francophone migrants complained that the Somalis and Sudanese had all the 
best parking spots. Camp workers invoked fictitious nationalities in discussing 
slots for using the gym with migrants, and bantered with them about the threat of 
deportation for Somalis. The game went beyond jokes and gym times to 
encompass central aspects of camp organisation. The green camp cards – key in 
allowing for exit, entry, meals and any interaction with the workers, who relied 
on cards rather than name or facial memory as means of identification – listed 
the “alleged nationalities” and names. In such interactions, workers and migrants 
soon became uneasy accomplices in the game of make-believe played out in the 
time-space gap of Ceuta. 
The documentary practices in Ceuta exemplify the power of documents, 
noted by Pelkmans (forthcoming), to forge or impose state-sanctioned identities 
in interaction with their holders. Also noting this disciplinary importance of 
documents, Kelly (2006:103) argues in his West Bank study – like Navaro-
Yashin (2007) – that documentation may serve to increase rather than reduce 
uncertainty. By opening a gap between legal and physical status, he says, 
documents allow for degrees of manipulation that produce fears and anxieties 
among their holders, who in this way come to embody the indeterminacies of 
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their documents. In Ceuta and Melilla, documents did both produce new 
identities and uncertainty around these, yet with a twist. Here, the “gap” between 
legal and physical status was built into documented reality itself, with the 
connivance of the authorities. Anxiety resulted not from uncertainties in the 
interpretation of documents, but from the certainty that documented reality itself 
was arbitrary and devoid of meaning. The documents’ imposed identities were 
shallow, instrumental and phoney; no one would destroy them, in the way 
Pelkmans (forthcoming) describes passports being torn at the Georgia-Turkey 
border; no one would ask, as Israeli soldiers did at the Israel-Palestine 
checkpoints discussed by Kelly (2006), whether the identity given by the 
document was really in correspondence with its holder.   
One day Mamá wanted to show me a newborn baby. We went into the 
camp clinic and met an Anglophone West African woman in the corridor. 
“Congratulations!” Mamá called out and hugged her. On a hospital litter inside 
lay the little newborn girl. We inspected the newborn’s camp card with its photo 
of her small, sleepy baby face. The card stated her name along those of her 
parents, as well as her country of origin: Somalia.  
The African women were in the worst bind of all. Their bulging bellies, a 
common sight in the camp, attested to the fluctuations in the Spanish policy on 
detaining, liberating and deporting pregnant women. When they realised 
pregnancy no longer guaranteed transfer to the peninsula in late 2008, the 
psychologist said, several of them suddenly carried out abortions. In 2010 
pregnancy insured women against deportation – but by cutting short the transfer 
to a CIE, pregnancy could also keep them stuck in Ceuta for even longer. One 
male resident pointed to a pregnant woman walking past. “She’s been here for 
three years, now she’s pregnant, which means she’ll be here for five years! 
Everyone teases her about it, but she just cries.”  
If migrants emerged from this make-believe world as untrustworthy 
figures, so did the authorities. One of the Congolese protesters, a musician and 
holder of a yellow card, had seen his high regard for Europe shattered during his 
seven months in Ceuta. “The Spaniards lie a lot,” he said: the police promised 
them decisions and meetings but nothing came of it. The institutional side of the 
camp was eyed with a similar mistrust to the police, especially under the 
previous director, who some residents scolded for his alleged close links to 
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security. And then there were the journalists, in cahoots with the state. I had 
bought the local rag and walked past a Ugandan friend tending to a supermarket 
entrance, and he shouted out: “That paper is no good, it’s all lies!” He pointed at 
the front page, scolding the paper’s journalist who always wrote bad things. 
“Every Wednesday he comes, when they prepare rice, and they take photos.” 
Nice food called for promotional shots. The seemingly arbitrary decisions that 
kept him stuck in Ceuta added to his anger. “We have no facts,” he said. “They 
don’t tell us the truth because we are immigrants.”  
 The lack of information was endemic, and made worse by the camp 
policy of using Spanish even with the most recent arrivals. The pause when 
asked about names and in heeding the microphone’s calls was as much about the 
pitfalls in easing residents into the pidgin Spanish of the camp as it was about 
lies and outright evasion.  
 One day, a new resident came to reception, upset. “I’ve signed a piece of 
paper, but I don’t know what it means,” he told me, “it’s only in Spanish.” He 
wanted to see the social worker who made him sign it. “She explained something 
in French but she doesn’t speak it well, so I didn’t understand.” We went into the 
social office, where one worker was adamant her colleague had translated it, 
“well, I was here and I heard it! But of course I can explain it again.” So she did, 
along these lines, and I translated: the paper said only that the migrant was at the 
camp voluntarily, that he would follow the camp rules, and that all he had told 
the workers was true. It was “nothing strange”, everyone signed it as they 
entered, and it would not affect him in any legal way. “Okay?” The resident 
nodded, asked me to offer his excuses for taking up her time, and left without 
asking for a copy of the text he had signed. 
Camp life ticked over through the circulation of make-believe documents: 
the signed entry forms, the yellow asylum cards that gave phoney access to the 
whole of Spain while offering little chance of a full asylum procedure, the green 
camp cards with their mix of fictitious and real nationalities and names. 
Meanwhile the black migrants of the camp could use their generic categorisation 
as subsaharianos in inventing nationalities, and their bodies as defence when 
they invoked health problems or sought pregnancy. But if camp life was a game, 
it was one of “who blinks first”. In mouthing half-truths and lies, migrants risked 
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being found out or getting stuck even longer. In pushing the make-believe 
further, camp workers risked the captives’ wrath, as had happened in the strike. 
The make-believery and arbitrariness, codified in documents, created real 
effects in camp relations and in the lives of migrants, as attested to by the real-
fake bouts of madness, the pregnancies, the Somali parking monopolies, and the 
chance of being sent to the peninsula. It also impinged upon that more formal 
circuit of information – the regular reports sent by workers and police to the 
ministries in Madrid. A constant production of information, including the 
psychological questionnaires amassed on new arrivals, data provided to the 
police and social, and any incidents registered by the madres, accompanied the 
circulation of half-truths within the camp itself, remaining out of reach of 
migrants yet helping to structure their daily rhythms in the camp.  
  
Killing time: schedules and dossiers 
 
A TUESDAY IN AUGUST, 5.45pm. The smell of fried potatoes wafted out of 
the room next to the canteen. Inside, a group of residents stood around a table, 
catering hairnets on their heads, chopping tubers for a Spanish tortilla under the 
stern gaze of two women from the NGO Accem, a major contractor in Spain’s 
outsourced migration assistance programmes. “What’s this called?” one of the 
workshop leaders inquired while waving the skimming ladle. She looked from 
face to face before homing in on an unfortunate African woman. The woman did 
not know. “An espumadera,” the leader said, admonishing her pupil. The 
workshop leader pointed at objects in the small makeshift kitchen, making the 
woman repeat vocabulary – aceite (oil), patata (potato), sartén (frying pan). The 
head of social had come along to watch proceedings, in a welcome relief from 
the tensions generated by the strikers. “They’ve spent three weeks here and then 
start screaming ‘Guantánamo’,” he said, standing on the ledge behind the 
cooking room and observing a ping-pong game outside the residential modules 
below. Finally the tortilla was ready, and the head of social and I joined the 
director, camp workers and kitchen helpers to eat the moist, golden slices.  
 This was the good work of the camp that had been overshadowed by the 
strike. Workshops, language classes and IT sessions, psychological assistance 
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and health checks, sports and excursions: the opportunities served up by the 
Spanish authorities for irregular migrants were unmatched by any other southern 
European country. The first task at the camp was a “recuperation of human 
dignity”, the director had explained, followed by social integration through 
learning Spanish and other skills. But the picture had grown more complex the 
longer migrants were stuck in limbo. During the Spanish economic boom, 
migrants were taught how to register with local authorities and where to look for 
work once in the peninsula. Those who made an effort to participate in courses 
“were rewarded with exit to the peninsula, [but] from 2006 onwards, this was 
cut,” said one Red Cross officer in Melilla. “The work of integration got 
somewhat lost.” With the withdrawal of the reward of exit, the courses that took 
place in the camps in 2010 merely filled – or killed – the time of migrants. As 
one worker put it: “There’s little hope for them at the moment, but we do what 
we can. At least the things they learn here are something they can take with 
them. We have to encourage them but without giving any expectations.” 
 This logic of passing time through what Goffman (1961) calls “removal 
activities” is familiar from other modern, total institutions. The “sense of dead 
and heavy-hanging time” in asylums or prisons, Goffman says, might lead to a 
premium being placed on voluntary, unserious pursuits among inmates: “If the 
ordinary activities in total institutions can be said to torture time, these activities 
mercifully kill it” (ibid:67). 
Even allowing for this distractive function, however, the integration work 
of the camps remained an absurd exercise. How could anyone learn Spanish 
ensconced on a faraway hillside, suspended in time and fearful of deportation? 
How could you integrate while held captive as a collective punishment, unable to 
work or register with the local authorities? The enclaves, in their extreme 
juxtaposition of incompatible goals, simply brought to a head Europe’s 
contradictory migratory logics on integration and control, as already noted in the 
strike. These contradictions were unevenly played out across the enclaves’ 
“geography of time” (Glennie and Thrift 1996:280). If the time-space of control 
stretched from fence to port and forest to camp, camp time itself was further 
subdivided into fields of surveillance, integration and indifference.  
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In Ceuta, the camp layout – offices upstairs, residential modules 
downstairs – helped create two distinct but complementary rhythms.5 Upstairs, 
time discipline reigned. Camp life was defined by schedules and governed by the 
clock, much like in the regimented school and factory settings once studied by 
Thompson (1967). Mealtimes at 1pm and 8pm, one hour each, with the guards 
congregating at the door once the canteen was about to close, to make sure it was 
emptied on time. Curfew at night and early morning, when everyone had to be in 
or else be registered on their cards as absent: three nights of absence and the 
resident lost their bed, as well as antigüedad  (“seniority”) once they came back. 
And they always did come back: banishment meant sleeping rough in the forests 
with little chance of an income or even nourishment.  
In this regimented time, paperwork gave the impression of progress. As 
migrants arrived fresh from being rescued, they were admonished to keep their 
documents safely. These included the “affiliation” paper, a thin slip given to new 
arrivals by the police listing their temporary identification number (NIP); the 
medical card, another flimsy piece of documentation cataloguing the compulsory 
medical tests and other notes from the camp clinic; a paper delineating the camp 
rules; and the protocolo slip with its list of compulsory meetings. A stamp 
marked attendance for each meeting, which were all to take place in the new 
residents’ first week in the camp: medical screening, a psychological test, a 
compulsory Spanish class introduction and a presentation on their rights to claim 
asylum.  
 If paperwork, clockwork and compulsory meetings created a distinct 
upstairs temporality, time downstairs in the dorms sagged and melted like a 
surrealist clock. This world, visited only by the madres and the guards, was 
bereft of routines, if not of activity. The sleeping modules, exposed to the 
scorching sun and the winds and rains lashing the hillside, were alternately hot 
and freezing. They were also cramped and claustrophobic. In one female dorm, 
water had been seeping in from the next-door shower, creating a puddle under 
one of the beds. A baby cot stood next to the bunk. “The baby can’t sleep like 
that!” the women complained, asking Mamá for another dorm. But the only 
empty module in these busy August days was closed because the ground below it 
                                                 
5
 The Melilla camp, unlike Ceuta’s, was not divided into upstairs and downstairs spaces 
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had cracked and sunk, in part thanks to the construction of the horse-riding 
centre above the camp. In other rooms, the electric sockets were coming loose, 
exposing live wires. Black mould stains spread across the cracks between wall 
and ceiling. “They shower with hot water in here in winter,” Mamá offered as 
explanation. “I tell them that can create problems with humidity.” The modules 
had no running hot water, so the women resorted to boiling water themselves. 
Eventually sockets would be fixed, floors cleaned and rooms fumigated, but the 
atmosphere of neglect was evident in the futile attempts at keeping the decay of 
the modules at bay.  
 
 
ANOTHER WEDNESDAY, 5.30pm. It was the hottest time of August, a couple 
of weeks before the Ceuta strike begun, and I was loitering in the camp 
courtyard. An elderly Moroccan gardener hosed the trees in the yard while 
sipping mint tea from a plastic glass. Many of the camp’s contract workers hailed 
from across the border, with its plentiful supply of licit and illicit labour. “This 
tree,” the gardener said, pointing to the large poplar in front of us, “I planted it in 
2002.” This was the year that Patrick, the lone boatman of the Strait, had first 
arrived in Ceuta. As the gardener moved on, Patrick sauntered up. He had not 
been feeling at ease since arriving. “I feel lazy and I don’t know why,” he said in 
his usual manner, thoughtfully and slowly, as if weighing every word in his 
mouth. Could it be the heat? No, he said, “maybe it’s the food, though sometimes 
the food is good, you don’t know, all we can do is wait and see what they give 
us. All I want to do is sleep.” He was starting to doubt himself. Like the other 
residents, he was “thinking too much”, especially when stuck inside the camp, 
going over the lost decade of his adventure. “I keep asking myself, why me?” he 
said. “Trying, trying, trying to become something, but it’s impossible.” 
 The “pragmatics of time that comes with living in shelters”, identified by 
Robert Desjarlais (1994:895), was already taking its toll on Patrick, the 
disjointed rhythms of camp life triggering a bodily unease in him much as it led 
to bouts of madness among others:  
 
The episodic quality of shelter life, where you need to live one day at a time and 
not get ahead of yourself and where nobody does anything, fixes time as a diffuse 
and sporadic order. There are eddies when the mundane occurs, and whirlpools 
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when someone is restrained or hospitalised, but much of the day, week, and month 
consists of a vast ocean of routine… 
 
In this fleeting, endless present – again reminiscent of the “heavy” time 
encountered by Goffman (1961) in asylums – hope took on a phantasmatic 
quality. Much like the phoney promises of upstairs time, adventurers harboured 
rosy thoughts of the future once they made it “up” (en haut) to the peninsula. 
These make-believe futures festered in the gap of the enclaves, in the empty 
time-space wedged between the rough world of the adventure and crisis-hit 
Spain.  
As hope dwindled with each passing month, the effort to enforce upstairs 
time became more difficult. Instead, workers used what Goffman (ibid) calls a 
“privilege system” – nudges, rewards and punishments – to sort and sift good 
from bad migrants. The nudge was the dossier kept on each resident that might, 
after all, enable one’s passage to the peninsula. Good behaviour was not just 
rewarded with free cigarettes but, the madres insisted, led to a thick dossier 
listing a resident’s attendance at the compulsory Spanish classes and protocolo 
meetings. Spanish course attendance was rewarded with access to the camp’s 
computer hall and workshops such as the oversubscribed cooking class. The 
punishment, meanwhile, were the partes (reports) filed by social workers and 
madres for bad behaviour. After the strike, nudges and punishments mixed in 
strange new ways. “Many people have been penalised,” Patrick explained, “and 
the penalty is Spanish classes.” If residents did not attend, their card could be 
withdrawn and they would be stuck inside the camp. This was in keeping with 
the make-believe integration work of the enclaves, attesting to the absurdity of 
language learning among deportable migrants. Patrick, like many other 
adventurers, had no concentration for attending the course, which the students 
anyhow saw as sub-standard. Besides, he still had the Spanish diploma he 
received from the camp in 2002 in his family home in Cameroon. “What has that 
helped me?” he asked. Diploma or not, Patrick had still been deported.  
 Language, instead of aiding integration or allowing passage to the 
mainland, rather became the measure of all things in the camp. Those who 
dominated Spanish got to participate in upstairs time, while those who resisted or 
failed to learn were marooned in downstairs time. The latter applied, above all, to 
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the women. Sitting in their cliques around the downstairs tables, braiding hair, 
playing board games or washing clothes, they were admonished by Mamá for 
failing to learn Spanish during their long time in Ceuta. One woman snapped 
back. “You’ve been here for seven years and you haven’t learnt any English 
yet!” Some workers said the women did understand Spanish, but simply 
pretended not to know. In either case, their refusal to participate, at least in part 
related to their frustration at losing the most important years of their lives, 
marginalised them in the camp.  
  Language learning also played a large role at the two other establishments 
for migrants in Ceuta. On the edge of town, a humanitarian association run by 
Ceuta’s nuns provided language exchanges while running workshops in making 
handcrafted candles, much as the camp had its cooking and Spanish classes. 
Another centre also run by a Christian NGO, Centro San Antonio on the slopes 
close to the camp, offered internet access and Spanish courses, with class 
participation again the prerequisite for screen time. In these sites, a certain 
subject was being promoted and produced: the good, integrated immigrant, who 
was kept busy and connected in exchange for his linguistic efforts.  
 Among the “good immigrants” with reassuringly thick dossiers, the Red 
Cross volunteers stood out. Amadou, the adventurer who climbed the valla alone 
in chapter four, was one of them. He spent his days helping the frail and elderly, 
his bus pass paid by the Red Cross, and even assisted relatives of Guardia Civil 
officers, the gatekeepers he had once eluded. “I’ve been in almost all the media 
here, on television, photos in El Faro and El Pueblo [the local newspapers], 
while helping out as a volunteer,” he said. Amadou’s accumulation of virtue 
meant he was showered with attention, but his main reward as a model migrant 
was a busy schedule. He clocked up hours as a volunteer, attended first aid 
courses and participated in Red Cross outings. For him, in contrast to Patrick and 
the majority of residents, time moved purposefully ahead. 
The schedules and dossiers held out the promise of making time move, 
accumulate, produce something. This upstairs time regime was a fragile 
construct, however. One camp worker, frustrated with the arbitrariness of rules 
and punishments, grabbed hold of a protocolo schedule, pointing at the time slots 
for meetings that residents had to tick off. “Look, here it says they have to go at 
11am but it’s not at 11am, it’s whenever they [the workers] feel like it! The 
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residents go there at 11am and no one is there, and lose confidence.” The rules 
said residents should be expelled after three nights away, she noted, but 
sometimes they were expelled after only one night. The strikers, meanwhile, had 
not been expelled even after several nights outside. “Someone comes and asks 
me whether they can go out and I can’t say ‘yes’ because if they throw him out 
afterwards, he will blame me for it. There’s no coordination, everyone does what 
they feel like. For the residents it’s very negative.” The residents’ protocolo slips 
sometimes stayed unstamped for weeks. 
 The camp time of rewards and punishments, schedules and dossiers, 
created a make-believe sense of progress that helped disguise the fact that 
migrants were, to the authorities, mere numbers and their time capital withheld 
from the smugglers. As such mediators between neglect and due process, the 
documents played a large role in a bureaucratic “production of indifference”, in 
Herzfeld’s (1992) term. Feldman (2012:6), picking up on Herzfeld’s ideas in the 
context of migration control, contrasts the policy world’s production of 
indifference about migrants – the focus of his valuable study – with the “face-to-
face interaction among and between migration officials and migrants”, which he 
sees as a secondary manifestation of deeper processes. Yet Ceuta and Melilla 
show how bureaucratic indifference was dependent upon a peculiar social 
interface. Indifference could only be produced thanks to the intricate 
entanglement of workers, migrants and police in the circulation of documents 
and the layered time-space regimes of the enclaves.  
 The make-believe documents also sparked strong emotional reactions, as 
already noted. The thick dossiers, ticked-off fueras, protocol stamps and signed 
forms stirred hopes of release or, in contrast, fears of confinement or deportation. 
When the paperwork refused to veil the callous confinement of the enclaves – 
when protocol slips stayed unstamped or yellow cards failed to work their magic 
– it could trigger anger and rage, as a sign of the “lies” to which migrants felt 
themselves subjected. This is what had happened in Ceuta’s strike.  
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Stretching time: surveillance and escape 
 
A WEDNESDAY IN JULY, 4.30pm. It was the month before the strike, and I 
was talking to Jean the protester in a café in central Ceuta. He had already been 
sleeping rough outside the police jefatura together with his fellow Congolese 
asylum seekers for several weeks, and looked increasingly haggard. Suddenly a 
moustachioed Spanish man came up, flashed a badge, asked for our papers. 
Police control. He eyed Jean’s camp card briefly, then paid my passport 
considerably more attention. He asked questions, took down my address, phone 
number, profession. A “neighbour” who had seen us talking had tipped him off, 
he explained. “You never know, this might be about smuggling or something 
illegal.” After he left, Jean shook his head. “I’m not afraid of him,” he said. 
“They always control us.” He knew why the undercover policeman had checked 
on us: because I am white and Jean is black, his colour marking him as “illegal” 
in the enclaves’ social order.  
 Ceuta and Melilla, tiny militarised territories hemmed in between the 
vallas and the sea, were perfect spaces of surveillance. Their delicate geopolitical 
situation meant that undercover police and informers were everywhere, or as 
graffiti on a Melilla wall put it: “If snitches [chivatos] could fly, we would no 
longer see the sun.” In Melilla in particular, police also enlisted chivatos among 
the migrants, who were quietly offered possibilities of a laissez-passer for 
gathering intelligence. As for the concerned “neighbour” informing on me and 
Jean, this was surely one of the many local informers eavesdropping on strangers 
in Ceuta’s cafés.  
The captive migrants, singled out by their skin, constituted readily 
available objects for raids, checks and deportations. The time lag between 
searching for and apprehending them was minuscule. “Here they don’t have to 
detain anyone,” said Luis. The police only needed to go and search for them in 
the camp. The camp, he clarified, “is not a detention centre, but Ceuta in itself is 
a detention centre”. The port was closed, all exits were blocked. There was no 
escape. This is why the undercover policeman took more interest in my passport 
than in Jean’s camp card – he knew he could find, detain and deport Jean 
whenever expedient. The police, preparing “the deportation of one, two or 150” 
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simply “proceed to detain them”, Marcelo explained. “You call them in and they 
show up, no problem.” Court summons and police notifications, written in 
obscure Spanish legalese, were posted on the camp noticeboard, next to leaflets 
for sevillanas dancing workshops and the like. Most residents had nothing to lose 
in trudging all the way down to the police offices or the courts in the hope that 
they would be taken to the peninsula. If they failed to show up or were to be 
deported en masse, the camp could be raided at any moment, a round-up yielding 
dozens of co-nationals at a time.  
 
 
 
The camp itself was a machine of surveillance, albeit a creaking, imperfect one. 
A private security company – since censored by the authorities for malfeasance – 
kept order in the camp.
6
 Some guards walked their daily rounds of the living 
modules with a swagger, their trousers tucked into heavy black boots and batons 
at the ready. Others joked and chatted with the migrants, and even befriended 
them on Facebook. One female guard had found love in an African camp 
resident; a male colleague of hers had improved his English by “listening to their 
stories for hours at a time”.   
In the weeks before the strike climaxed and the policing of the camp was 
ratcheted up several gears, the status of the guards often seemed suspended. In 
daytime, they ensconced themselves in the air-conditioned cubicle at the gate or 
manned the reception desk when the female receptionist was off duty, cracking 
jokes with staff and residents; guarding the canteen entrance at night, they 
clapped out a flamenco rhythm with the kitchen staff while the migrants looked 
on bemused. But suddenly it might all change, for no apparent reason: camp 
cards checked, doors closed, patrolling routines reinforced. I had constant trouble 
being allowed past the turnstiles even though I came several times a week; there 
was always someone new manning the security booth, or they wanted 
authorisation yet again. “See, it’s a prison,” smiled my Algerian friend as he saw 
me negotiating the gate.  
                                                 
6
 See http://www.elfarodigital.es/ceuta/economia/16148-el-misterio-de-economia-y-hacienda-
prohibe-la-contratacion-de-serramar.html  
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 If the camp was a prison, it was so only in a peculiar, postmodern 
fashion. As punishment for any misdemeanours, individual migrants could either 
be shut inside or banished from the camp. Locked in or locked out, it did not 
matter: the divide between inside and outside was flexible, and the police could 
reach both those banished into the forest and those stuck inside. 
 In the living modules, too, the boundary between neglect and surveillance 
was flexible despite the official insistence on residents’ privacy. The guards, 
police or madres were able to enter a room at any time, peek behind the tied-up 
bedsheets and ask dozing residents for their cards or for a hand in clearing a bed. 
Despite this “mortification”, in Goffman’s (1961) sense, of having their intimate 
spaces invaded, some residents contented themselves with the phoney privacy of 
the modules. Others countered their availability and deportability by stretching 
the time-space of surveillance as far as they could. The Algerians spent all day in 
port, trying to stow away on boats. Sub-Saharan migrants such as Patrick, aware 
of their instant availability to police, instead followed the strategy within 
institutions that Goffman (ibid:70) calls “playing it cool” – they tried to render 
themselves invisible by not participating in camp life, or by participating just 
enough. For this reason, too, Patrick kept his involvement in the strike half-
hearted. His strategy was to elbow into the Algerians’ space in the port, hoping 
to stow away or get on the ferry with a lookalike friend’s passport. 
Melilla’s chabolas and Ceuta’s hills provided a temporary respite and 
repose for the African camp residents, and especially so for the women with their 
restaurants. The open gates also allowed temporary escape from the reach of the 
police. If any foreign commissions came to identify their nationals for 
deportation, rumours would precede their arrival. The residents could escape up 
the hill in time, or else just stay silent, feigning ignorance. Migrants kept vigil at 
night, ready to jump across the fences if police vans approached. “They know 
everything,” said the director with a note of respect.  
The most radical way of stretching the time-space of surveillance was to 
abandon the camp and its comforts altogether. This was the path taken by 
Ceuta’s Indian migrants. They had left the camp for fear of police raids and 
deportation more than two years ago, and had since constructed their own 
community of shacks in the hills.  Locals, activists and camp workers alike urged 
me to go and see the indios del monte (Indians on the hill), among them the 
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camp’s medical assistant. “They called me the mother of the CETI,” she said 
wistfully as she recalled being invited by them for lunch. “They put a tablecloth 
on the ground, it was whiter than in my home, and they used disposable plates, 
all so hygienic,” she said. “Ask them to prepare the chickpeas and aubergines for 
you!” 
  
 
 
The indios lived far uphill, past the luxurious villas of Ceuta’s wealthy Indian 
merchants, beyond the loud barks of the perrera (dog kennel) and onwards into 
the thick underbrush. Then the first shack appeared, perched atop stilts furnished 
out of branches, its roof a patchwork of blankets and discarded plastic. In a 
clearing stood the cooking tent. Inside, five Punjabi men stooped over a big pot, 
slicing cauliflower, chilli and garlic that they proceeded to deep-fry for their 
visitors. With me was another visitor, a turbaned Sikh temporarily on shipping 
work in Ceuta’s port. We waited for the food seated on the forest floor; smells of 
spicy sabji wafted among the trees. “I had never thought I would meet my people 
living in the jungle like this!” the visiting Punjabi sardar laughed.  
There had been 72 of them to begin with. The indios had come to Ceuta 
through pre-paid smuggling packages from the Punjab at the time of Spain’s 
migratory frenzy in 2006. They had paid more than €20,000 each for their 
clandestine journeys across the Sahara, only to be dumped in Ceuta by the 
“mafias”, who told them they had now reached Europe. Some had died on the 
way, in trucks crossing the desert or squeezed into Ceuta-bound dinghies. Unlike 
most of the sub-Saharan adventurers, they had been wholly at the mercy of their 
smugglers. Deprived of their documents en route, they were now in hock to the 
Spanish authorities because of their undocumented status. “Losing your passport 
is like having your hands cut off,” they said. While some had been taken to the 
peninsula and released without papers, 20 of them still remained on the hillsides.  
During their long wait for any news on their fate, they had constructed a 
society in the hills, much as the African adventurers had once done in Mount 
Gurugú and Ben Younech outside the enclaves. The Indians worked in teams at 
Ceuta’s Eroski hypermarket. They bought groceries together, cooked together, 
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lived together in shanties scattered across the forest. In the process, they had 
earned an enormous amount of goodwill. “The locals support us,” explained 
Raju, a former university student and their sometime spokesman because of his 
Spanish skills. He and his friends were different in this respect from the 
subsaharianos or negros who, Raju said, were especially disliked after the 
protest.  
Their escape did not, however, put them out of reach of the police. In the 
enclaves, all strategies of escape were largely illusory. The sub-Saharans were 
marked by their physical appearance and could be apprehended at any time, as in 
the case of Jean. So were the indios, who the police visited regularly in the hills, 
exchanging pleasantries in a courteous game of make-believe freedom. Their 
“escape”, then, was not ultimately about avoiding the time-space of surveillance. 
Instead it was a conscious tactic based upon yet another contradiction: the 
fluctuation between indifference and fascination towards the stranded migrants 
of Ceuta and Melilla.   
 
Taking time: life in the observatory 
 
WEDNESDAY IN MID-AUGUST, 6pm. Lola, one of the three camp madres in 
Ceuta, was fuming. I had bumped into her outside control, where a verbal fight 
had erupted with a female security guard. The guard had called Lola earlier that 
day, saying she wanted clearance from the director for a list of female residents 
who should be allowed to leave the camp before the morning curfew, to do some 
sports. Lola had slammed down the phone. “You can’t hang up the phone on me 
like that!” the guard now exclaimed, waving the list of residents. In response, 
Lola let out a stream of angry words and stormed into the office.  
Lola’s fight with security and social over the rights of the women to leave 
was nothing unusual. She seemed constantly on the warpath, her steps brisk and 
her temper flaring. In part, her antagonism towards the guards was down to the 
“moral division of labour” in the camp (Hughes in ibid:107). In this division – 
again similar to those in total institutions – the social workers were aloof, the 
guards were alternately coercive and friendly, the director was avuncular and the 
madres, nurses and teachers were sympathetic though temperamental flak-
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catchers. Tensions between these groups usually took the form of occasional 
mutterings, but Lola wanted to show loud and clear that she was on the migrants’ 
side, unlike the guards or social workers. “Many times my eyes fill with tears,” 
she said. “I’ve been here for six years now. I’ve often thought I will leave it, but 
I can’t!” Her relatives asked why she stayed, since she always kept talking and 
worrying about the camp. “It’s just that I can’t stop thinking about it,” she said. 
“I live with them.”  
 Lola was not the only one to be captivated by the captive migrants of 
Ceuta. Her words were echoed by Paula, the steely elderly woman in charge of 
the nunnery’s assistance programme. “We work together with migrants,” she 
emphasised. This was a credo taken on board by the young women and men with 
dreadlocks and African-style plaits who came and went in the nuns’ cloisters, 
djembes in hand and bells round their bare ankles. These volunteers came to 
Ceuta to spend a couple of weeks in solidarity with migrants, playing beach ball, 
organising outings and celebrating Christmas or Easter. Then they left, taking 
pictures and memories, while the migrants stayed behind.  
 The fascination with the fate of the migrants was premised on their 
immobility. Their empty time in the enclaves was there for the taking. The illegal 
immigrants, stigmatised by their mobility, ironically stayed immobile while their 
visitors came and went, taking their time and stories away with them. And none 
did so more successfully than the journalists. 
 
 
 
The camp was a magnet for the media. When access was granted it was a dream 
come true: here journalists and researchers had the possibility to come and 
interview illegal immigrants fresh off their rafts, almost in their natural habitat. 
Documentary-makers, hacks, feature writers, authors, research students and fact-
finding delegations all made the pilgrimage to the heights of the camp, paying 
their respects at the gates before being let in and put in front of their research 
object, the illegal immigrant. Cameramen denied access resorted to filming the 
camp residents through the tall perimeter fence. Journalists came every other 
day, said Mamá. In order to shield the privacy of residents, cameras were 
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allowed only upstairs. There the migrants would stand and mouth their “half-
truths” for documentaries, newsreels and research projects, presenting 
themselves as the victims the media wanted to see. Mamá said this in an 
affectionate way, taking the residents’ part. Often they spoke too openly, she 
said. They should be careful. What they said might be used against them. People 
at home or in Spain might find out where they were, against their wishes. But 
after all, this was what tempted anthropologists, authors and hacks alike to study 
clandestine migration – its hidden-ness, its ripeness for revelation. And the camp 
provided just enough of a glimpse of the veiled world of today’s global outcasts. 
 The authorities in Ceuta and Melilla were ambivalent about the media. 
On the one hand, journalists spread uplifting news about the nice food and good 
work; on the other hand, they loved the story of a migrant invasion. The result 
was yet another make-believe game – this time of media management. In the 
Melilla camp, where the growing number of arrivals in the summer of 2010 had 
led to canteen and workshop halls filling up with temporary litters, access was 
denied to external visitors, as usual for privacy reasons. “The ministry doesn’t 
want to get the tents out,” one camp lawyer giggled, because then the media 
would report on a “failure of the [government’s] migration policy”. And if there 
was one thing that could not be jeopardised, it was this: the mediatisation of 
Spain’s successful response to clandestine migration. 
The game of make-believe was usually lost on the journalists, who 
faithfully regurgitated the stage-managed efforts of officials and migrants alike. 
Somalis appeared in videos and newspaper features, their stories of suffering 
taken at face value. “In Ceuta the government tries to help you,” one such Somali 
told a journalist. “In Somalia everything’s corrupt and since there were no 
possibilities there [to work] I decided to leave and look for a better future.”7 One 
reporter filming in Ceuta recognised that everything that migrants said to camera 
might not be true, but neither were journalistic techniques in staging, for 
example, migrant attempts to escape Ceuta via the port. Sympathy with migrants’ 
plight and awareness of the hatred they faced from xenophobes in Europe also 
played a role in downplaying doubts. But above all, the media ignored the pauses 
in performance because they usually had to slot the migrant story into either one 
                                                 
7
 See http://www.elfarodigital.es/ceuta/sociedad/15925-camiones-rumbo-al-sueno-europeo.html  
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of empathy and victimhood or rejection and menace. Doubts about nationalities 
and brief quivers across lips made the picture too complex, too deep and 
disturbing.  
 Along, too, came the academics. Ceuta and Melilla presented enviable 
research laboratories: the clandestine migrant finally pinned down, immobilised, 
bored and ready to talk in a setting that presented few difficulties, give or take 
some undercover police checks. Here, colonial-era academic history threatens to 
repeat itself. Anthropology’s “savage slot” (Trouillot 2003) depends not only on 
what Fabian (1983) calls a “denial of coevalness”, but also on the relative 
immobility of the object under study. US anthropologists had their Native 
American reserves; their European colleagues had colonised and corralled 
natives. If the clandestine migrant is the new savage at Europe’s margins 
(Andersson 2010; Silverstein 2005), he can only be satisfyingly studied, 
observed and written about when immobile, when his time can be freely taken 
and used, much as Radcliffe-Brown was able to carry out his kinship studies on 
Aborigines thanks to their being forcibly kept in camps on an island off the 
Australian coast (Lindqvist 2008). The “savage slot” might no longer be the 
exclusive reserve of anthropology, as shown by the steady stream of political 
scientists, geographers, law students and others in Ceuta and elsewhere along 
migrant routes. Yet regardless of the disciplinary outlook, all research efforts – 
not least my own – depended upon the migrants’ captive condition. Such 
observation-in-captivity nevertheless held a possibility for the stranded migrants, 
and gave a clue to why some of them had staged an escape into Ceuta’s hills.  
     
 
 
The full glare of the spotlight of Ceuta shone upon the most reluctant of latter-
day “savages”, the Facebook-connected indios ensconced in their hillside shacks. 
The nunnery’s hippies camped with them in the forest, and film-makers and 
reporters made their way uphill to document their tragic journeys. The journalists 
behind one award-winning documentary, called Los Ulises, had even gone to 
their homes in the Punjab, filming their families and bringing news back and 
forth. Raju and his friends welcomed these contingents of fact-seekers and 
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sympathisers to their weekly lunches, speaking openly about their ordeals. They 
willingly let journalists take their time, since they had nothing to lose. Thanks to 
their escape up the hill, the indios had made themselves the protagonists of a 
transnational media spectacle with a wide, sympathetic audience of nuns and 
hippies, camp workers and police, journalists and academics, foreigners and 
locals. This spectacle suffused their time in the enclaves with the promise of 
something bigger, of a future deliverance.  
The spicy cauliflower and puffed puri bread was finished, the plates 
cleared away from the forest floor. After a plastic glass of milky chai, we sat 
down in front of their temple, white kerchiefs covering our heads. The Sikh 
gurudwara was furnished out of branches, carton, pieces of fabric and plastic 
sheets. Garlands and bells hung from the ceiling inside; underneath, images of 
one of the Sikh gurus had been placed on a small table. In front of it, one of them 
read from the holy Guru Granth Sahib. Occasionally he launched into chanting, 
and those seated next to me joined in. The sunlight shone mottled through the 
filigree above us. In the “jungle” of Ceuta, in front of this shrine made up of the 
junk of postmodernity at the fringe of Europe, a stillness descended, offering a 
glimpse of something beyond the Trap. We stood, clasping our hands in a 
namaskar greeting, and then holy prasad was served: sticky balls of godly food 
made of breadcrumbs, coffee and sugar.  
Ceuta’s Indians were the good immigrants par excellence. This was in no 
small part down to the prominence of the enclave’s Indian merchants, for whom 
some of the indios del monte even worked, undocumented. However, the 
differing racial schemas applied to negros, moros and asiáticos were sharpened 
by the latter’s escape from the camp. Visiting reporters, volunteers and 
researchers had filmed, danced and slept in the hills, sharing the Indians’ food, 
pain and moments of worship. In Melilla, a contingent of Bangladeshis had 
similarly won the hearts of visitors and locals, only to be rounded up and sent to 
detention centres in 2010 after five years in the enclave. The outrage among 
melillenses that followed was, however, selective. The captives in the enclaves 
alternated between being good and bad, visible and invisible, objects of 
fascination or indifference. The fluctuation between invisibility and 
hypervisibility that Coutin (2005) has identified in the clandestine migrant 
experience was in Ceuta and Melilla portioned out to different categories of 
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migrants. If the indios were hypervisible in their “hidden” hillside shacks, so 
were the dangerous negros in the strike. The majority of illegal immigrants, by 
contrast, remained invisible and neglected. Patrick was among them, as were the 
Nigerians in the chabolas of Melilla; even more so were the sub-Saharan women.  
On Mamá’s afternoon rounds of the dorms in August, a West African 
woman confronted her. “When will the EU delegation come?” she asked. “They 
couldn’t enter because of your Cameroonian friends,” Mamá said, referring to 
the confrontation at the gate that had sent the researchers speeding away 
downhill. “But who will listen to us then?” the woman asked. “There are many 
of us here who don’t agree with the strike, what will happen to us?” Mamá 
blamed the Cameroonians, and another woman propped up on the windowsill 
shouted back: “Cameroonians! I’m Cameroonian! It’s not about Cameroonians, 
it’s because we have stayed here for so long, one and a half years, is that 
normal?” While they wanted to voice concerns over their captivity in Ceuta, the 
delegation had rather been planning to interview them about abuse suffered en 
route. As with refugee populations elsewhere, the visitors sought stories of the 
women’s traumatic pasts, ignoring their main concern over an anxious present 
and indeterminate future.
8
 In either case, their worries would remain unheard: the 
delegation had left the enclave, and was not coming back. 
 
Waiting for deliverance: the time beyond 
 
The enclaves’ time-space regime stretched from the minuscule pauses in 
migrants’ speech through the schedules, protocol slips and microphone calls of 
the camp system and on to the abstract economy of time used by the police. In 
the complex geography of time produced by this regime, the illegal immigrants 
appeared as people without a past and future, stuck in an endless, anxious 
present. If the police stole time collectively from migrants, the emptied time slots 
that remained could then be filled with the rituals of the camp or dedicated to the 
information-gathering efforts of the authorities, researchers and the media. These 
make-believe games, in turn, created their own rhythms – and their own reality. 
                                                 
8
 For a discussion of this focus on past traumas in the official construction of refugeeness, see 
Mann (2010:235-242) 
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Here appeared the good and bad migrants, visible and invisible, in hock to the 
contradictory time-space regime and their own impossible dreams.  
This regime has echoes with temporalities elsewhere in the contemporary 
world. Guyer (2007), in an influential article, suggests a shift in public notions of 
temporality towards a long-term time horizon and the “evacuation of the near-
present” in US society. For the stranded migrants in Spain’s enclaves, their 
immediate future had rather been vacated for them while their past had been 
temporarily disowned. Like for Guyer’s evangelical informants, the far-ahead 
future of deliverance instead became all the more real; their fate was down to the 
“grace of God” they constantly invoked. 
While the strike still raged in central Ceuta, I got on the bus heading 
towards the camp. At the back sat five migrants, all Anglophone sub-Saharans in 
camp parlance. None of them participated in the strike. I asked how they were 
managing, and their voices rose in raucous reply as the bus wound its way along 
the shore towards the camp and the border hamlet of Benzú. One of the migrants, 
a guy with natty dreadlocks who I knew from my journeys on foot to the camp, 
stood and spoke while pacing up and down the aisle. A white plastic crucifix 
dangled around his neck; the topic turned to God and the Bible. “There’s only 
one God, un Dios, cristiano musulman!” he shouted with joy. Headscarfed 
female passengers turned their heads, bemused. “Will a saviour come?” his 
friends wondered out loud. “How can we leave the camp?” “Ask and it shall be 
given,” one of them intoned, “seek and you shall find!” Did Moses go from 
Egypt to Israel or the other way round? they asked each other. “In the Bible it 
says the waters parted for him,” one of them shouted to cries of joy. “It could be 
like that for us here, the waters parting, opening a road to Europe!” Through the 
windows, Gibraltar Rock could just be made out in the distance.  
In addition to the time of deliverance, godly time, yet another frame has 
to be added to time-as-capital, paused time, camp rhythms, surveillance time and 
visitors’ time: the electoral cycle. After the conservative Partido Popular won 
Spain’s general elections in November 2011, it quickly removed “immigration” 
from the name of the Labour Ministry in charge of the camps. In 2012, job cuts 
for camp workers were announced, with the camp’s intricate ecology – its 
rhythms, its paperwork, its guessing games – hanging in the balance.  
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The camps, as workers and locals noted, nevertheless remained a 
necessity for political left and right alike.
9
 This usefulness stemmed from a final 
act of make-believe: they were, contrary to the Foucaldian view suggested at the 
beginning of this chapter, barely masquerading as centres of discipline. Like the 
migration policies underpinning their existence, they were contradictory 
creations made on the hoof. Cheap and outsourced, they helped produce the utter 
indifference of officialdom towards their residents, and hid the calculated use of 
confinement underneath a veneer of half-hearted regulations and schedules. 
Again, however, their ad hoc character did little to mitigate their very concrete 
effects. Like the “total institutions” they only imperfectly resembled, they helped 
create an arbitrary landscape of time whose spaces of punishment and privilege, 
visibility and invisibility heralded an absurd disconnect in migrants’ experiences, 
only imperfectly mediated by their invocations of God.  
 In this arbitrary landscape of time and the phoney battle staged upon it, 
there were no clear “winners”. The migrants – invisible and visible, good and 
bad, God-fearing and not – eventually made it out of there, despite their months 
or years lost to waiting. Amadou and the other “good immigrants” were sent on 
to reception centres on the mainland after the strike. The indios returned to the 
camp after the director had promised to help them. They were eventually sent to 
CIEs and set free. As their epic quest for survival ended, the audience dissipated; 
Raju was unhappy, finding racism stronger on the mainland than in Ceuta. In 
2011, the Indians’ abandoned hillside shacks were taken over by African 
migrants arriving in unprecedented numbers.  
The Nigerians, not least the women, were in a worse position. In early 
2011, a shack in Melilla burned down, killing three and triggering protests akin 
to those of Ceuta in 2010. Thankfully, my Nigerian friends were unharmed. They 
were still there, waiting for divine or state intervention to take them to Europe. A 
year later the chabolas were destroyed by the police. The authorities cited local 
complaints, the fire hazard and the fact that all migrants had a bed assured for 
them in the camp as reasons for the long-awaited intervention.
10
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 See, for example, a diatribe by the camp doctor at 
http://www.elpueblodeceuta.es/201201/20120115/201201158203.htm  
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 See http://www.europapress.es/ceuta-y-melilla/noticia-desalojan-melilla-campamento-medio-
centenar-chabolas-inmigrantes-levantado-hace-ocho-anos-20120529161926.html 
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Patrick had used his invisibility to the full, sneaking into a ferry and 
making it to a friend’s house in Seville. “I told you I would make it,” he said. As 
with el general and many others, the controls in port proved less stringent at 
times than the full surveillance the enclaves promised. Soon Patrick left 
Andalusia for Bilbao, the main destination for Ceuta’s migrants in 2010. “You 
know, Seville is Andalusia, it’s close to Africa,” he explained. “Life is difficult 
there, so I decided to climb.”  
While Patrick climbed, I descended, heading for Bamako. The Malian 
capital, through which most of the adventurers in Ceuta and Melilla had once 
travelled, has become a crucial site for the illegality industry in recent years: it is, 
again, a crossroads where its workers clash and mingle with the stranded 
migrants of the clandestine circuit.  
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7 
 
 
Marchers without borders 
 
 
 
Gogui, western Mali, January 2011. The activists come marching towards the 
camera, down an empty Sahelian road, holding their banner for the freedom of 
movement as a collective shield against the invisible enemy ahead. The enemy is 
Frontex, and Frontex shall fall, they chant: “À bas, à bas, à bas le Frontex! À 
bas, à bas, à bas le Frontex!” Fists are raised, calls for solidarité ring out, the 
clacks and thuds of djembe drums pierce the dull desert air. Then the chanting 
again, European and African voices in unison, waving “global passports” and 
anti-Frontex banners: “no borders, no nation, stop deportation!” But no one hears 
their chants, except for the camera-wielding participants in the march, a few 
villagers and a border policeman or two. The road towards the nearby 
Mauritanian border lies empty ahead, lined with hardy shrubs and dust-dry 
stretches of earth. No signs of Frontex, no deportees. What on earth are these 
transnational activists doing here, in a border hamlet on the potholed road 
between Nioro du Sahel in western Mali and Ayoun-el Atrous in Mauritania? 
“The border of the European Union has arrived in Gogui,” explained one 
of the marchers, Aboubacar, in his offices in the Malian capital. His brow 
frowned, his small frame tensed up and his voice rose in indignation each time he 
denounced the “externalisation” of policing to the European visitors frequenting 
the airy offices of his organisation, the Association Malienne d’Expulsés (AME, 
Malian association of expelled migrants). Standing at the whiteboard, he drew 
maps of Mali’s border areas, an X marking the spot of Nioro and arrows showing 
the lines of expulsion from Mauritania. Because of these expulsions, AME and 
its European partners had decided to make Gogui their first site of protest against 
Europe’s border regime in the fraught roadshow that is the subject of this chapter: 
the “Citizens’ Caravan for Freedom of Movement and Equitable Development” 
 245 
from Bamako to Dakar and the World Social Forum in February 2011. 
Aboubacar’s AME was the key Malian partner in this unprecedented 
collaboration, grandly named Afrique-Europe Interact, between European 
activists and Malian associations around the EU border regime and its “war” on 
the irregular migrant.   
 Transnational activists are increasingly converging on the Euro-African 
border, confronting security forces and contesting state and media narratives of 
migration. Among these are grassroots “noborder” camps springing up across 
Europe, anarchist mobilisations and direct action under the “No One is Illegal” 
and “Frontexplode” banners.1 Border theorists have in recent years opened their 
eyes to such making and unmaking of borders by citizens, with Chris Rumford 
(2008:2) applying the term borderwork to ordinary people’s acts of “envisioning, 
constructing, maintaining and erasing borders” (see also Donnan and Wilson 
1999). The borderwork of Aboubacar and his transnational colleagues would 
prove to be fraught with contradictions, however. How to enrol disparate 
activists, migrants and NGOs in the common task of protesting against the border 
regime? And how to locate this diffuse regime, stretching as it does from the 
Atlantic to the Sahara, from Canaries control rooms to scattered radar systems? 
Here the empty Malian border road was but a foretaste of the quandaries to come 
en route to Dakar. In Gogui, the only visible tokens of this regime were a few 
signs wedged into the dry earth. One sign – “STOP IRREGULAR MIGRATION, 
A DANGER FOR THE POPULATION” – was adorned with the EU flag and the 
logo of Bamako’s EU-funded migration management centre, CIGEM. Another 
announced Gogui’s defunct Red Cross mission of humanitarian assistance to 
deportees, modelled on that of Rosso-Senegal and financed by a Spanish regional 
government. Both signs were soon covered in anti-Frontex stickers and graffiti.
2
 
The activists would repeatedly try to locate and mark the border in this fashion in 
Bamako, en route through the borderlands and in their final march in Dakar 
against Frontex.  
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 See http://noborders.org.uk and http://www.noborder.org on “no border”, http://www5.kmii-
koeln.de/?language=en on No One is Illegal and http://frontexplode.eu/ on Frontexplode 
2
 I stayed in Bamako during the Gogui march; this section is based on recollections of 
participants and audiovisual material. See http://www.afrique-europe-
interact.net/index.php?article_id=384&clang=1  
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The activists did not only search for and conjure the EU’s borders, but 
also enlisted the stranded adventurers of Bamako in this enterprise. The figure of 
the irregular migrant, obsessed over by western states, has also become a source 
of inspiration for radical intellectuals, journalists and activists in recent years. In 
their accounts and campaigns, the migrant often appears as a heroic figure: a 
symbol of “cosmopolitan citizenship”, a rebellious burner of borders or a 
repository of the dream of free worldwide movement.
3
 The irregular migrant and 
the border here become the twin rallying points for a cosmopolitan or anarchist 
project, linked by the latter’s unjust violence upon the former.  
In the caravan, this relation between activists, borders and migrants 
would be put under increasing strain. In Gogui on the Mauritanian border and 
during the journey to Dakar, the deportees of Bamako were to become a unifier 
for the activists bereft of a border at which to protest. To Aboubacar and AME, 
they were living proof of a violent and inhumane border regime; to the European 
marchers descending on Bamako, they were its victims. As the caravan rolled 
towards Dakar, the deportees themselves increasingly participated in their own 
making as migrants, with quite different results to their repatriated brethren in the 
Senegalese capital. As will be seen, the caravan protests highlighted the 
fundamental absence – of location, of visibility, of responsibility – at the heart of 
the violent experience of clandestine migration, and the efforts of everyone in the 
illegality industry to fill it.  
To understand the dynamics between marchers, victims and their borders, 
we first have to consider the migratory geography of Bamako, where the 
deportees found themselves stranded. Mali’s capital is now the first and last safe 
place en route towards the desert; it is also an increasingly strategic point for the 
policing of migration in the Euro-African borderlands. 
 
Deported, globalised, trafficked: producing migrant victims 
 
It all begins at Sogoniko gare. This vast, smog-filled bus station in southern 
Bamako with its dozens of bus companies, hawkers and hustlers and revving 
                                                 
3
 The aim here is not to simplify the sophisticated arguments put forward for the subversive 
potential of irregularity, however. See Papadopoulos et al (2008) and Kalyvas (2010), who uses 
the term “cosmopolitan citizenship”, for intriguing explorations of this theme  
 247 
engines is a key transport hub for West African travellers setting out on their 
adventure towards the north. It is also the end point for those who have already 
crossed the desert and failed: the refoulés detained in Algeria or Mauritania and 
dumped at the Malian border sites of Tin Zaouaten deep in the Sahara and Gogui 
in western Mali respectively. An industry has grown around the stranded 
adventurers of Sogoniko – a world of aid workers, policemen, information-
seekers and activists replicating the structures already put in place in Ceuta, 
Melilla, Morocco, Dakar and elsewhere in the borderlands. CIGEM, the 
migration management centre founded on the back of the irregular migration 
“crisis” in 2008 with €10m in EU funding, had by 2010 developed working 
relations with about 80 migration-related associations, which seemed to multiply 
by the day now that funding was available. So did policing initiatives, growing 
along with Bamako’s role as crossroads on the clandestine circuit.  
Sogoniko seems far away from Ceuta and Melilla, but the tragedies at the 
fences in 2005 lay at the heart of Bamako’s strategic role in the illegality 
industry. Despite the Malian government’s refusal to sign repatriation 
agreements, the country has long been a dumping ground for those caught in 
raids under France’s increasingly strict migration regime. Such deportations, 
along with expulsions of Malians from Angola, had led to the creation of 
Aboubacar’s AME in 1996. The symbolic start to the latest expansion of Mali’s 
illegality industry, however, came with the expulsion of adventurers following 
the attaques at the Spanish fences. Here was a global, collective victim of 
Europe’s border regime: the deportee. 
 As deportees arrived at Bamako’s airport or made their way back through 
the desert where the Moroccan soldiers had left them, one woman rose to action. 
This woman was Aminata Traoré, alter-globalisation politician and activist 
extraordinaire, who in early 2006 hosted the Malian version of that year’s multi-
sited World Social Forum. On the anniversary of the tragedy, Aminata – a former 
Malian minister of culture and tourism – organised the first Journées 
Commémoratives for Ceuta and Melilla, where deportees mingled with 
journalists and activists flown in from Europe. She also set about mobilising the 
returnees, as she was to call those forcibly deported. The result was the 
association Retour-Travail-Dignité (return-work-dignity), which sought to 
reconnect returnees with their African heritage through agriculture, handicrafts 
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and political action. Under her patronage, Ceuta and Melilla returnees tilled the 
soil together in far-flung rural areas, with some receiving Spanish development 
funds to do so. Though the original RTD proved shortlived, with accusations 
flying over who-gained-what, Aminata’s charisma contributed to a larger 
ferment centred on the figure of the irregular migrant. She was now one of the 
figureheads of the official Bamako-Dakar caravan, despite growing tensions with 
the more hardline activists in AME. 
In Aminata’s view, the migrants made visible the malaise of Africa under 
neoliberalism. “When you ask those returned from Ceuta and Melilla why they 
left, their replies speak volumes about the real state of the continent,” she said in 
2008.
4
 Or as a banner at Aminata’s December 2010 conference on migration 
expressed it: “THROUGH MIGRANTS, THE WHOLE OF AFRICA IS 
HUMILIATED.” To her, they were victims of the injustices of neoliberal 
globalisation and should be reincorporated into a proud Africa embracing its 
traditions.  
In a similar vein, the migrants were seen as victims by the caravan 
activists about to descend on Bamako. Whereas Aminata focused her critique on 
neoliberalism, the Europeans and AME homed in on Frontex and the border 
regime, whose violent workings they would seek to make visible in Gogui and en 
route to Dakar. The core of the activists hailed from German anti-racist and anti-
deportation groups; some were neophytes, others grizzled veterans on the anti-
Frontex circuit. It was a motley crowd, united in its purpose of showing 
solidarity with African associations and the victims of Europe’s externalised 
borders.   
The victimhood of the returnees had a global, if recent, pedigree. In their 
study of the “politics of trauma”, Fassin and Rechtman (2009) have identified “a 
new configuration of victimhood” in the West. Whereas victims of war or 
disaster were once eyed with suspicion, they have in recent decades come to 
symbolise “the very embodiment of our common humanity” (ibid:23). And this 
new potency of victimhood, they say, stems largely from the legitimating power 
of trauma. It is this trauma – the bodily, mental or collective scar – that proves 
one’s victim status and points a finger at the perpetrator.  
                                                 
4
 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/63/41682765.pdf  
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The clandestine migration circuit disproves what Fassin and Rechtman 
call the “cruel gap” (ibid:183), borne of racial assumptions, that long left black 
Africa out of humanitarian trauma interventions. Indeed, migrants’ victimisation 
was, besides the activist denunciations, also the focus of aid interventions in the 
borderlands, with projects ranging from psychological assistance in the Red 
Cross Rosso mission to the AME’s trauma counselling service for deportees.  
 Perhaps surprisingly, the irregular migrant was not only seen as a victim 
by Aminata, the aid workers and the activists, but by Spanish police as well. “We 
don’t consider the migrant as a criminal, therefore he is a victim of the human 
trafficking networks,” Spain’s police attaché in Bamako said. While this non 
sequitur imputed the existence of criminal traffickers from that of victims, it also 
allowed for a slippage between the categories of migrant and criminal, as would 
be evident among the stranded migrants of southern Bamako. 
  
 
 
Not far from Sogoniko gare, up a mud lane from the Beijing IV Hotel, lay the 
compound of the association Aracem, a rare lifeline for migrants in the city. On 
the corner outside, a group of young men milled about, sharing cigarettes, 
mobiles and the occasional joke. These were the refoulés sent back by Algeria 
through the desert. They were the quintessential victims of migration, whether 
for political back-to-the-soil activists such as Aminata or freedom-of-movement 
voices such as Aboubacar. In the impending caravan, this was a role some of 
them would play to the full.  
 Aracem, the French acronym for “Association of Central African 
Deportees in Mali”, was set up by Cameroonians veterans from Ceuta and 
Melilla after Aminata’s commemoration in 2006, though its founders had since 
broken with their former patron. The association was at the end of a relay race of 
transport and care after deportation. From Tin Zaouaten on the desert border with 
Algeria, the ICRC trucked a minority of deportees to the nearest towns of Kidal 
and Gao. After three days in Gao’s Maison des Migrants (House of Migrants), 
funded by Caritas and a French NGO, the refoulés were sent out of the desert 
zone, towards Niger or Bamako. In 2010, Aracem received about 110 deportees a 
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month in two batches. After three days at Aracem, many languished in Bamako 
for months or even years, waiting for money to return home or head back north. 
In January 2011, Aracem, together with AME, was getting ready to host and 
accommodate the European caravan contingent that would soon descend on 
Bamako.  
 The victim role of deportees attributed by activists, NGOs and Spanish 
police alike was based on genuine victimisation in the Algerian desert. In 
Aracem’s patio, Alphonse from Cameroon sauntered about dressed in thick socks 
and plastic sandals, his foot inflamed after beatings endured in Algerian 
detention. “I had a good passport and a good visa,” he said as we sat down to 
talk. “The Algerians, even if you have papers in orders, they round you up.” Sent 
back from Alger on a well-trodden deportation route south, he was eventually 
dumped in Tin Zaouaten. He had seen mothers with children in detention and 
had, like other deportees, been forced to sign papers in Arabic before 
deportation. The officers refused his demands for a French translation, and “if 
you don’t sign, you get a beating.” He spent weeks in cells while the police 
waited to fill their “freight trucks”, as Alphonse called them: “they put you inside 
like cattle”. All he was given to eat was a piece of bread and powdered milk at 
noon. The police took his Algerian money and phone, leaving him with the SIM 
card – the same procedure reported by those expelled into the Moroccan-
Algerian border area, though this treatment was not common to all deportees in 
Bamako. “I don’t have the right to have Algerian currency, the Africans come 
here bringing diseases, that’s what they told me,” he said, no trace of anger in his 
voice. “I don’t know why they do this.”  
Aracem’s compound was not just for the beaten, dumped and robbed. 
Here was Didier, a Cameroonian “guide” who had just come down from 
Morocco, promoting his smuggling services and bragging about his exploits up 
north. Here too was his countryman Stéphane the intellectual, with a half-
finished degree and ideas of joining his sister in Canada; Pierre, the ancien 
caught up in the 2005 Ceuta and Melilla expulsions and since then chief of the 
now derelict ghetto for transiting adventurers in Bamako; and Eric, a young 
Congolese with three years on the road, his loud, grumpy voice adding a touch of 
comedy to the gathering. These street corner guys were what have in recent years 
become known as stranded migrants – a new policy category to worry about for 
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police, aid workers and experts. Some were stranded because they had lost 
everything during deportation; others because they lacked funds to continue their 
journey, often after having been frisked off their money by border guards 
targeting clandestins. They all found themselves fighting for their day-to-day 
survival. And they all coveted one key possession: a Malian passport.  
These pièces (documents), which enabled adventurers to travel into 
Algeria visa-free thanks to a bilateral friendship agreement, were one of the main 
reasons why the deportees stayed on in Bamako. They were also a prime catalyst 
for the slippage between migrant-as-victim and migrant-as-criminal hinted at by 
the Spanish police attaché. This slippage was spelt out in big, bold letters on the 
façade of Mali’s border police in central Bamako: 
 
THE MALIAN PASSPORT IS A NATIONAL DOCUMENT. IT SHOULD 
ONLY BE DELIVERED TO NATIONALS. ANY AUTHOR OR ACCOMPLICE 
IN THE DELIVERY OF A MALIAN PASSPORT TO A FOREIGNER WILL BE 
SEVERELY PUNISHED 
 
The passport trade was a main target for policing cooperation, with Canada and 
Spain helping Mali set up a national identity database to combat it. Malian 
officers, aware of the thriving trade and its ramifications, were keener to stress 
the criminal than the victimhood discourse. “We can’t reject them,” said the 
gendarme colonel in charge of irregular migration, but went on to link the 
“threat” of stranded migrants to their victimhood – and the need for more 
resources. “We need to have a transit centre in Kidal or Gao and another in 
Bamako, it’s what we told [the Spaniards]. If not, once they arrive here they have 
nothing, they’ll steal, rob, even kill, or they can be recruited by AQIM [Al Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb]. It’s a big problem.”  
 The repercussions of this criminalisation were felt on the Aracem street 
corner, where most adventurers had either paid someone for a passport or helped 
fix one. Cyrille, a Cameroonian veteran of the 2005 events now responsible for 
the welcoming of deportees, despaired at the police raids without warrant during 
the autumn. “They searched through everything!” he said, his soft voice 
momentarily rising. They threw documents on the floor, accusing Aracem of 
forging Malian passports. “That day, I really thought I would leave,” he said, in 
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anger over their unrecognised humanitarian work for deportees. “You know, 
we’ve even assisted Malians here.”  
 From the Aracem street corner, Bamako looked grim, poor and dusty. 
Eric and his friends complained of the fine dust and thick fumes cloaking the 
city, the heat and the food, the police and gendarme harassment. We looked out 
over the late-afternoon street as a golden haze descended over the city, as it 
always did at sundown. The mud road was strewn with flattened garbage 
coloured ochre by the dust: water bottles, old flip-flops, plastic sachets. Children 
played at the shuttered shopfronts. Three Malian girls walked past, swinging 
their hips lazily. “Bamako, c’est la merde” (Bamako is crap), exclaimed one of 
the stranded Cameroonians. The misery among the deportees was palpable as the 
days dragged on, much as they did for the captives of Ceuta and Melilla. But the 
street corner guys knew what they were in for and took pride in their survival. 
They did not see themselves as victims or villains. 
 
 
 
At the other end of Bamako in Djelibougou, AME had gathered representatives 
from the numerous Malian associations and NGOs that were meant to join the 
caravan. The European activists, who had raised money to cover the Malians’ 
participation, were about to arrive and seats needed to be allocated in the half-
dozen buses bound for Dakar.
5
 Associations that had not participated in caravan 
preparations had suddenly showed up, and Aboubacar was busy at the 
whiteboard in the packed hall, whittling the number of Malian participants down 
to 230. Aracem voluntarily offered a cut, while newcomers clamoured and 
pleaded to keep their allocations. Mouvement des Sans Voix, a Malian activist 
group, squealed when Aboubacar crossed out 10 of their allotted 40 places. 
“You’re going to leave the victims behind!” As in the funding game, so in the 
battle for caravan seats – the more victims, the better.6  
On the Aracem street corner, rumours were swirling about the impending 
caravan. “We’ll have visitors tomorrow,” confided Stéphane. “I think it’s people 
                                                 
5
 The caravan was funded by individual fundraising efforts and support from charitable 
foundations and NGOs (AEI 2011:119) 
6
 MSV focuses on evictions, and so their “victims” were not necessarily migrants  
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from the United Nations.” Another adventurer had heard the Europeans would 
offer work on international construction sites in Bamako. They would get 
something else altogether, however – a motley crowd of German radicals 
assigned to sleep in Aracem’s compound.  
 
We want the victims! Mobilising against the border 
 
The international delegation was delayed. The “interactive space” set up by 
AME on a field in Djelibougou – white tarps shielding clusters of metal chairs – 
was empty. The Europeans had found themselves on a connecting flight in Paris 
with that all-too-common cargo: a migrant about to be deported. They had 
protested and been given the full riot police treatment and taken off the flight. 
Already tired and some bruised by police, dressed in caravan T-shirts with 
mosquito spray at the ready, they finally descended on the Djelibougou field for 
several days of caravan preparations. Most of the activists spoke no French and 
certainly no Bambara; many had never visited Africa before. One of them 
confided he “would never come here unless it was for the caravan”: the poverty 
on display in the mud-cracked lanes of Djelibougou shocked him and his friends. 
 The caravan was but the latest and most striking example of the gradual 
growth of activism along the Euro-African border after the Ceuta and Melilla 
tragedies. In November 2005, the transnational network Migreurop set up 
operations in Paris, eventually incorporating 43 associations including AME and 
Aracem. Migreurop’s international mailing list, to which German and Malian 
caravaniers contributed, linked up activists who posted news on boat tragedies 
and Europe’s externalisation of borders. Activists also increasingly staged 
“counter-summits” in opposition to EU-Africa summits on migration.  In Rabat 
in 2006, a Euro-African manifesto was launched denouncing “the war that is 
increasingly being waged along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coastlines” and 
“the division of humanity between some who may freely move about the planet 
and some who may not”.7 More events followed during further summits as well 
as outside Frontex headquarters, in Oujda and on Greek islands (Gunsser 2008). 
One of the foundations for the caravan was the “call of Bamako for respect and 
                                                 
7
 See http://www.manifeste-euroafricain.org/IMG/pdf/manifesto-english.pdf  
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dignity for all migrants” of 2006, which decried the “murderous policies” behind 
the Ceuta and Melilla tragedies while urging the creation of an international 
migrants’ rights network.8 By the time of the caravan, the German and Malian 
organisers knew each other from previous counter-summits and had developed a 
sophisticated understanding of the need for transnational opposition to the EU 
border regime as well as of the hard work involved in consolidating disparate 
African and European networks. But they had perhaps not anticipated the 
difficulties that awaited them in Bamako. 
 The new arrivals gathered in the shade under the canopies and took turns 
at the microphone to deplore the police on the flight and discuss the logistics of 
the caravan and the marches ahead. What about accommodation? A film 
projector was needed! More than beds for the night and equipment, however, 
they needed what scholars of activism call a “master frame” that would help 
them define the issues, actors and events to mobilise around. This frame would 
then serve to underpin shared meanings and ideas (della Porta 2006:67). The 
activists had already started to forge such a convergence of ideas, as shown on a 
banner strung between two trucks next to the tents: “externalisation endangers 
the freedom to circulate in the African space”. This was what Snow and Benford 
(1998) label the diagnostic dimension to the frame – spelling out the problem the 
caravan was addressing. The prognostic element was reflected in the caravan 
motto, “for the freedom of movement and equitable development”, which tried to 
suture the development-oriented goals of especially the Malian partner 
associations with the migration and anti-Frontex focus of the Europeans and 
AME. Finally there was the motivational dimension of the frame. To boost 
morale and mobilise activists, the Europeans had prepared a caravan song, which 
was sung in a jumble of voices each day of the assembly meetings: 
 
 
                                                 
8
 For the history of AEI, see http://www.afrique-europe-
interact.net/index.php?article_id=38&clang=1  
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J’aime bien la caravane 
J’aime bien le mouvement 
J’aime bien la liberté 
J’aime bien la resistance 
Et ce que j’aime mieux  
c’est la solidarité 
Solidari-solidari-solidarité-é-é 
Solidari-solidari-solidarité-é-é 
Nous nous battons pour un monde sans 
frontières 
 
I like the caravan 
I like the movement 
I like freedom 
I like resistance 
And what I like the most 
is solidarity 
Solidari-solidari-solidarity 
Solidari-solidari-solidarity 
We are fighting for a world without 
borders 
 
Solidarity was a powerful motif for the Europeans, who distributed their song’s 
sparse lyrics on slips of paper to participants under the canopy. So were its 
accompanying terms, the somewhat uneasy bedfellows freedom and resistance. 
But as is often the case in emerging social movements, these motifs uneasily 
disguised the disparities among those they yoked together (James 2007:29). 
Solidarity – “a signifier of the impossible fullness of society if ever there was 
one” (Žižek 1999:178) – both meant supporting African activists in their various 
struggles and solidarity with the deportees. These aims, and the power relations 
each implied, overlapped awkwardly on the Djelibougou field. “I’d like to speak 
to the expulsés, that’s why we have come!” said one of the visitors during the 
endless canopy meetings. “When is it that we get to see them?” The AME 
chairman assured the visitors that “here we are all expulsés”, including him 
(though not Aboubacar). This was true, but not quite what the Germans had in 
mind: what they wanted were the victims of Europe’s externalisation policies. 
They wanted the street corner guys of Sogoniko.  
 
 
 
If the activists saw the deportees as victims of Europe’s externalisation policies 
and local police often saw them as potential criminals, these categories proved 
increasingly irrelevant in the gritty environs of Sogoniko. Here was the 
dreariness of Aracem’s street corner society, but also hotels and “hustling 
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places” frequented by sharp dressers of uncertain occupation. Mistrust marred 
the adventurers’ world, sometimes running along national lines. The 
Cameroonians were particularly singled out, amid talk of spectacular money-
making frauds of the kind popularised by the country’s notorious conmen 
(feymen; Malaquais 2001). “The Cameroonians are crooks,” said a Guinean 
friend of Eric’s. Whereas he had worked in construction earning 700 CFA a day, 
the Cameroonians just sat around, asked for “loans” and created trouble. 
 Didier was one the adventurers whose varied roles on the migration 
circuit straddled the victim-villain dichotomy. He had jumped on the deportation 
wagon voluntarily, getting himself detained in Algeria in order to travel for free 
down through the desert. While insisting that he had lived rough for years in 
Morocco, he also kept up a running sales pitch to the street corner gathering on 
how many Cameroonians he had helped into Spain as a guide between the 
Algerian border and Melilla. His tall tales were not just for adventurers’ ears, 
however: he had guided journalists through the no-man’s-land between Oujda 
and Algeria for a fee, and had received a juicy journalistic offer of filming along 
the desert routes from Bamako. Now he wanted to work, of all things, on 
preventing illegal migration, perhaps with an international NGO.  
These paradoxical pursuits made sense in the surreal world of the 
clandestine circuit. As routes into Europe have closed up, stranded adventurers 
have sought other means of fending for themselves (se débrouiller). While some 
tinkered with petty fraud and others did menial jobs, the most astute adventurers 
monetised their migratory project itself. Theirs was a warped, reflexive inversion 
of the standard aim of international migration: instead of migrating to find work, 
their migration had itself become a job. At the top of the pecking order among 
such “professional migrants” were the leaders of migrants’ associations in 
Morocco. European and Moroccan NGOs active in the country – themselves 
lambasted as a “humanitarian mafia” by academics and migrants, much like their 
counterparts in Senegal – called upon these leaders to provide testimony 
(témoignage) in donor’s conferences, or else as project brokers; their countrymen 
approached them for advice and assorted services; journalists hungered for their 
stories and expertise. Some published books on their ordeal, or donned titles such 
as “consultant on sub-Saharan migration”. Didier was simply trying to tap into 
this market in his own small way, moving easily between Sogoniko’s hotels-
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cum-brothels and Aracem, between Ceuta and Oujda, between journalists and 
smugglers. In the German caravaniers, he would soon find a new and eager 
audience. 
 
Activism unleashed: the protests begin 
 
Chaos reigned in the Djelibougou field, where any European hopes for efficiency 
seemed to melt away with each day of meetings in the suffocating heat. 
Moreover, everyone had to be heard. The caravaniers had adopted the cherished 
assembly format pinpointed in della Porta’s (2006) study of recent transnational 
activism, but assembly-based consensus democracy was proving achingly hard to 
practice among the disparate caravan groups. The street corner guys had finally 
made it to the field, where they now stood studying anti-Frontex posters taped to 
the walls of the AME-run restaurant. “Why is everyone so nice here?” asked 
Eric, looking at the Europeans who kept smiling and offering him their seats. 
Still, he was not carried away with excitement. The caravan’s citizen-journalists 
had filmed at Aracem, he said, but he had refused to participate unless they paid 
him. “After, they’ll sell that and make money!” The wariness was to be expected: 
stories circulated about journalists and researchers visiting with hidden cameras 
or offering money for dangerous trips into the desert.  
 Under the canopy, debates had been heating up for several days. A 
contingent from the French sans-papiers (undocumented migrants’) movement 
had arrived in day-glo vests, and had mobilised the caravaniers for a protest at 
the French embassy. Malians in the gathering had voiced concern about 
protesting without a permit, a reservation ignored by the more hardline elements 
in AME and in the overseas factions. The protest had ended in police beatings 
and bruisings. Undeterred, the activists went about organising their next 
demonstration before heading off on the caravan – to the EU Delegation in 
central Bamako. A flyer circulated among those attending, announcing the aim of 
the march – contre l’expulsion des aventuriers et aventurières et contre les 
deguerpissements. A French Bamako resident and AME collaborator saw the 
flyer and sighed. “Aventuriers, that means nothing!” No local would understand 
it, she said. Neither would they understand deguerpissements, which referred to 
 258 
the evictions campaigned against by one of the caravan organisations, the 
Mouvement Sans Voix. A friend of Eric’s looked at the flyer and shrugged, too, 
pointing at the word aventurière, the female form of “adventurer” that had been 
inserted in accordance with the gender equality aims of the activists. “They need 
to take that out,” he said. Such disparate concerns pointed to the failure in 
creating a master frame able to unite not only the factions in the activist network 
but a larger audience of migrants and Malians as well. The stakeholders were 
increasingly antagonistic, the local audience nearly non-existent. Except for the 
association representatives under the canopy, the only Malians circulating among 
the metal chairs were a ragged bunch of local children and the occasional trinket 
vendor. Not surprisingly perhaps, since almost all speakers resisted using the 
local languages. “They should speak Bambara,” said one bemused Cameroonian 
adventurer. “See, there are no locals here!” 
 These tensions did not deter Aboubacar and his fellow militants. He had 
failed to show up at the march on the embassy but now he increasingly grabbed 
the microphone, calling for more radical action. “It’s important for us to do a 
march here in Bamako,” he said, his voice growing louder. “We’re into concrete 
activities because we’re activists!” One of the German organisers asked if the 
march had been announced to the authorities. “We’ll pass on that question,” said 
Aboubacar curtly. “We’re not going to spend our time on authorisations.” He 
headed off for meetings elsewhere, to coordinate with Aminata’s section of the 
caravan as well as with another Forum caravan approaching Bamako from 
Benin, leaving participants to voice unease at the radical turn and the growing 
dissent between the factions.  
 As tensions grew among the caravaniers, their target nonetheless acted as 
a unifier. For the core participants, the target was the EU border regime or, more 
specifically, Frontex. This was an example of what Tarrow (2005) calls frame 
condensing – combining several grievances into one “supertarget” (della Porta 
2006:70). Europe’s whole migration management strategy, stretching from 
Bamako’s CIGEM to the violent Algerian deportations, was in this way being 
framed as the enemy. And now the enemy had arrived at the Djelibougou field, 
in the form of a motorbike with a CIGEM numberplate. The CIGEM spokesman, 
who I knew from a series of unsuccessful interview attempts at the migration 
management centre’s offices, skulked around the tents without having announced 
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his presence to the caravaniers. One of the Germans spotted the motorbike and 
slapped an “Abolish Frontex” sticker on the numberplate. “Direct action,” 
chuckled a colleague, looking on. More radical anti-Frontex action was about to 
come, both at the border in Gogui and at the caravan’s destination in Dakar. In 
the assembly, a plan was hatched for Dakar protests aimed at “the police where 
Frontex is based”. The activists had done their homework, pinpointing Jean-
Pierre’s border police office. The march on Frontex “against the death of 
thousands of migrants at the external borders of Europe” would be the climax of 
their transnational caravan to the Forum. 
 There were smaller protests to organise before this distant goal: first 
Nioro and Gogui, then the EU Delegation in Bamako. Aboubacar rallied the 
caravaniers around the marches in the Mali-Mauritanian borderland, and the 
buses set off for the gruelling journey towards Nioro. Once there, angry debates 
ensued on whether to continue all the way to the border. Some opposed this 
initial plan because the kidnapping and terrorist threat against Europeans. 
“There’s nothing in Gogui, there’s no danger in Gogui,” the AME chairman 
assured his visitors. He was right on both counts: there was no danger for the 
marchers, but there was also “nothing” there. Camouflage-clad Malian border 
officers showed the marchers around what were supposedly empty huts for 
deportees. Activists stickered the road signs marking the EU border regime and 
sprayed anarchist symbols on a building. After all the protestations and debates, 
their target had proved illusory.  
The logic of this march might be found in the “protest repertoires” of 
transnational activism. Della Porta (ibid:238) identifies three forms of activist 
action: the logics of damage, of numbers and of witnessing – the first aims to 
destroy property, the second to achieve a critical mass of supporters and the third 
to engage in direct action with high symbolic impact. A few graffiti-ed border 
signs aside, the logic in Gogui was neither that of damage nor that of numbers. 
Afterwards, participants struggled to define the purpose of the march. Some 
rationalised it as a show of support to Malian authorities against the Mauritanian 
policing of the border, others as an attempt to listen to local concerns about 
poverty. But the purpose of the march had been to target the EU-Africa border 
invoked by Aboubacar. As such, it was a form of witnessing, but it went further 
in enacting the border for subsequent broadcast on the movement website and 
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other visual records of the caravan. To an outside observer, however, their 
borderwork seemed as absurd as that of the migrant protesters of Ceuta: the 
anger of both was directed at an invisible enemy, which failed to appear however 
much it was summoned. 
  
 
 
The marchers were back in Bamako where, on the last day of January, the Benin 
caravan arrived. Caravaniers new and old gathered at Maison des Jeunes, the 
youth cultural centre in central Bamako, where speech after speech denounced 
Europe’s border regime. Even the deportees’ usual role of providing testimony 
was absent; looking on, one of the street corner adventurers complained about 
those who “speak in our name”. Local associations sought to prolong their 
moment in the limelight, resulting in an endless talk-fest that tired European and 
African participants alike. One of the Germans, a big moustachioed man, shouted 
to camera in frustration: “always this blah blah and no action, das ist scheisse! 
(that is shit!)” Finally, the drums began tapping a restless beat for the march on 
the EU Delegation. The marchers snaked their way down the road, blocking 
traffic as they went. A French activist spray-painted the walls outside the EU 
building as people stormed towards the gates. The moustachioed German did a 
victory sign to camera. But it ended there: no police violence, no further activist 
damage.  
Back on the Aracem street corner, Eric was getting anxious about the 
caravan. He was on the list of participants, but had now been told only those who 
had joined the Nioro escapade would be allowed to go. “I want to move on, I’ll 
hang onto the back of the bus!” he exclaimed. He was growing restless in 
Bamako and hoped an expenses-paid trip to Dakar might propel him onwards on 
his adventure. Stéphane showed me a lucid analysis he had written for the Forum 
workshops in Dakar on the fate of migrants and the inequalities of globalisation. 
His paper denounced “internal borders” created in Africa and the contradictions 
arising out of the disjuncture between ECOWAS freedom of circulation accords 
and EU-imposed controls. “Our economy moves, but the people don’t,” he 
summed it up. “And the adventurers are victims of these contradictions.” 
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It was the eve of departure. Cyrille looked out over the Aracem 
compound from the rooftop sleeping space. He had been assigned to stay behind 
in Bamako, but was pondering trying to join anyhow and then get an empty seat 
on another freedom-of-movement caravan, from Morocco to Dakar, as it headed 
back up north. “I need to think of myself a little,” he said. He was annoyed with 
the way that unequal gains of money and attention were straining relations 
between the Malian associations in the caravan. Political splits were widening as 
well. Aminata’s caravan contingent, whose political objectives sat uneasily with 
the Gogui and EU Delegation marches, was now set to depart later than the buses 
of the more radical activists on the Djelibougou field. Despite the efforts of the 
Germans and AME to rally around the supertarget of Frontex, the caravan was 
fracturing and splintering even before leaving Bamako.   
 
Bamako-Dakar: searching for the border 
 
The day of departure finally came. The Djelibougou field filled with expectant 
travellers, who stacked foam mattresses on top of their buses and put banners and 
backpacks in the boot. Eric had called me before departure, desperate. He was 
off the caravan list. Cyrille was left behind too, but Didier and Stéphane were 
there with the Aracem contingent. Soon after departure, they would both try to 
make the most of their time with the Europeans. As the buses were boarding, 
delegates and unannounced travellers scrambled for seats despite the best efforts 
of the organisers with their official lists of participants. It was to prove a small 
taste of things to come in this jumbled escapade into the West African hinterland, 
looking for the elusive EU-Africa border. 
 The buses ground their way out of Bamako slowly, caught in the usual 
traffic jams and the smog-packed heat of noon. I found myself squeezed into the 
back of the bus designated for the members of Mouvement Sans Voix, who 
turned out to be anything but voiceless. A cohort of djembe drummers launched 
into caravan songs, and the stuffy air of the bus soon reverberated with shouts, 
chants and drum beats. I had managed to get into the caravan in the role of 
scribe, documenting the trip for AME. Besides me and other record-keepers, the 
caravan had welcomed a few journalists of an activist bent: an Italian reporter, 
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two Spanish documentary makers and the German filmmaker I had first met in 
Ceuta. But no big media organisations were present. Except for the Malian 
journalists who appeared during the initial Djelibougou days, the caravan would 
attract little media attention. It was instead the caravaniers’ reflexive self-
presentation that, like in the online shots from Gogui, gave credence to the 
caravan as an event. Much as the Frontex maps and control room screens it 
targeted, its connection to any external referent was getting increasingly tenuous.  
 Soon after leaving Bamako, one of the Benin buses broke down. As the 
caravaniers streamed out of the bus for greasy road-stop mutton and rice, Didier 
leapt to action. “I’m an illegal migrant,” he said, presenting himself and his 
Moroccan adventures to other caravaniers before pitching an idea for a film on 
migration. The European journalists he had met in Bamako for a report on 
migrant routes had offered too little money, so now he was trying his luck with 
the activists before returning to Morocco via Dakar, he told me later. Stéphane 
was getting excited too, trying to make me introduce him to some German 
women. I interviewed him for the AME caravan record, and he launched into a 
political discourse: “we are about to show to the eyes of the world, to the eyes of 
the United Nations, to the eyes of the whole European Community, that we can 
change things.” As we travelled on, he used any opportunity to speak up in 
meetings and to the Europeans, alternately presenting himself as a deportee and 
an Aracem spokesman. 
 Lacking a clear border and a visible supertarget, activists increasingly 
leant on migrants such as Stéphane as an alternative unifier for action. The 
humiliated, robbed and victimised deportee was, after all, living proof of the 
existence of the elusive border they sought. Clandestine migration also proved to 
be the glue among caravaniers. Once the drums fell silent in the MSV bus, a 
heated debate started raging on women’s rights, with the young Europeans on 
board growing increasingly frustrated with their male Malian co-passengers’ 
views. “The only thing we can agree on is migration!” one of them later said in 
despair. 
 Tensions were not limited to intellectual debates about gender equality. 
Increasing animosity between youth of different West African nationalities 
erupted once the caravan pulled up at the stadium of Kayes in westernmost Mali 
around midnight. Tired passengers fought and scuffled for the mattresses, then 
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scrambled to get some food, pushing the caterers aside. Next day, in a morning 
meeting on the lawn, the caravan organisers insisted that violence among the 
caravaniers was not acceptable. “Everyone should know that we’re together!” 
The Germans took up the caravan song, their weak voices chanting solidari-
solidari-solidarité. The huddle of activists on the lawn looked increasingly 
unsure, their big hopes for the caravan crumbling further with each stage of their 
journey.  
 The day that followed, with its endless talks interspersed with theatre and 
music, failed to inject the necessary solidarité. Aboubacar’s admonishing that his 
Malian co-participants should stop stoking tensions with fellow West Africans 
fell on deaf ears. Back at the stadium, a fight suddenly broke out. A young 
Malian from our bus cracked a branch off a tree: people thronged, shouted and 
scuffled. The No Vox bus, part of the Benin caravan, was broken. “They don’t 
want anyone else to leave,” someone explained. Now they threatened to block 
the route with their own bus, creating a border in our midst. Aboubacar tried to 
mediate, to no avail. Camera-armed caravaniers filmed the youngsters fighting 
in front of the parked buses. Fists and branches, Malians against Burkinabes. 
Most of the Germans were ensconced in their bus, suddenly reduced to the role 
of onlookers, like tourists happening upon a street rebellion.   
“Frontex is in our heads,” one of the caravaniers had quipped before the 
fight. “Between the idea and the reality, there’s Frontex.” His remark seemed to 
be an ironic reflection both on the failure to find a physical border at which to 
protest and on the tense faultlines that had appeared between caravan 
participants. 
 The No Vox passengers were finally taken aboard the remaining nine 
buses, which slowly snaked their way towards the Mali-Senegal border. Next 
beckoned Tambacounda, Senegal’s easternmost city and like Kayes a big 
“sending region” for migrants.  
 
 
 
The activists streamed out of the buses in central Tambacounda, taping anti-
Frontex posters to railings and steeling themselves for another day of talks. To 
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boost flagging spirits and launch into the action they kept invoking, the 
caravaniers decided to march through the city. Two Germans mounted their 
stilts, dressed as human fence-cutting shears and holding a banner calling for a 
world without borders between them. A sound system was heaved onto a 
donkey-pulled cart and the marchers streamed down the main street, into 
Tambacounda’s market, denouncing migrant expulsions over their megaphone. 
A few children in rags trailed behind the protesters, and market women looked 
on perplexed. Stéphane held the megaphone, launching into a call-and-response 
with gusto. “Open the borders!” he shouted, the marchers echoing his words. 
“No more expulsions!” A group of emaciated building workers, perhaps regional 
labour migrants themselves, looked at this confident, educated Cameroonian with 
glazed eyes. He was the migrant with the European megaphone; they the silent, 
impoverished bystanders.  
The Germans had taken an increasing interest in the Aracem caravaniers 
since the bus left Bamako. After the march, the Germans gathered in the shade, 
discussing the need to record the deportees’ testimonies, which would later 
pepper the caravan documentary. There was one story that had rattled the 
gathering in particular. One of the Aracem deportees had told them migrants had 
been executed by the Spanish Guardia Civil in the forest outside Ceuta, on the 
Moroccan side of the border, in 2009. He had also talked about German, French 
and Moroccan police firing on migrants in the forest hideouts. The Germans 
were troubled by this. I and the German reporter joined their circle, voicing 
concerns about the plausibility of the story based on our research in Ceuta. The 
Germans did not want to let it go, however, discussing how to verify the claim 
and what action they could take. One of them finally drew a conclusion. Even if 
the story was mixed up with rumours, he said, there could still be a kernel of 
truth to it, a trauma embedded in these stories, which the migrant used to make 
sense of it all. The gathering nodded and assented.  
While this idea of the scar left by trauma rendered migrants worthy of 
attention, care and assistance (Fassin and Rechtman 2009), for the activists in 
Tambacounda it was also the clearest sign of the existence of the border they 
protested against. In their view, the migrant had mixed the general tragedy of the 
border regime with the individual psychological shock experienced outside Ceuta 
in order to cope better with the latter. Then I found out that it was Didier, the 
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professional migrant, who had told them of the killings. I kept quiet about the 
fact that the story had probably been fabricated to arouse the attention of the 
Germans. Didier surely knew that they, as activists, needed a story “designed to 
generate outrage and action” (Merry 2005:241), and that he was the man to 
deliver it.  
After another round of delays, the caravan rolled out of town for its next 
stop. The road to Kaolack wound westwards for hours, before we pulled up late 
at night, exhausted. No Vox and the Bamako caravan had fallen out again, this 
time over sleeping spaces, and Aboubacar stood looking lost and tired among the 
parked buses. I saw my chance to escape the chaos of it all, saying furtive 
goodbyes and catching the night bus to Dakar. I arrived, dirty and bleary-eyed, 
just in time to attend the first global declaration on freedom of movement “by 
and for migrants”. This was the World Charter of Migrants, finalised on the 
island of Gorée. Those summoned for this historic occasion included the AME 
leader (“as migrant, not as chairman”) but he was now marooned in Kaolack, 
unable to attend. They also included Pierre, Bamako’s veteran ghetto chief; a 
clique of professional migrants who had helped organise the caravan from Rabat; 
free movement advocates from West Africa, the Maghreb and Europe; and 
Mohammadou, my old repatriate friend, who sat silent in a corner listening to the 
deliberations. As the charter was joyously signed off to drumbeats and slogans, I 
felt a long-lost sense of relief: the journey was over, and the international civil 
society extravaganza of the World Social Forum was about to begin.  
 
Finding Frontex at the Forum 
 
The caravan I had abandoned in Kaolack finally rolled into Dakar. Its exhausted 
participants dusted themselves down, donned their stilts and banners and joined 
the inaugural Forum march. Central Dakar was heaving with the international 
NGO elite: slogans were shouted, hands shaken, banners held high, flags waved, 
contact books filled. Excitement was in the air, but would soon dissipate amid 
the orchestrated chaos that followed upon the sudden about-turn at Université 
Cheikh Anta Diop, the Forum venue. The withdrawal of support by the 
university director and Senegal’s government was, as noted in chapter one, 
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leading to chaos on campus.  
In the tent village for diaspora and migration set up in the university 
grounds to deal with the lockout, I met Mohammadou and Omar, the repatriate 
association’s sunglassed and smooth-talking spokesperson. They were trying to 
organise another session on repatriation after the spectacular failure of the first 
one in an empty university hall, but no audience appeared. Finally Mohammadou 
spotted someone with a video camera and the reporters, three European 
university students, powered up their equipment. They asked the usual questions 
and got the usual answers on how the association had fought illegal migration, on 
the need for partners, on the false claims of the likes of Mother Mercy. Then the 
reporters asked Omar about his boat journey. As he launched into a tragic 
account of his trip to the Canaries, people started gathering around our chairs. 
“Were you not afraid?” asked the reporter. No, said Omar, his voice rising: “You 
have to throw your brother overboard…” The audience kept growing, almost all 
of them European, leaning in to hear the story. “We’re doing testimonies on 
illegal migration,” Mohammadou explained to the swelling crowd, handing out 
flimsy business cards and finding more chairs for the newcomers. Recording 
devices were thrust towards Omar as he talked of his second journey and final 
failure; a reporter from the caravan was snapping pictures. There was a hitch, 
however. Rumours, unknown to Omar’s eager audience, had it that he had not 
done the clandestine boat journey at all. Mohammadou later admitted to doubts 
surrounding Omar’s migration story. “But he can speak if he wants to,” he said 
with a tired smile. As in the stories of Didier and Stéphane, the narrative of the 
violence of the border was taking on its own life, regardless of who told it. 
Clandestine migrants’ traumatic stories stirred the Europeans’ curiosity while the 
realities reflected in the Sogoniko environs and the battles of Mohammadou’s 
association – not to mention the larger inequalities underpinning these – 
remained unheard and unreported. 
 All along, the Germans had wished to connect the story of the sea border 
and the repatriates with that of the deportees they had met in Bamako. As in the 
caravan writ large, they sought a “convergence of struggles” among migrants and 
in solidarity with them, and had gone to one of Dakar’s fishing neighbourhoods 
to organise a joint cultural soirée for the purpose. Stéphane had come along to 
the preparatory meeting as representative for Aracem. But he was something else 
 267 
too. “I’m a victim of illegal migration,” he said when introducing himself to the 
circle of local association representatives and visiting caravaniers. By now, the 
complex migrant victimhood he had written about in Bamako – the adventurer at 
the receiving end of the contradictions of globalisation and migration policies – 
had been reduced to a convenient label for the activists’ consumption.  
In the Saudi-funded tent city (“Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Humanity” 
read the logos, much to the activists’ dismay) for all Forum participants, the 
caravaniers were busy preparing for the Frontex march, the climax of their 
caravan. The offices of the Senegalese border police, pinpointed during the pre-
caravan talks, were a good target since they lay outside the “red zone” of central 
Dakar where the authorities had prohibited protests. But no permission was 
forthcoming for the short march down to the Cité Police complex on the seafront 
either, and feeling was running high about what should be the next step. 
Mohammadou and his repatriate friends had been roped in as well, and stood 
discussing plans for participation with the Germans. He asked for 20,000 CFA to 
bus people from Yongor to the protest, but the caravaniers insisted participation 
should be voluntary. “We can get youth from Soumbedioune otherwise,” said 
one of them, referring to the neighbourhood around the corner from Cité Police. 
“Have you seen any [repatriates] there?” Mohammadou snapped back with 
newfound confidence. Suddenly, an announcement stirred the gathering: the 
authorities had given their go-ahead for the march. 
 
 
 
On the morning of 10 February 2011, a knot of activists clustered outside the 
post office of the neighbourhood Medina. Most of them were Europeans; among 
the few Africans present was the AME chairman. Mohammadou had arrived 
alone, and stood talking to a woman about the destination of the impending 
march. “Where are we marching?” she asked. “To the university,” replied 
Mohammadou. “Oh, I thought it was to the French embassy,” she said. “Frontex” 
remained an elusive target and destination even for the marchers. As the crowd 
slowly grew with the sans-papiers activists and German caravaniers, so did the 
police presence. Officers in full riot gear descended from vans and positioned 
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themselves around the crossing that the marchers had to pass on the short stretch 
of road leading to the corniche and Cité Police.  
Finally, the placards started appearing – Abolir Frontex (abolish Frontex) 
– and two Germans got on their stilts, holding the usual banner. The crowd 
moved towards up the road, chanting solidarité, solidarité. The riot police moved 
ahead of them, while a police van and an ambulance secured the rear. European 
citizen-journalists snapped pictures and filmed their slow progress. Finally, the 
goal of the caravan beckoned: “Frontex” and the seafront corniche.  
It starts with tentative steps, in a shy dance between security forces and 
protesters. Police take up positions, safeguarding the front gates and perimeter 
wall of Cité Police. Workers gather on the balconies, looking down on the 
marchers. The second floor of this building houses Jean-Pierre’s division; this is 
where Frontex has been located by the activists. The crowd starts chanting à bas, 
à bas, à bas le Frontex to the wild tam-tam-tam of drums. “Sit down!” someone 
screams into the megaphone, and the protesters start their sit-in, blocking access 
to the corniche. The police keep their distance and so do I, gravitating towards 
the big mosque across the road. An old man in boubou and skullcap asks 
bemused what it is about, and the man next to him replies on my behalf: “You 
want a world without borders!” I feel increasingly awkward in this delicate 
balancing act between my police and activist contacts, but it is impossible to act 
the role of bystander: there are no onlookers except for us and a few itinerant 
sunglass vendors. “They want a world without borders but they’re creating a 
border right here!” the older man retorts with a smile, looking at the road blocked 
by sitting activists. Some of them have strung a banner along the perimeter wall 
of the Cité; then suddenly a dreadlocked German unfolds another banner on the 
balcony of the third floor of the DPAF building. “FRONTEXPLODE” it says, 
referring to the European anti-Frontex network. He had sneaked in for a relaxed 
chat with a high-ranking police officer, he later explained, and unfolded the 
banner on the way out. “It’s the second floor that is Frontex really, but anyway it 
doesn’t matter,” he said, proud of his achievement.  
 “So you’re hiding here!” Mohammadou spots me on the sidelines outside 
the mosque. He comes up waving an anti-Frontex poster, holding a marker pen 
and flashing a smile. “Help me to write Yongor here,” he says, turning the poster 
over on the ground. I sigh. Am I with him and the protesters, or am I not? I say I 
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have to leave, and saunter back up the road towards the post office. On the way I 
meet a local man, who snaps angrily: “The Forum is not for the Senegalese, it’s 
the foreigners who come to see each other here. They come and block the route 
like this!” The next day, I find no news of the protest in the papers, and even the 
Forum publications kept total silence, according to the marchers.  
While this mainstream lack of interest was perhaps to be expected, the 
Frontex protest still brought to a head the larger conundrum already observed in 
Gogui, in Tambacounda, in Bamako. Europe’s nebulous border regime was, as 
seen in chapter two, producing a border that was no longer “at the border”. It 
could only be located with difficulty and through painstaking research. Yet 
despite the activists’ deft groundwork in pinpointing “Frontex”, the border 
regime remained elusive. By locating the border regime in the DPAF offices, 
they pragmatically stayed out of the “red zone” of central Dakar – but it was still 
not clear why “Frontex” was faced down there, rather than in the Senegalese 
Navy base, the Spanish embassy, or indeed away from Dakar, at the Military 
Palace in Las Palmas or the Guardia Civil headquarters in Madrid. The marchers’ 
difficulty in locating the border and its regime pointed to a larger absence of 
responsibility for the tragedies of the borderlands. It is this absence at the heart of 
the violence of clandestine migration – and the absurdity it engenders among 
those who try to confront it – that this chapter has tried to pinpoint, and to which 
we will now briefly turn. 
  
Conclusion: the absent perpetrator 
 
This account of victimhood and borderwork during the Bamako-Dakar caravan 
might seem overly critical, an exercise in the “misplaced cynicism” so carefully 
avoided by Fassin and Rechtman (2009). As academics and activists increasingly 
step on each other’s toes in both their fields of travel and of expertise (Merry 
2005), it might moreover seem an unfair attempt at promoting the perspective of 
the scribbling, sweaty anthropologist on the back of the caravan bus above those 
of his sloganeering fellow passengers. It is important, then, to emphasise that the 
marchers were not simply tilting at windmills. Theirs was an audacious attempt 
at taking transnational activism on free movement to a new level. Given this 
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ambition, the chaos, infighting and outreach troubles were acutely felt by many 
of the participants. Evaluating the caravan for the in-house documentary, one of 
the Germans called it a “glass both half full and half empty”. “A good many of 
our political plans that were a bit ambitious such as establishing contact with the 
local populations and exchanging viewpoints about their and our experiences, 
have naturally only functioned in part,” he said. Others criticised the unequal 
gains of Malian associations involved in the caravan and the communication 
problems that had marred it. What was not salient in their internal critique, 
however, was the deeper issue of how to mobilise protests on behalf of a 
particular kind of migrant at this peculiar kind of border. In taking as their 
rallying points the illegal migrant and the Euro-African border, the activists 
joined the police, the aid world and the media in making these twin spectres 
increasingly real. Their mobilisation inadvertently confirmed the official 
obsession with illegality while cementing its importance in relations between 
European and African nations. This was the tragedy of solidarity in the 
borderlands: the opposition to the illegality industry could only take place on the 
“factory floor” of this industry itself. 
The borderwork of the activists overlapped with that of the police in a 
play of reflexive performances-upon-performances. They both marked out the 
territory of the border – the marchers’ anti-Frontex stickers, banners and graffiti 
superimposed upon the anti-migration signs and property of EU-funded 
officialdom. With their placards, banners and spray cans, the marchers located 
and fixed the diffuse border regime in sites such as Cité Police and Gogui. Here 
lay the irony of their efforts: the marchers for a world without borders first had to 
create the walls they wanted to break down.  
The activists, like their opponents within the illegality industry, also had 
to conjure a certain type of migrant in this contradictory borderwork. In the 
caravan, the figure of the clandestine migrant underwent an inversion, from 
threatening villain to globalised victim. Cleansed of the dirt and dust of the 
border, the migrant’s new victim role was, moreover, selective. As in other 
rallies for broad causes (James 2007:48), the most articulate and perhaps least 
victimised by the border regime took the metaphorical and literal megaphone: 
strident leaders such as Aboubacar, Didier the professional migrant and Stéphane 
the student rather than the limping deportee Alphonse or, of course, any 
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impoverished regional migrants spotted on the sidelines. In this way, the illegal 
migrant was made up (Hacking 1986) as a victim in a collaborative exercise 
between adventurers and their activist interlocutors. As Fassin and Rechtman 
(2009:279) note with survivors of disaster and war, the adventurers quite 
logically “adopt the only persona that allows them to be heard – that of victim”.  
As already noted, however, the perpetrator of the victimisation was more 
difficult to identify. For the activists it was Frontex, whereas for the Spanish 
police it was the smugglers; for African police and migrants, it often seemed to 
be wild, untamed nature itself. At other times, these antagonists followed 
Stéphane in glossing over the question of the absent perpetrator when he said he 
was a “victim of illegal migration”. Illegal migration itself here appeared as an 
increasingly reified and violent force. Absent yet present, much like the border it 
depended upon, it was becoming a faceless perpetrator all actors in the industry – 
police, activists, migrants, aid workers and journalists – could rally against. 
 
 
The story does not end with the Frontex anti-climax. Most of the caravaniers 
returned to Bamako, the deportees now with new journalists in tow. As I left the 
gathering in Dakar, Aboubacar had seemed deflated, a far cry from his strident 
caravan self. His firebrand performance was ending. Meanwhile, Stéphane’s 
making up as migrant victim was becoming painfully real. A few months after 
Figure 18. Anti-Frontex graffiti outside the agency’s headquarters in Warsaw 
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the caravan, he emails me from Bamako. He has been deported, thrown in prison, 
and seen friends die in the desert. In early 2012, we get in touch again after I 
have seen his eloquent testimony in an email sent around by a “professional 
migrant” on the Migreurop mailing list. He is now in northern Morocco with 
Eric, waiting to cross into Ceuta. Mohammadou is still in his neighbourhood, 
ever on the lookout for partners but more hopeful than before thanks to his 
growing network of contacts after the Forum. Cyrille finally escaped from 
Bamako. Rumours had it that he stole money from the street corner guys, but he 
told me he had to run away after being threatened by the returning Aracem 
caravaniers. The European activists, meanwhile, geared up for the next big 
protest against the border regime – Boats4People, a transnational “solidarity 
flotilla” between Italy and Tunisia in the summer of 2012. The migration story 
continues, in circles of absurdity and tragedy into which the illegality industry 
taps at the points of its convenience. 
For another actor, Mother Mercy, this industry was no longer what it 
once had been. Before leaving Dakar, I met her for an interview at the Forum. 
Accompanying her was a young Belgian research student who had found out 
about Mother Mercy’s association via a Red Cross contact. It had looked perfect 
for her research project, as it had for many others before her: “migration, women 
and development, the three issues that interest me!” Her insecure demeanour and 
bewildered look indicated, however, that her first impressions were already 
falling short of expectations. 
Times were dire for her reluctant host. The Spanish money had stopped 
coming and Mother Mercy had had to close her office, the sight of which had 
taunted Mohammadou and his friends in the years following their repatriation. 
“We have no more electricity, no more internet, no more water!” she 
complained. “It’s a real pity for our women because we wanted to show another 
side of the Senegalese woman.” Her main role at the Forum now concerned 
women’s rights rather than migration, and she was soon to encounter that other 
symbol of female empowerment, Aminata, on the beach of Mohammadou’s 
neighbourhood. Women from Yongor who had lost their sons on the sea journey, 
dressed in white for mourning, met with Aminata’s caravaniers to light candles 
for their relatives as darkness fell over Dakar and the sea with its invisible 
border. At night, on the main Forum stage close to the “Frontex” offices, 
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Aminata’s theatre troupe acted out the journey through the desert, to the fences 
of Ceuta and Melilla. As the adventurers were sent back to Bamako, their elders 
danced, sang and cleansed them, reincorporating them into Africa like long-lost 
children. “Ceuta Melilla Lampedusa Canaria” intoned a female voice, evoking 
those European slivers of land where the violence of the border was finally, 
unequivocally made real. “Ceuta Melilla Lampedusa Canaria.” 
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Conclusion: the absurd 
battle 
 
 
Absurd is that which is devoid of purpose (Ionesco in Esslin 1972:23) 
 
 
The workings of the illegality industry, it has been repeatedly stated in this 
thesis, are absurd. Absurdity covers a range of meanings, from existential 
predicament to colloquial dismissal, but what will initially concern us here is the 
absurd in its guise of purposelessness pure and simple. The illegality industry’s 
sectors work according to their own institutional logics, and quite rationally so. 
Yet taken together and assessed over a wider temporal and geographical 
perspective, these efforts serve little evident purpose. The illegality industry is 
like a sledgehammer that fails even in its basic task of cracking a nut. Attempts 
to combat illegality only generate more illegality.  
Not only do clandestine migrants keep coming, controls or no controls, 
but their routes and methods take increasingly surreal forms. To briefly 
recapitulate, it was thanks to increasing police harassment and the fortification of 
Ceuta and Melilla that the small, harmless groups of sub-Saharan adventurers in 
Morocco in the early 2000s morphed into a seemingly frightening horde. Further 
crackdowns proved the catalyst for the opening of a route to the Canaries, and 
suddenly packed wooden pirogues appeared among European holidaymakers. 
The closure of the Atlantic route piled pressure on Greece and then Italy, whose 
neighbour Libya had perfected the political art of using clandestine migrants as a 
bargaining chip. The blanket control of the Mediterranean also strengthened 
smuggling networks and gave rise to ever stranger, and more dangerous, entry 
methods. The illegality industry and its contradictions – on humanitarianism and 
violence, visibility and hiddenness, outreach and closure – has moulded its raw 
material of illegality into ever more distressing forms.  
Yet on the frontline and in European capitals, it is business as usual. 
Illegality is now hardwired into institutional arrangements, from Red Cross 
 275 
rescue operations to Frontex risk analysis networks. It materialises in detention 
centres, hi-tech fences and coastal radar stations. It is paraded in broadcasts, 
broadsheets and border guard videos. It is counted, calculated and stacked up in 
ledgers by Frontex and European and African interior ministries. As the stakes 
grow higher, illegality is reified and refined. It also becomes ever more absurd, 
in the various meanings of the term listed by Luper-Foy (1992:97): ridiculous, 
incongruous, senseless and futile. Like Sisyphus in Greek mythology, the 
illegality industry rolls its boulder up a hill every day only for it to roll back 
down again. 
This might be too neat a conclusion, however. My thesis has followed 
migrants’ own analysis in focusing on what the illegality industry does achieve, 
and on who benefits from these achievements. In fields such as development aid, 
sea surveillance and humanitarianism, illegality is not just produced; it is also 
productive. As a “problem” to be solved, it sparks new security “solutions”, 
NGO projects, professional networks, activist campaigns, and journalistic and 
academic engagements that might otherwise remain unfunded and ignored.  
 Coplan (2001) observes, in his study of the Lesotho-South Africa border, 
how the border is above all a business in which officials, police, smugglers and 
criminals have staked a claim. As was seen in Chapter two, this is similarly the 
case at the Euro-African border, on a much larger scale. The business of 
bordering of Europe, however, is simultaneously a political project that might be 
more rational – and cynical – than this thesis has seemed to suggest.  
Gabrielli (2011:341) has convincingly argued that Spain and the EU 
have, by focusing on statistically minuscule flows of clandestine migrants from 
south of the Sahara, engaged in a spectacular show of force that hides, by sleight 
of hand, a continuing influx of workers and tourists from economically more 
important regions. Sub-Saharan Africa here appears not even in its commonly 
invoked guise of reserve labour pool, but as a frontier zone for a projection of 
fears and visions that obscures the real situation, thus serving the electoral 
interests of European powers. 
 These political and economic rationales explain, in part, the continued 
funding of the illegality industry. But the efforts soon backfire, as should be clear 
from the preceding chapters. Europe’s externalisation of controls creates what 
can be conceptualised as negative externalities, in the sense familiar from 
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environmental economics. The plans for the illegality industry might have been 
costed and evaluated, but their insidious social, political and human effects are 
rarely taken into consideration. As has been seen in this thesis, these “side-
effects” constantly threaten to overrun the workings of the industry. This, in turn, 
leads to more complex expressions of absurdity than mere lack of purpose. 
 
 
 
One of the principal externalities was seen in the borderlands in Chapter three. In 
framing clandestine West African migration as a risk and heaping the “junk” risk 
onto North African partners, unforeseen tensions are stoked. This has often been 
starkly spelt out by the Moroccan authorities, who insist that they pay a high 
price for cooperating in controls. The externalities of externalisation – worsening 
relations with fellow African states; social malaise caused by migrant destitution 
and blockage; a dented image of Morocco abroad – are adding up. For the 
migrants, needless to say, these externalities are even more acute. 
For the third sector, the negative externality might similarly be one of 
credibility. The lack of accountability and transparency among NGOs, as well as 
their dependence on funders’ priorities, has been noted across contemporary 
Africa and beyond. These features of the global NGO expansion, however, are 
thrown into particularly stark relief by the fight against illegal migration, where 
non-profits and international organisations such as the Red Cross and the IOM 
function as a buffer between the steely core of the border regime and its human 
interfaces. The rancorous funding battles, replicated from Senegal to Morocco 
and even Spain, show a tawdry scramble for funds disbursed according to 
warped short-term priorities. In these battles, local resentment builds over the 
inequitable distribution of provisions, as exemplified by the repatriates’ struggles 
in Chapter one and the Rosso quandaries in Chapter three. 
In these two forms of subcontracting – policing and aid – migration is 
turning into a privileged language for exchanges between the West and its 
“others”. Migrants become tokens of communication in a claims-making process 
through which a small, containable “problem” is hugely inflated, as was absurdly 
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illustrated by Libya’s Gadaffi who in 2010 asked for €5bn a year to “stop illegal 
migration” in order to prevent Europe “turning black”.  
Those labelled “illegal migrants” are increasingly participating in these 
games themselves, using their imposed status to receive recognition. Their 
participation brings yet another externality for European powers, however minor 
at present. The migrants encountered throughout this thesis exhibit a growing 
disillusion with the European dream that once motivated their adventures. This 
disillusion is paired with a searing critique of the illegality industry itself – 
whether by repatriates in Dakar, deportees in Bamako or strikers in Ceuta – 
which they see as illicitly profiteering from their misfortune. In their protests and 
grievances, such “illegal migrants” are neither the seekers of the European 
favours or rights amply studied by migration scholars, nor the invisible, apolitical 
clandestins glimpsed by Coutin (2005) and others. Here appears, rather, what 
Kalyvas (2010) calls the “rebellious immigrant”, an unexpected and bitter fruit of 
the illegality industry’s labours.  
The emerging clandestine lingo reflects the radical twist to migrants’ 
perceptions. As seen in Chapter four, this lingo increasingly mimics the larger 
industry under whose shadow the illegality industry labours, the “war on terror”. 
Terms such as “Guantánamo”,  “Taliban” or “bunker” highlight how adventurers 
increasingly ironise their subject position as that of the most-wanted Other of the 
contemporary West: the terrorist. This new border vocabulary confirms yet 
subtly undermines Europe’s invasion myth; more importantly, however, it frames 
Europe as a wretched empire victimising African travellers through military 
means. As anger and disillusionment spreads through migrants’ social networks 
and even filters into the illegality industry itself, fragments of a shared narrative 
of the Euro-African borderlands emerge. The end result is not pretty: Europe 
here emerges as a dark, cynical force finally robbed of its once so shiny allure. 
  
 
 
To explore the world of migration controls along Spain’s coasts is to travel 
through a landscape of ruins, structures set up only a few years ago that are 
already falling into disuse thanks to the changed migratory landscape. In the 
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Canaries, the CIEs stand empty, their detainees long departed. In Tarifa, the 
debris washed up by waves of arrivals has made Red Cross workers ponder 
creating a museum to clandestine migration, with artifacts displayed as in an 
ethnological exhibit: inflatable boats, car tyres used as life vests, a migrant 
paddle sculpted out of a single piece of wood. But the Red Cross offices are 
themselves museum-like; made for migrant rescues, they stand empty, unused.  
Even when the illegality industry succeeds, in its repressive guise, in re-
routing migrants, the remnants it leaves behind hint at the futility of its efforts. 
These efforts are, by necessity, always in excess and never quite suited to their 
target. Steel fences, detention centres and rescue facilities remain among the few 
tools available for politicians to signal decisiveness in the “fight” against fluid, 
fickle migrant routes.  
The illegality industry’s efforts are in excess in a more human sense as 
well. I began this thesis by tentatively suggesting that the illegality industry acts 
reductively: travellers with diverse origins, stories, aims and legal statuses are 
gradually reshaped to fit the generic mould of migrant illegality. Yet this 
imposition of a one-dimensional illegality is not the whole story. As the chapters 
have shown, the illegality industry’s workers constantly dress up the “naked” 
notion of illegality. In part, they do so to target and tailor their interventions – 
after all, everyone cannot be asked for papers, detained, deported, rescued, 
observed, cared for, filmed or written about. But such instrumental aims combine 
with deeper reasons. The illegality industry needs something to fundamentally 
motivate and justify its workers’ efforts, which many of them openly recognise 
as futile. In the borderlands, backpacks and black skin hint at a dangerous, 
hidden illegality that calls for prompt detection. In Ceuta, lack of documents 
implies an essential condition of vulnerability that justifies “treatment”. In 
policing and aid work, the secrets and traumas in migrants’ heads motivate 
interrogation or therapy. These excess attributions, in Derrida’s (1976) sense of 
the “supplement”, come to the aid of something that had increasingly seemed so 
natural, so common-sense, so black-and-white – migrant illegality.  
From the material perspective of this thesis, this “will to meaning” 
(Robbins 2006:213) is simply another factor fed back into the illegality 
industry’s hybrid functioning. The excess attributions materialise in the 
iconography of Frontex operations, in the “humanitarian” Melilla fence, in 
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rescue imagery and in the make-believe paperwork of Ceuta. Here absurdity is 
more than just purposelessness: it becomes an incongruous, even grotesque split 
between reality and representation, set in a feedback loop that generates ever 
stranger real results. 
One of these real results concerns the lived experience of migrants, who 
have to endure the contradictory attributions with which their illegality is crafted. 
The illegal migrant is defined by the stigma and promise of mobility yet 
regularly rendered immobile; he is a threatening, cunning invader but also an 
innocent, ignorant victim; skin and clothing make him visible, but he is still 
endowed with an authority-eluding invisibility. Out of these contradictions 
emerges an elusive essence of migrant illegality, produced by the mere absence 
of documents-in-order. This “illegal immigrant”, as Coutin (2005) hints, is 
however an impossible presence. Living through this impossibility, migrants at 
times come to experience the absurdity of their predicament in its existential 
sense of radical unmooring – or, in the words of Camus (1942:18), of 
“irredeemable exile”. 
 Incongruousness is also on display at the border. This thesis has asserted 
that clandestine migration is a spectacle and a staging, and as such it might give a 
brief glimpse of truths otherwise left hidden about the workings of the 
contemporary world. Seen through such a lens, the strange show – discussed in 
chapter four – of migrants congregating round a Spanish banner on Isla de Tierra 
in September 2012 under the gaze of sunbathers and journalists seems, like the 
2006 spectacle on Tenerife’s beaches, to fulfill the task once envisioned for the 
mid-century Theatre of the Absurd (Esslin 1972:400): 
 
The means by which the dramatists of the Absurd express their critique – largely 
instinctive and unintended – of our disintegrating society are based on suddenly 
confronting their audiences with a grotesquely heightened and distorted picture of a 
world that has gone mad. 
   
Perhaps it is here that the illegality industry finally finds its wretched purpose. 
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 
 
The illegality industry is in a constant state of disequilibrium. In 2012, Mali had 
undergone a coup and seen its vast desert north claimed by separatists, sparking a 
refugee crisis that soon set alarm bells ringing in Madrid and Warsaw, while the 
violent aftermath to the “Arab spring” saw mass displacements further north. In 
Senegal and Spain, new governments promised a different political era, and 
perhaps different priorities on migration – as seen in the large cut in development 
aid for sub-Saharan Africa announced by the Spanish conservatives. The 
illegality industry grinds on, despite these changes, yet its configuration is 
amenable to change at a moment’s notice. 
One catalyst for change is economics. As the eurozone crisis deepened, 
southern European countries were again being seen as nations of emigrants, not 
immigrants. Angola offered to help Portugal in mitigating the crisis, and 
Portuguese workers streamed back into the former colony. Jobseeking Spaniards 
travelled not just to northern Europe but also to new destinations such as Brazil, 
where tougher border controls in a tit-for-tat between governments eventually 
forced Madrid to ease checks on Brazilians entering Spain. “One day Europeans 
will come to Africa to look for work,” an adventurer in Tangier had angrily 
predicted in 2010. That day might well come sooner than he expected. 
 Perhaps one day, the inhabitants of what was once the rich world will 
look back at the early twenty-first century and wonder why so much time, energy 
and money was spent on controlling the movements of so few. Perhaps then, 
decision-makers will realise the folly of controlling human movement at any 
cost, of labelling certain travellers illegal, and of parading these “illegals” in 
elections, broadcasts, surveillance rooms, NGO pamphlets and theses such as the 
present one. But for that to happen, the illegality industry first needs to be 
dismantled and the product on which it works seen for what it is: nothing more, 
and nothing less, than people on the move.   
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